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A reluctant partner:
the pattern of Denmark's involvement 
in the European Community
Denmark joined the European Community (EC) on 1 January 1973 together with the 
United Kingdom and Ireland. Its relationship with the EC has since then been uneasy, 
culminating with the popular vote against the Maastricht Treaty in June 1992 which 
threatened for a moment to halt the European integration process. Although Denmark's 
uneasy relationship with the Community has been noted by external observers, the reasons 
behind its reluctance towards European integration are not widely understood. The aim 
of this thesis is to explain the pattern of Denmark's involvement in the EC during three 
crucial periods in the evolution of the Community by analysing Denmark's adaptation to 
EC membership and response to the developments in the process of European integration.
The thesis's theoretical framework combines the concept of acquis communautaire 
with the four basic elements of the theory of International Regimes - principles, norms, 
rules and decision-making procedures. These four basic elements are used to analyse 
Denmark's compliance with the rights and obligations of EC membership defined as the 
'regime contract'. The concept of an integration dilemma serves to help to examine 
Denmark's attempts at balancing through a set of strategies, the external and internal 
pressures stemming from the process of integration.
The empirical part of the thesis focuses on three episodes in Denmark's EC 
membership: the accession to the EC, the relaunch of the Community leading to the 
signing of the Single European Act and the negotiations and ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty.
The main conclusion of the thesis is that Denmark has been a reluctant partner in 
the European integration process mainly because of its difficulties to embrace the 
principles of the 'Community regime'. This reluctance towards the principles of European 
integration has conditioned Denmark's pattern of involvement in the EC and influenced 
its behaviour as a member of the EC.
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Chapter 1
Outline of the Thesis
10
L Introduction
In January 1973, Denmark acceded to the European Community (EC) together with the 
United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland, beginning an uneasy relationship as an EC member 
state. In June 1983, Denmark attached a number of footnotes to the Solemn Declaration 
of Stuttgart indicating its disagreement with the aim and content of European Union (EU). 
In January 1986, a majority in the Folketing rejected the proposals for reform to the EC 
Treaties in the form of the Single European Act (SEA). In February 1986, the Danish 
parliament's rejection was reversed by a referendum in which 56 per cent of the 
population voted in favour of the SEA while 44 per cent voted against. In May 1992, a 
large majority in the Folketing endorsed the outcome of the intergovernmental conferences 
(IGCs) on the Maastricht Treaty1 reforming the EC, strengthening cooperation in foreign 
and security policy, and in justice and home affairs. On 2 June 1992, the Danish 
population shocked the whole European political establishment by rejecting the Maastricht 
Treaty by a narrow margin. In an effort to safeguard Denmark's membership of EU, while 
respecting the verdict of the Danish people without necessitating a renegotiation of the 
Maastricht Treaty, the political leaders of the EC member states agreed to grant Denmark 
special status in EU by reaching a solution in the shape of the Edinburgh Agreement at 
the European Council's meeting in December 1992. Pledging that the Edinburgh 
Agreement guaranteed a substantially different basis for Denmark's membership of EU 
paving the way for a new European policy, the Danish government convinced the 
population to endorse Denmark's new status in EU in a second referendum on 18 May 
1993. Since then Denmark remains a member of EU, but, by agreement with the other 
eleven member states, important features of EU do not apply to the country. In the act of 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, Danish politicians have, in their turn, given a 
guarantee to the population that Denmark should not renounce its special status without 
the population's consent.
Many of these facts are well known and could be found in any major literature on the EC
]The denomination 'the Maastricht Treaty' will be used throughout the thesis, as this 
is more common than 'Treaty on European Union’.
11
covering the periods mentioned. The reasons behind Denmark's position as an EC 
member, and the often dramatic events which have surrounded major developments of the 
Community's life, are much less known. In fact, to my knowledge, there is no literature 
in the English language which gives a thorough and detailed account of Denmark's 
position during the three major episodes which are covered by this thesis's study of 
Denmark. Literature in English on the EC is more concerned with the general 
development of the Community, theoretical aspects of European integration or the 
influence of EC institutions, big member states and European-wide interest groups, rather 
than the predicament of a small member state, although its difficulties have more than 
once threatened to halt the European integration process. This is not a criticism of the 
choice of focus of the English EC literature, but to show that this thesis will fill a gap in 
the literature on the Community and the conditions of European integration.
The theoretical framework which is set up to assist the analysis of Denmark's 
participation in the European integration process presents an alternative and, to my 
knowledge, a new approach to the study of the Community. Its main claim is that it 
focuses on the rights and obligations of Community membership by elaborating a 
conceptual framework around the acquis communautaire combined with the four basic 
elements of the theory of International Regimes. Acquis communautaire is a concept 
which is often used in the context of the Community, but its full significance has not been 
explored, nor has it been linked to the development of European integration. This thesis 
identifies and defines the acquis communautaire, combines it with the four elements of 
Regime Theory and establishes a link between development of the Community with the 
rights and obligations of EC membership. In conceptualizing the body of rights and 
obligations of EC membership, it is possible to learn something about the nature of a 
member state's participation in the integration process and thus evaluate the position of 
this individual member in the process. It is my hope that this new framework of analysing 
the requirements on an EC member state will contribute to the study of European 
integration.
1. Key Areas of Concern
This thesis investigates the pattern of Denmark's involvement in the EC by addressing the 
complex nature of its EC membership. Its main concern is to find the reasons behind the
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perception of Denmark as a reluctant partner, to substantiate this perception and to draw 
conclusions from the findings on the nature of Denmark's participation in the European 
integration process.
The thesis starts from the assumption that during twenty years of EC membership 
Denmark has been a reluctant partner in the European integration process. This reluctance 
has conditioned its pattern of involvement in the EC and has influenced Denmark's 
domestic political environment. The questions to be asked are:
• Is it possible to show that Denmark has been a reluctant partner in the European 
integration process while it has shown diligence in keeping to Community rules 
and implementing legislation passed by the EC into national laws?
• Has the reluctance towards European integration conditioned Denmark's pattern of 
involvement in the EC?
• Has the reluctance towards European integration been a major concern in domestic 
politics and has it influenced the political environment in Denmark?
• Have Danish governments had to balance internal reluctance towards European 
integration with external pressures to deepen the level of integration in order to 
safeguard Denmark's membership of the EC?
• Has the reluctance towards European integration influenced the nature of 
Denmark's participation in the development of the process?
2. Framework of the Thesis
To produce answers to these questions the main body of the thesis has been divided into 
two parts: one shorter which sets up a theoretical framework to provide tools for the 
research into a member state's participation in the European integration process and one 
longer which investigates empirically three key episodes of Denmark's EC membership.
The aim of the theoretical chapter (chapter 2) is to gain insight into the European 
integration process by focusing on an individual member state, its position in the 
integration process, and the influence by internal and external pressures on the member
13
state to reduce or intensify its participation. To learn more about an individual member 
state’s position, the analytical approach identifies the rights and obligations of membership, 
in other words, the terms of membership, which delineate the framework within which 
external and internal pressures are at play. Therefore, we need to know something about 
the fundamental character of the conditions regulating the interplay between member states 
in the European integration process. In chapter 2 an analytical framework is constructed 
which combines the four basic elements of the theory of International Regimes - 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making processes - with the concept of acquis 
communautaire, which is identified and defined. This approach makes it possible to 
introduce the concept of a 'Community regime' which is regulated by a 'regime contract'. 
The regime contract is made up by the acquis communautaire whose political dimension 
is mainly composed of principles and norms while its judicial dimension is mainly 
composed of rules and decision-making procedures. There is, however, a link between the 
two concepts in that deeper European integration has been secured through integration by 
law.
The theoretical framework also introduces a dynamic dimension of the concept of 
Community regime, which serves as a tool to analyse steps towards deeper European 
integration.
To link an individual member state's participation in the European integration 
process, in this case Denmark, with the domestic political environment, the concept of an 
'integration dilemma' is introduced. This concept serves to help us understand the position 
of a small state in the process of European integration, a state which perceives the 
principle of integration as a threat to its democratic, social and cultural values. As it is too 
small to halt or influence substantially the development towards deeper integration, but 
cannot afford to be abandoned by other member states, it perceives an integration 
dilemma. Governments, or other parts of the political or administrative elite which fear 
the cost of being abandoned more than the risk of being entrapped, adopt strategies to 
balance internal and external pressures with the aim of securing the state's participation 
in the integration process.
The aim of researching into the three episodes in Denmark's EC membership is to analyse: 
(1) Denmark's motivation to seek membership of the EC, the reason for the conditions set
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up for joining the Community, the nature of the Danish debate on whether or not to join 
the EC and its consequences for the basis of Denmark's EC policy after accession (chapter 
3); (2) the foundations of Denmark's traditional status quo-oriented EC policy, adopted 
after accession, which increasingly came under strain with the relaunch of the European 
integration process in the early 1980s, the minority government's attempts to balance 
increased external pressure for reform of the EC Treaties with the integration-sceptical 
majority in parliament led by the Social Democratic Party, and the referendum on the SEA 
(chapter 4); and (3) the change of direction of Denmark's status gwo-oriented EC policy 
by a majority of the integration-sceptical political elite which enabled Denmark to adopt 
an active policy in view of the major reforms to set up EU, the attempts to find a solution 
to the popular rejection of the Maastricht Treaty based on exempting Denmark from a 
number of areas of the Union, and, finally, the content and significance of the Edinburgh 
Agreement (chapter 5).
The study of these three episodes examines Denmark's response to the Community regime 
at the time of accession, to the change within the regime with the signing of the SEA, and 
to the major reform brought about with the Maastricht Treaty. It describes the domestic 
political debate between government and opposition which determined Denmark's 
involvement at the EC level during the accession period, and the SEA and Maastricht 
periods. It also takes into account the public opinion and the influence of the social 
partners and other pressure groups on the Danish EC policy. The integration dilemma in 
which Danish governments found themselves during these three episodes is analysed with 
the help of identifying their strategies to find a middle way between being abandoned or 
entrapped.
The concluding part (chapter 6) discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical 
framework, the implications of the thesis's approach and its possible contribution to 
research into European integration. This discussion is accompanied by an analysis of the 
findings of the periods studied, and discusses the underlying fundamental reasons for 
Danish reluctance towards European integration while identifying some complexities of 
the nature of Denmark's membership of the EC. The chapter concludes that Denmark has 
an inherent reluctance towards the political dimension of European integration. This
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reluctance did not come to the fore during the accession negotiations with the EC, mainly 
because the development of integration at that time had reached few tangible results, 
remaining largely the ideal of some groups in the original six member states. The public 
reluctance, however, was appreciated by the Danish politicians who tried to alleviate the 
fear about the result of European integration by trivializing its importance. With the drive 
towards deeper integration in the mid-1980s, the traditional Danish EC policy came 
increasingly under pressure. In the referendum of 1986, the pro-European government was 
able to present the SEA to the population as a limited functional adjustment to the existing 
treaties without any political implications. With the IGCs on EU, and despite the 
Maastricht Treaty receiving support from a parliamentary majority in favour of the new 
treaty, the population rejected what it saw as the erection of a state-like entity likely to 
threaten Danish democratic, social and cultural values. The Edinburgh Agreement can 
therefore be interpreted as a deal between Denmark and other EU member states on the 
terms for Danish participation in the Union, in which Denmark is exempted from some 
important features, concrete or symbolic, of the political dimension of the Union. Since 
the Edinburgh Agreement, the political dimension of the acquis communautaire of EU is 
applied differently to Denmark than to the other member states, Denmark thus holding a 
partial membership of EU, although still being a full member of the EC.
3. Assessment
The thesis contributes to the study of the EC/EU in three main areas:
• It analyses the nature of Denmark's membership of the EC by explaining the 
challenges and constraints met by Danish policy-makers during three key periods. 
It highlights the importance of specific features of the Danish political system, 
such as the emergence of a system of weak minority governments and strong 
parliamentary control in the shape of the Market Committee. It accounts for the 
forming of Danish positions in the accession negotiations, the IGCs leading to the 
signing of the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty and the gradual emergence of a sort 
of direct democracy in respect to important decisions regarding Denmark's 
membership of the EC.
• It sheds light on the nature of the rights and obligations of Community
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membership by identifying the acquis communautaire, its different dimensions and 
its link to the European integration process with the help of the four basic 
elements of the theory of International Regimes. It analyses the development of 
the acquis communautaire with the dynamic process of European integration.
The introduction of the concepts of 'Community regime' and 'regime contract' 
makes it possible to analyse the pressures resulting from participation in the 
European integration process as perceived by Denmark. These pressures, stemming 
from internal and external sources, are defined as Denmark's dilemma of 
integration, which is a useful concept when analysing the specific position of a 
small country with an inherent scepticism towards the political dimension of 
European integration.
The thesis investigates the position of a particular country in the context of European 
integration, which inevitable limits the account of pressures among and from other 
member states and EC institutions, all having an impact of the outcome of the accession 
negotiations, the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty. It does not, therefore, attempt to give a 
full overview of positions and the multilateral bargaining process leading to the first 
enlargement or deeper integration. The aim of the theoretical framework is to assist the 
analysis of the pattern of Denmark's involvement in the EC, not to present a fully-fledged 
analytical structure, although it is my hope that the approach chosen in the thesis might 
introduce a new element into the research on European integration. Particular points of 
the theoretical framework and the analysis of Denmark's EC membership are discussed 
in chapter 6, part I.
IL Methodology
As outlined above, the main body of the thesis is divided into two parts, one theoretical 
and one empirical, whose content and aim are explained in the previous section.
The reasons for choosing to develop a new theoretical framework for the empirical 
analysis was to establish the complexity of Denmark's involvement in the EC and to 
pinpoint the intriguing, but somewhat intangible, rights and obligation of EC membership 
governing the dynamic process of European integration. The objective was to establish a
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framework which satisfied the thesis's aim to present new understanding about European 
integration, by gaining knowledge about the specific character of the process and the 
conditions of participation facing an individual member state.
The reason to study three episodes in Denmark's EC membership was to capture 
the Danish response to the development of the 'Community regime' and its evolution 
during these periods of Denmark's EC policy, and to examine the nature of internal and 
external pressures facing Danish governments during three crucial events, and their 
attempts to find a way of balancing the pressures. To focus on only one of the three key 
episodes would have meant that the influence of the dynamic process of European 
integration would had been missed, representing only a snapshot of an isolated event in 
time, but not the development over time. The three successive accounts illustrate the 
influence the European integration process has on an individual member state. The choice 
of a closing point for the last episode in the study of Denmark's EC membership fell just 
after the second referendum on the Maastricht Treaty on 18 May 1993, as this point in 
time constitutes a natural break between the events surrounding the ratification process 
and further development in Denmark's policy towards European integration.
The thesis focuses mainly on the political, popular and administrative elites' 
response to the 'Community regime', while putting less emphasis on the reasons behind 
the Danish electorate's reaction to moves towards deeper integration. This limitation in 
focus was necessary to be able to investigate properly the impact of the 'Community 
regime' on the Danish political process in the space available. The investigation of the 
electorate's response to deeper integration, mainly during the referenda which have been 
held in Denmark and the elections to the European Parliament, is an interesting and 
important task, and would have merited being the subject for a thesis in its own right. The 
Danish EC referenda have been the subject of extensive research from which a series of 
publications have resulted.2
2See, for instance, Peter Gundelach, Ole Riis, Vcerdiforandringer i Danmark 1981- 
1990, Institute of Political Science, University of Arhus, Arhus, 1990. Niels Henrik Haahr, 
Folkeafstemningen 2. juni 1992 om dansk ratifikation a f Maastrichttraktaten, Institute of 
Political Science, University of Arhus, Arhus, 1992. K.E. Miller, 'Policy-Making by 
Referendum: The Danish Experience', West European Politics, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1982, pp. 
54-67. Hans Jorgen Nielsen, 'Danskeme og EF', 0konomi og Politik, Vol. 56, No. 3, 1982, 
pp. 25-34. Hans Jorgen Nielsen, 'Det skaeve Danmark', 0konomi o f Politik, Vol. 51, No.
18
As mentioned above, literature in English on Denmark is very scarce. This implies that 
almost all the literature on Denmark and Denmark's relations with the EC had to be 
collected in Denmark: this was done during several trips to Copenhagen and one to Arhus. 
Access to Danish public libraries and newspaper records is easy. On the other hand, the 
much celebrated Danish tradition of open government, does not apply to the Foreign 
Ministry's records, tVvttr^pareonly some official records are used in the thesis. The 
relative secrecy of ministerial records has probably had little impact on the accuracy of 
events, as it is the tradition in Denmark that political affairs are reported in great detail 
by the media, and that politicians and civil servants often express their views on policies 
or on the chain of events in publications destined for the commercial market or as 
background material in university teaching. Danish politicians and policy-makers are 
usually accessible and willing to grant interviews (including to foreign research students). 
For a more detailed account of the source material, see the bibliography.
3, 1985-86. Hans Jorgen Nielsen, 'The Danish Voters and the Referendum in June 1992 
on the Maastricht Agreement', in Morten Kelstrup (ed.), European Integration and 
Denmark's Participation, Copenhagen Political Studies Press, Copenhagen, 1992, pp. 364- 
80. Nikolaj Petersen, Attitudes Towards European Integration and the Danish Common 
Market Referendum, Institute of Political Science, Arhus, November 1975. Nikolaj 
Petersen, 'Europeanism and its Foreign Policy Attitude Correlates: A Political Belief 
System', Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. X, No. 3, 1975, pp. 143-66. Karen Siune, 'EF 
debatten 1972, et apropos til 1979', sartryck til Pressens Arbog, 1979. Karen Siune, Palle 
Svensson, Ole Tonsgaard, Det blev et nej, Forlaget Politica, Arhus University, Arhus, 
1992. Ole Tonsgaard, 'Folkeafstemningen om EF-pakken', in Nikolaj Petersen and 
Christian Thune (eds.), Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Arbog 1986, Jurist og Okonomiforlaget, 
Copenhagen, 1987. Torben Worre, 'The Danish Euro-Party System', Scandinavian Political 
Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1987, pp. 79-95.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical Framework
20
I. Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to explain distinctive features of the mode of cooperation 
in the Community by using some propositions from International Regimes Theory. The 
Community regime of cooperation will serve as an analytical framework to understand the 
challenge of integration which has to be met by the member states, in this case Denmark.
The analysis of the Community regime concentrates on the role of the acquis 
communautaire and politique (the shorter acquis communautaire will be used unless there 
is a special reason to distinguish the two) in the cooperation between the member states. 
The Community is understood as being based on a contract between the member states 
which stipulates, implicitly and explicitly, principles, rules of cooperation and an agreed 
behaviour. The institutions are seen as distinct actors whose role is to promote the 
integration process by performing specific tasks, but the focus remains on the member 
states. The terms of the contract are the acquis communautaire. The acquis communautaire 
is perceived as an entity of written and unwritten principles, norms, rules and decision­
making procedures to which member states of the Community have to comply.
The Community regime is dependent on the members' acceptance of the acquis 
communautaire as forming the framework of cooperation. In this framework the risks are 
controlled and the costs are distributed more or less equally among the members.
The role of the acquis communautaire as the framework of the Community regime 
is highlighted during major renegotiations of the EC Treaties or the formulation of a new 
Treaty, and in the event of enlargement of the EC. The applicant country has to accept 
the rights and obligations of acquis communautaire as only exemptions in time are 
granted. It involves a process by which the country adapts to make national provisions 
compatible with the requirements of EC membership. This is a more or less strenuous 
process depending on the applicant's economic, political and technological development. 
The process of adaptation is also dependent on the applicant country's perception of its 
own political, economic and social regime vis-a-vis the Community and to what extent 
the two are seen as compatible.
This chapter aims to:
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• Explain the role of the acquis communautaire in the Community,
• Analyse the insistence of the existing members states on the compliance of 
applicant countries to the acquis communautaire,
• Link the acquis communautaire to the theory of International Regimes, thus 
defining the characteristics of the Community regime,
• Develop a framework for analysis of Denmark's membership of the EC in the light 
of the Community regime,
• Analyse the link between Denmark's internal politics and the constraints of the 
Community regime.
EL The Theory of International Regimes
1. Criticism and Definition
The theory of International Regimes emerged in the 1970s and was developed further 
during the 1980s. The theory has been mostly referred to by American academics who 
focused on the declining dominant position of the USA which became increasingly visible 
at the beginning of the 1970s.
1.1. The Background to the Theory o f International Regimes
The 1970s witnessed an increased interdependence between states in the international 
system. Two major events underlined this tendency; the breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
monetary system and the first oil crisis in 1973. John Gerhard Ruggie (1975, p. 569) 
described the emerging awareness of 'living in one world' as implying that 'technological, 
ecological, political, economic and social environments are becoming so globally 
enmeshed that changes taking place in one segment of international society will have 
consequential repercussions in all others'. Governments and international organizations 
were no longer capable of managing the changes taking place. A new situation of 
interdependence emerged and states realized that the need for international cooperation 
was more compelling than before.
The concept of interdependence was used to analyse governments' attempts to 
collaborate in new issue-areas and their efforts to manage mutual sensitivity. The increase
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in transnational relations implied that national actors were becoming increasingly involved 
with each other and this tendency changed the scope, nature and level of cooperation. 
Interdependence was used as a paradigm to explain why states chose to cooperate, 
although cooperation threatened their sovereignty.
Increased cooperation in international relations became the focus of many scholars. 
Contrary to the discussion on definitions, there was near-consensus among scholars on the 
situation in which regimes emerge: interdependence. The theory of International Regimes 
emerged as a framework to study and explain patterns of cooperation among states.
Ernst Haas (1980, p. 357) explained that 'the need for collaboration arises from the 
recognition that the costs of national self-reliance are usually excessive', while suggesting 
that there are new features in the contemporary world that seem to make collaboration 
generally more desirable. They are: scientific and technological knowledge in the 
attainment of economic welfare; a greater number and types of participating actors; 
channels of international communication are more numerous and diverse; and a seemingly 
greater reluctance to use force in the solution of economic disputes.
1.2. Criticism o f the Theory o f International Regimes
The theory of international regimes has been criticized from various aspects. Susan 
Strange (in Krasner, 1983) summarized her criticism of regime theory in five points: (1) 
it is a fad, a shift of fashion on behalf of American academics that will have no impact 
over a longer time-period; (2) it is woolly and imprecise, as 'regime' is used with different 
meanings; (3) it is value-biased as it implies an exaggerated measure of predictability in 
the political system; (4) it distorts by overemphasizing the static and underemphasizing 
the dynamic elements of change in world politics; and (5) it is narrow-minded, rooted in 
a state-centric paradigm that limits the vision of a wider reality.
Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986, pp. 753-54) explain that the critique against the 
regime concept as 'yet another academic fad' is a misunderstanding of the efforts of 
scholars to analyse new patterns of international cooperation. They place international 
regimes somewhere between formal institutions and systemic factors and suggest that 
international regimes have become associated with the concept of international 
governance.
In the same article, Kratochwil and Ruggie (pp. 763-71) give an account of the
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problems in the practice of regime analysis. They refer to Strange's criticism of the 
'woolly' character of international regimes, agreeing that there exists no agreement on 
basic issues such as boundary conditions; where does one regime end and where does 
another start? Nor is there agreement on how to evaluate the proposal that any set of 
patterned or conventionalized behaviour be considered as evidence of a regime (in Oran 
Young, Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall o f International Regimes).
According to Kratochwil and Ruggie, there are two fundamental difficulties which 
arise when analysing regimes. First, no angle exists from which regimes can be viewed 
as they 'truly' are. This is because regimes are conceptual creations not concrete entities. 
They reflect common-sense understanding, actor preferences and particular purposes for 
which analyses are undertaken. Concepts analysed in the regime theory, such as 'power' 
or 'state', are difficult to define. Second, the problem concerning epistemological 
difficulties relates to the definition of regimes as social institutions around which 
expectations converge in an international issue-area. Kratochwil and Ruggie's analysis 
relies on the assumption that regimes are known by their principles and shared 
understanding of desirable and acceptable forms of social behaviour, spelled out in the 
four analytical components, principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, of 
which the first two are highly subjective concepts. When studying international regimes 
it is difficult to separate a change in members' behaviour from fundamental changes in the 
regime. In these authors' view the contradiction between converging expectations, 
prescriptions for desirable behaviour and the interpretation of the development of a regime 
give rise to much disagreement about the value of regime analysis.
1.3. The Definition o f International Regimes
The concept of international regimes has been given different definitions. Krasner's often 
quoted definition (1983, p. 2) describes regimes as 'sets of implicit or explicit principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge 
in a given area of international relations'. Ruggie (1975, p. 570) referred to Krasner's 
definition, but also introduced mutual expectations, plans, organized energies and financial 
commitments. The role of governments was elaborated by Keohane and Nye (1977, p. 5) 
who define regimes as 'governmental arrangements where governments regulate and 
control transnational and interstate relations by creating or accepting procedures, rules and
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institutions for certain kind of activity'.
In this thesis the Community regime is defined as a set of principles, norms, rules 
and decision-making procedures which determine the conditions of cooperation. The 
conditions are specified in the regime contract which is made up by the acquis 
communautaire of the EC/EU. The dynamic character of the Community regime will be 
analysed by stressing the important role of principles and norms.
This definition is, however, not satisfactory when analysing the case of Denmark's 
pattern of adaptation to the Community regime. The framework of analysis elaborated here 
serves to create a link between the Community regime and the Danish political process. 
It aims at clarifying one of the major weaknesses of Regime Theory mentioned by 
Haggard and Simmonds (1987), who claimed that the theory overlooked the domestic 
political process, which, according to them, determines to a great extent the behaviour of 
the state in the international system.
2. The European Community and International Regimes
This section aims at clarifying the link between the EC and the theory of International 
Regimes. Certain aspects of the Community mode of cooperation can be analysed 
according to the above-mentioned definition of regime theory, although the fundamental 
characteristics of the EC/EU show it is more than a regime. These characteristics are both 
important ingredients in the Community mode of cooperation and vital to the four 
components of the Community regime, principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures:
• The EC/EU has fundamental objectives combined with a strong integrative 
character, as spelled out in the Treaties of Paris and Rome and the Maastricht 
Treaty, which go beyond the kind of cooperation that is normally described by the 
scholars of regime theory.
• The EC/EU goes further than an international regime in demanding that member 
states give up formal competences. The direct applicability and priority of 
Community law over national law and the special role of the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) are examples of this. Other examples where the member states have 
conceded sovereignty are areas of exclusive Community competence, like the
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Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) and the Common Commercial Policy and 
Customs Union.
• The EC/EU covers a wide scope of policy areas in a complex network of 
cooperation, while examples of international regimes are often taken from 
cooperations in single issue-areas or in an area covering similar and inter-linked 
interests.
• The Community's institutional framework is stronger and more coherent with its 
quasi-constitutional structure and independent institutions than the international 
organizations described in International Regimes.
2.1. The Role o f Institutions in International Regimes
The theory of International Regimes is ambiguous when explaining the role of institutions. 
Haggard and Simmonds (1987) point out that a regime is not an institution. To them, the 
basic assumption of regimes is their fundamental feature of national sovereignty and the 
pattern of cooperation among states. Keohane (in Krasner, 1983) likens a regime to a 
contract between independent actors, without the authority to enforce rules. In another 
work (1985, p. 63), Keohane states that international regimes should not be interpreted as 
'elements of a new international order "beyond the nation-state". They should be 
comprehended chiefly as arrangements motivated by self-interest: as components of 
systems in which sovereignty remains a constihjjrvfc, principle.' Keohane modifies this by 
proposing that 'regimes can certainly affect expectations and may affect values as well'. 
Haas (1980, p. 359) agrees with this modified approach by stating that 'complex 
interdependence suggests that states are no longer certain how various goals should be 
ranked when opportunity costs of adopting new goals at the expense of old ones must be 
evaluated1.
Nevertheless, institutions are clearly central to the regime as they build on its 
capacity to reduce the inherent risks stemming from cooperation. The role of the 
institutions is, according to Keohane (in Krasner, 1983), to provide high-quality 
information. Scholars of international regimes do not see institutions as independent 
entities to which members have conceded an agreed amount of sovereignty. The 
institutions of regimes are, however, necessary to channel correct information and 
facilitate decision-making in order to make the regime arrangements efficient. In
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comparison with classical integration theories, the institutions of international regimes are 
not promoting, implementing or controlling activities undertaken by the regime, but 
constitute a central part of the mechanism of cooperation.
In the Community regime the EC institutions play an important and independent 
role. They are however dependent on the degree of sovereignty transferred to them by the 
member states, and only have competence within the scope assigned to them by the 
Treaties.
2.2. The EC and the Theory o f International Regimes
Scholars of international regimes have seldom taken the Community as an example in 
their studies and no attempts have been made to analyse the EC as such. Keohane and 
Hoffmann (1991, p. 10) state in their three propositions about the European institutions 
that 'the EC is best characterized as neither an international regime nor an emerging state 
but as a network involving the pooling of sovereignty'.
Specific features of the EC, however, have been used as examples of regimes, like 
the STABEX scheme of the Lome Convention between the EC and some developing 
countries (Keohane in Krasner, 1983, p. 169). Nevertheless, Keohane points at a wider use 
of regime theory when citing Jervis's concept of European integration in the same article 
(p. 158, see also footnote 38). He defines the notion of reciprocation as 'the belief that if 
one helps others or fails to hurt them, even at some opportunity costs to oneself, they will 
reciprocate when the tables are turned. In the Concert of Europe, this became a norm 
specific to the regime, a standard of behaviour providing that statesmen should avoid 
maximizing their interests in the short term for the sake of expected long-run gains.'
Keohane elaborates Jervis's concept of reciprocation with what he calls 'the norm 
of generalized commitment - (which) precisely forbids specific interest calculations'. 
According to Keohane, the norm of generalized commitment 'rests on the premise that a 
veil of ignorance stands between us and the future, but that we should nevertheless assume 
that regime-supporting behaviour will be beneficial to us even though we have no 
convincing evidence to that effect'.
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III. The Concept of Acquis Communautaire: A Survey of the Literature
The concept of acquis communautaire often emerges in the debate when the EC is facing 
major changes in its internal structures. They can be caused either by external actors in 
the event of enlargement or by internal developments as new constitutional structures or 
reforms of the existing treaties are discussed.
This survey contains examples of both sets of changes, but focuses on the issue 
of enlargement since the examples are more numerous and more easily detected. The 
concept of acquis communautaire has developed over time both in scope and 
interpretation, and is used increasingly rigidly as pressures from potential membership 
candidates have grown stronger and the Community's agenda has become more complex 
and comprehensive. Since the SEA, the concept of acquis communautaire also comprises 
the acquis politique covering the actions taken within the framework of European Political 
Cooperation (EPC). The most decisive development of acquis communautaire was in the 
Common Provisions of the Maastricht Treaty where, for the first time, it was given a legal 
value. The mentioning of acquis communautaire in Articles B and C underlines the 
enhanced role of the acquis communautaire in the process towards EU.
1. The Concept of Acquis Communautaire
When literally translated into English acquis communautaire means 'what the communities 
have achieved' (Nicoll and Salmon, 1990, p. 29). Attempts have been made to give it an 
English translation, but as Juliet Lodge (1986, p. 106) puts it, acquis communautaire is 
'unsatisfactorily translated as "Community patrimony'". Anthony J.C. Kerr (1990, p. 196) 
continues on the same subject '..the acquis communautaire, as the French Foreign 
Minister...called this complex of values, laws and procedures evolved over a period of 
years. The interpreters...generally translated this expression as "the Community set-up" or 
the "Community patrimony", but there was no really adequate English term for something 
which had been thought out in French and generally in accordance with French ideas.' As 
the English language has no counterpart to the word, the French term is almost exclusively 
used. According to Hugh Thomas (1991, p. 37), the practise of bringing foreign terms 
linked to the EC in the English language has had an adverse effect in the UK. He writes 
'the culture of the Community, with its strange, French, untranslatable words (acquis
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communautaire) has struck nocViortlin British life'.
In general the concept of acquis communautaire is little known to the public in any 
of the member countries and even less in the countries outside the EC. Marie-Franfoise 
Labouz (1988, p. 26) argues that 'II [acquis communautaire] est fait de principes degages 
des traites et de la practique par la Cour de Justice de Luxembourg beaucoup plus que de 
realisations connues du grand public. II reste a priori, par sa technicite et son caractere 
evolutif, affaire de specialistes.'3
When analysing literature on the EC, the concept of acquis communautaire appears 
in two different forms which give way to two different definitions. The first is 
minimalistic and appears injudicial texts. It will be referred to as the 'judicial definition'. 
The second is maximalistic and appears in texts where the author analyses features and 
decisions taken by the EC in order to explain a specific course of events or the reasons 
behind Community strategies. It will be referred to as the 'political definition'.
2. The Judicial Definition
An expert in Community law would without doubt have much more to say about the 
concept of acquis communautaire and its importance in the judicial system, in particular 
its development since the Maastricht Treaty. This is not, however, the objective of this 
chapter. The following discussion serves as background for the next section where the 
political definition of acquis communautaire is elaborated.
2.1. The Rulings o f the ECJ
The judicial definition of acquis communautaire has both an internal and external 
dimension. The internal acquis communautaire concerns the legal competencies of the EC 
derived from the EC Treaties. This dimension gives acquis communautaire its purest 
definition, which is, according to Kerr (1990, p. 12) '..the sum of Regulations, Directives, 
Decisions, etc....in addition to the Treaties..'. The external dimension concerns the 
Community's relations with countries or organizations outside the EC framework.
3It (acquis communautaire) is made out of principles emerging from the Treaties and 
the practice of the Court of Justice in Luxembourg rather than achievements known to the 
general public. It remains a priori because of its technicality and evolving character a 
matter for the specialists.
29
The basic definition of acquis communautaire has developed since the beginning 
of the EC through the rulings of the ECJ. Labouz (1988, p. 26) argues that '..elle preserve 
au fil de ses arrets un acquis qu'elle contribue a enrichir au detriment des Etats et souvent 
a leur insu. L'acquis jurisprudentiel degage des traites de base est en effet redevable de 
Interpretation centralisee du droit communautaire et des methodes juridictionnelles qui 
s'y attachent avec quelque exces aux yeux des Etats.'4 This implies that the ECJ has 
enlarged the scope of the acquis communautaire by interpreting the Treaties teleologically. 
The show of force is directed towards the member countries and plays an important role 
in establishing the competencies of the institutions. This has resulted in the success of the 
ECJ in promoting European integration internally with the Treaties as a base. Labouz 
continues (1988, p. 26) '..mais l'acquis jurisprudentiel qui s'en degage est un facteur 
d'integration. II s'impose en effet aux recalcitrants comme aux candidates d'adhesion, et 
surtout, edifie par strates sedimentaires, il est extensible.'5
2.2. Introduction as a Treaty Provision
The importance of the acquis to integration was given additional weight in the Maastricht 
Treaty. Article B of the Common Provisions reads 'the Union shall set itself the following 
objectives:..to maintain in full the acquis communautaire and build on it with a view to 
considering...to what extent the policies and forms of cooperation introduced by this 
Treaty may need to be revised with the aim of ensuring the effectiveness of mechanisms 
and the institutions of the Community'. Article C continues 'the Union shall be served by 
a single institutional framework which shall ensure the consistency and the continuity of 
the activities carried out in order to attain its objectives while respecting and building 
upon the acquis communautaire'. The reason for giving the acquis communautaire a legal 
value was to prevent the Union from being diluted by internal tendencies of asymmetrical
4..1t [the Court] protects through its rulings an acquis which it contributes to extend 
at the expense of the states and often without their knowledge. The judicial acquis 
emerging from the fundamental treaties derives in fact from the centralized interpretation 
of Community law and from the judicial procedures which are part of it and which the 
states find excessive.
5..But the judicial acquis deriving from the Court of Justice's interpretation is an 
element of integration. It imposes itself in fact on both the sceptics and the membership 
applicants, and, above all, being built on sedimentary layers, it is elastic.
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integration among member states and external pressures in the event of enlargement. 
When the constitutional structure was discussed during the IGC of 1991, the member 
states favouring the unitary 'tree construction' had to give in to those member states 
favouring a 'pillar construction' which separated the Community from the areas of foreign 
and security policy and home affairs. In this context, the mention of EU's federal objective 
was also removed from the common provisions. The member states which had favoured 
an explicit statement on a federal Union based on a unitary framework were recompensed 
by the introduction of the acquis communautaire in the common provisions.6
The external dimension of the acquis communautaire comes to the fore in the event 
of enlargement of the EC. On no other occasion is the content of the acquis 
communautaire so thoroughly analysed.
2.3. Acquis Communautaire and Enlargement o f the EC
The concept of acquis communautaire was mentioned officially for the first time in the 
Communique issued by the Heads of State and Government at the Summit of The Hague 
on 2 December 1969. The Heads of State and Government, with the French President, 
Georges Pompidou, at the forefront, agreed to open accession negotiations with the UK, 
Denmark, Ireland and Norway. But the candidates had to fulfil one fundamental condition 
if the negotiations were to be successful: paragraph 13 reads 'in so far as the applicant 
states accept the treaties and their political finality, the decisions taken since the entry into 
force of the treaties and the options made in the sphere of development, the Heads of 
State or Government have indicated their agreement to the opening of negotiations 
between the Community on the one hand and the applicant states on the other'.
This condition became one of the absolute requirements for a candidate country. 
It forms the basic principle of the total acceptance of the acquis communautaire which 
ever since the first enlargement has served as a yardstick to measure the true conviction 
and readiness of the candidate country to become a member of the EC.
Guy Isaac (1989, p. 18) states this principle by explaining 'soucieuse de se proteger 
contre les risques de denaturation, la Communaute avait fait accepter, a 1'occasion de ce
6Poul Skytte Christoffersen, Konferencen vedrorende traktaten om den europceiske 
union, Jurist og 0konomiforbundets Forlag, Copenhagen, 1992, p. 54.
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premier elargissement, le principe que l'adhesion se realise sans remise en cause du 
systeme (principe de l'acquis communautaire)'.7 Later in the same text (pp. 27-8), he 
distinguishes between two types of conditions; technical and political. '...Une condition 
technique ....Cette condition s'exprime dans le principe de l'acceptation de l'acquis 
communautaire, clairement degage lors du premier elargissement. II signifie que les 
candidats doivent accepter immediatement non seulement les traites, mais encore 
l'ensemble des actes adoptes sur leur base et, plus generalement tout ce que, a titres 
divers, recouvre 1'oeuvre des Communautes depuis leur creation....Ensuite, une condition 
politique-, par le preambule du traite C.E.E., les fondateurs invitent a s'associer a leur 
effort les autres peuples d'Europe 'qui partagent leur ideal'.'8
The Community has thus been most careful not to run the risk of diluting its 
acquis communautaire in the event of enlargement. It would, however, be an impossible 
task for any candidate country to adopt the increasingly extensive acquis communautaire 
from the date the accession treaty enters into force. The EC has therefore added to the 
principle of acceptance of the acquis communautaire, the establishment of transitional 
measures that will help the candidate country absorb the problems of adjustment that 
membership brings about. Loukas Tsoukalis (1981, p. 162) makes this perfectly clear 
when he explains 'the negotiations between an applicant country and the Community are 
only about the type and length of the transitional period which follows accession. The 
acquis communautaire itself does not come into question during those negotiations.'
7Anxious to protect itself against a transformation of its fundamental character, the 
Community, at the occasion of the first enlargement, imposed the principle that 
enlargement is achieved without questioning the system (the basic principle of acquis 
communautaire).
8..A technical condition:..This condition manifests itself in the principle of the 
acceptance of the acquis communautaire, which became clear during the first enlargement. 
It means that the applicants must immediately accept not only the treaties, but also the 
body of acts adopted on the basis of the treaties, more generally everything that, under 
different headings, encompasses the work of the Communitites since their creation. Then, 
a political condition: through the preamble of the EEC Treaty, the founders invite other 
peoples of Europe 'who share their ideal' to join them in their efforts.
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3. Hie Political Definition
Authors who have specialized in political science tend to see the concept of acquis 
communautaire in a different way than the judicial experts. They put more emphasis on 
the consequences of the use of acquis communautaire when they search to explain the 
reasons behind the strategies adopted by member states and EC institutions.
3.1. A Wider Concept
Helen Wallace and Wolfgang Wessels (1991, p. 3) give a short definition of the acquis 
communautaire when writing '..acquis communautaire (the corpus of Community 
legislation and commitments)'. Helen Wallace (1985, p. 2) underlines '..the symbol of the 
acquis communautaire as shorthand for everything already agreed within the Community'.
The content and legal definition of acquis communautaire is treated with less 
precision by political scientists. Their analyses, however, provide understanding about its 
wider concept and implications. Acquis communautaire occurs in the context of 
enlargement and major changes of the Treaties and is often used as a means to describe 
the cooperation process among the member states, therefore close to the definition of 
norms in regime theory.
Political scientists have given different interpretations to the acquis communautaire. 
A straightforward approach is given in the five-institute report (1983, p. 41); 'the 
Community rests upon an implicit contract, that its member states accept mutual 
obligations in return for mutual benefits. Continued respect for that contract requires a 
sense in all member states not only that the costs and benefits of membership are 
distributed equitably, but also that the rules and obligations which each has accepted are 
accepted and observed by all.' This definition is similar to the discussion of regime 
principles which makes explicit the shared goal of a regime and norms to regulate 
members' behaviour.
Helen Wallace (1985, p. 20) stresses that 'the basic concept prevails that EC 
membership directly implies the involvement of all member states in the pursuit of an 
agreed set of policy objectives, in the acceptance of mutual obligations and common 
disciplines, and in the collective pursuit and financing of common policies. This is after 
all what comprises the acquis communautaire.'
William Wallace (1983, p. 411) elaborates on the symbolic value of the political
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concept of acquis communautaire; 'a certain mythology has grown up around the "grand 
design" of European integration allegedly shared by the "far-sighted" statesmen who 
negotiated and signed the Treaties of Paris and Rome. Such myths have their political 
value;...in the European Community, this has served to underpin the acquis 
communautaire, the package of policies and rules agreed to under the Treaties and in the 
fifteen years which followed their signature.' His definition is close to the regime 
principles which clarify the goal of the Community regime.
3.2. A n Inflexible Concept
As acquis communautaire is a concept which serves to preserve what has already been 
achieved changes to the acquis communautaire can be implemented only if member states 
agree. Therefore, a degree of inflexibility follows in the cases where there is no agreement 
on the dynamic character of the regime principles. William Wallace (1983, p. 419) writes 
that 'only a sustained effort by a coalition of governments to reopen the redistribution 
issues which underlie the CAP, an exercise which requires political attention and action 
from outside the sector to cut across the entrenched interests, could successfully amend 
the acquis'. He continues (p. 422) 'the development of a Community process,.., has been 
hesitant and slow, the underlying issues at stake submerged until the early 1980s by the 
mythology of the acquis and the compartmentalized structure of the decision-making 
process'.
Frank Vibert (1990, p. 141) criticizes an unjustifiable rigidity of 'the doctrine of 
acquis communautaire (or patrimony) [which] states that once a function or power has 
been obtained at the Community level, it should never be relinquished'. Vibert has found 
a scapegoat for this inflexibility in 'the idea that old functions should always be sustained 
and new policies always additional is a bureaucrat's dream. The concept of acquis 
communautaire is a doctrine invented by the bureaucrats for the benefit of bureaucrats.' 
In his criticism, Vibert seems to seriously misunderstand the importance of the acquis 
communautaire. He overlooks its deeper role as a basic element in the European 
integration process, regulating members' behaviour and restraining excesses of self-interest 
which would harm cooperation and integration in the long term. He seems to confuse the 
changes to the acquis communautaire as an integral part of a benign integration among 
states, with the ever-centralizing EC institutions acting supposedly outside their
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competences. He also neglects the legal relevance of the concept as a basis for legal 
certainty, which smaller member states in particular regard as fundamental.
3.3. Acquis Communautaire and Enlargement o f the EC
The criticism of acquis communautaire focuses to a large extent on its role in the three 
enlargements of the Community. The EC has shown a tendency to perceive candidate 
countries as potential threats to the established principles and norms, thereby encountering 
challenges to them with thorough perseverance. The first time this came to the forefront 
was in the 1960s when the UK presented its membership application to the EC. The 
original six states, in particular France, were not convinced that the UK shared the long­
term political goals of the Treaties and feared a dilution of the process of European 
integration as the UK might seek to undo the Community obligations. This fear, together 
with concerns of balance of power and the distribution of economic benefits, prompted 
General de Gaulle to veto British accession in 1963 and 1967. The General expressed 
doubts about UK commitment to the principles and norms of the Community, but was 
fundamentally worried that the accession of a big country, with traditionally strong ties 
to other parts of the world and some very different policy interests, would upset the 
balance within the EC in which France had the leading role.
K.R. Simmonds (1968, p. 16) made the following comment regarding the French 
position on UK membership of the EC: '..the fundamental French objection to an 
expansion of the Community membership derived from a fear of change in the 
institutional balance laid down in the Treaty'.
The situation changed towards the end of the 1960s as Georges Pompidou, who 
succeeded General de Gaulle as President of France, did not share the General's concerns 
about UK accession and the future development of the Community. At the Summit of The 
Hague in December 1969, the Heads of State and Government agreed on a strategy in 
three parts - completion, deepening and enlargement - for the future of the EC. The 
political leaders concluded that accession negotiations could be opened with the four 
candidate countries, the UK, Denmark, Ireland and Norway, on the condition of their total
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acceptance of the acquis communautaire9 Throughout the negotiations the EC held firmly 
to this principle, leaving the length of the transition agreements to be decided on.
Helen Wallace (1985, p. 2) has commented as follows on the inflexible character 
of the acquis communautaire'. 'already at the time of the first enlargement of the 
Community in 1973, some doubts had emerged about the feasibility of maintaining 
momentum in the face of the disparate policy interests represented by the new members. 
The reflex of the founder members was to sharpen the definition of the prevailing 
"orthodoxies". Institutional problems would arise from the accession of new members only 
if the rules of the Treaties were disregarded. New policies might be embraced which 
would be advantageous to new members, but only on condition that the existing policy 
objectives and instruments of the EC were fully accepted by the governments of the 
acceding countries. Out of this debate emerged the symbol of the acquis communautaire...'
Helen Wallace (1983, p. 49) also forwards some explanatory remarks on the 
problem of a badly adjusted acquis communautaire. She writes 'there are...problems arising 
from the Treaty base and subsequent acquis. First, the Treaties were formulated in the 
economic and political circumstances of the 1950s. Their policy prescriptions are no 
longer entirely appropriate to current policy needs, although much depends on how 
Community and national policy-makers choose to interpret Treaty provisions. Secondly, 
the Treaties embraced the policy interests of the six founder members and have often been 
interpreted in a way which constrains the adjustment of policies to meet the need of an 
enlarged EC.'
The SEA was an attempt to try to rectify the deviance between the provisions of 
the Treaties and the existing policy needs. The IGC on the SEA was prompted by internal 
and external pressures to adjust the Treaties to the development, in the scope of 
cooperation between EC members that was already in place or that was necessitated by 
new policies and projects (the internal market), and to accommodate the changes made 
necessary by enlargement of the EC.
9The communique stated 'in so far as the applicant states accept the treaties and their 
political finality, the decisions taken from the entry into force of the treaties and the 
options made in the sphere of development, the Heads of State and Government have 
indicated their agreement to the opening of negotiations between the Community on the 
one hand and the applicant states on the other'.
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Many of the examples found in the literature comment on or analyse the role of 
the acquis communautaire in the event of the first enlargement and with particular focus 
on the UK. The reason why the UK accession seems to have been especially difficult, is 
undoubtedly linked to the UK's special political and economic position in the world in the 
past, and its different experiences than the continental European states during the Second 
World War. In the case of Denmark, which had few problems in accepting the terms of 
entry, the difficulty for many Danes in accepting the principles of integration resided in 
an uneasiness with the objectives and ideals of the Community.
3.4. Extending the Acquis Communautaire Outside the EC
The scope of the acquis communautaire has grown considerably during the 1980s. Not 
only by the SEA, the first major amendment to the Treaties of Paris and Rome, but the 
1992-project establishing the internal market has also added weight to the acquis 
communautaire, and the Maastricht Treaty has strengthened its legal and symbolic 
significance.
The attraction of the internal market made neighbouring European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) countries eager to forge closer links with the EC. The Community, 
which at the time did not want to consider further enlargements, offered a new kind of 
relationship to the EFTA countries based on the extension of the internal market's four 
freedoms and flanking policies - the European Economic Area (EEA). The idea of the 
creation of an EEA, which was first presented by the Commission President, Jacques 
Delors, in January 1989, appealed greatly to the EFTA states, as it would grant them the 
necessary access to the EC markets without them having to consider the difficult political 
problems posed by EC membership. The objective of the EEA was spelled out at a 
ministerial meeting in 1989 between the EFTA states and the EC: 'atteindre la realisation 
de la libre circulation des marchandises, des services, des capitaux et des personnes, sur 
la base de Yacquis communautaire, identifie conjonctement; des exceptions eventuelles, 
justifiees par la sauvegarde d'interets fondamentaux, ainsi que des dispositions transitoires 
pourraient etre l'objet de negotiation..'10
,0to achieve the free circulation of goods, services, capital and people on the basis of 
acquis communautaire identified jointly; possible exceptions justified by the protection of 
fundamental interests, as well as transitional provisions, might be the object of
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However, the EEA negotiations were to become more difficult than expected, 
mainly because of the fundamental problem of extending the acquis communautaire to 
countries which were not members of the Community. The conflict between the EFTA 
states' demands for a genuine participation in the Community decision-making process and 
what the EC was able to deliver was finally taken to the ECJ by the European Parliament, 
to establish whether the EEA institutional set-up was compatible with the EC Treaties. 
The Court ruled that the provisions in the EEA Treaty giving the EFTA states access to 
the Community's decision-making process were incompatible with the Treaties and the 
latter was therefore invalid. The Court's message was clear: only members of the EC 
which share the rights and obligations of membership have the right to take part in the 
decision-making process.
4. An Assessment of Acquis Communautaire
This analysis has shown that the acquis communautaire is a central concept in the 
Community. The concept itself has no exact definition, although in its judicial meaning 
the term is more clearly identifiable.
For the member countries and Community institutions, the acquis communautaire 
represents the cornerstone of European integration, and regulates the mode of cooperation 
between them. The acquis communautaire spells out the terms of the membership contract, 
and in this capacity becomes the preserver of what has already been achieved within the 
Community. The acquis communautaire has become rigid in its design to maintain the 
status quo. Only occasionally have efforts been made to adjust the acquis communautaire 
to developments in the Community mode of cooperation.
The acquis communautaire comes to the fore in the event of enlargement of the 
Community. The acquis communautaire is used as a tool to measure an applicant country's 
true desire to adhere to the principles of integration and its capacity to fulfil the rights and 
obligations of membership. This have given way to one of the basic principles of EC 
membership, which is the applicant's acceptance of the acquis communautaire. The reason 
behind this requirement touches a fundamental factor of European integration: in order to 
survive, the EC must be able to guarantee its members that the price they have had to pay
negotiation.
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in terms of loss of sovereignty is balanced by gains in political influence and cooperation 
in policy areas. The costs which membership implies must, in the long term, be distributed 
equally. As EC membership is deemed irrevocable, members also demand an assurance 
of stability over time and robustness towards external pressures. As there is no European 
constitution in the proper sense of the word, the concept of acquis communautaire has 
become its stand-in, and, some would argue, its poor substitute.
The fact that the acquis communautaire is not negotiable when the Community is 
dealing with third states, has often made the terms of entry to the EC hard to accept for 
acceding states. The EC is therefore subject to criticism which focuses on the inflexibility 
of the acquis communautaire. This orthodox character, sometimes taken as an excuse for 
member countries to maintain advantageous arrangements achieved through the 
Community cooperation, is an integral part of the integration process. On the other hand, 
it should be pointed out that the member states can, and do continuously, adapt the acquis 
communautaire to the progress of EC policies.
The Community has in recent years started to claim the principle of acceptance of 
the acquis communautaire in negotiations beyond enlargement. In the case of the EEA 
negotiations, the EFTA states were asked to define what they believed to be the relevant 
acquis communautaire. It was then possible for them to leave out some of the more 
complicated parts, like the CAP. The exercise proved nevertheless frustrating since the EC 
showed little willingness to negotiate alternatives to full participation in the decision­
making process. The Community proved to be very sensitive about conceding any 
substantial derogations or exceptions to the acquis communautaire, although the objective 
of most EFTA states was not at the time to become members of the EC.
Over the years the acquis communautaire has developed continuously through the 
everyday functioning of the Community machinery, successive enlargements and 
amendments to the original Treaties. It has been argued that the more comprehensive the 
acquis communautaire becomes, the more rigidly the concept will have to be applied. It 
is certainly true that as the EC moves towards EU, it will demand an increasingly greater 
effort by new member countries to adjust to the acquis communautaire and successfully 
settle down in the Community. The concept of acquis communautaire is now written into 
the Maastricht Treaty, which may be a deliberate strategy to protect the fundamental 
characteristics of Union membership.
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IV. Acquis Communautaire and the Theory of International Regimes
1. Four Basic Elements
International Regimes have been defined by Krasner (1983, p. 2) as 'sets of implicit and 
explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations'. These four basic 
components of a regime can be used as analytical tools to establish the conditions of 
cooperation, and once the regime is in place, they are what is needed to make the 
cooperation successful. The Community mode of cooperation has a similar set of 
distinctive components, but before analysing them, the conceptual framework based on 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures must be defined more closely.
1.1. Principles
Krasner (1983, p. 2) defines principles as 'beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude'. 
Keohane (1985, p. 58) somewhat differently writes that 'the principles of regimes define, 
in general, the purposes that their members are expected to pursue'.
The principles and purpose of regimes, in the Community context, can be found 
in the text of the preambles of the Treaties where the overall aims of European integration 
are stated:
Determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe. Resolved to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries by 
common action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe (Treaty of Rome),
or,
Moved by the will to continue the work undertaken on the basis of the Treaties 
establishing the European Communities and to transform relations as a whole 
among their States into a European Union, in accordance with the Solemn 
Declaration of Stuttgart of 19 June 1983 (Single European Act),
and
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This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible 
to the citizens (Maastricht Treaty).
The declarations of the European Council are meant to give input from the highest 
political level, in the form of guidelines for the Community's future action. These 
guidelines are supposedly compatible with the fundamental objectives of the Treaties and 
should lead the member states and institutions further along the path towards integration:
Desiring to consolidate the progress already made towards European Union in both 
the economic and political fields, the Heads of State and Government reaffirm the 
following objectives:...' (Solemn Declaration on European Union).
The rulings of the ECJ have an important role in interpreting the Treaties. The resorts to 
teleological interpretations have spelled out the intentions of the founding fathers. The 
Court has clarified and reinforced, and in some cases indirectly established, the principles 
of the Community regime.
Scholars of international regimes have argued that none of the four elements explain 
explicitly why a regime is created. In the case of the EC, however, it is possible to 
deduce from the wording in the preambles of the Treaties the fundamental principles for 
cooperation: to achieve a lasting peace in Europe through an ever closer union among the 
peoples and a constant improvement of their working and living conditions. The 
overarching principles of the Community have a clear integrative objective, which is 
meant to be shared by all member states as a point around which their interests will 
converge. The principles are therefore the fundamental component of the Community 
regime, and what gives it its purpose. If the principles are shared by the member states, 
the Community regime functions coherently. If they are not, the Community regime may 
weaken or divert from its original direction. The principles have so far not been 
renegotiated, but reinforced by successive reforms of the EC Treaties. But some member 
states' difficulties in sharing the principles have weakened the acquis communautaire and
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have threatened to weaken the Community regime, e.g. the arrangement on Social Policy 
attached to the Maastricht Treaty.
1.2. Norms
Krasner (1983, p. 2) defines norms as 'standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights 
and obligations'. Keohane (1985, p.58), in his turn, has written that 'norms contain 
somewhat clearer injunctions to members about legitimate and illegitimate behaviour, still 
defining responsibilities and obligations in relatively general terms'. Haas (1980, p. 397) 
states shortly that 'norms tell us why states collaborate'.
The problem is to distinguish a norm from a principle. If  principles are seen as 
objectives for the whole Community process and tell us something about the direction 
towards which the EC should head, norms are explicit and implicit notions about the 
formulation of this process. The norms say more about the process of cooperation than 
the principles (which constitute an overall umbrella of common values). The authors point 
to the rights and obligations of Community membership. Violation of a norm causes 
concern in the EC as it implies a violation of the mode of cooperation. An example of 
violation of a norm was Margaret Thatcher's unrelenting pursuit of a refund for the British 
budget contribution. The reaction from other member states was one of great disapproval 
at the persistence and aggressiveness with which the claim was pursued. The French 
Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas, was reported as complaining that the British way of 
handling the matter was not 'the Community way'.
In Krasner's and Keohane's definitions norms are important regulators for the 
behaviour of the members of the regime. Rather than Haas's 'why states collaborate', 
norms show how cooperation takes place and the conditions that are necessary for 
collaboration to be maintained. The violation of a norm is often connected to the non- 
acceptance of a Community principle. At least when a member state, known not to share 
the Community principles, breaks a norm, it has a more severe impact on the Community 
regime than when a member which accepts the principles breaks a norm. The fear that the 
non-acceptance of a principle may threaten the Community regime turns the breach of a 
norm into a serious matter. The fact that the violation of principles or norms is outside 
the jurisdiction of the ECJ, because principles and norms concern the mode of cooperation 
between the member states makes compliance a matter for the member states. The relative
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size and importance of a member state decides the assessment as to the cost of breaking
a norm (exclusion or being disregarded). A big member state's violation is likely to force
other member states to consider accommodating it in some way, while if a small member
state considers breaking or breaks a norm the fear of exclusion or complete disregard of
any legitimate grievance is more likely. On the other hand a small member state's
bc.i wA
violation of a norm may also result in a special status^ '■granted that country, while a big 
member state may not be granted a special status as it would be considered to have an 
even more serious impact on the Community regime.
1.3. Rules
Rules are in Krasner's definition (1983, p. 2) 'specific prescriptions or proscriptions for 
action'. Keohane (1985, p. 58) writes that rules are difficult to distinguish from norms, but 
that rules are more specific, indicating in detail the rights and obligations of members. In 
the case of the Community, Krasner's definition of rules seems to coincide with praxis. 
Clearly, rules are explicit expressions of actions that the regime should take to develop 
further the cooperation. The Council's law-making capacity fits this definition. Regulations 
and directives, and to a certain extent decisions and recommendations, are tools to ensure 
that actions are taken in the areas of Community competence. An example is the 
framework directives, in which general principles of Community policy are explained and 
their objectives prescribed, while the practical implementation rests with the member state. 
The rules form the secondary legislation of the Community, as well as the decisions taken 
within the framework of EPC (as part of the acquis politique).
Rules are on a different level from principles and norms in the Community regime. 
Being part of the Community framework as explicit measures for action in areas stated 
in the EC Treaties, they are proposed, amended, implemented and safeguarded by the EC 
institutions. The violation of a rule may be sanctioned by the ECJ when a member state 
is found guilty of not complying national legislation to EC legislation. Breaking a rule 
may therefore be less dramatic than breaking a norm or not accepting a principle, as the 
Community regime has a direct and effective way of establishing and condemning the 
violation. Regulations are special in the respect that they are directly applicable in the 
member states.
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1.4. Decision-making Procedures
Krasner (1983, p. 2) defines decision-making procedures as 'the prevailing practices for 
making and implementing collective choice'. Keohane (1985, p. 58) puts them 'at the same 
level of specificity as rules, but referring to procedures rather than substances, the 
decision-making procedures of regimes provide ways of implementing their principles and 
altering their rules'. Haas (1980, p. 397) sees procedures as an 'answer to the question of 
how the collaboration is to be carried out. Procedures, therefore, involve the choice of 
whether specific administrative arrangements should be set up to regulate the issue-area.'
These definitions all point at the administrative character of the decision-making 
procedures. The procedures are tools for facilitating and regulating the effective 
management of the cooperation. In the Community, decision-making procedures fulfil the 
crucial task of prescribing the act of taking decisions. Behind the administrative 
dimension, however, looms the important role of the procedures to balance power among 
members by weighted majority voting, and to safeguard further loss of sovereignty by 
prescribing vote by unanimity in some major areas and reforms of the treaties. Refusals 
to comply with the prescribed decision-making procedure are evidence of a more 
fundamental disagreement on the principles of the EC. The most striking example is the 
'crisis of the empty chair' in 1965, when the Community decision-making process was 
blocked for several months because of France's refusal to accept the rules of majority 
voting. The underlying reason was a fundamental mistrust by the French President 
towards the EC institutions, so he attempted to stop what he regarded as an erosion of 
French sovereignty. The Luxembourg compromise is an anomaly that has had a negative 
effect on the functioning of the Community. It was not only a flagrant breach of voting 
procedures, but also violated norms of behaviour and therefore the fundamental principle 
of integration. It also influenced the applicant states in the run-up to the first enlargement.
In the Danish parliamentary debate, it was discussed whether Community 
membership was a threat to national sovereignty. The proponents pointed to the 
Luxembourg compromise as a guarantee that Denmark, despite being a small state, could 
not be forced to accept future integration. The so-called 'veto-right' became a condition 
for Danish entry and has remained in the EC debate. A more recent example is the 
Ioannina compromise of April 1994 between the Twelve member states over the voting 
procedures in an enlarged EU. This was prompted by a complaint from the UK and Spain
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about big member states' relative voting strength in the case of qualified majority voting.
The decision-making procedures have a bearing on the other components in that 
they are necessary to make the Community regime move forward. If the decision-making 
stalls, no rules are adopted, and it is likely to amount to a violation of a norm. It is 
indirectly a non-acceptance of the principles of the Community regime, as the principles 
proscribe integration among the member states as a dynamic process which is necessary 
to move forward and not to lose its reason d'etre.
2. Dynamics, Development and Adaptation
In the previous sections, the Community regime has been defined and linked to the four 
basic elements of the theory of International Regimes. Acquis communautaire has been 
defined as the terms of the regime contract. This approach has analysed the Community 
regime as a static framework where its features are described. However, the Community 
regime is, by its integration principle, a dynamic phenomenon designed to move forward 
towards the goals stated in the preambles of the EC Treaties. In the same way the acquis 
communautaire has progressed over time, both in its continuous everyday development 
through the adoption of new rules, and by substantial steps to strengthen the principles 
and norms of the Community regime through intergovernmental negotiations. The purpose 
of this section is to (1) introduce a dynamic concept of the Community to explain the 
development of the Community regime; (2) analyse the motivation for participation and 
the impact of violation or non-acceptance of the basic components (since regime 
development is dependent on the member states' active involvement); (3) analyse the 
relative position of an individual member state in the Community regime and introduce 
a notion of its perception of this position; and (4) analyse a member state's strategies to 
deal with the need to adapt to the regime and its development.
2.1. The Dynamic Character o f the Community Regime
Changes in principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures imply change of or 
within the regime. Krasner (1983, p. 5) has elaborated further the significance of these 
four components in the event of change.
He distinguishes between principles and norms on one hand, and rules and 
procedures on the other. Principles and norms provide the basic defining characteristics
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of a regime. Therefore, changes in principles and norms are changes of the regime itself. 
Changes in rules and decision-making procedures are changes within the regime provided 
that principles and norms remain unaltered.
Change in the principles of the EC implies either a fundamental reformulation of 
the objectives or the beliefs of the preambles to the Treaties, or a radically different 
institutional and legal set-up. An example is the European Parliament's project on the 
Draft Treaty establishing European Union, orchestrated by Altiero Spinelli, which would 
have changed the EC into a federal system had it been adopted.
Under the same overarching structure, the Maastricht Treaty incorporates the 
Community pillar, reinforced with Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), and two pillars 
of intergovernmental character: the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and 
justice and internal affairs. It attempts to regulate the division of competences between 
the Commission and national and regional administrations through the principle of 
subsidiarity, but it does not radically change the balance between the EC institutions and 
the member states. The Maastricht Treaty is an important change in the Community 
regime as it strengthens the links between the different areas in which the member states 
cooperate and defines better the roles of the EC institutions. It strengthens the Community 
regime in that it gives it a common framework, EU, and some symbolic values, e.g. the 
Union citizenship. The decision, however, by eleven member states except the UK, to 
implement the Social Charter outside the Maastricht Treaty but using the Community's 
institutional framework, the British and Danish opt-outs, and the Edinburgh Agreement, 
are elements which are likely to have weakened the Community regime.
It is still too early to judge whether the Community regime has been strengthened 
through the Maastricht Treaty, or if the intergovernmental character of the Treaty will 
weaken European integration. As the Treaty did not deal with the difficult question of 
defining the institutional structure of EU and the balance between the big and small 
member states, it is necessary to wait for the next IGC in 1996 to evaluate if, on the 
whole, the Maastricht Treaty fundamentally changes the regime. A foretaste of the 
difficulties in endowing EU with a new institutional structure came during the accession 
negotiations of February and March 1994 with the dispute over the procedures for 
qualified majority voting in an enlarged EU.
The SEA did not change the principles of the Community. On the whole, the SEA
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was not a change of, but in, the Community regime. It modified the EEC Treaty (and the 
Treaties of Paris and Euratom to a minor extent) by introducing new policy areas linked 
to the internal market, and it rendered the decision-making procedure effective in these 
areas by introducing majority voting. Although the SEA codified the EPC and the 
European Council, it did not amount to a change in principles since both fora were part 
of the Community regime. The SEA was a change in the regime in that it strengthened 
the contract between the member states by making the objectives of market integration 
and economic and social cohesion clearer, and the decision-making rules more efficient.
Norms of the Community are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and 
obligations. A change of norms must therefore be either a change in the members' 
perceptions of the value of the rights and fairness of the obligations, or a change in the 
rights and obligations themselves.
Perceptions of the value of the rights and fairness of the obligations are subject 
to a normative evaluation by the member states on an individual basis. The difficulty in 
analysing a change in norms resides in this fundamental problem: a member state's 
perception of its rights and obligations of Community membership. It is inevitable that 
member states will perceive norms differently and that one member state's perceptions 
will be evaluated by others according to the prestige of the former. Another difficulty is 
found in the lack of exact definition of the Community norms. As norms define standards 
of behaviour, it is implied that what is approved as acceptable behaviour is a matter of 
subjective judgement. From this argument stem the value-biased propositions about 'good' 
and 'bad' member states. 'Good' members, like the founding Six, are granted more leeway 
in their behaviour as their compliance with the norms (and principles) is often taken for 
granted.
There seems to be consensus among the EC member states and the Community 
institutions that access to the rights and obligations of the EC is a privilege for member 
states only. During the negotiations over the EEA, southern EC members complained that 
the EFTA states were being granted access to the rights of EC membership without 
having to take on the obligations. This view was shared by some representatives of the 
Commissions and the ECJ, which ruled that the EEA institutional set-up was in breach 
of the EC Treaties. This conflict was solved through a compromise based on a much
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reduced access to the right of participation in the decision-making process, and fulfilment 
in part of some obligations through the establishment of a cohesion fund financed by the 
EFTA states for the benefit of poorer EC members.
Were there to be a general change in the perception of the value of the rights and 
the fairness of the obligations of EC membership, the norms attached would have to be 
reformulated. A general change of the norms would amount to a change of the regime. 
One member state's violation of a norm does not change the Community regime. An 
occasional violation, even if general, does not change the regime, but a repeated violation, 
either general or by a single member and tacitly accepted by the others, would amount 
to a change in the norm and therefore of the regime.
The SEA (see also above) is an example of codifying in a legal text both a change 
within existing norms and new norms which have become accepted by the member states 
as features belonging to the Community regime. The SEA makes provisions for the 
European Council and the EPC. Both forms of cooperation had developed as general 
praxis between the member states in the 1970s, but had no legal value before the SEA. 
Although the introduction of majority voting in the areas related to the internal market 
changed the norm of voting behaviour, the change was not general, being confined only 
to a limited area. In the long run, however, it has proved to pave the way for the 
acceptance of a major change in the voting procedure in the Council of Ministers, by 
respecting the rules of the Treaties. The norm of economic and social cohesion which had 
been agreed in principle with Spain and Portugal during the accession negotiations and 
expressed in the declarations of the European Council as a desirable objective for the 
Community, had no explicit provision in the EEC Treaty. The SEA opened a whole new 
chapter on the economic and social cohesion. This is an example of a norm agreed upon 
between the member states and then introduced by an amendment of the Treaty.
Changes in rules, defined as the secondary legislation of the EC, take place within the 
framework of the principles stated in the preambles, the norms spelled out in specific 
provisions in the Treaties or implicit or explicit norms agreed upon by the member states. 
A new rule can originate from the declarations of the political leaders in the European 
Council, who express their wish for action in a specific policy area. Changes in rules are 
provided for in the decision-making process of the EC and take place in a context of
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bargaining between the member states, assisted by the Commission. Rules that are 
changed in the EC framework are a change within the regime. Changes of the rules are 
easier to realize than changes of principles and norms, as they are normally not perceived 
to threaten national sovereignty by being defined within the scope of the Treaties.
According to Krasner, this is also true for changes in the decision-making 
procedures. In the context of the Community and European integration, however, the 
reality is more complex and Krasner's argument does not hold true. In the Community 
mode of cooperation, the change of decision-making procedures does in most cases also 
amount to a change of the principle of parity between the member states.
The legal set-up of the decision-making procedure is a complex mix between 
unanimity and majority voting, according to the sensitivity of the area concerned. In those 
areas where decisions are taken by majority voting, a balance is struck between large and 
small member states through a system of weighted votes. Each member's votes are 
distributed so that no permanent voting block is established, nor is any one member able 
to block a decision. The system of weighted votes creates a dynamism between groups 
of states; small/large, rich/poor, southern/northern, or traditional groups like Portugal and 
Spain, the Benelux countries or Ireland and the UK. The legal dimension of the decision­
making procedure is a way to balance differences in power between member states. In this 
respect, a change of the decision-making procedure is more than a small change within 
a regime, since the underlying reason is of a more fundamental character. It would imply 
a change in a norm and therefore a change of the regime.
Some changes in the decision-making procedure have taken place as a result of 
attempts to strengthen the intergovernmental dimension of the Community at the expense 
of the supranational institutions. The most obvious examples of such changes within the 
procedures, but outside the initial scope of the Treaties, are: Comite des representants 
permanents (Coreper), which was created to make the Council's decision-making more 
efficient; and the Comitology, which emerged as a result of the member states' concern 
to control the Commission's capacity to execute decisions in areas delegated to it by the 
Council. The Comitology is a borderline case between change in a procedure and change 
of a norm, as it clearly restricts the Commission's freedom of manoeuvre.
Finally, Krasner (1983, p. 5) discusses the difference between the weakening of 
a regime and changes within, or of, a regime. Krasner gives the following definition for
49
the weakening of a regime, 'if the principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures 
of a regime become less coherent, or if actual practice is increasingly inconsistent with 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, then a regime has weakened'.
Before the Maastricht Treaty the Community experienced a number of amendments 
to the founding Treaties. The amendments were necessitated by the emerging 
discrepancies between the legal texts and praxis which had developed out of the process 
of cooperation. Adjustments were often found to be necessary in order to increase the 
efficiency of the institutions. Examples are the Merger Treaty which put the institutions 
of founding Treaties under the same legal framework and made provisions for Coreper, 
or the treaties modifying the budgetary and financial dispositions. In its first and third 
titles, the SEA codified practices which had developed in parallel with the Community. 
The second title, which covers amendments to existing Treaties, is to a large extent an 
anticipation of changes necessary in scope and decision-making provisions to ensure a 
successful realization of the internal market.
The IGC on EMU included changes to the existing Treaties, deemed either 
necessary because of the internal market, or desirable as logical developments in the 
process of economic integration, while the IGC on Political Union (PU) was called less 
because of internal logic, but rather because of external events (the German reunification, 
the break-down of the communist system in central and eastern Europe and the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union). EU represents a major change as it incorporates 
within its framework a more comprehensive set of issues for the Community regime, 
making it more coherent and therefore stronger. It is possible to argue, however, that the 
Maastricht Treaty has weakened the Community regime, by a drift towards decomposition 
of the 'solidarity mechanism' through the introduction of a kind of differentiated 
membership. Although the Community has long since dispelled differing abilities to 
comply in practice with the rights and obligations of membership, this new component 
of the Community regime stands out clearly in the section of the third stage of EMU 
where those member states which comply with the convergence criteria in 1996, or 1999 
at the latest, can choose to forge ahead and introduce a common currency, and in the 
protocol on Western European Union (WEU) where those EC members which are not 
members of the WEU are invited to become members but are not obliged to do so. Even 
more striking is the arrangement for eleven member states on Social Policy, the British
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and Danish opt-outs from the third stage of EMU, and the Edinburgh Agreement which 
stipulates Denmark's membership conditions of EU. These features of EU are an explicit 
breach of one of the fundamental principles of the Community regime, since they are a 
break with the rule that the acquis communautaire should be the same for all members 
(although some provisions largely outside the scope of the EC Treaties, like the early 
monetary arrangements, displayed incomplete participation). Now the acquis 
communautaire contains treaty-based opt-outs and a differentiated membership. The next 
IGC scheduled for 1996 will have to try to deal with the difficult institutional 
arrangements for an enlarged EU and with two member states which have chosen not to 
take part in all the rights and obligations of EU.
It seems true that changes within the Community regime are brought about by a necessity 
to adapt the legal framework to developments which have already occurred. Treaty 
amendments have to a great extent been steps to strengthen the functioning of the 
cooperation, or to take corrective measures in order to halt a lurking weakening of the 
regime. These kinds of measures have implied amendments to decision-making procedures 
and in some cases to the norms. But they seemed, before the Maastricht Treaty at least, 
not to have provoked changes in the principles or any of the more fundamental norms, 
and they have therefore been relatively easy to implement. When changes have taken 
place in principles or norms, there has been much more reluctance to ratify the new 
measures. Keohane (1985, p. 62) has written that principles of the regime have to be 
weaker than national principles, as principles touch national sovereignty. This proposition 
confirms the reluctance towards changing principles, and, were a change to take place, it 
is probable that an external challenge would have provoked it. The effect of the German 
reunification on the Community and the desire to negotiate PU are examples of the impact 
of external events in pushing integration further.
During the 1970s and early 1980s, the modest achievements of the Community, 
the obvious malaise in the decision-making process and serious economic difficulties, 
dubbed Eurosclerosis, were caused by a weakening of the regime as EC member states 
turned their backs on cooperation to pursue their national interests. The development 
revealed much inconsistency between norms and principles of the Community and the 
behaviour of member states.
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2.2. Mem ber States' Motivations
By studying the Community regime, that is the Community mode of cooperation as spelt 
out by the acquis communautaire and politique, it is possible to learn more about the 
integration process between the EC member states. The focus is on the member states, not 
because the EC institutions are not important, but because the member states, as 
'sovereign' states, agreed initially to cooperate within the EC framework, and because the 
development in the Community is dependent on the dynamics between them. The 
argument takes account of the capacity of EC institutions to promote and enable further 
integration. The role of the institutions is defined as part of the dynamic process between 
the member states. The following study of Denmark's EC membership concentrates on 
intergovernmental negotiations between the EC member states, either in the context of 
enlargement or reform of the Treaties.
Since the aim of this thesis is to analyse Denmark's EC membership, it is 
necessary to distinguish individual member states as entities in the integration process. 
The link between the domestic political process and the behaviour of individual states at 
the level of cooperation is the point of focus in the case of Denmark.
Before studying this link, it is necessary to distinguish those characteristics in the 
Community regime which have an impact on the cooperation between member states, and 
to deduce from them some assumptions about the individual state's decision to participate 
in the regime, as well as the conditions under which it operates.
The fundamental characteristics of the structure of the Community regime are:
• An independent overarching goal of EU, guiding the development of European 
integration.
An independent legal framework, including the ECJ capable of ruling on 
infringements, non-action or breach of treaty provisions, and to interpret the 
meaning of the Treaties. Some of the Community's legal acts have direct effect in 
the member states' jurisdiction, creating a direct bond between the EC and the 
domestic level.
An independent control function carried out by the Commission to ensure that 
member states which break the rules or do not implement new provisions are
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detected.
• Independent institutions which propose and facilitate new legislation (the 
Commission) or legitimize the Community regime (the European Parliament).
• New provisions reached through a process of bargaining between the member
states in which the Commission and the European Parliament have a stake.
The Treaties, which stipulate the rules of adopting decisions, and in the case of 
majority voting, assign a weighted vote to each member.
The following assumptions can be made about the Community regime:
• States which choose to participate in the regime estimate that the gains of
cooperation will compensate for the loss of (formal) sovereignty.
Gains/losses can be material and direct through participation in Community 
policies, e.g. CAP, common commercial policy, the internal market, common 
fishing policy, and in the structural and regional funds.
They can be material and indirect by creating a level playing-field through 
cooperation in social and environmental policies, common transport and common 
energy policies; by enjoying greater weight in international negotiations, e.g. being 
represented by the EC in the GATT trade negotiations; and by enjoying improved 
predictability in national economic performance through intra-EC trade and a 
degree of economic convergence.
They can be immaterial and direct By sharing information and constant
interaction, the predictability about member states' actions increases as well as an 
individual member's safety (no more wars). Concerted action on the political level 
leads to increased influence in the international context. Being a member of the 
Community regime may stabilize the domestic political situation and prevent 
undesired developments.
53
They can be immaterial and indirect Being part of the European integration 
process may be an ideological objective. It directs future development in the 
member states towards peace, democracy, economic well-being and the respect of 
human rights.
• For a state which is a member, the costs to leave the Community regime are 
extremely high, both in material and immaterial terms.
• Despite the acquis communautaire and the EC institutions which are there to 
safeguard it, the relative influence and margin of manoeuvre are not equal between 
member states. The big member states have a greater capacity to influence the 
development of the EC, they have more to offer when negotiating in terms of side- 
payments and concessions, and they carry a greater weight in the 
intergovernmental aspects of the Community regime. Small states, however, gain 
disproportionately, both in direct and indirect terms, and benefit from a 
strengthening of the Community regime. There are, therefore, reasons to expect 
that small member states evaluate the regime cooperation differently and are more 
sensitive to changes in the acquis communautaire than bigger states as the balance 
between existing members in the EC may alter during the process of change. 
Small states in the EC have, however, taken a quite different view on the benefits 
of deeper economic and political integration and have evaluated their interest of 
deeper integration as either an opportunity (e.g. the Netherlands and Belgium) or 
as a threat (e.g. Denmark).
2.3. Individual Member States and the Community Regime
A Danish political scientist (Kelstrup, 1992, p. 23) has likened Denmark's position in the 
Community Ho an integration dilemma. The dilemma lies in the choice between 
proceeding w» Hh the development of integration and being 'entrapped', or not following 
and being 'abandoned'. He writes that 'I have never heard a German or a Frenchman 
claiming that either state has an integration dilemma in relation to the EC...while in small 
states such as Denmark this dilemma is self-evident'.
54
Kelstrup's concept of the integration dilemma seems to signal a fundamental aspect 
of Denmark's relation to the Community and European integration. By analysing the 
choice between being 'entrapped' or 'abandoned', it should be possible to determine the 
impact of the integration dilemma on Denmark's position as a member of the Community 
regime, and Danish attempts to reconcile the two extremes.
To undertake such an analysis, it is necessary to establish the factors behind the 
notion of being 'entrapped' or 'abandoned'. But first some considerations about the concept 
have to be taken into account: since the integration dilemma is perceived as such by 
Denmark, Danish perceptions about the EC and European integration have to be 
evaluated. The factors behind the perceptions cannot be expected to be evaluated 
identically, nor similarly, by actors on the Danish political scene. They have to be 
investigated separately in order to analyse the dynamic process of Danish EC policy.
The notion of being 'entrapped' is taken here to mean the costs of endorsing further 
integration. The reasons why further integration is perceived as inflicting costs on 
Denmark has to be investigated. The notion of being 'abandoned' is taken to mean the 
costs of having to leave (or being penalized in some other form) the Community regime. 
Originally, Community cooperation was perceived as benefiting Denmark, or at least it 
was felt that Danish interest would be damaged if Denmark stayed outside while the UK 
became a member of the EC.
2.4. Strategies o f Adaptation
Following this analysis, it should be possible to distinguish Danish strategies designed to 
reconcile domestic reactions to, and expectations of, EC membership with the progress 
of the Community regime. The strategies should explain both Denmark's behaviour as a 
partner on the EC level, and the process of adaptation taking place inside the country.
Denmark's adaptive behaviour in the international context and in bilateral relations 
with neighbouring countries has been analysed by Hans Mouritzen (1988). In an attempt 
to develop a general theory of adaptive politics, he establishes a link between strategies 
and modes of adaptation. Modes of adaptation are '..characterized by the value account
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that a regime11 is prepared to live with in relation to its salient environment..', and 
strategies are '..the regime representatives' action programmes vis-a-vis the environment, 
designed with the intention of safeguarding the regime values..' (p. 75). According to 
Mouritzen, it is possible to establish whether a value account is positive, negative, 
negligible or balanced by adding the value implications of the regime strategies in use. 
Mouritzen operates with five strategies: the strategy of concessions, the strategy of non­
commitment; the bastion strategy; the counter-weight strategy; and the strategy of detente 
and mediation (p. 76).
In the context of Denmark and the Community, Nikolaj Petersen uses in parts 
Mouritzen's concept of adaptation and his typology of strategies to explain the nature of 
Denmark's membership of the EC, in particular with regard to the popular rejection of the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Petersen (1993, p. 82) interprets the process of adaptation in 
foreign policy as the decision-makers' attempts to adapt to external and internal pressure 
in such a way that the national interests, as defined by the decision-makers, can be 
pursued in an optimal way. Depending on the strength of the external and internal 
pressure the adaption process takes a different character. If the internal factors are stronger 
than the external, the foreign policy takes a 'dominant' character, while in the opposite 
case, the foreign policy becomes adaptive, 'acquiescent'. If  the internal and external factors 
are equally strong, the foreign policy becomes 'balancing'. According to Petersen, the 
latter was the case with Danish EC policy during the period between 1990 and 1992, as 
external factors were dominant in the first phase while internal factors dominated in the 
second, with the referendum of June 1992 marking the turning point.
Petersen presents the strategies and techniques used by the policy of adaptation. 
Pointing to Mouritzen's typology, he states that the most important are the concession 
strategy, the condition strategy and the bastion strategy. The concession strategy implies 
the acceptance of an outcome which would not have been accepted without external 
pressure; the condition strategy implies the acceptance by external actors of an outcome 
they otherwise would not have accepted; and the bastion strategy implies the erection of 
conditions of a more ultimate character or prevention of future concessions.
nHere, not used in the sense of 'international regime', but '..as an actor that strives to 
safeguard each of the following values: its own autonomy; its identity; and its control over 
a certain territory, including its population and material assets' (pp. 41-2).
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Denmark's EC membership is evaluated in this study. The analysis attempts to cover the 
middle ground between studies of international cooperation and domestic politics. It 
concentrates on Denmark's adaptation to the process of integration within the Community 
regime, and the strategies designed to accommodate pressures from the domestic level by 
the rights and obligations implied in Community membership (acquis communautaire).
The study deals with three stages of the development of Denmark's membership 
of the EC: the first chapter covers the accession period, when, for more than ten years, 
Denmark considered membership of the EC and other alternatives to gaining market 
access in western Europe. In 1970, Denmark, together with the UK, Ireland and Norway, 
began to negotiate for EC membership. Denmark had, like the other applicants, to accept 
in full the acquis communautaire of the Community and to become increasingly familiar 
with the Community regime. The second chapter deals with the period of renewed 
dynamism within the EC leading up to the IGC on the SEA. The SEA was the first major 
reform of the existing Treaties and was an important step in strengthening the existing 
contract between the EC member states (the Community regime) towards European 
integration. The third chapter deals with the intergovernmental negotiations leading to the 
signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the difficult situation created by the Danish rejection of 
the Treaty in the referendum on 2 June 1992, and the Edinburgh Agreement. The IGCs 
on EMU and PU were attempts to change radically the Community regime.
The reason for focusing on these episodes in the Community is to analyse how 
Denmark dealt with the different features of the Community regime and the process of 
European integration on one hand, and domestic pressures on the other. The following 
questions will be asked in the study of the three episodes of Denmark's EC membership:
• How has Denmark responded to the Community regime, i.e. the acquis
communautaire, and the process of European integration? How has Denmark 
responded to changes within it, or of it?
• Why is European integration perceived as a dilemma in Denmark?
• What strategies were developed to deal with the integration dilemma?
• How has Denmark adapted to EC membership? How has Denmark adapted to the
four elements of the Community regime (principles, norms, rules and decision-
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making procedures)?
How has Denmark's position influenced the Community regime and how has the 
Community regime influenced Denmark's political system?
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Chapter 3
Denmark and the Enlargement o f  
the European Community
1961-1973
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L Introduction: In Search of a European Maifeet Solution12
Early attempts to establish a structured (federal) European order, which had resulted in 
the creation of the Council of Europe in 1949, were regarded with scepticism in Denmark. 
At the time, Denmark shared the views of the UK, Norway and Sweden in advocating 
cooperation in the form of trade arrangements of mutual benefit instead of integration, and 
in 1950 the Uniscan agreement was signed between these countries. In parallel the Nordic 
countries searched for forms of deepening cooperation, either by a defence union, a plan 
which never came off the ground as Denmark and Norway opted for membership of 
NATO, or by creating an internal Nordic market. During a session of the Nordic Council 
(created in 1952) in October 1954, Danish, Norwegian and Swedish ministers agreed to 
investigate the possibilities for a Nordic customs union. To that end, a ministerial 
committee and a committee of civil servants were established. In 1956, Finland became 
a member of the Nordic Council and took part in the preparatory work. The Nordic 
Council decided in 1957 that the Nordic customs union was compatible with a large 
European free trade area, but that the plans for its creation should be postponed until the 
work of the Maudling committee (see below) was finished.
After the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 
1952, a committee, led by the Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, was set up at 
the Messina conference in 1955. It was given the task of drawing up a report on the 
creation of a common market between the six signatories of the Treaty of Paris (Belgium, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). The 
committee's work resulted in the Treaty on the European Economic Community (EEC) 
signed between the Six in 1957 in Rome. In response to the efforts of these six 
continental European states, the UK, which had so far rejected participating in plans 
leading to closer integration and supranational institutions, proposed a plan, in 1956, to 
create a large European free trade area. The British plans were supported by the Nordic 
countries and other free-trade-minded small states. Denmark expressed satisfaction with 
plans for a large European free trade area, but was less pleased with the British reluctance
12Jacob A. Buksti, Dansk Markedspolitik: Historisk, kronologisk oversigt, Institute for 
Political Science, Arhus University, September 1973. Carsten Lehmann Sorensen, 
Danmark og EF i 1970eme, Borgen, 1978.
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to include provisions on agriculture. The negotiations were opened in 1957 under the 
auspices of the OEEC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation), and were led 
by the British Paymaster-General, Reginald Maudling. At the time, the Danish government 
sought assurances that agricultural products would be included in the agreement.
Plans to create a large European free trade area seemed to offer a solution to the 
political dilemma of the Danish market. Denmark, whose agricultural production 
amounted to approximately 25 per cent of GNP, was dependent on market access for its 
large agricultural surplus. Traditionally, the main Danish markets for agricultural products 
were Germany and the UK and for industrial goods, the Nordic countries, especially 
Sweden, were becoming increasingly important. The policy, which in the Danish debate 
was known as the 'wider market solution' embracing the continental European countries, 
the UK and the Nordic countries, was aimed at fulfilling the requirements of market 
access. The policy was criticized by agricultural interest groups representing farmers with 
large holdings, which argued that only inside the EC could Danish farmers enjoy the 
advantages of the agricultural policy being set up among the Six; neither the large 
European free trade area, nor a Nordic customs union could offer similar favourable 
terms.
When the Maudling committee's negotiations broke down in 1958 because of 
disagreement between France and the UK over the organization of the free trade area, a 
British proposal was launched to create a free trade area, the EFTA, composed of the 
European countries outside the EC. This plan put Denmark in a dilemma, as becoming 
a member of either the EC or EFTA would imply restricted access to either German or 
British markets. The Danish government announced in parliament that Denmark was 
seeking a way to resume the negotiations between the EC and other OEEC countries so 
that the trade war threatening Europe could be avoided. It also confirmed that an internal 
Nordic market including agricultural products could not be expected, and that plans for 
a Nordic customs union were to be put aside during the negotiations on EFTA.13
At the end of the 1950s, Denmark saw three options for its market policy: 
isolation, membership of the EC, or membership of EFTA, none of which provided an 
entirely satisfactory solution.
13Buksti, Dansk Markedspolitik, p. 11.
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Isolation was not a real alternative as Denmark was dependent on the import of 
basic resources and the export of industrial and agricultural goods.
Membership of the EC, advocated openly only by the farmers' organizations and 
the Liberal Party, was not on the agenda of the other parties. The ruling Social 
Democratic Party was sceptical about EC membership because of both the characteristics 
of the Community, and because of the British position which remained incompatible with 
EC membership. Although Danish industry, which exported two-thirds of its produce to 
west European markets, needed an arrangement which could guarantee tariff and quota- 
free export for Danish goods, it was not keen on Danish membership of the EC because 
trade would then take place under the provisions of the EC customs union. A report, the 
'shock report', published in 1958 by the Danish Foreign Ministry, argued that Danish 
industry was protected to such extent that a customs union could endanger more than 40 
per cent of the industrial production.
Membership of EFTA, although not satisfactory for Danish agriculture, was left 
as the only possible alternative. Denmark signed the EFTA Convention in Stockholm in 
1960, after having sought assurances from other EFTA members that agriculture would 
be included in the agreement and that EFTA was the first step towards an all-European 
free trade area. Denmark had already signed a bilateral trade agreement in 1958 with West 
Germany to ensure market access for its agricultural products, and it now sought German 
assurances that membership of EFTA would not be perceived as an unfriendly act.14
II. Denmark's Route to EC Membership
1. European Deceptions and the Search for a Nordic Alternative
In economic terms, the Danish government knew before signing the Stockholm 
Convention in 1960 that EFTA would not be satisfactory for the agricultural sector. In 
political terms, the division of Europe into different trade systems worried Danish policy­
makers as it was seen as a threat to the security cohesion among the member states of 
NATO. But opinions on which alternative could best serve Danish interests varied across 
the socio-political spectrum.
14Buksti, Dansk Markedspolitik, p. 14.
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The farmers' central association (Landbrugsrddet), supported by the Liberal Party, 
advocated membership of the EC primarily because of the benefits set out in the emerging 
agricultural policy of the EC.
Danish industry had less unified views on a European trading framework. 
Although isolation was not possible, a free trade arrangement could have a negative 
impact on the less competitive sectors. The Conservative Party at first reflected the 
hesitating position of industry, but finally decided to advocate membership of EFTA.
Small farmers' organizations (Husmandsforeningeme) did not share the interests 
of farmers with large holdings. They and the party associated with them, the Radical 
Liberal Party, were against Danish EC membership, and advocated closer links with the 
Nordic countries. They therefore supported membership of EFTA as long as a Nordic 
alternative was not available.
The labour movement was against EC membership and in favour of Nordic 
cooperation perse, which, they argued, could also be pursued in the framework of EFTA. 
The Social Democratic Party, particularly its leadership, was not as negative to EC 
membership as the trade unions, but had to respect their views. Being in government from 
1953 to 1968, often without its own majority in parliament, the Social Democratic Party 
also had to take into account the opinion of the Socialist People's Party, on which it had 
been dependent for parliamentary support since 1960. This party was categorically against 
EC membership.15
1.1. The First Application and Negotiations with the EC, 1961-62
When the UK government under Harold Macmillan indicated that a British application
for EC membership was imminent, the basis for the Danish market policy changed.
Denmark, which was not satisfied with the progress in the agricultural area within EFTA,
saw the prospects of having its two main importers - the UK and West Germany - both
in the EC offering great opportunities if Denmark also joined, but disaster if it remained
outside.
In a speech to the NATO Ministerial Council in May 1961, the Danish Foreign
15Lehmann Sorensen, Danmark og EF i 1970eme, pp. 36-8.
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Minister, J.O. Krag,16 welcomed the British move, adding that if the UK entered accession 
negotiations, Denmark 'would also want to initiate such negotiations with the EEC'.17 On 
31 July 1961, the British government stated its intention to seek EC membership in the 
House of Commons. A few days later, on 4 August, the Danish government's decision to 
apply for membership was endorsed by the Folketing. In a parliamentary debate, the 
Foreign Minister argued that only full membership of the Community could solve Danish 
problems, especially those in the agricultural area, and give the country access to the 
Community decision-making process. He listed the conditions for Danish EC membership: 
accession together with the UK and for the interests of other EFTA states, especially the 
Nordic, to be taken into account.18 On 10 August 1961, the Danish and British 
applications for EC membership were officially presented to the Community.
The decision to seek membership of the EC on these conditions won the approval 
of all political parties in parliament with the exception of the Socialist People's Party. The 
reaction of groups outside parliament was mixed.
The farmers appeared on a united front in favour, since the prospect of a British 
accession to the EC also convinced small farmers of the necessity for Danish 
membership.19
The position of industry was still hesitant, as opinions on EC membership varied 
depending on the sector in question, and as it was on the whole satisfied with the EFTA 
agreement. Prospects of a British entry to the EC, however, made the President of the 
Federation of Danish Industry, I.C. Tygesen, adopt a slightly more favourable attitude to 
EC membership.20 An underlying reason for the shift in attitude was the rapid
16Jens Otto Krag, bom 1914, dead 1978, MP for the Social Democratic Party 1947-73, 
Minister of Commerce 1947-50, Minister without portfolio 1953, Economics Minister 
1955-57, Minister for External Economics 1957-58, Foreign Minister 1958-62, Prime 
Minister 1962-68 and 1971-72, Head of the EC Mission to the USA 1974-75.
1?Frances Nicholson and Roger East, From Six to Twelve: The Enlargement o f the 
European Communities, Longman, Harlow, 1987, p. 102.
18Buksti, Dansk Markedspolitik, p. 19.
19Lehmann Sorensen, Danmark o gEF i 1970eme, pp. 58-9.
20Buksti, Dansk Markedspolitik, p. 24.
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development of Danish industrial production since the late 1950s, which had made 
industry more dependent of the large markets of the EEC and more able to compete. A 
governmental report on the economic implications of Danish EC membership in 1961 
stated that 20 per cent of the industrial output was likely to be at risk if Denmark acceded 
to the Community, compared to the 40 per cent predicted in the 1958 report.21
The labour movement was split, but in the end the Social Democratic Party was 
able to turn the Confederation of Danish Trade Unions in favour of the membership 
application on the basis of the conditions the government had arranged. The Norwegian 
decision in May 1962 to seek EC membership, and the Swedish decision to seek 
association with the EC, were even more important in winning over the trade unions and 
the population.
Popular movements against the EC emerged during the early 1960s. Their central 
organization sharply criticized statements made by the Social Democratic Foreign 
Minister, Per Haskkerup,22 at a ministerial meeting with the EC Six in 1962, in which he 
stressed Denmark's willingness to participate in the Community's political cooperation. His 
statement came as a great surprise to the Commission, and was undoubtedly directed to 
those in the Community who doubted Denmark's acceptance of the political dimension 
of EC membership.23
On 14 January 1963, General de Gaulle declared that the UK's accession to the 
Community would radically change its character, as the General had the impression that 
the UK was unwilling to accept the conditions for EC membership that were crucial for 
France. The General's statement, which turned into a veto shortly thereafter, made 
Denmark's simultaneous accession with the UK impossible. Prime Minister Krag, who had 
been offered the possibility of Denmark alone becoming a member of the EC by the 
General during a visit to Paris from 26-29 January, clarified Denmark's position in 
London on 30 January by declaring, after consultations with the British, that Danish
21Lehmann Sorensen, Danmark og EF i 1970eme, p. 59.
22Per Haekkerup, bom 1915, dead 1979, MP for the Social Democratic Party 1950-79,
Chairman for the Social Democratic Parliamentary Group 1966-68, Foreign Minister 1962- 
66, Economics Minister 1971-73 and 1975-77, Chairman for the Danish Mission to the 
United Nations General Assembly 1961-66.
23Buksti, Dansk Markedspolitik, pp. 23-4.
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accession to the EC without the UK was inconceivable, and that the government's 
objective remained accession to the EC as soon as possible together with the UK, Norway 
and other EFTA states.24
During the following years, Denmark made several unsuccessful attempts to extend 
the EFTA agreement to agricultural products, all of which failed because of British 
reluctance to set up an agricultural trading system supported by other Nordic countries 
(which wanted to protect their vulnerable farming sectors). Denmark's frustration with the 
progress within EFTA increased in 1964 when the UK introduced an import surcharge of 
15 per cent on most industrial imports. The UK was criticized for breaking the rules of 
the Stockholm Convention and was urged to revoke the decision.25
1.2. The Second Application, 1966-67
The Danish government cautiously continued to seek openings which could lead to the 
reopening of accession negotiations. The government, along with the Radical Liberal Party 
and the Conservative Party, stressed that any solution to Denmark's market problem had 
to be found in conjunction with the UK or other Nordic countries, while the Liberal Party 
argued that the time had come for Denmark to seek EC membership on its own.26
During 1966 and early 1967, the British government under Harold Wilson explored 
the possibilities of reopening the negotiations with the EC Six on UK membership. The 
British government decided in May 1967 that the time was ripe for a second membership
24Nicholson and East, From the Six to the Twelve, p. 103. Buksti, Dansk 
Markedspolitik, p. 24. The event was confirmed in an interview in Copenhagen on 26 
October 1993.
25T. Clive Archer, 'Britain and Scandinavia: Their Relations within EFTA', 
Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. XI, No. 1, 1979, pp. 1-23. The author argues that the 
reason why the Danes (and the Norwegians) were more upset by the British decision than 
the Swedes was that 'the weaker states had the most to lose if the rules of EFTA could 
be broken at will by any member without protest.... The smaller states were particularly 
aware of the value of any such institution in EFTA for applying pressure and for mutual 
consultations: a value that was nullified if the largest member attached little importance 
to it', p. 7.
26Nicholson and East, From the Six to the Twelve, pp. 103-104.
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application, which was subsequently presented on 11 May.27
On the same day, the Danish government, which had been following the situation 
closely, opened for discussion in parliament the question of a second application for EC 
membership. Parliament endorsed the government's recommendation to resume accession 
negotiations with the EC together with the UK with 150 votes in favour and the 20 MPs 
from the Socialist People's Party voting against. The second Danish application for 
membership was presented by Denmark's Ambassador in Brussels on 11 May.
Shortly thereafter, an explanatory memorandum from the Danish Foreign Ministry 
was presented to the Commission President, Jean Rey. The memorandum stressed 
Denmark's willingness to accept all obligations arising from the Community Treaties and 
all regulations taken under them; its wish to participate in further economic and political 
development of the Community; and its hope that other Nordic countries would be able 
to negotiate satisfactory arrangements with the Community. The memorandum noted 
several technical questions which were likely to arise during the forthcoming negotiations. 
It pointed out that Danish agriculture would be adjusted before the accession so that no 
transitional period would be necessary for agricultural products and that Denmark only 
wanted a short transitional period for industrial goods. It expressed the wish that the 
Danish accession negotiations be parallel to the British, with the view to a simultaneous 
accession of the two countries.28
In July 1967, the Swedish government decided to seek some form of association 
with the EC and the Norwegian government decided to follow Denmark in applying a 
second time for EC membership.29
The British application, however, was again met with French opposition. General 
de Gaulle declared on two occasions, in May and November 1967, that some economic 
and political factors made the UK's entry into the Community impossible, and that the 
very survival of the Community could be put at risk. The other five member states did
27Jens Christensen, 'Danmark, Norden og EF 1963-72', in Birgit Niichel Thomsen 
(ed.), The Odd Mem Out? Danmark og den Europceiske integration 1948-1992, Odense 
University Studies in History and Social Sciences, Vol. 169, Odense Universitetsforlag, 
Odense, 1993, pp. 135-52.
28Nicholson and East, From the Six to the Twelve, p. 104.
29Buksti, Dansk Markedspolitik, pp. 35-6.
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not share the French view, and enlargement became an increasingly contentious issue 
between the Six. In December 1967, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers, the 
diverging views between France and the Five came into the open as the Council was 
unable to agree to open accession negotiations with the applicant countries, but decided 
to let the applications remain on the agenda.
The new Danish right-wing government (from 1 February 1968), a coalition 
between Liberals, Conservatives and Radical Liberals, assessed the situation after the 
second French rebuff of the British membership application. The government expected 
that it would take a long time before enlargement could be agreed between the Six as 
President de Gaulle had been re-elected in December 1965 for a seven year period. The 
previous Social Democratic Prime Minister had in 1967 discussed with high officials in 
the Foreign Ministry the options in the event of a second French veto. They agreed that 
an enlarged Nordic economic cooperation aimed at preparing these countries for EC 
membership was a good alternative, albeit risky. If the initiative failed, however, Nordic 
cooperation would had been tried and this might convince opponents that there were no 
Nordic alternatives to EC membership.30
The government knew EFTA was a good solution for Danish industry, but had 
little to offer the agricultural sector. Steps in the Community towards setting up the CAP 
were making progress and its implications were already felt by Danish farmers in terms 
of decreasing export to the Six. The right-wing government, however, decided to try to 
promote cooperation within EFTA and strengthen the ties with the Nordic countries while 
retaining the EC membership application. Earlier proposals from the Liberal Party on 
Danish membership without the UK were forgotten in the name of government cohesion, 
as the Radical Liberals were against while the Conservatives had never showed support 
for this alternative.31
30Jens Christensen, Danmark, Nordek og EF 1963-72', in Dan Larsen, summary of 
contributions and debate at the conference, Danmark og den europceiske integration i 
efterkrigstiden, 10-12 February 1992, Statens humanistiske forskningsrad, Copenhagen,
1993. The events were confirmed in an interview on 26 October 1993.
31Buksti, Dansk Markedspolitik, p. 37.
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1.3. The Nordek Negotiations
At the Nordic Council's meeting in February 1968, the Danish Prime Minister, Hilmar 
Baunsgaard,32 set forward a proposal to create closer Nordic economic cooperation aiming 
at preparing the Nordic countries for future accession to, or association with the EC. He 
suggested that a Nordic IGC be convened, which the other Nordic ministers accepted.33
The IGC was convened in April 1968, during which it was agreed to continue the 
work to find common positions on a range of issues, including a Nordic customs union, 
Nordek. A working committee presented its report on wider Nordic economic cooperation 
in January 1969, concluding that the centrepiece of Nordic cooperation would be a 
customs union, but that it should not prevent the possibility of EC membership.
In Denmark, the plans for a Nordic customs union were received with satisfaction 
from all the parties in parliament, except for the Left Socialist Party which remained 
critical. The trade unions, which had advocated closer Nordic cooperation for some time, 
welcomed the Nordek project, while the Confederation of Danish Industry was very 
critical to plans for a customs union. The farmers' central association warned on several 
occasions that the CAP had already inflicted severe damage on Danish agricultural exports 
to the Six, and that a Nordic customs union would not meet Danish farmers' needs for 
European markets. It called with increasing impatience for the government to investigate 
the consequences of Danish EC membership without the UK. The Minister for Market 
Affairs, Poul Nyboe Andersen,34 found himself in a difficult position, having to satisfy 
demands from within his own Liberal party, while balancing the interests of the coalition 
government holding a pro-Nordic line. The government never failed to point out that by
32Hilmar Baunsgaard, bom 1920, dead 1989, MP for the Radical Liberal Party 1957- 
77, Chairman for the Radical Liberal Parliamentary Group 1971-75, Minister for External 
Trade 1961 and 1962-64, Prime Minister 1968-71. After retiring from politics, he held a 
number of appointments to the boards of Danish companies.
33Frantz Wendt, Danmark, Norden og EF, Udenrigspolitiske skrifter, Serie 14, No. 1, 
Det Udenrigspolitiske Selskab, Copenhagen, 1979, pp. 12-13.
34Poul Nyboe Andersen, bom 1913, Professor in economics at Copenhagen Business 
School, MP for the Liberal Party 1971-77, Minister for Economics, Minister for Market 
Affairs and Nordic relations 1968-71, Minister for Economics and External Trade 1973-75, 
Chairman of the board for Andelsbanken 1976-81, appointed to the board of Danish 
companies and associations.
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promoting Danish membership of an enlarged Community, its objective of a wide 
European market would be made possible.
During autumn 1969, the work on the treaty establishing Nordek reached a 
stalemate. Different policy interests in the Nordic countries made it impossible to find a 
satisfactory compromise, and when changes in French politics suggested that the deadlock 
on the question of EC enlargement could soon be overcome, the political objective of 
Nordek was contested. The Finnish government clarified in January 1970 that it retained 
the right to withdraw from the Nordek negotiations if a Nordic country decided to 
participate in formal negotiations with the EC, as Finland's political situation necessitated 
that Nordek remained an entirely Nordic affair.
The Danish government was heavily criticized in parliament by the Social 
Democrats for failing to show leadership at a crucial stage of the Nordek negotiations. 
The government maintained in February 1970, however, that Denmark was now closer 
than ever before to realize its dual-market political objective: EC membership together 
with the UK and close Nordic cooperation.35
At the meeting of the Nordic Council from 7-12 February 1970 in Reykjavik, four 
Nordic heads of government unanimously endorsed the proposal on the Nordek Treaty, 
with a view to finalizing the formal Treaty for signature and ratification before the 
summer. On 24 March, the Finnish government announced suddenly that it would not sign 
the Nordek Treaty, explaining its decision to withdraw by pointing at the undermining of 
the Treaty's independence and longevity by the intention of some Nordic countries to start 
negotiating with the EC for membership. When the Danish Prime Minister Baunsgaard 
complained that the Finnish decision was both unexpected and annoying, the Finnish 
Foreign Minister, Vaino Leskinen, replied that 'we have finally to realize that foreign 
trade is also foreign politics. The creation of economic blocks leads to the creation of 
political blocks.'36
Denmark's position in the Nordek negotiation was characterized by its dual-market 
political objective: securing closer cooperation with its Nordic neighbours while keeping 
the door to EC membership open. The Danish government was convinced that this policy
35Buksti, Dansk Markedspolitik, pp. 43-8.
36Frantz Wendt, Danmark, Norden og EF, pp. 18-19.
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would enable it to forward its fundamental foreign policy objective: to promote, and 
hopefully create, a solution for a large European market. In practice, the objective was 
hardly realistic, but served the four established parties as the main consensus of Danish 
foreign policy.
The Nordek exercise showed that Danish politicians had not realized, or had not 
wanted to realize, the political pressures under which Finland conducted its foreign policy. 
Finland's representatives on the other hand must have registered the fast development 
which had taken place during the EC in the latter half of 1969, leading to the Summit of 
The Hague in December 1969. The explanation why the Nordek negotiations failed is 
found in the fundamental difference in political and strategic constraints and the 
composition of the economic interests of the Nordic states.
Toivo Miljan commented on Denmark's decision to put forward the plan to set up 
Nordek as fulfilling a two-fold purpose: to strengthen the economic relations between the 
Nordic countries which would have been to the advantage of Denmark while it awaited 
the Community deadlock to end, and to strengthen Denmark's bargaining position vis-a-vis 
the Community through its participation in a strong, economic cooperation with the 
Nordic countries.37
2. Accession Negotiations, 1970-71
In 1969, after the departure of General de Gaulle, Georges Pompidou won the approval 
of the French population in the June presidential election. Georges Pompidou's position 
on EC enlargement was from the outset less well known, but was not as categorically 
sceptical as that of the General. Soon after taking office, Pompidou committed himself 
to a European summit to solve the difference of opinions between the Five and France 
about the future development of the Community. On the question of enlargement he said 
'we have no objection in principle against a possible accession by the UK. But we do 
think it right that the Six should first reach agreement amongst ourselves.'38
37Toivo Miljan, 'Denmark: The Anxious European', in The Reluctant Europeans: The 
Attitudes o f the Nordic Countries towards European Integration, C. Hurst and Company, 
London, 1977, p. 178.
38Quoted in Uwe Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion, Thames and Hudson, London, 
1973, p. 69.
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At The Hague Summit on 1-2 December 1969, the French Foreign Minister, 
Maurice Schumann, spelled out a number of conditions on the Community's own 
development which were accepted by the other Five, conditions which had to be settled 
before accession negotiations could be opened with the applicant countries. He insisted 
on the necessity to strengthen the Community through a three-fold plan of action - 
Tachevement, Vapprofondissement, Telargissement - completion, deepening and 
enlargement. Completion was shorthand for finding a solution to the Community's 
financial arrangement, for which the Six agreed to endow the EC with a system of own 
resources. Deepening concerned integration in the political and economic and monetary 
areas. To this effect two committees were set up under the chairmanship of Etienne 
Davignon and Pierre Werner to produce reports on the prospects of political cooperation 
and EMU. The reports were presented to the Council of Ministers during the course of 
1970.
The Six agreed that the basic condition that the applicant states had to accept 
before becoming members of the EC was the acquis communautaire: the Treaties 
establishing the Communities and the decisions which had been taken under them, 
including their political objectives. The summit adopted a formula on the procedure of 
negotiations which, as opposed to the 1961-62 negotiations, was to be conducted between 
the Community, represented by the Presidency, and the four applicants.39
The Danish government, at the time involved in negotiations on Nordek, was 
immediately prepared to take up negotiations with the EC. The Minister for Market 
Affairs, Poul Nyboe Andersen, reiterated the resolutions adopted by parliament in May 
1967 and May 1968 empowering the government to resume accession negotiations on EC 
membership together with the UK, and expressed his hopes that other Nordic countries 
would be able to establish satisfactory relations with the Community.40
The accession negotiations between Denmark and the Community, less contentious than 
those of the UK and Norway, were opened on 30 June 1970 at a ministerial meeting
39Christian Franck, 'New Ambitions: From The Hague to Paris Summits (1969-72)', 
in Roy Pryce (ed.), The Dynamics o f European Union, Croom Helm Ltd, Beckenham, 
1987, pp. 130-48.
40Folketingstidende, Copenhagen, No. 25. Cols. 3362-3, 5 February 1970.
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between the Community and the four applicants in Luxembourg. Denmark was well 
prepared for negotiating as in 1966 a committee of civil servants, the Market Secretariat, 
had been established to monitor developments within the EC and produce reports on the 
progress of the Danish economy. The reports assessed the points of divergence between 
developments in Denmark and the EC, and how Danish legislation could be adapted to 
be compatible with Community rules. The preparatory work proved to be very useful for 
the government and the civil service in establishing Danish positions in the accession 
negotiations.41
The first negotiations with the Community in 1961-62 had already set the 
parameters for Denmark's accession to the EC. In some areas the fact-finding period was 
already accomplished, as Danish EC policy had not changed much in the intermediate 
period, and a series of legislative adaptation had been carried out to ensure that new laws 
as well as existing laws were compatible with EC legislation.42 During the intermediate 
period the Danish economy had developed in the direction of the Community, with the 
result that the harmful effects of adaptation predicted in the early 1960s were no longer 
valid. Fear of mass unemployment caused by adjustment problems for the Danish 
industry, one of the major worries of the trade unions, was no longer part of the public 
debate and the agricultural policy had been adapted to the Community system whereby 
no adjustment was necessary. There were, however, three areas of contention during the 
first accession negotiations which were also difficult at the second: the common Nordic 
labour market; the provisions for free transfer of capital; and the fear of harmonization 
of social policies.43
The common labour market between the Nordic countries, which had been 
established in 1954, was incompatible with free movement of labour of the EC which 
prescribes preferential employment for EC workers. An abrogation of the Nordic labour 
market regulation, however, would have given Danish anti-EC groups a powerful
41Toivo Miljan, 'Denmark: The Anxious European', in The Reluctant Europeans, p.
179.
42Interview in Copenhagen on 26 October 1993.
43Toivo Miljan, 'Denmark: The Anxious European', in The Reluctant Europeans, pp. 
173-5.
argument in the forthcoming debate. In the accession negotiations a solution was found 
which gave Denmark the right to a system of double preferences, making it possible to 
comply with the provisions of the Nordic labour market and EC legislation.
Free movement of capital was not a real problem in the negotiations. Nevertheless, 
popular fears that traditionally high interest rates would attract foreign speculation and 
disrupt the capital market emerged and influenced the Danish debate. The subject was 
dropped in the 1970 negotiations, as, according to a preliminary report on the terms of 
accession, it was expected that Danish interest rates would converge, i.e. decrease, during 
the transition period.44 This assurance did not prevent free movement of capital becoming 
a contentious issue in the referendum debate.
In the area of social policy, problems emerged because of different systems of 
funding. In Denmark, social security was largely funded by indirect taxes, while in the 
Community the system was based on employer and employee contributions. The 
Community did not allow special provision for Denmark in this area for the rules already 
in place in the EC, feeding anti-EC arguments about the loss of national independence in 
the economic and social areas which would lead to the dismantling of the Danish welfare 
system.
With the experiences from the first round of accession negotiations in mind, the Minister 
for Market Affairs Nyboe Andersen, had formulated his opening speech on 30 June 
around the acceptance of the acquis communautaire which had been picked up in the 
political discourse after the negotiations of 1961-63. While accepting the political 
objectives, the minister added that Denmark had noted with satisfaction that foreign 
political cooperation would be carried out outside the institutions of the Community, and 
that it regarded political cooperation of this kind as a natural consequence of an extensive 
degree of integration.
The Danish government wished for no period of transition, and was willing to 
assume the obligations of membership from the time of ratification of the accession treaty. 
It recognized, however, that other applicant countries would demand some form of
44Markedssekretariatet, No tat. Det forelobige resultat afforhandlingeme om Danmarks 
medlemskab a f De europceiske Fcellesskaber, Udenrigsministeriet, 16 July 1971, p. 14.
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transition period and that the Community was in agreement with this. The Danish minister 
accepted to establish the terms of transition during the negotiations, but hoped that 
negotiations would be confined to a minimum and would concentrate on the customs 
union, transitional arrangements for agriculture, economic and monetary cooperation, the 
Faeroe Islands and Greenland and the EC institutions. He underlined the Danish 
government's wish to maintain and develop closer Nordic cooperation, and expected the 
Community to agree that this was not only a natural policy for a Nordic country, but 
could also serve common European interests.45
The Danish accession posed no political problems, nor any fundamental problems 
of substance for the Community. Had it not been for problems in the negotiations with 
the UK over the budget contribution, transitional arrangements and the Commonwealth 
agricultural export, and with Norway over the fisheries policy, Denmark's negotiations 
would have been accomplished within a few months. Some of the issues in the Danish 
negotiations, such as the transition periods for agricultural and industrial products and 
budget contribution, were delayed because of the direct link to the agreement between the 
Six and the UK. This in itself was no disadvantage from a Danish point of view, as a 
recurrent theme in the debate during the negotiations was the worry that the British 
negotiations would break down while the Danish were concluded successfully. Regardless 
of whether the Community would have accepted the accession of only one or two of the 
applicants, accession without the UK would probably not have been politically possible 
in Denmark.
In the summer of 1971, the Danish Minister for Market Affairs, Nyboe Andersen, 
concluded after a meeting at ministerial level that the main difficulties of the negotiations 
were overcome. The main points which remained to be solved were the terms of transition 
for agricultural and industrial products and Denmark's budget contribution. The solutions 
found later in the year corresponded to Danish requirements: immediately after accession 
Denmark would be subject to the mechanism of the CAP while the adaptation to the 
Community's price level would take place over a five-year period; and contributions to 
the Community budget would be subject to a digressive rebate making 1978 the first year
45Udenrigsministeriet,'0konomi- og markedsminister P. Nyboe Andersens tale pa det 
forste mode mellem De europaeiske Faellesskaber og de fire kandidatlande i Luxembourg 
den 30 juli 1970', in Supplerende Redogorelse: Utviklingen i 1970, Appendix 1/1, 1971.
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in which Denmark would pay in full - a share of 2.42 per cent of the total budget (which 
was less than Denmark's share of the GNP of the enlarged Community).46
Other questions of solely Danish importance, such as the acquisition of property 
by persons not permanently resident in Denmark and special provisions for the Faeroe 
Islands and Greenland, were also solved within the framework of the negotiations by 
arrangements which were in some respects not compatible with the acquis communautaire 
of the EC.47
More troublesome at the domestic level were the Community's plans in the 
political and economic and monetary areas, which were criticized publicly, and other 
issues, not part of the negotiations, which were brought into the debate by opponents, e.g. 
the impact of EC membership on the social security system and the welfare state, in 
particular the policy of redistribution of income.
A statement by the Danish Minister of Foreign Economic Affairs, Ivar Norgaard48 
(of the newly appointed Social Democratic minority government), at a meeting of 
ministerial level between Denmark and the EC on 9 November 1971, sparked a crisis in 
the Danish debate. In an attempt to defuse Danish worries over the possibility of EMU, 
the minister pointed out that the Danish government believed it essential to retain the 
possibility of carrying out national policies to ensure a more just distribution of income 
and greater equality and personal freedom for the individual citizen. The minister added 
that the Danish government could adhere to the resolution on EMU, but only on the 
condition that 'our participation in the planned cooperation must not prevent the Danish 
parliament from deciding an economic policy, including a tax policy and a social policy
46'Det danske forhandlingsresultat', in Traktat om oprettelse a f Det europceiske 
okonomiske Fcellesskab, EF-forlaget, Holte, 1971.
47Lehmann Sorensen, Danmark og EF i 1970eme, p. 77.
48Ivar Norgaard, bom 1922, MP for the Social Democratic Party since 1966, Member 
of the Social Democratic Party's executive committee from 1961, Economics Minister 
1965-68, 1979-1981 and 1981-82, Minister for Foreign Economic Affairs 1967-68, 1971, 
1972-73 and 1975-77, Minister for External Trade 1977-78, Minister for the Environment 
1978-79, Member of the European Parliament 1974-75 and Chairman of the Market 
Committee since 1991.
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which will ensure greater equality between the various groups of the population'.49
The statement, intended to sooth public fears, had the opposite effect. It led to an 
uproar among the anti-EC groups, which interpreted the minister's statement as proof that 
Danish welfare policy, including social policy and taxes, would be decided in Brussels 
if Denmark became a member of the EC. The storm was only somewhat calmed down 
by a reassuring statement from the Commission's President, Jean Rey, during a visit to 
Denmark.
The accession negotiations between Denmark and the EC were concluded in 
December 1971. The government was empowered to sign the accession treaty after 
parliament had endorsed the negotiating result by 141 votes to 32 on 16 December 1971. 
The previous day, when outlining the result of the negotiations, the Minister of Foreign 
Economic Affairs, Ivar Norgaard, had assured parliament that the terms of entry were 
satisfactory for Denmark. Other Nordic countries were to forge fruitful relations with the 
EC and cooperation with the Nordic countries was compatible with Denmark's obligations 
as a member of the Community. Concerning the Community's plans on further 
development in specific issue-areas, such as industrial, social, environmental and regional 
policies, the minister found them all acceptable to Denmark, and in the case of social 
policy there were no provisions of harmonization among the existing EC member states. 
On the subject of plans for the creation of EMU, Ivar Norgaard found it natural for 
applicant countries to make their views known to the Community. It was in this light that 
his statement at the ministerial meeting on 11 November had to be seen, but myths that 
the President of the Council of Ministers, Aldo Moro, had warned Denmark not to expect 
to be able to pursue national economic and social policies were false. On the plans for 
political cooperation, the minister pointed out that there was no agreement among the Six 
where an institutionally structured cooperation was implied, which Denmark opposed, or 
regular consultation between the Six, which Denmark welcomed. In conclusion, the 
minister pointed out that an enlargement to include the UK, Ireland, Norway and Denmark 
would strengthen the democratic forces in the Community. This, together with the 
strengthening in the EC's economy, would create new possibilities to promote peace and
49Udenrigsministeriet, Statement by the Danish Minister fo r  Foreign Economic Affairs, 
Ivar Norgaard, at the Meeting at Ministerial Level between Denmark and the European 
Communities, Copenhagen, 9 November 1971.
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detente in the world.50
The accession treaties were signed by the four applicant countries on 22 January 
1972 after tough negotiations on fisheries had been concluded between Norway and the 
EC.
3. The Debate on Danish Membership of the EC
When the Danish Prime Minister, J.O. Krag, signed the Danish accession treaty in January 
1972, he stated that 'more than ten years have passed since I, in October 1961, as Foreign 
Minister on behalf of the Danish government, presented Denmark's application for 
membership of the European Communities...We had, admittedly, not expected that it 
would take so long to reach the end of the road. But we have not been waiting in silence. 
Hardly any question has been discussed so much...At every opening of the Danish 
parliament, in all major parliamentary debates in Denmark, in all ministerial meetings of 
EFTA since its start, in the Nordic Council, in the Council of Europe, at visits to the 
European capitals, one of the principal subjects has been how the economic split-up of 
Western Europe could be overcome.'51
The words of the Prime Minister illustrated the Danish pursuit of a wide European 
market solution which had been the dominant feature of the political debate in Denmark 
since the first attempts to create political and economic cooperation in Europe. Denmark, 
whose traditional foreign policy orientation was formulated on the basis of universal, 
Atlantic, European and Nordic considerations, sought to find ways to overcome the 
perceived artificial and detrimental economic division of western Europe. This view 
decided Danish foreign economic policy in the 1960s, when different, and from the 
outside somewhat contradictory, options of cooperation and integration were pursued. EC 
membership was the undisputed option only for the Liberal Party and the farmers' 
organizations. Other political parties, interest groups and popular movements had many 
diverging views on the benefits of Danish membership of the EC. Subsequently, only EC 
membership on the condition of the UK's simultaneous accession, and association
50Udenrigsministeriet, Udenrigsokonomiministems tale i folketinget den 15. december 
1971 vedrorende udvidelsesforhandlingeme mellem Danmark og De europceiske 
Fcellesskaber, Copenhagen, 1972.
51Quoted in Nicholson and East, From the Six to the Twelve, pp. 112-13.
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arrangements between the Nordic countries and the EC, could rally strong political 
support.
3.1. The Political Parties
The Social Democratic Party has always played a key role in Danish political life. The 
party held power between 1953-1968, 1971-73 and 1975-1982, and has been the biggest 
political party (in percentage of votes) in Denmark since 1924.52 The Social Democratic 
Party was traditionally a working class party with strong institutionalized links to the trade 
unions.53
Although it was under the coalition between Social Democrats and Radical 
Liberals that the decision of 1961 to apply for EC membership was taken, the Social 
Democratic Party had laid down an EC policy whose main focus was on a large market 
in western Europe, not European integration. Carsten Holbraad argues that 'the Social 
Democrats, always the largest and most of the time also the governing party, have exerted 
a particularly strong influence both on the security, alliance, and defence policy, and on 
the Community policy of the country1.54 The Social Democratic Party, however influential 
in formulating early EC policies, was weakened by an internal division on EC 
membership which became increasingly troublesome as the debate developed. The 
division went right through the party and trade union movement while there was 
consensus on cooperation with other Nordic countries. The feeling of closeness to their 
Nordic counterparts was enhanced by frequent contacts and shared views on economic and 
social policies. The Social Democratic Party, however, was not in ideological terms the 
strongest advocate of a united North. Both the Socialist People's Party and the Radical 
Liberals pursued an even more pro-Nordic policy. In the intermediate period, between the
52Erik Damgaard, 'Stability and Change in the Danish Party System over Half a 
Century', Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 9, No. 9, 1974, pp. 103-25. Peter Hansen, 'The 
Formulation of Danish European Policy', English manuscript, December 1972, later 
published as 'Die Formulierung der danischen Europapolitik', Osterreichische Zeitschrift 
fu r  Aussenpolitik und Internationale Beziehungen, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1973.
53Carsten Lehmann Sorensen, 'Danish Party Politics on European and Nordic 
Cooperation', Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. XIV, 1979, pp. 171-91.
54Carsten Holbraad, Danish Neutrality: A Study in the Foreign Policy o f  a Small State, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991, p. 157.
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two rounds of negotiations with the EC, Nordic cooperation was an important issue in the 
political debate, and remained crucial when the Social Democratic Party, in governing 
position, advocated in favour of Danish EC membership.
When in opposition in February 1968, the Social Democrats had deplored French 
opposition to the British application, while at the same time favouring plans to create 
close Nordic economic cooperation through Nordek.55 In October 1969, at the time when 
the French position on EC enlargement was changing, the Social Democratic Party 
criticized the government for not doing its best to conclude the Nordek negotiations. In 
early February 1970, a Social Democratic spokesman expressed his satisfaction that the 
Nordek negotiations were close to conclusion, and expressed his pride in his party for 
initiating the plans for Nordic cooperation under the former Social Democratic 
government. He expressed doubts about the government's assessment of The Hague 
Summit, but argued that if enlargement was to take place, Nordek would give Denmark 
a stronger position in the accession negotiations.56 After the Finnish government's 
declaration in March 1970 that it would not sign the Nordek Treaty, the Social 
Democratic Party agreed with the other Danish parties that Nordic cooperation should be 
extended and initiated in all possible areas, but within a framework which was compatible 
with the requirements of EC membership. When official accession negotiations were 
opened between Denmark and the EC in 1970, the Social Democratic Party endorsed, in 
agreement with the government parties, the decision to empower the government to 
negotiate on the basis of the conditions laid down in 1968.57
The Social Democratic Party's leadership kept to its cautiously positive position 
on EC membership based on the twin conditions of entry, and hoped that not only 
Norway, but also Sweden, would seek EC membership. Within the party, however, there 
was a growing worry that EMU would interfere with Denmark's policy of redistribution 
of income, regarded as a cornerstone of the Nordic welfare model. To ease these tensions, 
Ivar Norgaard, as Minister of Foreign Economic Affairs, made a statement at a ministerial 
meeting between Denmark and the EC in which he sought to make clear that Denmark
55Ivar Norgaard, Folketingstidende, 31 October 1968, col. 1125.
56Ivar Norgaard, Folketingstidende, 5 February 1970, cols. 3381-5 and cols. 3451-4.
57Ivar Norgaard, Folketingstidende, 11 November 1970, cols. 1178-9.
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would not accept EC policies that would interfere in Danish tax and social polices (see 
section 3.1). EMU was only one issue among many which convinced the labour 
movement that the Community was fundamentally an economic and social clash of 
interests between farmers and capitalists on one side and workers on the other, in which 
workers were to lose out to the free market forces reigning in the Community.58 Other EC 
policies, such as free movement of capital and workers, were seen as means to the same 
end. Because the Social Democratic Party could not accept some parts of the acquis 
communautaire, it had to pursue a difficult balancing act between radical and moderate 
forces, which translated into insisting on the economic necessity of membership while 
down-playing political and institutional implications which were seen as harmful to 
Danish society.
The division within the party and its voters made the party leader, J.O. Krag, play 
the constitutional card. In May 1971, the party's Executive Committee and the Social 
Democratic MPs decided to demand that a binding referendum be held before accession 
to the EC, even if parliament ratified the accession treaty by the constitutionally required 
five-sixths' majority. The decision was also a political manoeuvre to prevent EC 
membership becoming a key issue in the general election which was scheduled for 21 
September 1971, where an open split could harm the party and force traditional Social 
Democratic voters who opposed EC membership to vote for anti-EC parties to the left of 
the Social Democrats.
The 1953 constitution stipulates in Article 20 that powers vested in the 
constitutional authorities can be delegated to international authorities by a five-sixths' 
majority of the members of parliament. If this majority cannot be reached, a referendum 
will decide the matter. Parliament can also through a special law decide to hold a binding 
referendum which in that case takes precedence over a parliamentary vote.
The parliamentary consensus on foreign policy in the 1960s had secured the five- 
sixths' majority required for all votes relating to the EC until the vote on 16 December 
1971 (after the September election) empowering the government to sign the accession 
treaty. The governing parties, therefore, at first contested the Social Democrats' decision
58Toivo Miljan, 'Denmark: The Anxious European', in The Reluctant Europeans, p.
186.
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and intended to follow the provision of Article 20 of the constitution. Tacitly, the Radical 
Liberal Party, which was also split on the EC question, supported the Social Democratic 
line, as it would spare the party from too much internal division. The Social Democratic 
Party, however, referred to Article 42 in response. This requires 30 per cent of MPs to 
vote in favour of submitting a bill to a binding referendum. At the time, the Social 
Democrats held 62 seats in parliament, amounting to 35 per cent.59 The idea of a 
referendum was accepted with varying degrees of enthusiasm by all parties as a political 
necessity, but became a constitutional requirement when parliament, in the vote on 16 
December 1971, could no longer muster the five-sixths' majority on questions relating to 
the EC.
The traditional basis for parliamentary consensus on foreign policy had been 
changing during the 1960s. The first sign of a more polarized system came with the 
weakening of the traditional alliance between the Social Democratic Party and the Radical 
Liberal Party, as the former formed two single-party minority governments from 1964-66 
and 1966-68. The break of the alliance was completed when the Radical Liberals formed 
a majority government with the Conservatives and the Liberals from 1968-70. During the 
second Social Democratic minority government from 1966-68, there had been a 'workers' 
majority' in parliament composed of the Social Democrats and the Socialist People's Party. 
By the time of the third Social Democratic minority government from 1971-73, the party 
once more enjoyed the informal support from the Socialist People's Party, although the 
alliance was less formalized than in the 1960s, partly because the parties held opposing 
views on EC membership. During the 1960s, the Social Democratic Party had shifted to 
the left because both its traditional social liberal alliance partner, the Radical Liberal 
Party, chose to reorient itself slightly more to the right, and the Socialist People's Party, 
founded after a split in the Communist Party in 1959, won parliamentary representation 
in 1960.
Because of the polarization among the political parties, the Social Democratic 
Party increasingly competed for electoral support with the Socialist People's Party, and
59Toivo Miljan, 'Denmark : The Anxious European', in The Reluctant Europeans, pp. 
182-3.
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had to find a way to accommodate the anti-EC tendency among many left-wing voters.60 
The call for a referendum was an attempt to prevent parts of the Social Democratic 
electorate, who were negative or hesitant on Danish membership of the EC, to give their 
support to the Socialist People's Party. The strategy worked quite well for the Social 
Democratic Party in the 1971 election, as it won eight additional seats reaching 37 per 
cent of the seats in parliament. The Socialist People's Party also did well, and the election 
resulted in an overall increase of seats for the anti-EC forces. J.O. Krag managed to form 
a minority Social Democratic government with informal support from the Socialist 
People's Party and two representatives from Greenland and the Faeroe Islands. But the 
alliance was fragile and did not hold together in the strategically important vote to 
authorize the government to sign the accession treaty on 16 December 1971. The 
opposition block consisted of all the MPs from the Socialist People's Party, eleven Social 
Democrats (who voted against the official recommendation of their party), and four 
Radical Liberals.61 Some of the Social Democratic MPs who voted against the government 
line belonged to the Cooperation Committee for Social Democrats against the EC, which 
had been founded on 13 December 1971 and which was composed of representatives from 
the trade unions, the youth organization, Free Forum (Fritt Forum) and the Social 
Democratic Society (Socialdemokratiskt Samfund).
The Socialist People's Party was the only wholly anti-EC party in parliament during the 
period from 1961-72.62 It had been founded by the former Communist Party chairman, 
Aksel Larson, who was expelled from the Communist Party in 1959 after having criticized
60Erik Damgaard, 'Stability and Change in the Danish Party System over Half a 
Century', p. 112, table V. Ib Faurby, 'Party System and Foreign Policy in Denmark', 
Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. XIV, 1979, pp. 159-70.
61Buksti, Dansk Markedspolitik, p. 60.
62Apart from the Left Socialist Party, which had broken away from the Social People's 
Party after accusing the leadership of cooperating too closely with the Social Democratic 
Party. The Left Socialists won representation in parliament in the 1968 general election, 
but lost it again in the election of 1971. To win seats in parliament, political parties need 
to reach a 2 per cent threshold of total votes.
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the Soviet Union's policy in Hungary63, and it had its roots in the labour movement based 
on a socialist ideology. In the 1960 general election, the Communist Party lost its 
representation in parliament, but the Social People's Party won enough votes to take its 
place on the left of the Danish political spectrum.
The party was fundamentally against membership of the EC, and was very critical 
of the character of the EC and European integration. The reasons for its dislike were 
formulated on ideological grounds. The political and integrationist dimensions of the EC 
were seen as threats to Danish sovereignty which would result in the United States of 
Europe, including a defence union, possibly forming a part of NATO (the party was also 
against Denmark's membership of NATO). The EC seemed to symbolize efforts to 
consolidate capitalism in western Europe after the Second World War, and its extensive 
agricultural policy appeared to favour farmers at the expense of workers. The Socialist 
People's Party's national congress in November 1970 adopted a resolution calling for the 
withdrawal of the application for EC membership, warning that as a member, Denmark 
would be exposed to the dominance of the continental, capitalistic companies with serious 
consequences for the labour movement and democracy. Integration would endanger 
Danish sovereignty and reduce the country to a German province.64
Nordic cooperation, which became an emotional nationalistic argument, appealed 
to the labour movement both because of its close relations with other Nordic trade unions 
and Danish industry's expansion in Nordic markets. The party's arguments for the Nordic 
socio-political culture which was based on stable and democratic foundations, as opposed 
to what was perceived as the capitalist and undemocratic societies of Germany and 
France, were strengthened by the political unrest in these countries in 1968.65 The 
emotional anti-EC arguments, which warned against membership often combined with 
political motives, had an effect on the Social Democratic Party's officially positive line 
(and other parties in favour of membership). As a counter move the Social Democratic
63Lehmann Sorensen, 'Danish Policies on European and Nordic Cooperation', pp. 185-
6 .
64Udtcdelse om markedsforhandlinger, Socialistisk Folkepartis landsmode (Socialist 
People's Party's national congress), 19 November 1970.
65Toivo Miljan, 'Denmark: The Anxious European' in The Reluctant Europeans, p.
186.
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Party tried to tone down the political dimension of the EC and to bring forward the 
economic advantages for Denmark.
The Socialist People's Party, whose seats in parliament in 1971 represented about 
10 per cent of the electorate, had a disproportionate influence on the EC debate. As the 
referendum campaign gained momentum, the popular movements against the EC partially 
drew their strength from connections to the Socialist People's Party's rank and file.66
The Radical Liberal Party had positioned itself in the middle ground between the left- and 
right-wing parties by adopting a social liberal policy. In the 1960s it was distinctively pro- 
Nordic, and it was under the Radical Liberal Prime Minister, Hilmar Baunsgaard, that 
Denmark took the initiative on the Nordek negotiations. The party, however, adopted a 
pragmatic line on EC membership, which made it possible to accept, as a coalition partner 
with the Social Democrats, the first Danish application for EC membership in 1961. 
Again forming a coalition government in 1968, this time with the Conservatives and the 
Liberals, the Radical Liberals pragmatically accepted the opening of accession 
negotiations with the EC in 1970. The party did, however, underline the importance of 
the Nordic countries to coordinate their EC policies, and hoped that Denmark would not 
be the only Nordic country to accede to the EC.67
The careful positive position of the leadership was not shared by the rank and file 
of the party, which was split on the EC question. Many had doubts about the EC's policy 
towards Third World countries, supranational institutions and whether Nordic cooperation 
would survive Danish membership of the EC. The position of the Radical Liberals was 
in many ways similar to that of the Social Democrats. The party leadership, however, 
adopted no official line on EC membership and made no recommendations to Radical 
Liberal MPs. After the debate on 16 December 1971, 4 of the 27 Radical Liberals voted 
against authorizing the government to sign the accession treaty.68
66Damgaard, Stability and Change in the Danish Party System over Half a Century, 
p. 122, table XII.
67Niels Helveg Petersen, Folketingstidende, 5 February 1970, cols. 3408-10.
68Lehmann Sorensen, Danmark og EF i 1970eme, pp. 83-4.
85
The Conservative Party adopted early on a pro-European line within the framework of the 
established Danish objective of a wide European market solution, and based Danish EC 
membership on the conditions of British accession and as close an agreement between the 
EC and other Nordic countries as possible. The party supported closer Nordic cooperation 
and the Nordek Treaty.
Drawing on support from Danish industry, the party traditionally advocated free 
trade on the widest possible basis. As a result of Danish industry's adaptation in the early 
1960s, making it gradually more positive towards the economic possibilities offered by 
membership, the Conservative Party was able to echo the economic arguments of industry, 
welcoming the EC's trade and commercial policies. As a strong supporter of Denmark's 
membership of NATO, the Conservative Party accepted plans for more extensive political 
consultation among the EC member states, but hoped that this cooperation would not only 
be confined to the EC, but would also include the Atlantic partners.69
The Liberal Party was traditionally the most pro-European political party, and the only 
in favour of a federal Europe. The Liberals had already adopted in the 1950s the goal of 
Danish membership as the basis for its official EC policy. Although in favour of EFTA 
and Nordek, the party never failed to point out that they could only be intermediate 
solutions, not substitutes for EC membership. During the period between the French 
vetoes, the Liberals harboured the idea that Denmark could seek membership on its own 
merits without the UK. Behind the activist pro-European attitude of the Liberals lay the 
interests of the Danish farming community. The chairman of the farmers' central 
organization, Anders Andersen,70 was also MP for the Liberals and Chairman of the 
Market Committee during the right-wing government of 1968-71, and the Liberal MP, 
Poul Nyboe Andersen, was in charge as Minister for Market Affairs for the negotiations 
with the EC. In December 1971, Poul Nyboe Andersen, then member of the opposition, 
expressed the view that it was in Denmark's interest to hold on to the policy of EC
69Haunstrup Clemmensen, Folketingstidende, 11 November 1970, cols. 1059-69.
70Anders Andersen, bom 1912, landowner, President of the Agriculture Committee 
1960-73, MP for the Liberal Party 1953-79, Minister of Finance 1973-75, Minister for 
Economic Affairs 1978-79, Economics Minister 1982-87, Chairman for the Market 
Committee 1968-71.
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membership even if Norway did not accede to the Community. Within an enlarged 
Community Denmark could take the role of bridge builder for Norway and other Nordic 
countries.71
3.2. The Social Partners
The farmers' organizations, with the exception at first of the small holders' organization, 
advocated Danish membership from the moment it became clear that the EEC would 
adopt an agriculture policy. In October 1957, the farmers' central organization argued that 
if Denmark remained outside the EEC, exports of agricultural goods might be hit by 
protectionist measures. It gave a pessimistic account of the UK market, which received 
by far the biggest share of Danish exports (see figure 3), but whose market was 
stagnating, while export to the Six was rising steadily.72
During the whole period from the early 1960s to accession in 1973, the farmers' 
organization pressed for EC membership, preferably together with the UK, but when the 
British accession negotiations ground to a halt, the farmers pleaded for a unilateral Danish 
approach to the EC. Throughout the political debate on a suitable market solution for 
Denmark, the farmers argued that neither EFTA, nor Nordic cooperation, could satisfy 
their needs for export markets. The CAP came to be seen as the promised land that they 
were unjustly denied.
The economic structure of Denmark changed between 1950 and 1970. The 
agricultural sector, which accounted for 61 per cent of the total export, declined steadily 
to 22 per cent in 1970, while during the same period the industry's share of total exports 
rose from 30 per cent to 65 per cent (see figure 2). The reasons behind this were both the 
beneficial effect on Danish industry of free trade within EFTA and the detrimental effect 
of the EC preferential trade in agricultural products.73
Danish industry took a more ambiguous view on economic integration in Europe. 
Positions on EC membership varied depending on different sectors' prospects of
71 Quoted in Buksti, Dansk Markedspolitik, p. 61.
72Buksti, Dansk Markedspolitik, p. 7.
73Hansen, The Formulation o f Danish European Policy, pp. 13-14.
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competing within Europe.
An official report in 1958 warned industry against Danish inclusion in the EEC 
customs union, predicting that 40 per cent of the industry would run the risk of decline. 
The degree of industrial protection in Denmark was such that large parts of industry were 
not ready to meet European competition. The Confederation of Danish Industry opposed 
the Nordic customs union on the same grounds, arguing that the EFTA agreement had 
already opened the free trade necessary to satisfy Danish industry's needs.74
During the 1960s, industry managed to increase its international competitiveness, 
and overtook agriculture as the main provider of export earnings. The Nordic export 
market increased significantly, from a total of 31 per cent in 1950 to 37 per cent in 1970, 
to be compared to the EC Six whose importefrom Denmark in 1950 accounted for 16 per 
cent and in 1970 19 per cent (see figure 4).
Towards the end of the 1960s, the Confederation of Danish Industry became more 
positive to EC membership. Several factors lay behind the change of attitude: the 
development of the industry during the last ten years had reduced the risk of competition 
within the EC;75 and the prospects of remaining outside the EC in the case of the UK 
becoming a member threatened industry's possibilities to compete.76 The effect of EC 
membership on Danish industry, however, remained different from sector to sector, and 
this explained why the Confederation of Danish Industry took a carefully optimistic 
position, but never argued directly in favour of EC membership.
The trade unions and the labour movement were divided on the question of EC 
membership. Among the anti-EC groups, there was a strong tendency to see membership 
as an emotional, political, almost nationalist question where the capitalist, catholic and 
continental societal systems were challenging the Nordic, democratic, welfare state. There 
were strong anti-German and pro-Nordic sentiments combined with arguments that
74Buksti, Dansk Markedspolitik, pp. 9 and 44.
75Markedssekretariatet, Danmark ogDe europceiske Fcellesskaber, Udenrigsministeriet, 
Copenhagen, June, 1971.
76Industriraadet, Dansk industri ogFcellesmarkedet, 3rd edition, Copenhagen, February 
1972.
accession to the EC would erode Danish sovereignty, crush Danish (Nordic) socialism and
separate Denmark from cooperation with the Nordic countries. The anti-EC feelings of
the left-wing forces within the labour movement strongly influenced the EC debate.
The dilemma of the Social Democratic leadership to defend its pro-EC position
without losing support from more left-wing groups within the party, in some ways
mirrored the dilemma o f the leadership of the Danish Confederation o f Trade Unions. The
Confederation was composed of 60 to 70 specialized unions o f which the General and
Semi-skilled Workers' Union, the Retail Clerks' and Office Workers' Union, and the
Smiths' and Machinists' Union were the biggest.77 Although the Confederation waited until
May 1972 to adopt an official position on EC membership, the leadership supported the
pro-European line of the Social Democratic government. The trade unions' central
Hie.
leadership, however, could not guarantee^complete loyalty o f its members to the Social
Democratic line on the EC.
The division on the question of membership was also felt inside the trade unions
The chairman for the General and Semi-skilled Workers' Union, Anker Jorgensen,78
argued at a congress in September 1971 that it would be unrealistic to believe that
Denmark could stay outside the EC while maintaining economic progress. He believed
it reasonable to support EC membership as long as certain conditions were fulfilled:
Norway and the UK becoming members o f the EC, and Sweden concluding a form o f
association preventing customs barriers with Denmark; the preservation of the Nordic
labour market; the continuing operation o f the Nordic free trade area; the social and
monetary policies remaining national prerogatives; and, in general, that the European
cooperation did not go too far in the direction of integration and supranational institutions.
Although Anker Jorgensen strongly advocated EC membership at an extraordinary
congress in April 1972, the trade union delegates voted against with 354 votes to 297.
u f  a
The Smiths' and Machinists' Union also toofyposition against EC membership, and its
11 Dansk Arbejdsman- og Specialarbeiderforbund, 250,000 members; Handels- og 
Kontors funktioncerenes Forbund, 100,000 members; and Dansk Smede- og
Maskinarbejder Forbund, 100,000 members.
78Anker Jorgensen, bom 1922, Member of General and Semi-skilled Workers' Union 
1962-68 and President 1968-72, MP since 1964 for the Social Democratic Party, Prime 
Minister 1972-73, 1975-1982, Chairman of the Social Democratic Party 1973-87, 
Chairman for the Danish Delegation to the Nordic Council 1982-93.
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leader, Hans Rasmussen, became the leading opponent to the Confederation's official line.
The Confederation positioned itself cautiously in favour of EC membership, but 
had to allow scope for opposite views when formulating its EC policy. To avoid too deep 
a split the Confederation decided to adopt a wait-and-see attitude until the result of the 
accession negotiations was known, not adopting an official position until an extraordinary 
congress in May 1972. At the congress the Confederation decided, with 524 votes against 
406, to support Danish membership of the EC.79
3.3. The Popular Movements
The People's Movement against the EC (Folkebevcegelsen modEF) was created in parallel 
with the development of the debate on EC membership. The original groupings had the 
character of ideological organizations which, although right-wing rather than left-wing, 
did not adopt any party-political positions. Their ideology aimed at safeguarding 
Denmark's national, cultural, political and social values based on a fundamentally 
bourgeois outlook. The first organization to take a position against Danish membership 
of the EC was Danish Rally {Dansk Sam ling) which had its roots in the resistance 
movement during the German occupation in the Second World War. Being very active 
in the debate, Danish Rally set the tone for the opposition to EC membership and 
influenced the EC debate for a long period.
In 1962 an umbrella organization composed of the two most active groups against 
the EC, including Danish Rally, was set up, named the Cooperation Council of 1962 
against the Rome Union (Samarbejdsudvalget erf 1962 modRom-unionen). Although the 
Committee claimed to cut across party-political lines and received financial support from 
big industrialists, it was largely identified as left-wing. When the accession negotiations 
broke down in 1963, the Committee decided to stay on guard for the revival of the 
negotiations.
Nordic cooperation was often forwarded as an alternative to EC membership by 
the popular movements against the EC. Attempts to forge institutionalized links between 
the Nordic countries in the second half of the 1960s led to the establishment of two 
groups, Nordic Action {Nordisk Aktion) and Free North {Frit Norden), which became part
79Buksti, Dansk Markedspolitik, pp. 57 and 63-4.
90
of the popular movement against the EC when accession negotiations between Denmark 
and the EC were reopened in 1970.
At the beginning of 1970, many groups voiced opposition against EC membership, 
including the Cooperation Committee of 1962 against the Rome Union, Nordic Action and 
Free North. The necessity to create a strong and coherent organization became 
increasingly important. This would have to include both established anti-EC organizations 
from the early 1960s, Nordic-oriented groups, left-wing parties and youth organizations. 
Its creation became a struggle between those who wanted the movement to cut across 
party-political lines, and those who wanted the organization to take a political position. 
The founding groups were reluctant to include political parties as they feared that these 
parties, with their superior administrative machinery, would dominate the umbrella 
organization and change its character from a popular movement to a platform serving 
party-political interests, in particular for parties such as the Communist Party, which were 
not represented in parliament. An attempt in September 1971 to create a coordinating 
committee only partially succeeded, and it was the promise of government grants to the 
referendum campaign which disciplined the various groupings to coordinate their efforts. 
The constituent assembly was composed of groups ranging from political parties, such as 
Denmark's Justice Party, the Communist Party, Danish Rally and Socialist People's Party, 
to youth organizations attached to the same political parties and the Radical Liberal Party, 
and a number of ideologically based groups. Groups within the Social Democratic Party 
opposing EC membership did not take part, arguing that it would not cooperate with 
groups opposed to the EC solely on nationalistic grounds.
This initiative marked the creation of the People's Movement against the EC. It 
was based on a compromise limited to coordinating the efforts of the groups, not to an 
integration of their activities. The reasons why the groups opposed Danish EC 
membership were based on different values and motivations, but they shared some 
fundamental views on the EC. They opposed the federal character of the Community, 
which in their view was set to develop into a political union in which individual countries 
would lose national identity and sovereignty. They believed there would be development 
towards a state-like Community, based on German and Roman principles which were 
incompatible with Nordic traditions. The trade unionists, who were opposed to EC 
membership, believed that the EC would cement a capitalistic order in the society at the
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expense of the labour movement, while the socialist group believed that the EC spelt the 
end to a socialist society. They were divided between the older generation of Communists 
who based their opposition on nationalistic arguments, and the younger generation who 
opposed Danish EC membership either as the continuation of the 1968 youth revolution 
or because they believed Denmark's Third World policy would be ruined by the 
Community which they perceived as founded on old colonialist values. All these groups 
shared the fear of political union.80
The People's Movement against the EC became the opposition to federal ideas and 
ideology which had inspired the creation of the EC and was the driving force behind 
European integration. Their anti-federalism resided in a fear that traditional Danish values 
might disappear in a large state-like continental entity. There was a strong perception that 
Danish society, economy, culture and democracy was incompatible with the European 
integration process and would be negatively influenced inside the Community which was 
to a large extent founded in the traditional perception of the Danish society as influenced 
by the Danish nineteenth century philosopher N.F.S. Grundtvig. Elements of big-state 
dominance, block-formation or a super-state creation were important in channelling fears 
about a future development towards EU. The Nordic orientation of the centre and left- 
wing parties was based on a perception that the Nordic welfare model was unique and 
different from those on the continent. The Community regime was seen a threat to 
traditional social-democratic values and objectives. The cornerstone of European 
integration, to promote peace and social and economic stability, never became a strong 
argument in the EC debate as deep down many Danes felt they could better attain this on 
their own, remaining outside the Community.
4. Hie Referendum on EC Membership, 2 October 1972
When the Social Democratic minority government took office in October 1971, it became 
the task of the Prime Minister, J.O. Krag, to carry out the decision of parliament of 18 
May 1971 to call a binding referendum. After the signing of the accession treaties in 
Luxembourg in January 1972, the date for the Danish referendum became the target for
80Hans Martens, Danmarks Ja, Norges Nej. EF-folkeafstemningeme i 1972, Dansk 
Udenrigspolitisk Instituts Skrifter 6, Munksgaard, 1979.
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much speculation and strategic manoeuvring. The main reason why the date of the 
referendum was tactically important was the prospect of influencing public attitudes to the 
EC in Denmark and Norway, but also, to a lesser extent, the outcome of the negotiations 
between the EC and the other EFTA states, which would be known before the 
referendum, as the terms of the Nordic countries' arrangements with the EC were 
important. The referendum, however, had to be held in time for necessary adjustments to 
be made before 1 January 1973 when membership was set to come into force.
Another factor complicating the decision was the resolution adopted by the Social 
Democratic Party in August 1971, which stated that if Norway failed to join the 
Community 'a new situation would have been created', implying that the Danish 
referendum should be later than the Norwegian. This was forced through by opponents 
to membership within the party, and reflected tactical considerations that if the Norwegian 
result was negative, the chances for a negative result in Denmark would increase 
substantially.
Despite Prime Minister Krag and his Norwegian counterpart, Trygve Bratteli, 
knowing that the decision on the referenda dates was crucial, there was no cooperation 
on setting the dates between them. The Norwegian Prime Minister had been warned 
against the reaction of the public if it became known that there had been cooperation with 
the Danish government. Both prime ministers were convinced that a negative result was 
more likely in their own country, and both preferred that the neighbouring country voted 
first. The Norwegians had, however, for domestic, practical reasons to set a date for the 
referendum earlier than the Danes, a tactical disadvantage for the Norwegian government.
In February, pressure on Prime Minister Krag increased. The right-wing parties 
advised him to call the referendum not later than the same day as the Norwegian, while 
opponents to EC membership within his own party and the Socialist People's Party 
announced the same month that they would hold the government responsible for the 
resolution adopted at the Social Democratic party conference the previous summer. They 
would not accept the referendum being held on the same or the following day, arguing 
that if there was a negative result in Norway, there would not be enough time to reassess 
the situation.
The internal cohesion of the party was certainly an important factor for Prime 
Minister Krag when deciding on the date, but it has been argued that his conviction that
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\Norway's referendum would end in a positive result and that the outcome of the Danish 
was much more risky, in the end made him make up his mind.81 On 3 March 1972 the 
Norwegian government announced that the referendum would be held on 24 to 25 
September, and on 7 March Prime Minister Krag announced that the Danish referendum 
would be held on 2 October, a week after Norway.
When the referendum campaign got underway in late 1971, the Danish population 
was not unaccustomed to public debates on EC membership. It was, however, pursued 
with an unprecedented intensity and many groups and individuals in society became 
engaged. Opinion polls throughout the 1960s had showed a large majority in favour of 
Danish EC membership, but this tendency was broken in April 1971 when the majority 
in favour decreased substantially to 37 per cent, while the rate against increased to 30 per 
cent and the 'don't knows'jumped to 30 per cent (see figure 5). The shift in the electorate 
took place some months before the referendum campaign had started, but was seen as 
evidence that the population realized the salience of the prospects of EC membership.82
Analyses of the referendum campaign highlight the different levels of argument 
between the opponents and the proponents of Danish membership of the EC. While the 
latter emphasized the economic advantages for Denmark were it to become member and 
down-played the institutional-supranational consequences, the former underlined the 
political-integrationist character of the Community and warned against the objective of 
creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which they saw the arrival 
of the United States of Europe and the end for the nation-state.83
On the political level, the yes-campaign was directed by the Conservative and 
Liberal Parties, and, with somewhat less enthusiasm, the Social Democratic Party. The 
leadership of the Radical Liberal Party was divided; the leader of the parliamentary group,
81 Martens, Danmarks ja, Norges nej, p. 50.
82Hans Branner, 'Danish European Policy Since 1945: The Question of Sovereignty', 
in Morten Kelstrup (ed.), European Integration and Denmark's Participation, Copenhagen 
Political Studies Press, Copenhagen, 1992.
83See, for example, Hans Branner, 'Danish European Policy Since 1945' in Kelstrip 
(ed.), European Integration and Denmark's Participation, pp. 314-5. Peter Hansen, 'The 
Formulation of Danish European Policy', pp. 17-9. Carsten Lehmann Sorensen, Danmark 
og EF i 1970eme, pp. 81-8.
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Hilmar Baunsgaard, the party political spokesman, Niels Helveg Petersen,84 and most MPs 
were cautiously in favour of membership, while the party's foreign affairs spokesman and 
three other MPs were against. Two of these MPs were prominent members of the People's 
Movement against the EC. On the socio-economic level, business and industry and the 
farmers' associations took the yes-side of the campaign. Contrary to the opponents, the 
yes-side did not form a strong platform for cooperation and coordination of the campaign. 
Some organizations were created, such as the Committee for Accession to the EC, but 
their influence was minor in comparison to the People's Movement against the EC.85 The 
campaign in favour of Danish EC membership was to a large degree managed through 
the channels of the pro-European political parties.
In parliament,86 the debate largely concentrated on four themes: the effect on the 
Danish economy; the political and security dimension of the EC; other Nordic countries; 
and institutional issues and integration. Economic arguments were almost always in favour 
of EC membership, focusing on the necessity for Denmark to gain access to EC markets 
for industrial and agricultural products: the CAP would guarantee Danish farmers a high 
level of income; free movement of capital would lead to lower interest rates and access 
to EC capital funds. These arguments in favour were based on a series of reports from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs's Market Secretariat and the Ministry of Finance. MPs 
underlined that the consequences of staying outside the EC had become costlier as the 
House of Commons had voted in favour of British accession and most EFTA countries, 
such as Sweden, had concluded free trade agreements with the EC. Worries that plans for 
EMU would endanger Danish sovereignty on social and tax policies were rejected on the 
grounds that no provisions in the Rome Treaty made harmonization in these areas 
necessary, and that the plans towards further economic and monetary integration were as 
yet only plans. They would only become reality by a unanimous decision in the Council
84Niels Helveg Petersen, bom 1939, MP for the Radical Liberal Party 1966-74, and 
from 1977, Chef de Cabinet for Commissioner Gundelach 1974-77, Chairman for the 
Radical Liberal Parliamentary Group 1977-88, Economics Minister 1988-90, Foreign 
Minister since 1993.
85Martens, Danmarks Ja, Norges Nej, p. 181.
86Collected from parliamentary debates, Folketingstidende, 15 March 1972, cols. 3629- 
49; 26 April 1972, cols. 5278-484; 4-6 September 1972, cols. 7036-700.
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of Ministers. If the EC member states decided to take steps towards exchange-rate 
cooperation, Denmark would argue for the participation of non-EC members, for instance 
Sweden and Switzerland. The parties opposing EC membership argued that the 
government's and right-wing parties' assessment of the effects of a negative referendum 
result on the Danish economy was exaggerated and an attempt to intimidate the public. 
In their opinion the economic arguments were of minor importance when Denmark's 
national identity and independence were at stake.
The political dimension of the EC was described by the proponents in terms of a 
natural development between states which cooperated closely in the economic area. 
Political cooperation should develop pragmatically and remain outside the EC Treaties and 
the EC institutions. The opponents regarded the political dimension of the EC as a step 
towards a united Europe, a union that was aiming to play a part in the formation of 
political blocks, and with a negative impact on the process of detente between NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact. It was argued that the political ideology associated with the Community 
was influenced by the politics of former colonial powers having a negative impact on the 
shaping of the Community's policy towards the Third World. Denmark, as a small 
country, would lose its national sovereignty along with traditional social, cultural and 
political values.
The proponents argued that Nordic cooperation was compatible with EC 
membership, and that no provision agreed between the Nordic countries would have to 
be given up were Denmark to become member of the EC. In reply to the opponents' 
opinion that Nordic cooperation was an alternative to EC membership, they pointed at the 
lack of common interest and political will to agree on a Nordic customs union during the 
Nordek negotiations. The fact that other Nordic countries had concluded free trade 
arrangements with the EC, prompted the proponents to advocate Danish membership of 
the EC as a step towards a large European market, while the opponents were convinced 
that Danish EC membership would stall and possibly make further Nordic cooperation 
impossible. Meanwhile, a rejection of the EC in Denmark and Norway would unite the 
North, and closer Nordic cooperation would emerge as the only realistic option.
On institutional questions, the proponents argued that the competences of the EC 
institutions should develop pragmatically in accordance with the development of the 
Community. Institutional development, however, was not an aim in itself and should be
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carried out under the control of national parliaments. The proponents were positive to 
further integration in areas where there was substantial interest and need for cooperation, 
and favoured opening new areas of cooperation to non-EC countries, wherever possible. 
In the context of integration, they underlined the importance of the Luxembourg 
compromise as a political and treaty-based security guarantee for a small country. The 
opponents argued that the degree of integration within the EC would force Denmark to 
give up a substantial amount of sovereignty to the EC institutions. They claimed that the 
long-term objective of the Community was to create a state-like entity based on a high 
degree of bureaucratization at the expense of democracy and decentralization.
In the run-up to the referendum, it became increasingly clear that the government 
wished to pursue a clearer position in favour of EC membership, but felt bound by the 
obligation to reassess the situation in the event of a negative result in the Norwegian 
referendum. The government became the target of strong criticism in parliament from 
those opposed to EC membership, for a statement by the Minister for Foreign Economic 
Affairs, Ivar Norgaard. At the Norwegian Labour Party congress in April 1972, he 
claimed that the Danish government would pursue its policy of EC membership regardless 
of the outcome of the Norwegian referendum. The minister's statement was defended by 
Prime Minister Krag saying that this had been the government's policy ever since the 
signing of the accession treaty in January 1972. The government did not intend, however, 
to bind the Social Democratic Party to this policy, as its position on EC membership 
would not be concluded before the extraordinary party congress on 10 September 1972.87
The Social Democratic Party had called for an extraordinary party congress after 
parliament's final vote on Danish EC membership, following the Confederation of Trade 
Unions' extraordinary congress in May at which, after a long and stormy debate, a 
resolution in favour of Danish membership was adopted.88 The Social Democratic Party's 
position was finally adopted on 10 September 1972 with a majority of 272 votes to 95 
in favour of EC membership. The resolution favoured EC membership because the party 
foresaw no Nordic alternative, and Denmark would best serve Nordic interests as a
87Quoted in Folketingstidende, 26 April, 1972, cols. 5423-4.
88Buksti, Dansk Markedspolitik, p. 64.
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member of the Community.89
Parliament's final vote on Danish membership of the EC took place after three 
days of intensive debate. The ratification act was adopted on 8 September 1972 by 141 
votes to 34. The result was just short of the five-sixths' majority necessary for transfer of 
sovereignty, but parliament had anyhow already overridden this provision by deciding to 
hold a binding referendum on Denmark's membership of the EC (see section 4.1).
The next decisive event was the referendum in Norway on 24-25 September. Prime 
Minister Krag's belief that the Norwegian population was likely to vote in favour of EC 
membership proved to be wrong. On 26 September a majority of the population rejected 
Norwegian membership of the EC. The Danish government held on to its pro-EC position, 
recommending the Danish population to vote in favour in the referendum, and arguing, 
together with the pro-European political parties, that if Denmark acceded to the 
Community, it would be able to act as a bridge between the Nordic countries and the 
Community. The Prime Minister warned that were Denmark to reject EC membership, the 
Danish currency would be devalued and trading was suspended to prevent speculation.
The run-up to the referendum on 2 October 1972 was dramatic. The political 
debate had been very intensive and had opened divisions in at least two of the parties 
represented in parliament. The public campaign was by no means less intensive. The level 
of popular interest in the EC was high. Research carried out in May 1972 showed that 42 
per cent of the population was very interested, while only 25 per cent was very little or 
not at all interested in the debate.90 The arguments used in the public debate by opponents 
and proponents mirrored the debate in parliament. A senior civil servant commented on 
criticism directed towards the way in which proponents argued for EC membership on 
economic grounds, by underlining that it would have been futile at the time when the 
Community's future development was laid down in statements of intent, but when no 
concrete actions or plans had been taken, to try to convince the population of the virtues 
of political integration. Consequently, no clear answers could be given to questions about 
the EC's future, and speculation would only have given rise to further fears of loss of
89,J.O. Krag: Klart resultat, vil pavirke befolkningen', Berlinske Tidende, 11 September 
1972, p. 8.
90Karen Siune, 'EF-debatten 1972, et apropos til 1979', Sartryck till Pressens Arbog 
1979, 1979, p. 202.
national independence and sovereignty.91
The effect of the debate on the public was presented in a Gallup poll published 
on 16 July 1972.92 The poll concluded that the debate had turned public attitudes steadily 
towards favouring membership. On the question of Denmark's economy, 30 per cent of 
the respondents believed the effect would be positive, while 15 per cent believed the 
effect was likely to be negative, and 26 per cent expected no change. Significantly, 60 per 
cent of those who claimed to vote in favour of membership in the referendum were 
convinced that it would have a positive effect on the economy (1 per cent thought the 
effect would be negative), while only 6 per cent of those who would vote against 
membership believed the effect would be positive (42 per cent expected a negative effect). 
On the question of the effect of membership on national independence, 55 per cent 
believed it would be much or somewhat reduced, while 24 per cent believed national 
independence would not be affected. Among those in favour of membership, 46 per cent 
believed Denmark's independence would be much or somewhat reduced, while 81 per cent 
of the opponents were convinced that the effect would be negative.
The poll showed a strong belief among supporters of the Conservative Party and 
the Liberal Party that membership would have a beneficial effect on the economy, while 
Social Democratic and Radical Liberal voters were equally divided between believing in 
a positive effect or no effect. A majority of the Socialist People's Party's supporters did 
not believe membership would have a significant influence on the economy, while a 
minority expected a worsened economy. The Conservative and Liberal voters expressed 
equally divided opinions as to whether EC membership would have some effect or no 
effect at all on national independence. The Social Democratic and Radical Liberal voters 
believed that their independence would be somewhat reduced, while the Socialist People's 
Party's supporters overwhelmingly (92 per cent) believed national independence would be 
much or somewhat reduced. This survey found that the views expressed by the population 
mirrored to a large extent the arguments of the parties which they supported. The internal 
division in the Radical Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party reflected their 
supporters' equally divided views on whether EC membership was favourable to Denmark.
91Interview in Copenhagen, 26 October 1993.
92'Danskemes opfattelse af EF i skred', Berlinske Tidende, 16 July 1972, p. 3.
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On 2 October 1972, the Danish population voted ^3*3 per cent to%-7per cent 
in favour of Danish membership of the EC. The participation was high, 90 per cent of the 
population cast their votes. From opinion polls carried out after the referendum, it was 
clear that arguments on the economic advantages of membership had been the most 
important for those who voted in favour. Among those who voted against, the fear of 
losing national sovereignty and influence over the personal situation had been decisive.93
HL Political Implications and Administrative Adaptation
1. A Political Landslide
On 3 October 1972, the day after the referendum's positive result, Prime Minister Krag 
announced in parliament his decision to resign. The decision surprised many 
parliamentarians, despite the Prime Minister's claim that he had wanted to retire from 
politics for some time. The leadership of the Social Democratic Party decided 
unanimously to propose Anker Jorgensen, the President of the General and Semi-skilled 
Workers' Union, as candidate for the post as Party Chairman. Two days later, on 5 
October, Anker Jorgensen was appointed Prime Minister. In his opening statement to 
parliament on 10 October, Prime Minister Jorgensen confirmed that the policy of the 
former government remained the basis of the new government. He assured that Denmark 
would not a become member of the EC in order to delay or obstruct the development of 
the Community. On the contrary, Danish interest could be better safeguarded if it 
remained member of the Community, and that success in economic and social policies 
was dependent on EC membership.94
Until the general election in 1973, the Danish party system had shown an 
exceptional degree of stability for the previous five decades. The elections of 1968 and 
1971 were to some extent precursors of the radical change which was to come into full 
effect in 1973, for they had introduced a higher degree of polarization between the five
93Peter Hansen, Melvin Small and Karen Siune, 'The Structure of the Debate in the 
Danish EC Campaign: A Study of an Opinion-Policy Relationship', Journal o f Common 
Market Studies, No. 2, 1976, pp. 93-129.
94Buksti, Dansk Markedspolitik, pp. 69-70.
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parties represented in parliament, eroding the traditional consensus on foreign policy 
issues. There were signs that the electorate had become increasingly volatile in their 
support of the established parties, while there was an increase in support of parties 
without parliamentary representation. The question of EC membership, although not the 
central issue of the 1971 election, was present in the debate, highlighting the difference 
between the four 'old' established parties and the Socialist People's Party.95
The election of 1973 has often been described as a landslide in Danish political 
life. The four 'old' parties experienced heavy losses as their share of parliamentary 
representation dropped from 90 per cent to 60 per cent and five new parties entered 
parliament. Of these five, two parties had only recently been founded: the right-wing 
Progress Party, which had started as a popular movement against the established political 
and administrative elites, the traditional policies of the political parties, particularly on 
taxes, and which showed general discontent with the excess of red-tape and high degree 
of bureaucratization in society; and the Centre Democratic Party, founded by MPs 
breaking away from the Social Democratic Party because of discontent with what they 
saw as radicalization of Social Democratic policies. These two parties won 23 per cent 
of the vote (15 per cent and 8 per cent respectively). The other three 'new' parties, the 
Communists, the Justice Party and the Christian People's Party, won representation by 
playing on the general discontent among the public with the established parties.
The result of the 1973 election spelt the beginning of a new period in Danish politics, 
characterized by frequent elections and weak minority governments. On both sides of the 
party-political spectrum, the established parties had difficulties in forming stable coalition 
governments, either because of difficulties in agreeing on important areas such as foreign 
policy or economic and social policies, or because some of the new parties were regarded 
as unacceptable coalition partners. This was especially true for the Progress Party, which, 
in its manifesto, had declared to be against the existing form of parliamentarism based on 
consensus and agreements of support on important questions. The Progress Party saw this 
as evidence of rot in the political system, and therefore obstructed the workings of 
parliament. In addition, its leader, Mogens Glistrup, had presented his personal systematic
95Damgaard, Stability and Change in the Danish Party System over Half a Century, 
pp. 121-3.
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tax frauds as a legitime way of beating an unfair system. When a legal case was brought 
against him, the parliamentarians voted to nullify his parliamentary immunity, with the 
result that Mogens Glistrup was tried and sent to jail. The fact that he conducted the party 
chairmanship from his prison cell did not increase the acceptability of his party as a 
coalition partner.
The overall implication of the 1973 election was to change the basis of successive 
governments' EC policy. Constitutionally, foreign policy is a prerogative of the 
government, but as the parliamentary situation after 1973 gave a new, and fundamentally 
stronger, position to parliament, it could exert tighter control on the direction of matters 
of foreign policy. As Denmark's membership of the EC had remained a highly politicized 
issue, parliamentary influence was especially felt in questions relating to the Community. 
The Market Committee was set up as a direct result of parliament's desire to control the 
development of Denmark's membership of the EC.
2. The Parliamentary Control System
One of the most characteristic features of Danish EC decision-making is the way in which 
parliamentary control and information on EC affairs is ensured by the Market Committee. 
The precursor of the Market Committee was set up on an ad hoc basis at the time of the 
first accession negotiations of 1961-62, and was revived when official negotiations 
between Denmark and the EC were reopened in 1970. The Market Committee is one of 
parliament's standing committees, whose legal basis is enshrined in the Danish act of 
accession. The provisions lay down the government's obligation to inform the Committee 
of the proposals for adoption by the Council of Ministers which are directly applicable 
to Denmark, or which need the collaboration of parliament for implementation. The 
Committee's methods of work and authority have been developed and extended through 
a series of reports.
The parliamentary situation after 1973, characterized by weak minority 
governments, has been of fundamental importance in the development of the Committee, 
which has become crucially important to governments in ensuring that their EC policy 
gains parliamentary support, especially as the contentious nature of Danish EC policy has 
increased the degree of politicization. The composition of the Committee is a direct result 
of strong parliamentary interest in EC matters. The members reflect the distribution of
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seats in parliament, and parties are often represented by party chairmen, or foreign affairs 
spokesmen, and even former ministers occupy seats in the Committee.
Cooperation between the government and the Market Committee has evolved into 
a form of consultation, where the minister in question (most often the Foreign Minister 
or the Foreign Economic Minister) presents an outline of the government's negotiation 
position on a question of major importance on the Council of Ministers's agenda. In 
theory, it is the government that decides when to put an issue on the Committee's agenda, 
but in practice the parliamentary strength of a particular government determines whether 
it is necessary to seek parliamentary support. In the 1980s, a special relationship 
developed between the members of the Committee and the governments, as the Market 
Committee became part of the decision-making elite and some MPs came to regard it as 
a second chamber.96 The ministers' account of the Danish negotiation position is always 
presented orally, in order to secure confidentiality on Danish ministers' positions in the 
negotiations in Brussels.97
Governments have been criticized for supplying the Market Committee with too 
little information too late in case this undermined the effective control over the 
government. The reasons behind this are the technicality of the proposals from the 
Commission, the rushed time schedule of the EC, and the obligation to safeguard the 
confidential negotiation positions of Denmark as well as other member states. The Market 
Committee has the right to bring in specialized parliamentary committees to give advice 
on a technical issue, but this has not become part of the routine, both because of the 
obligation of confidentiality, and the fear of erosion of the Committee's authority. The 
specialized committees have lost out to the Market Committee which enjoys more 
prestige. Although the Market Committee has a number of distinguished members, they 
do not always have the special knowledge required to control detailed legislation from 
Brussels to the extent necessary. The elitist character of the Market Committee has 
attracted criticism from other MPs, who feel that the Market Committee has attained too
96 Interview in Copenhagen on 23 February 1993.
91Beretningfra markedsutvalget, Folketingsaret 1972-73, Tillasg B. (82), cols. 1297- 
300. K.E. Tygesen, 'Den danske EF-beslutningsproces', Niels Jorgen Haagerup and 
Christian Thune (eds.), Folketinget og uderigspolitikken, Jurist og 0konomforbundets 
Forlag, Copenhagen, 1986.
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strong a position in relation to other, more specialized, parliamentary committees, and that 
its members have sometimes become remote from grass roots politics.
Danish officials have often met with criticism from other EC member states that 
Denmark's Market Committee complicates and delays the negotiation process in Brussels. 
The officials are of the opinion that this attitude is a sign of lack of understanding of the 
link between government and parliament, and the control of individual ministers and the 
government by the committee. On the contrary, officials argue, the Market Committee is 
essential in the decision-making process, for ensuring that legislation adopted by the 
Council of Ministers has support in the Danish parliament and that it can be effectively 
and speedily implemented in national legislation. Denmark has succeeded in implementing 
EC legislation despite the fact that almost all governments since accession have been 
without majority in parliament. Also, when a government has had a working majority on 
other issues, EC policy has been an area of great contention because of diverging views 
between the government parties and the opposition, making consultation within the Market 
Committee even more important.98
3. The Administrative Adaptation
The process of administrative adaptation necessitated by EC membership had started 
already at the time of the first accession negotiations between Denmark and the EC.99 The 
practices which were established throughout the 1960s and the first two years of the 
1970s laid the foundations for Danish EC decision-making.
During the initial phase of negotiations with the EC (in fact during the whole of 
the 1960s), the Market Secretariat of the Foreign Ministry held a strong position both 
within the Foreign Ministry and in relation to other ministries. It enjoyed a high degree
98See Jorgen 0rstrom Moller, 'Danish EC Decision-Making: An Insider's View', 
Journal o f Common Market Studies, Vol.XXI, No.3, 1983, p. 255. K.E. Tygesen, 'Den 
danshe EF-beslutningsproces', pp. 57 and 65-6.
"This section is based on Sven Auken, Jacob Buksti and Carsten Lehmann Sorensen, 
'Denmark joins Europe', Journal o f Common Market Studies, Vol. XIV, No. 1, 1975. 
Jorgen Gronnegaard Christensen 'Da Centraladministrationen blev international' in Niels 
Amstrup and lb Faurby (eds.), Studier i dansk udenrigspolitik, Forlaget Politica, Arhus, 
1978. Jorgen 0rstrom Moller, 'Danish EC Decision-Making'. Interview at the Foreign 
Ministry on 22 February 1993
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of independence, underlined by the appointment of a special minister for Foreign 
Economic Affairs under the right-wing coalition government in 1968, a practice which 
continued under the Social Democratic minority government of J.O. Krag. In 1971-72, the 
decisions on the future shape of the administrative decision-making structure were to be 
taken. After internal negotiations for a central position in the decision-making system, a 
compromise was reached in 1972, in which, although the Market Secretariat was still 
assigned an important role in the system, the functional ministries were given a greater 
role than initial plans had foreseen.
The Danish EC decision-making process, as it was set up in 1972 was composed 
of four levels: the special committees, the EC Committee, the Government's EC 
committee and the Market Committee (see figure 1).
There were originally 21 special committees, but they were soon increased to 27. 
They were set up to correspond largely to the Commission's Directorates-General and the 
working groups under the Council of Ministers and Coreper. Each special committee is 
composed of representatives from three or four ministries (or more if required) and their 
task is to examine and communicate the content and nature of the Commission's proposals 
which are presented to the Council of Ministers and its working groups, and then to refer 
its recommendations to the next level, the EC Committee. The special committees consult 
the interest groups concerned whenever necessary or desirable, according to the 
procedures of the ministry in charge. The civil servants taking part in the work of the 
special committees often represent their ministries in the preparatory phase, before the 
Commission's proposal is drawn up. It has been proved in practice that the special 
committees have a great influence on the ultimate decision, as their recommendations are 
often confirmed by subsequent levels. This has increased the role played by functional 
ministries, especially the Ministries for Agriculture and Economic Affairs, because of their 
knowledge and expertise in dealing with highly technical proposals from the Commission, 
while diminishing the central position of the Department of Foreign Economic Affairs.
The EC Committee is composed of senior civil servants from all ministries 
involved, with the Department of Foreign Affairs assuming the presidency and the 
secretarial obligations. The task of the EC Committee is to identify, decide upon and 
observe the development of the Community. The task of identification implies ensuring 
that in substance and procedure the recommendations of the special committees are
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consistent with the objectives of Danish EC policy. The EC Committee decides whether 
the position is within the general framework of Danish EC policy, and can in that capacity 
approve, change or refer back a recommendation to the special committee in question. 
The points on the EC Committee's agenda are divided into A-points and B-points 
following the procedure of the Coreper and the Council of Ministers. The EC Committee 
also discusses the more general development of the Community. Since the Danish 
Presidency of 1982, the EC Committee is responsible for handling the presidency.
The Government's EC Committee is composed of all ministers involved in EC 
questions, including the Prime Minister, and sits under the chairmanship of the Foreign 
Minister, or when appointed the Minister of Foreign Economic Affairs. Its main task is 
to give political guidelines for Danish EC policy. To ensure consistency with deliberations 
at official level, the head of the Department of Foreign Economic Affairs (now the North 
Group) who is chairman of the EC Committee, is secretary to the Government's EC 
Committee and attends the meetings of the parliamentary Market Committee.
Two ministries have established a particularly independent and strong role in the 
decision-making machinery. First, the Foreign Ministry whose Department for Foreign 
(political) Affairs was at first not involved much in EC affairs. However, with the 
development of the political dimension of the Community, the department has re­
established its competence in this area. The Department of Foreign Economic Affairs, the 
successor of the Market Secretariat, has become the most central element of coordination 
of Danish EC policy. The department is responsible for preparing briefs for the Danish 
representatives in the Council of Ministers or the Coreper, after the matter in hand has 
been discussed by the EC Committee or the Government's EC Committee. It has assumed 
the important role of coordination between the Permanent Representation in Brussels and 
the rest of the decision-making machinery. The staff in Brussels, whether they are 
originally from the Foreign Ministry or functional ministries, report to the department of 
Foreign Economic Affairs. Equally, ministries should channel contacts with Brussels 
through this department. Lastly, the Department for Foreign Economic Affairs is 
responsible in practice for ensuring that the Market Committee is supplied with 
information.
In 1991 the first stages of a radical reorganization of the Foreign Ministry were 
implemented, as the need for a more efficient coordination and rational utilization of the
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Ministry's resources was recognized. The artificial separation between the Department of 
Foreign Economic Affairs and the Department of Foreign (political) Affairs had become 
increasingly untenable with the development of the Community. In view of future reform 
of the Community Treaties, the Foreign Ministry was reorganized into two functional 
geographical groups, North and South, which conduct both economic and political 
activities. Western and eastern European countries and North America belong to the North 
Group, as do the EC, NATO and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). The rest of the world, including the UN, belongs to the South 
Group. The reorganization was aimed at improving the coordination of all matters dealt 
with within the EC framework and areas in close relation to it, such as EFTA, the USA 
and Japan.100
Second, the Ministry for Agriculture was reformed, which before accession to the 
EC was not a ministry in the proper sense of the word but a coordinating body serving 
the agricultural organizations (which in turn were in charge of many of the managerial 
functions of the agricultural policy). When the question of administrative adaptation to 
the complicated framework of the CAP came on the agenda, the farmers' organizations 
sought to keep their dominant position. The Ministry for Agriculture was at first positive 
to plans that most administrative tasks would be carried out by the farmers' organizations. 
This was, however, disputed by other functional ministries, in particular the Ministry of 
Trade, which feared that the agricultural arrangements could set a precedent for interest 
groups related to trade. A compromise solution was found by which the relative strength 
of the farmers' organizations were weakened and the ministry's competences were 
extended. The Special Committee on Agriculture has assumed an independent position, 
which has further increased the strength of the Ministry for Agriculture at the expense of 
the Department of Foreign Economic Affairs.
100Udenrigskommissionen, Betcenkning fra  Kommissionen a f 1. april 1989 om 
udenrigstjensten, Statens Informationstjenste, Copenhagen, 1990. Jorgen Gronnegard 
Christensen, 'Udenrigsministeriets reorganisering', in Nikolaj Petersen and Christian Thune 
(eds.), Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Arbog 1991, Jurist og 0konomiforbundets Forlag, 
Copenhagen, 1992.
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IV. Conclusion
The motivation behind the Danish decision to seek membership of the EC in 1961, and 
again in 1967, was primarily to secure access to external markets for the Danish economy. 
Denmark, having no primary resources other than arable land, was dependent on 
agricultural exports. Its industry, based on processing raw material into finished goods, 
was dependent on international free trade both for its import requirements and export 
needs.
Denmark did not embrace the ideals of the federal movement in the post-Second 
World War period. Its long-standing tradition of neutrality did not prevent Denmark from 
joining NATO in 1949, but contributed to Denmark's reluctance to take part in attempts 
to unite western European countries under a common institutional framework. The 
resistance movement, which was one of the major forces behind early federal movements 
in several continental European countries, was in Denmark the founding force behind the 
People's Movement Against the EC. Some have traced this 'long tradition of avoiding 
involvement in anything which tasted of Gmsspolitik']0] back to 'a spirit reminiscent of 
that which had overcome the nation after 1864, [which] expressed grave doubts that the 
country would be able to maintain itself as an independent state'.102 In this context, many 
Danes preferred to identify themselves with the Nordic countries, to which they felt closer 
in terms of democratic, social and cultural values and traditions. The labour movement, 
which represented 95 to 100 per cent of Danish workers, the radical left-wing parties and 
some Social Democrats, played an important role in advocating national, 'Nordic' values 
of the welfare society and neutral attitudes, against the block-building politics of some 
European countries and the USA. A feeling of social and democratic superiority to the 
continental countries lay behind the insistence on Nordic values.
Denmark, therefore, deplored the inability of the western European countries to 
agree on a large free trade area under the auspices of the OEEC in the late 1950s. The
I01Peter Hansen, 'Denmark and European Integration’, Cooperation and Conflict, No. 
1, 1969, p. 15.
102Holbraad, Danish Neutrality, p. 165. In the war of 1864 against Germany, the Danes 
lost a large part of its territory in southern Jutland, now part of Schleswig-Holstein in 
Germany.
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idea of a large free trade area was a recurrent theme in the foreign policy debate, and was 
perceived as securing Denmark with the freedom to fulfil the four main objectives of 
Danish foreign policy: the universal (towards the Third World), the Atlantic (in security 
policy), the European (for market access and good neighbourly relations with continental 
European countries, especially Germany), and Nordic (for cultural, democratic and social 
values).
When the CAP was established, negatively influencing Danish agricultural exports, 
the pressures on the government from the farming community increased. In parallel, 
industry had undergone a major restructuring process in the late 1950s, preparing it for 
competition in the EC markets. When the UK government therefore announced its 
intention to seek membership of the EC, the Danish government was ready to follow. 
Danish EC policy of 1961 was based on three conditions being fulfilled before Denmark 
joined the Community: accession together with the UK; satisfactory arrangements for 
those EFTA countries which chose not to opt for EC membership; and the possibility of 
maintaining Nordic cooperation.
The basis for Denmark's EC policy was maintained during the 1960s, and was 
reconfirmed by parliament as official accession negotiations were opened between 
Denmark and the Community in 1970. The only change from 1961 was that the insistence 
on satisfactory arrangements between the EC and other EFTA countries had become an 
'expectation' that 'the Nordic countries' would find solutions for their relations with the 
Community. To assure doubters inside the EC about Danish intentions to seek 
membership, the government stressed that Denmark would comply with the acquis 
communautaire, including plans for future development and the political aims of the EC.
After the accession treaty was signed, the terms of accession were presented to 
parliament. As mentioned, the detailed terms of entry were not the focus of the debate, 
as Denmark had already obtained favourable terms of entry. It was the character of the 
Community, and the implications of membership on Danish society in the wide sense of 
the word which were debated. The Market Committee's report submitted in August 1972 
on Danish EC membership103 was endorsed by all members but four, of which two were
103Markedsutvalget, Betcenkning over I. forslag til lov om Danmarks tiltrcedelse a f De 
europceiske Fcellesskaber og II. forslag til lov...De europceiske Fcellesskaber, 25 August 
1972, Folketinget 1971-72.
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Social Democrats and two were from the Socialist People's Party. This report made clear 
that Danish politicians had not embraced the ideals of European integration, nor accepted 
the goal of the Treaty of Rome - the creation of EU. In this report, the politicians pointed 
out a number of areas, political and economic, where Denmark would oppose deeper 
integration, effectively spelling out the terms of Denmark's adherence to the 'Community 
regime'. The terms were largely based on a notion that expansion of the rules and 
decision-making procedures was acceptable in limited areas, but that only limited 
implementation of the principles and norms in the form of deeper integration would be 
accepted by Denmark. This notion was the basis for the status quo-oriented Danish EC 
policy, as it developed after the accession.
The population, which was positive to the EC during the 1960s, had not taken an 
active interest in the early debate on European integration and federalism. The impact of 
federalist ideas was less significant in Denmark then in the original Six, as public interest 
was mostly focused on the question of whether the accession negotiations would succeed. 
Consequently, Nikolaj Petersen wrote, 'it was natural for opponents to concentrate their 
propaganda on the negative effects of membership on Danish sovereignty and self- 
determination. In their view, membership would not only subject Denmark to the 
considerable degree of supra-nationalism already achieved in the EC: still worse, the level 
of integration was seen as bound to rise steadily, even exponentially, according to the 
'laws' of integration.'104 Nikolaj Petersen's study on popular attitudes to European 
integration concluded that there was a low level of support for federalism and European 
integration in general in Denmark at the time of the referendum (and after), and that 
'Danish politicians did not obtain any mandate for a federalist or integrationist EC policy 
in the 1972 referendum, but neither did they seek one'.105
When negotiating with the EC, Denmark pledged to accept in its totality the acquis 
communautaire of the EC, including its future objectives and the spirit of the Treaties. 
The negotiations were conducted smoothly and the terms of accession were never
104Nikolaj Petersen, 'Attitudes towards European Integration and the Danish Common 
Market Referendum', Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 1, New Series, No. 1, 1978, pp. 
23-41. Quotation from pp. 30-31.
105Petersen, 'Attitudes towards European Integration', pp. 40-41.
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disputed, as most Danish demands had been obtained. Denmark had no problems in 
accepting or participating at the Community's level of cooperation at the time. The 
problem lay in the objectives of European integration, the principles of the Community 
regime, and in the gradual development of these principles in the form of deepened 
integration. This was perceived as an integration dilemma and prompted the political elite 
to interpret the obligations of EC membership in a way which smoothed over the 
perceived incompatibility between the Community regime and Denmark, as well as 
signalling to the EC at an early stage those developments that Denmark would find hard 
to accept. The political elite adopted a form of strategy of adaptation, which will be 
analysed with the help of Nikolaj Petersen's modified typology (see chapter 2).
The bastion strategy was dominant when Denmark decided to seek membership of the EC 
on three conditions: accession with the UK, satisfactory trading agreements between the 
Nordic countries and the EC, and maintenance of the existing Nordic cooperation. These 
three conditions concerned Denmark's external position more than the acquis 
communautaire, and were accepted by the EC. A clear sign that Denmark did not share 
the principles of the Community regime was its insistence on the Luxembourg 
compromise. This was seen as the basis for its EC membership and enshrined in the 
Danish act of accession, Article 3. It was also perceived as the ultimate safeguard for a 
small country wanting to protect its national interests or its sovereignty in a particular 
matter. The Luxembourg compromise was seen as a way for Denmark to escape the 
integration dilemma.
Denmark erected a whole set of bastions for its participation in the Community 
regime, in particular with regard to the Community's future development. At the time, the 
development of the Community was still at an early stage. Danish reservations about the 
future development of the EC, although part of the acquis communautaire, were therefore 
not part of the actual accession negotiations. In addition, the reservations, with some 
exceptions, were designed for domestic consumption and did not receive much attention 
in Brussels as the negotiators concentrated on the problems of the UK and Norwegian 
negotiations.
The bastions were, however, quite fundamental in character. The most conspicuous 
was the bastion on a future EMU, raised by the Danish minister, Ivar Norgaard,
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concerning the right to lead an independent budgetary policy, a cornerstone of the Social 
Democratic welfare policy. The perception of threat by EMU to the welfare system was 
so strong in Denmark that he already felt compelled to signal Denmark's fundamental 
opposition to Brussels at this stage. Other bastions concerned the EC institutions where 
the Market Committee report had announced that future developments should be based 
on the political reality and practical needs for cooperation. It could be no objective in 
itself to create new institutions, or extend the competences of existing ones. In addition, 
the power should remain with the Council of Ministers and the competences of the 
European Parliament should be extended only if desirable for practical purposes. Yet 
another bastion was erected by the Market Committee on foreign political cooperation, 
deemed desirable as long as it remained intergovernmental and outside the scope of the 
EC Treaties.
Many of these bastions would prove incompatible with the development of the 
Community regime, but as the EC entered into a long period of slow development or even 
regression shortly after the first accession, the Danish reservations did not emerge before 
the mid-1980s.
The condition strategy was not prominent in the accession period, as Denmark as 
an applicant country had to accept the acquis communautaire. Denmark, however, 
obtained some remarkable results in the accession negotiations, for instance in maintaining 
domestic legislation barring foreign ownership of secondary homes, the retention of the 
Nordic labour market provisions and the favourable terms for its net contribution to the 
Community budget (Denmark, although one of the richest member states of the EC per 
capita, receives more from the EC than it pays out).
Another condition granted to Denmark was the translation of the word 'union' of 
the EEC Treaty's preamble into sammenslutning, corresponding to the word 'unity' 
although 'union' does exist in the Danish language. This was an important concession 
granted to Denmark for domestic reasons, as it enabled Danish politicians favourable to 
EC membership to argue that the implications of political integration were insignificant, 
in short that the threat by the 'Community regime' to Danish societal values was 
exaggerated.
The concession strategy was prominent as a mirror of the bastions set up for future 
development of the Community regime. Contrary to 1961, in 1970 Denmark pledged to
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accept in its totality the acquis communautaire, including the future objectives of the 
European integration process and the spirit of the EC Treaties. Pledging its adherence to 
the principles of the Community regime in Brussels, Denmark set up a set of bastions at 
home to signal its fundamental opposition to some of the future plans discussed in the 
Community at the time. The concession of accepting the judicial (technical) part of the 
acquis communautaire had to be made, however, as a condition for opening accession 
negotiations by The Hague Summit in 1969. The Community spirit was accepted by some 
groups in Denmark, but the public at large, and the main part of the political and 
administrative elite, did not share it. This became clear in the referendum campaign as no 
one advocated in favour of Denmark joining the Community because of the principles of 
European integration, but solely because of economic advantages. European integration 
and EU were used only by those opposing EC membership and therefore became 
associated with highly negative projections for the future.
There was no feeling in Denmark of adhering to the principles of the 'Community regime' 
nor sharing its norms as a set of mutual values. The proponents' pledges that the 
integration needed to implement the rules and decision-making procedures to obtain the 
economic advantages of EC membership would not interfere with Danish traditions and 
values, were in strong contrast to the opponents' warnings about the principles and norms 
of the 'Community regime' which threatened the foundations of the Danish welfare state, 
political culture and popular democracy.
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Chapter 4
Denmark and the Single European Act
1983-1986
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L Introduction
1. The Social Democratic Party's Dilemma106
1.1. Destabilizing Factors after Accession
The period from 1973 to 1983 has often been named Eurosclerosis as it was characterized 
by a combination of severe economic recession and loss of confidence in European 
cooperation. There were several factors behind the recession, but the economic problems 
were aggravated in particular by the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 and the period of 
international monetary instability in the 1970s. The inability of the Community's member 
states to agree on a common response to the problems in the energy sector, and the 
tendency to rely on national action programmes to assist ailing industries, made the 
Community spirit from the late 1960s and early 1970s evaporate. This period produced 
little that was concrete in terms of new Community policies or common action, and 
lowered moral in the EC institutions.
For Denmark, as a new member state of the EC, the economic recession with its 
high inflation and unemployment could not have come at a worse time. The proponents 
of Danish EC membership had promised that Denmark, as a member, would enjoy 
increased economic prosperity: EC membership was seen as a prerequisite for maintaining 
the Danish welfare state. The economic problems which hit Denmark after the first oil 
crisis were not in themselves linked to accession to the Community, but with its high 
expectations of the effects of EC membership, the Danish population was bound to be 
disappointed. Opinion polls which had showed a majority of the population in favour of 
EC membership just after the referendum in October 1972 dropped, and in 1973 there was 
a majority which claimed it would have voted against EC membership had there been a 
second referendum (see figure 6).
In 1974 a British Labour government came to power on an electoral promise to 
renegotiate Britain's terms of entry to the Community. The start of the renegotiations 
between the UK and the EC kept alive a belief among Danish anti-EC groups that 
Denmark could also have a referendum on whether to remain in the EC. There is no
106Erik Meier Carlsen, Plads fo r  dem alle? Strid og forvandling i Socialdemokratiet, 
Forlaget Hovedland, Copenhagen, 1992. Birgit Niichel Thomsen (ed.), The Odd Man Out? 
Danmark og den Europceiske integration 1948-1992.
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evidence107 that the leadership of the Social Democratic Party was at any stage seriously 
worried that the UK would leave the Community, but the prospects of a second 
referendum kept anti-EC groups alive both within and outside the Folketing.
The situation was difficult for the Social Democratic Party, which held power from 
1971 to 1982 (except for a brief period between 1973 to 1975 when a Liberal minority 
government held office). Immediately after the referendum, the Social Democratic Party 
lost its leader and prime minister, Jens Otto Krag, when he suddenly and unexpectedly 
resigned for personal reasons. Anker Jorgensen, appointed in his place, inherited the 
difficult task of bridging the division in the party and the labour movement over EC 
membership. Opponents to the EC remained active and enjoyed support in the Folketing 
from the young generation of Social Democrats elected to parliament in 1971. The 
decrease in the number of Social Democratic seats in the 1973 general election, and the 
low support for EC membership in the population, made the shaping of the government's 
EC policy a delicate matter. Another factor destabilizing the shaping of the Danish EC 
policy was the fundamental change in the parliamentary structure by the landslide election 
of 1973 (see chapter 3, section 6).
To the Social Democratic Party the electorate's change in attitude towards the left 
posed a serious dilemma. In view of the division in the party over the EC and the threat 
of losing votes to the radical left, shortly before the election of 1973 the Social 
Democratic leadership promoted some of its most prominent Euro-sceptic MPs to 
government positions (Ritt Bjerregaard108 and Karl Hjortnass) and to Chairman of the 
Market Committee (Jorgen Hansen). The strategy backfired in the election of 1973, which 
saw not only the breaking away of the party's right-wing under Erhard Jakobsen to form 
the Centre-Democratic Party, but also the re-election of the Communist Party with 6 seats. 
The Social Democratic Party lost a third (from 71 to 47) of its seats in parliament and 
decided to leave government.
107See comment by Niels Thomsen, 'EF som stridspunkt i dansk politik 1972-1979', 
in Niichel Thomsen (ed.), The Odd Man Out?, p. 163.
108Ritt Bjerregaard, bom 1941, MP for the Social Democratic Party since 1971, 
Minister for Education 1973, 1975-78, Minister for Social Affairs 1979-81, Chairman for 
the Social Democratic Parliamentary Group 1981-82 and 1987-91, Vice-Chairman 1982, 
Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee since 1982, President for the European 
Movement since 1992, appointed commissioner in the new Commission of 1995.
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The Social Democratic government also experienced internal problems over the 
adoption of an economic policy which could balance the consequences of recession, while 
at the same time meeting the demands on the welfare society. The government initially 
adopted an economic policy of expansion, both to satisfy the expectations of its voters 
and to prevent a trend of increasing popularity of the Socialist People's Party. This policy 
led to a large budget deficit,109 forcing the government to resort to substantial borrowing 
abroad which further weakened the Danish krone. In 1979 the national debt (35.7 billion 
kroner)110 had become so alarming, while attempts to introduce a more restrictive 
economic policy remained unsuccessful, that the Social Democratic Finance Minister, 
Knud Heinesen,111 resigned declaring that Denmark was approaching a bottomless 
economic pit.112
As it was in power until December 1973, it fell upon the Social Democratic 
government to lay the foundations of Denmark's EC policy. Ivar Norgaard, as Market 
Minister, formulated a policy based on pragmatic functionalism which favoured more 
cooperation in the economic and social areas, supporting the creation of a stable currency 
system and liberalization of international trade, while opposing the transfer of 
competences to the EC institutions, reforms of the Treaties and insistence that the 'veto- 
right' be maintained. Although the Liberal minority government between 1973 and 1975 
tried to adopt a more positive EC policy, it was prevented from doing so by the Social 
Democratic Party's sceptical attitude in the Market Committee, supported by the Socialist
109In 1975, the budget deficit was recorded at Danish Kroner 4,350 million from a 
surplus the previous year. The budget deficit reached new heights in 1980 at 10,002 
million kroner and peaked in 1982 at 37,552 million. (International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1993, New York, 1993, pp. 312-15).
110Ibid, p. 315.
11’Knud Heinesen, bom 1932, Lecturer in economics at Copenhagen Business School 
1968-71, MP for the Social Democratic Party 1971-85, Vice-Chairman of the Social 
Democratic Party 1980-85, Minister for Education 1971-72, Finance Minister 1975, 1978- 
79 and 1981-82, Minister for Public Works 1981. In 1985, he left politics to become 
President of the Copenhagen Airport and to hold a number of appointments to the boards 
of Danish companies and organizations.
112Quoted in Erik Meier Carlsen, Plads fordem  alle?, p. 41. Also in Anker Jorgensen, 
Brcendingen: Fra mine dagboger 1978-1982, Forlaget Fremad, Copenhagen, 1990, p. 291.
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People's Party and the Radical Liberal Party. When the Social Democrats returned to 
power in 1975 they continued the cautiously sceptical EC policy, and were wary not to 
aggravate the division in the party and in other anti-EC parties in the Folketing on whose 
support they relied. The government's low profile was also helped by the right-wing 
opposition parties, which although positive to the Community, were eager not to turn 
Denmark's EC policy into a parliamentary question, both because of weak support by the 
general public for European integration and the fear of undermining Denmark's position 
among other EC member states. The fact that the Community did not achieve much in 
terms of new policies or institutional reforms in the 1970s helped the government to 
conceal a potential division on European integration between Denmark and the founding 
members. By the early 1980s, Danish politicians still did not believe there would be a 
revision of the Treaties, and the political parties had not considered it necessary to prepare 
their political hinterland, nor the population, for the prospect of further integration.113
1.2. Events during the First Yecu's o f EC Membership
Three events are worth mentioning concerning the Social Democratic government's 
attitude to European integration. First, Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen participated in the 
Paris Summit on 20 October 1972, signing the declaration in which the political leaders 
confirmed their will to establish EU by 1979. On his return to Copenhagen, Jorgensen 
confessed that he had some doubts about the term 'Union', but had let it pass because it 
was so vague.114
Second, the plans for direct elections to the European Parliament were more 
troublesome for the Social Democratic government. Under the Liberal government, the 
Social Democrats had succeeded in ensuring a resolution on the conditions under which
113Interview in the Foreign Ministry, November 1993.
114Niels Thomsen, 'EF som stridspunkt i dansk politik 1972-1979', in Niichel Thomsen, 
The Odd Man Out?, p. 159. The Prime Minister's evaluation of the validity of the term 
was also shared by the entourage around President Georges Pompidou which had 
suggested the term. When the Secretary General of the Elysee asked the presidential aid& 
Edouard Balladur what it meant, he is reported to have replied: 'Nothing...But then, that's 
the beauty of it'. Quoted in Christian Franck, 'New Ambitions: From the Hague to Paris 
Summits (1969-1972)', in Pryce (ed.), The Dynamics o f European Union, 1987, p. 145, 
and footnote no. 36.
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Denmark could accept direct elections to the European Parliament: the election should be 
held on the same day as an election to the Folketing, and only MPs could be elected 
members of the European Parliament. In December 1975 the Folketing decided to accept 
direct elections to the European Parliament without explicitly mentioning the conditions. 
When in July 1976 the European Council agreed on the rules and distribution of seats, 
individual member states were allowed some leeway in the implementation, ensuring that 
the Folketing's conditions could be maintained. As the Folketing was about to finalize the 
implementation, there was initially some hesitation from the right-wing parties about 
abandoning these conditions. They were concerned about the risk that the People's 
Movement against the EC would gain a substantial number of seats, but in the end the 
conditions were dropped.115
Third, the Social Democratic government had to make its attitude on further 
European integration clear in the report on EU by the Belgian Prime Minister, Leo 
Tindemans, commissioned by the Paris Summit of 1974. The government's report to Leo 
Tindemans was based on a recognition that Denmark had subscribed to the goal of EU 
at the Paris Summit of 1972, but although favouring more cooperation between the EC 
member states, it endorsed the Luxembourg compromise, stressed improving the 
functioning of EC institutions within the existing Treaties, and advocated that expansion 
of the activities of EPC should be kept separate from the Treaties.116 Although Danish 
politicians were attributed with the unflattering description of 'foot dragging Danes' by 
Leo Tindemans,1 the government endorsed the Tindemans Report as a 'piece of realistic 
politics' which did not threaten the 'veto-right', nor propose reforms of the Treaties.118 
Although the Tindemans exercise showed that the leadership of the Social Democratic
115Niels Thomsen, 'EF som stridspunkt i dansk politik 1972-1979', in Niichel Thomsen, 
The Odd Man Out?, pp. 167, 169 and 171.
U6Bogen om EF-Unionen, 'Regeringens oplaeg til Tindemans', Europabevaegelsen i 
Danmark, Copenhagen, 1976.
117Attributed to the Danes by Leo Tindemans during a BBC interview in 1976. Quoted 
in Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Da Danmark igen sagde ja  til det fcelles.., Schultz Forlag, 
Copenhagen, 1987, p. 22.
118Niels Thomsen, 'EF som stridspunkt i dansk politik 1972-1979', in Niichel Thomsen, 
The Odd Man Out?, pp. 168-70.
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Party had progressively adopted a more positive attitude towards the EC, it had not 
abandoned its pragmatic functionalist EC policy. The younger generation had become 
politically more responsible by holding positions in government or other important posts, 
but had not become less sceptical towards European integration.
n. The Relaunch of European Integration
1. The Solemn Declaration on European Union, 1983
In January 1981 the German Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, announced a 
major initiative to relaunch EU at the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) party congress ' 19 
Genscher's initiative was supported by his Italian counterpart, Emilio Colombo, and 
together they lent their names to the initiative, the Genscher-Colombo Plan. In November 
the same year the two Foreign Ministers sent copies of the plan to their counterparts in 
EC capitals, the Commission and the European Parliament. The Social Democratic 
Foreign Minister, Kjeld Olesen, gave a cautiously positive response to the plan, but 
stressed that it contained some points incompatible with Danish EC policy.120
The Genscher-Colombo Plan was discussed by an ad hoc group, composed of high foreign 
ministry officials, during the three presidencies of Belgium from January 1982, followed 
by Denmark and Germany.121 Meanwhile a new right-wing government was formed in 
Denmark with Poul Schliiter122 of the Conservative Party as prime minister and Uffe
119Gianni Bonvicini, 'The Genscher-Colombo Plan and the 'Solemn Declaration on 
European Union' (1981-83)', in Pryce (ed.), The Dynamics o f European Union, pp. 174-87.
120Kjeld Olesen, declaration of 14 November 1981 concerning the German-Italian 
deliberations on a European Union, in Christian Thune (ed.), Dansk Udenrigspolitisk 
Arbog 1981, Samfundsvidenskabeligt Forlag, Copenhagen, 1982, p. 296.
121 Gianni Bonvicini, 'The Genscher-Colombo Plan and the 'Solemn Declaration on 
European Union' (1981-83)', in Pryce (ed.), The Dynamics o f European Union, p. 179.
122Poul Schliiter, bom 1929, lawyer, MP since 1964 for the Conservative Party, 
Member of the Conservative Party's Executive Committee 1952-55 and since 1971 and 
party Chairman 1974-77 and 1981-93, Member of the Council of Europe 1971-74 and 
since 1979, Prime Minister 1982-93, Member of the European Parliament since 1994.
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Ellemann-Jensen123 of the Liberal Party as foreign minister. Despite the 
Christian People's Party and the Centre-Democratic Party joining the coalition, the 
government remained in minority in parliament.
The new minority government was composed of parties which all favoured the 
Community although to varying degrees. With the support of the Radical Liberal Party, 
the government had a majority on economic issues which excluded the Social Democrats 
from decisive influence in this area. It remained, however, in line with the Social 
Democrats on the EC, with the result that EC policy and security policy became the 
battleground for opposition politics. The reasons why the Social Democratic Party chose 
these two areas to base their attacks on the government was partly because it needed to 
stem the loss of votes to the radical left, and partly because the radical wing of the Social 
Democratic party was influenced by the neutral tendencies of the peace movement which 
strongly criticized the American policy in NATO and campaigned for a nuclear-free zone 
in Scandinavia.
With the first Schliiter government a period began where EC policy was directed 
by an alternative majority in the Market Committee, in most cases synonymous with the 
policy of the Social Democratic Party supported by other opposition parties. This situation 
clearly emerged when on 18 November 1982, during a parliamentary debate, Foreign 
Minister Ellemann-Jensen was asked to give an account of the negotiations on the 
Genscher-Colombo Plan. He assured parliament that the current government had taken 
over the positions of the former and that an agreement on EU had been reached in the 
Market Committee to deepen cooperation as far as possible without changing the 
institutional structures. The Social Democratic spokesman on EC affairs, Ivar Norgaard, 
commended the efforts of the new government to conform to the EC policy of the former, 
and spelled out the details of the Social Democrats' position on the Genscher-Colombo 
Plan. A majority in the Folketing composed of the government parties, the Social 
Democrats and the Radial Liberals approved a resolution which confirmed that the 
existing government continued the EC policy of the former, also in relation to the
,23Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, bom 1941, journalist at the Danish television 1970-75, 
Editor-in-chief for Bersen 1975-76, MP for the Liberal Party since 1977, Chairman of the 
Market Committee 1978-79, Chairman of the Liberal Party since 1984, Foreign Minister 
1982-93.
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Genscher-Colombo Plan.124
Despite the modest compromise reached at the European Council meeting in 
Stuttgart on 17-19 June 1983, the Danish Prime Minister was obliged by the parliamentary 
resolution to make reservations to a number of points in the Solemn Declaration of 
European Union,125 much to the annoyance of other member states.126 The reservations 
covered a variety of areas many of which were easily traced back to traditional Social 
Democratic views on the Community: that security policy should be kept out of the 
deliberations of the EPC; that harmonization efforts should not be extended to social 
security; that there should be no increase in the competences or status of the European 
Parliament; and that there should be no cooperation in the judicial area as it might entail 
future reform of the Treaties.
2. The Firet Steps towards Reform of the EC Treaties127
There is no consensus on the precise factors behind the European 'relaunch' in the mid- 
1980s. Some authors stress intergovernmental dynamics and internal political changes in 
some EC member states;128 others the functional logic embedded in the transformation of 
systems as supranational and transnational elites and national political leaders were 
mobilized towards a shared goal;129 and others again stress the role of the EC institutions,
n4Folketingstidende, debate on the Genscher-Colombo Plan, 18 November 1982, cols. 
1873-1922.
125Solemn Declaration on European Union, European Communities, Bulletin, EC 6- 
1983, Luxembourg, 1983, pp. 24-9.
126Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Da Danmark igen sagde ja  til det foelles.., pp. 24-5.
127The following chapters are in part based on Niels-Jorgen Nehring, EF-pakken: 
Hvordan det kom sa vidt.., Working Paper No. 15, Institute of Political Science, 
University of Copenhagen, 1987. Some points were discussed in depth with Mr Nehring 
during an interview in November 1993.
128See for instance, Andrew Moravcsik, 'Negotiating the Single European Act', in 
Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann (eds.), The New European Community: 
Decisionmaking and Institutional Change, Westview Press, Boulder, 1991.
129See for instance, Thomas Pedersen, 'Political Change in the European Community: 
The Single European Act as a Case of System Transformation', in Kelstrup (ed ), 
European Integration and Denmark's Participation, 1992, pp. 184-212.
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in particular the European Parliament and its initiative on the Draft Treaty establishing 
the European Union, which acted as a catalyst for further integration.130 It is difficult to 
establish which was the most important factor. It seems, however, safe to say that each 
of these factors, and others such as enlargement and the realization of external 
technological challenges, had an impact on the process towards the IGC leading to the 
signing of the SEA. From discussions with politicians and civil servants in Denmark, who 
were involved in the process, it is clear that they had great difficulties at the time in 
assessing the determination of other EC member states and institutions to forward 
European integration.
2.1. The French Presidency
It was during the French Presidency in the first half of 1984 that momentum grew towards 
a qualitative change of the underlying conditions for a major revision of the Treaties.
The economic policy of France's left-wing government had shifted between 1981 
and 1983 from having been based on the nationalization of ailing industries and massive 
injection of public money to stimulate the French economy to promoting economic and 
monetary stabilization through a number of austerity measures and devaluation of the 
currency. In line with the new economic policy and the decrease of Communist influence 
in the Cabinet, President Mitterrand adopted a more pro-European stance. In a speech to 
the European Parliament on 24 May 1984, the President gave his support to European 
integration and outlined a number of measures to improve the functioning of the 
Community. Finally, he proposed 'preparatory consultations, perhaps leading up to a 
conference of the Member States concerned..' to correct a number of inadequacies in the 
EC institutions.131
Mitterrand's speech led to considerable political speculation in Denmark on the 
true intentions and possible consequences of the shift in French EC policy. Uffe 
Ellemann-Jensen expressed his surprise, along with other Danish politicians, at France's 
new position, which he partly attributed to internal political considerations prompted by
130See for instance, Richard Corbett, 'The 1985 Intergovernmental Conference and the 
Single European Act', in Pryce (ed.), The Dynamics o f European Union, pp.23 8-72.
131'Address by Mr Franfois Mitterrand, President of the European Council, 24 May 
1984 in the European Parliament', Europe Documents, No. 1312, 28 May 1984.
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the elections to the European Parliament in 1984, and he foresaw an end to Danish EC 
opponents counting on France to stop initiatives towards EU.132
2.2. The Folketing's Resolution o f May 1984
President Mitterrand's speech was the focus of a major EC debate in the Folketing on 28 
May 1984. The debate was prompted by Social Democratic and Radical Liberal efforts 
to establish a narrower framework for the government's EC policy. In the months 
preceding the debate, there had been increasingly harsh discussions in the Market 
Committee between the opposition and the Foreign Minister. Now the Social Democratic 
Party and the Liberal Party proposed a motion to resolve the conditions for Denmark's 
future EC policy. Speculations stemming from President Mitterrand's speech fed into the 
debate, particularly his allusions to the possibility of Europe progressing at different 
speeds or with variable geometry, restricting the Luxembourg compromise and reforming 
EC institutions. The Folketing had reacted with dismay in February 1984 at the Draft 
Treaty establishing the European Union, refusing to debate it in parliament and finally 
rejecting it with the parliamentary resolution of May 1984.
The government, in particular the Foreign Minister, was not happy with the 
detailed wording of the proposed resolution, but conscious of the necessity to establish 
conditions for cooperation with the opposition, the governing parties133 voted in favour 
of the resolution, forming a large majority together with the Social Democrats and the 
Radical Liberals.
The resolution, which became absolutely crucial for the Danish position in the 
forthcoming negotiations, summed up a number of well-known points of Danish EC 
policy:
The Folketing confirms that the basis for Denmark's membership of the EC is the
preservation of the veto-right and the preservation of the division of competence
between the Council of Ministers, the Commission and the European Parliament,
132Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Da Danmark igen sagte ja  til det fcelles.., pp. 29-30.
133Except for two Centre-Democratic MPs.
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and therefore the Folketing rejects the Draft Treaty of the European Parliament 
concerning the establishment of a European Union.
After stating the fundamental principles of Danish EC policy, the resolution drew up an 
agenda, based largely on Social Democratic policies, to be implemented at the European 
level. It continued:
The Folketing confirms that Denmark will work actively within the EC during the 
coming years for: (1) a substantial effort against unemployment, including a 
coordination between the member states for a reduction of working hours; (2) the 
realization of new common activities within the areas of industry, research, 
technology and energy; (3) a coordinated effort to improve the internal and 
external environment which does not hinder individual members' capacity for 
independent national progress; (4) a tightening up of the control of multinational 
companies; (5) the retention of the principles of the CAP; (6) an improvement of 
the economies of developing countries; and (7) a strengthening of the cooperation 
with the EFTA states.134
The resolution effectively spelt out the limits of Denmark's acceptance of European 
integration policy and set an agenda for the Community's future development, thereby 
considerably limiting the government's margin of manoeuvre in future negotiations.
2.3. The Fontainebleau European Council, July 1984
On 25-26 June 1984 the European Council met in Fontainebleau. President Mitterrand, 
who invested much personal prestige in the successful end of the meeting, had undertaken 
a trip around the EC capitals to consult and discuss solutions to a number of problems on 
the Community's agenda, of which the British budgetary problem was the most pressing. 
When the President came to Copenhagen, Prime Minister Schliiter was anxious to find 
out the possible consequences of his May speech to the European Parliament. The French
UAFolketingstidende, 28 May 1984, cols. 7160-232.
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President assured Poul Schliiter that France did not foresee any major changes of the EC, 
favoured a reduction of the misuse of the Luxembourg compromise, and was favourable 
about inviting non-EC states to a future IGC. Reassured that the European Council would 
not present any disagreeable surprises, the Prime Minister later gave a soothing message 
to the Market Committee on the basis of his discussions with President Mitterrand and 
had no problems in obtaining a mandate from them.135
The Fontainebleau European Council succeeded in finding a solution to the British 
budget problem and Chancellor Kohl's demand for compensation to German farmers for 
the abolition of the Monetary Compensatory Amounts. These problems solved, the 
European Council went on to discuss the future of the Community. It was decided to 
convene two committees to advance the concept of EU; on People's Europe and on the 
improvement of cooperation within the Community. The committees later became known 
under the names of their Chairmen, the Adonnino and the Dooge Committees.
Prime Minister Schliiter was able to secure approval from the Market Committee 
on Denmark's participation in the work of both committees, on the condition that 
Denmark would not be bound to the outcome in advance. Because of the general wording 
of the mandate, the Dooge Committee was not seen as a major institutional initiative and 
the Market Committee therefore at first paid more attention to the committee on People's 
Europe. The Danish Foreign Ministry did not believe the Dooge Committee would in the 
short term lead to any major change in the institutional structure. The reason for 
misjudging the situation, according to one commentator, was a phenomenon already 
identified by Danish diplomats: because of Denmark's well-known and rigid positions on 
institutional questions it had become uninteresting as a discussion partner for other EC 
member states; in other words, Denmark was increasingly disconnected from crucial 
discussions on the future institutional structure of the EC.136 Not sharing the principles of 
European integration, the 'reform-friendly' member states were wary not to let Denmark,
135Niels Jorgen Nehring, EF-pakken: Hvordan det kom sa vidt.. pp. 20-21.
136Niels Jorgen Nehring, EF-pakken: Hvordan det kom sa vidt.. pp. 21-4. As the work 
of the two committees proceeded, the Dooge Committee attracted most attention from the 
Market Committee. The Adonnino Committee is not mentioned in the following account 
as it had little impact on the successive events in Denmark.
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as a reluctant partner, put a stop or water down the process in its early stages. In this way 
they protected what they saw as the Community's acquis from losing its dynamism.
3. The Work of the Dooge Committee, 1984-85
It soon became clear to the Danish representatives, Otto Moller from the Foreign Ministry 
and Niels Jorgen Nehring from the Prime Minister's Office as his alternate, that the Dooge 
Committee was different than previous working groups which had operated within the 
framework of the Treaties. The committee was composed of personal representatives of 
the member states' political leaders, which thus gave it prestige and patronage from the 
highest quarters.137 This was the case of Maurice Faure, the French representative, who 
was personally instructed by President Mitterrand and reported directly back to him. The 
European Parliament was indirectly represented by the Italian and Belgian representatives 
(Mauro Ferri and Fernand Herman) who were members of its Institutional Affairs 
Committee. The informal structure and lack of explicit rules made the Danish position 
even more delicate. Those member states which wanted the Dooge Committee to produce 
concrete results138 took an uncompromising attitude to the reluctant member states, by 
letting it be known that this time the rule of the smallest common denominator would not 
be applied. Denmark, together with the UK and Greece, soon found itself marginalized 
in a position where it could not resort to the threat of veto. The fact that the UK wanted 
to avoid marginalization and had more room for manoeuvre than Denmark, put the Danish 
negotiating position under increasing pressure.
The committee, under the chairmanship of the Irish senator James Dooge, set out 
to meet for two days fortnightly in order to submit a preliminary report to the Dublin 
European Council in December 1984 and to finalize the work during the Italian 
Presidency. Disagreements in substance came to the surface at the committee's very first
137The personal prestige and closeness to the political leaders varied between the 
representatives. In some cases, like the German, their appointment was the source of 
internal discussion (Europe, No. 3917, 31 August 1984, p. 2, No. 3926, 13 September 
1984, p. 3).
138Both Niels Jorgen Nehring and Uffe Ellemann-Jensen refer to a clear French- 
German understanding that the committee should reach a politically acceptable result to 
bring further integration at a later stage (EF-pakken: Hvordan det kom sa vidt.., p. 25, and 
Da Danmark igen sagte ja  til det foelles.., p. 33).
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meeting on 28 September 1984, and to avoid reaching stalemate at an early stage, the 
committee decided to give Maurice Faure the task of drafting a policy document.139 
Although the committee received a number of papers from other representatives, the 
report of Maurice Faure remained the most influential document and became the basis for 
the preliminary report to the European Council in Dublin.
As the preliminary report took shape, Denmark felt compelled to insert a number 
of reservations in the form of footnotes: a general reservation in which the overall 
approach of the report was questioned; and to specific points which could give the 
Community new impetus.140 The Danish reservation on the chapter on efficient and 
democratic institutions, considered by other representatives as the only measure of real 
importance, singled out Denmark's fundamental scepticism about EU. Although the UK 
and Greece also raised reservations on some points, Denmark's position stood out as the 
most uncompromising. The approach of the Dooge Committee thus succeeded in 
separating out the 'reform willing' from the 'reform sceptic' member states.
In the run-up to the European Council in Dublin on 3-4 December 1984, the 
Danish government became increasingly worried about the consequences of the 
preliminary report, which potentially threatened the basis of Denmark's EC membership. 
The report mentioned the possibility of convening an IGC to negotiate a draft EU Treaty 
and that a decision to that extent could already be taken at the Dublin European Council. 
The government had to assess the situation and its likely consequences before approaching 
the Social Democrats, with the aim of reaching a common understanding about the 
strategy to adopt in the following months, and to share responsibility with the Social 
Democrats and the Radical Liberals by keeping them continuously informed about the 
work of the Dooge Committee. At the meeting of the Market Committee before the 
Dublin European Council, the Prime Minister succeeded in obtaining an agreement that 
Denmark should remain in the Dooge Committee to try to influence the work during the 
following months. The Social Democrats, however, were worried about the consequences 
of the preliminary report, but like the government, lacked a clear idea of what might
l39Euwpe, No. 3939, 1-2 October 1984, p. 3.
140'Interim Report of the A d  Hoc Committee in Institutional Affairs to the European 
Council', Europe Documents, No. 1333, 2 December 1984.
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follow.141
The European Council in Dublin took note of the preliminary report and invited the
Dooge Committee to submit a final report to the European Council in Brussels on 29-30
March 1985. During the discussions, the British Prime Minister Thatcher directed strong
criticism towards the working methods of the Dooge Committee and demanded that
consensus be the rule. Her criticism gave Danish and British representatives a stronger
hand when the Dooge Committee convened again after Dublin. The final report did not
deviate much from the preliminary as the political context for including further points of
an integrationist character were not ripe. The areas of security policy, economic
convergence and EMS was further developed, which led to a series of reservations from
Ireland, Germany and the Netherlands.142
As Prime Minister Schliiter oriented the Market Committee before the European
Council in Brussels, he reported with satisfaction that the substance of the report had been
H\e
strengthened while institutional issues remained unchanged. Ultimately Brussels European 
Council, which concentrated on finding a solution to Greece's block to the accession of 
Spain and Portugal, referred the debate on the Dooge Committee's final report to the 
European Council in Milan in June.
The work of the Dooge Committee aroused public speculation about EU in Denmark and 
fuelled the rhetoric of anti-EC groups, in particular the People's Movement against the 
EC. For the latter, a return of the discussion on EU albeit in the form of the Dooge 
Committee's report, was an opportunity to attract public attention again and score some 
points at the expense of the government. The People's Movement against the EC, and its 
allies in the Folketing, had long tried to secure a second referendum on Denmark's EC
141Niels Jorgen Nehring, EF-pakken: Hvordan det kom sa vidt.., p. 28.
142'Report of the A d  Hoc Committee on Institutional Questions to the European 
Council', Europe Documents, Nos. 1349-50, 21 March 1985. Niels Jorgen Nehring, EF- 
pakken: Hvordan det kom sa vidt.., pp. 28-30, and Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Da Danmark 
igen sagte ja  til det fcelles.., pp. 33-5.
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membership with the aim of terminating it.143 In December 1984 it circulated pirate copies 
of the preliminary report of the Dooge Committee as evidence that their warnings about 
future EU were true. In March 1985, the Left Socialist MPs tabled a motion for a 
resolution in the Folketing, which amounted to a mandate for the government in the 
coming negotiations on EU. The proposition was not passed to a vote as no other party, 
except the Socialist People's Party, supported it, but it did fulfil its aim of heating up the 
debate in parliament on reforms of the EC.144
4. The European Council in Milan
In the period between the European Councils in Brussels and Milan, the Danish 
government had to find out the intentions of the other EC member states, in particular the 
big three and Italy which held the Presidency. The assessment of this period, both in the 
Prime Minister's office and the Foreign Ministry, was of general confusion and conflicting 
signals. The situation was therefore precarious for the government, which had to find a 
balance between the constraints of the Market Committee majority based on parliament's 
resolution of May 1984 and the possible developments at the Milan European Council.
4.1. The Danish Government's Assessment o f the Situation
The situation looked less positive for those states and institutions in favour of institutional 
reform in early spring 1985, because of dwindling support from Germany and opposition 
in the UK. The Italian Presidency, however, took on the task of consulting other EC 
members and institutions in the run-up to Milan, in order to identify possible 
compromises. Representatives of the Presidency conducted a tour of the EC capitals and 
reached Copenhagen on 9 May. The Danish Foreign Minister interpreted the visit of 
Mauro Ferri, instead of Prime Minister Craxi or Foreign Minister Andreotti, as proof of 
the Italians' conclusion that Denmark's rigid positions made it not worthwhile to seek
143Victor Andersen, 'Det store opgor om union kommer snart', Weekendavisen, 4 
January 1985.
U4Folketingstidende, 'Forslag til folketingsbeslutning', 12 March 1985, and 
'Forhandling', 21 March 1984, cols. 7806-27.
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openings to Treaty reforms.145 The Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister were not able 
to gain any insight from the discussions with Mauro Ferri into the positions of other EC 
states, but made the following assessment of the situation before the Milan European 
Council:
• The European Parliament has a close ally in the Italian Presidency which is ready 
to go far to accommodate its demands. The Commission, with its new president, 
Jacques Delors, is playing an increasingly active role in seeking to relaunch the 
Community. It has been given the task by the Brussels European Council to draw 
up a programme for the internal market (Lord Cockfield's White Paper - a 
programme and a time table for the provisions necessary to implement the internal 
market) to be presented in time for the Milan meeting. The EC institutions, 
however, will not participate in the decision to call an IGC and their influence on 
the process is not regarded as crucial.
Germany has changed its position in the Dooge Committee during the second 
phase of the deliberations. As the committee’s work enters specific policy areas, 
such as the EMS, German resistance has surfaced due to internal opposition. The 
discrepancy between Chancellor Kohl's pro-European rhetoric and German 
opposition in specific policy areas has come dramatically to the forefront since 
May 1985, when the German Agriculture Minister Kiechle evoked the 
Luxembourg compromise on the price on cereals.146 This event is a recurrent issue 
in the debate on the 'veto-right' in Denmark, forwarded as evidence that the 
'reform-friendly' member states are paying lip-service to their European credentials 
while using the veto in areas where they have special interests.
• The Franco-German understanding on an institutional break-through is increasingly 
strained because of the incoherent German EC policy. The relationship has 
deteriorated further since the two countries showed openly diverging positions at
145Prime Minister Schliiter had consultations in private with his Italian counterpart and 
Foreign Minister Andreotti on 12 June. Andreotti asked for specific Danish openings and
did not try to conceal his ambitions (.Europe, No. 4108, 13 June 1984, and Niels Jorgen 
Nehring, EF-pakken: Hvordan det kom sa vidt.., p. 36).
]A6Europe, No. 4092, 20-21 May 1984, pp. 7-9.
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the G7 meeting in Bonn from 2-4 May 1985, and the influence of Prime Minister 
Thatcher on Chancellor Kohl in trying to build up a relation of confidence 
between two right-wing politicians against socially inspired policies.147 In Denmark 
there is awareness about President Mitterrand's personal stake in relaunching the 
European idea. It is also known that the EC was an area where President 
Mitterrand might succeed in splitting the right-wing opposition of the Gaullist 
Rassemblementpour la republique (RPR) and the integration-friendly Union pour 
la democratic frangaise (UDF). Subsequent, unclear, French declarations of intent 
are being interpreted in Denmark as a sign that once German pressure for reforms 
falters, France will resume its traditional EC policy.
4.2. Bilateral Consultation
Bilateral consultations between the Presidency and the member states were accompanied 
by written reports and proposals for changes to the Treaties, which made Denmark's 
assessment of the developments even more difficult. At the Foreign Ministers' meeting 
in Stresa on 8-9 June 1985 the British Foreign Minister, Geoffrey Howe, presented the 
UK's proposal, the Howe Plan, which was largely in line with the positions of the 
memorandum148 presented to the European Council in Fontainebleau the previous year, 
and which proposed to strengthen the intergovernmental aspects of the EPC and to reduce 
the misuse of the Luxembourg compromise.149 The Danish government reacted positively 
to both documents and the Foreign Minister considered them as a good and realistic basis 
for Denmark in future negotiations. The fact that the British government expressed 
opposition to Treaty reforms and tried to deflect pressure towards pragmatic solutions 
based on intergovernmental agreements, raised the hope of the Danish government that 
they would be able to reach a solution compatible to the Folketing resolution of May
147In an editorial, Emanuele Gazzo wrote that 'Chancellor Kohl has been subject to 
internal political influences and strong pressure from Mrs Thatcher (who could not bear 
the idea of an initiative headed by two socialist leaders, Mr Craxi and Mr Mitterrand, 
being successful)', Europe, No. 4111, 17-18 June 1985.
148European Communities, 'Europe: The Future (United Kingdom Memorandum)', 
Europe Documents, No. 1322, 26 July 1984.
149Europe, No. 4115, 22 June 1985.
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1984. In the last few days before the Milan European Council, France and Germany 
jointly presented a paper, in an attempt to regain the initiative and to mend the Franco- 
German understanding on Europe. The initiative was presented as a redrafted version of 
the British paper on EPC, but with the important difference that the changes proposed 
were presented as a draft treaty of EU. Because the preparation of the draft treaty was 
unclear, as no previous negotiations had taken place, it gave rise to confusion among the 
member states.150 Just after the announcement of the Franco-German draft treaty, a French 
memorandum on Europe's future was presented, which summarized the French 
government's overall position on a number of aspects of European integration.151
News of the two initiatives reached Prime Minister Schliiter and Foreign Minister 
Ellemann-Jensen as they were departing for Milan. The late presentation of the initiatives 
increased both their confusion about the likely outcome of the European Council and their 
feeling of political isolation.152
4.3. The Folketing's Debate in May 1985
During the debate in the Folketing on 23 May 1985, the ruling parties, the Social 
Democrats and the Radical Liberals, reiterated their positions from the previous year 
which were largely reflected in the resolution forwarded by them. The text reconfirmed 
the resolution of 28 May 1984 as a basis for Denmark's EC policy, and it pre-empted the 
opening of deliberations between the EC member states on the future of European 
cooperation by stating that Denmark was not bound in advance by the negotiation result, 
making it clear that Denmark was free to decide whether it should participate in an 
extended cooperation after the negotiations were concluded. The resolution also requested 
that the government work for strengthened cooperation between the EC member states and
150Europe, No. 4119, 28 June 1985, p. 3. Niels Jorgen Nehring, EF-pakken: Hvordan 
det kom sa vidt.., pp. 37-8. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Da Danmark igen sagte ja  til det 
fcelles.., pp. 39-40. The Foreign Minister expressed his and the Foreign Ministry's worry, 
prompted by the news of the Franco-German draft treaty, as they thought that Denmark 
had not been consulted (along with Greece and Ireland) while other member states had. 
The Foreign Minister believed that if this was true, it meant that Denmark had received 
the red card and been put aside as no longer worthy of being a negotiation partner (p. 40).
151Europe, No. 4120, 29 June 1985, p. 6-bis.
152Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Da Danmark igen sagte ja  til det fcelles.., pp. 36-7.
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other West European countries.
Ivar Norgaard, the Social Democratic EC spokesman, commended the Danish 
representative in the Dooge Committee for maintaining the Danish reservations in line 
with the May 1984 resolution. As a reply to those 'super-European' member states which 
wanted to see a reduction in the use o f the Luxembourg compromise and an increase in 
the European Parliament's competences, Ivar Norgaard recalled that the German 
Agriculture Minister had evoked the Luxembourg compromise despite Chancellor Kohl 
and Foreign Minister Genscher being in favour of institutional reform and EU. Ivar 
Norgaard argued that the Luxembourg compromise was crucial for small member states, 
as the big states in reality always have a veto-right regardless o f the existence o f the 
compromise.153 The government's line, presented by the Foreign Minister, was designed 
around the May 1984 resolution, but was expressed in a forthcoming way. The 
government assessed as small the risk that the Milan European Council would convene 
an IGC, as the bilateral consultations between the member states had not reached the 
stage where a consensus was taking shape.154
The Prime Minister adopted the same position when he presented the situation to
the Market Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee155 before leaving for the
European Council in Milan from 28-29 June 1985. The government believed that the
prospects o f an IGC were unlikely, although the European Council was poised to take a
decision on the internal market. Regarding changes to the EPC, the government proposed
that Denmark should support British proposals as they rested on an intergovernmental
flvG,
character. The Prime Minister assured^that the EPC secretariat, unacceptable for the Social 
Democrats unless placed in Copenhagen, was to be independent o f the EC institutions, 
although the government's efforts to win agreement for the secretariat to be in the Danish
153Ivar Norgaard, Folketingstidende, 23 May 1985, cols. 10423-27.
154Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Folketingstidende, 23 May 1985, col. 10421.
155The European Council was to discuss matters on the EPC which come under the 
jurisdiction o f the Foreign Affairs Committee. As this committee has only consultative 
competence, the Prime Minister also increasingly discussed EPC matters in the Market 
Committee, thereby subordinating him self to the majority views o f the Folketing. The 
Prime Minister had begun to follow the procedure o f the Foreign Minister and the 
specialized ministers in the run-up to European Council meetings, to compensate for the 
lack o f institutionalized working procedures of the European Council.
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capital had been unsuccessful. The government supported the internal market on two 
conditions: no harmonization of indirect taxes which could influence the policy of income 
distribution, and no majority voting in areas covered by the internal market.
Possible institutional reforms were played down in the prime ministerial statement. 
The government argued that Denmark should accept: some formulations about EU; the 
extension of the consultation procedure between the European Parliament and the Council; 
a preliminary hearing by the European Parliament of Commission proposals; and an 
increased use of Article 148(3),156 or the introduction of a procedure to prevent misuse of 
the Luxembourg compromise.
The Social Democratic Party accepted without enthusiasm to extend the 
consultation procedure, restrain the misuse of the Luxembourg compromise and establish 
an EPC secretariat separate from the EC institutions, but opposed the preliminary hearing 
of the European Parliament and a strengthening of the decision-making process of the 
European Council, as this institution was not subject to the same parliamentary scrutiny. 
The Radical Liberal Party expressed cautious scepticism for the possible changes in the 
Community, while condemning the strengthening of EPC by an independent secretariat.157
4.4. The 'Coup' in Milan'5*
At the outset of the European Council in Milan it was unclear as to whether the meeting 
would result in any concrete progress on Treaty reforms. The meeting was opened by the 
Prime Minister Craxi, followed by Chancellor Kohl who stressed that the moment of truth 
had come and that Germany was prepared to go beyond the Treaties to accept procedural 
changes (but listed a number of conditions before an IGC could be convened). President 
Mitterrand stated that France was prepared to go far if needed, but that he was also in 
favour of more limited progress. Margaret Thatcher insisted that there was no need for
156Article 148(3) states that a member state abstaining from voting does not prevent 
the Council from adopting a measure by unanimity.
157Niels Jorgen Nehring, EF-pakken: Hvordan det kom sa vidt.., pp. 41-7.
158Niels Jorgen Nehring, EF-pakken: Hvordan det kom sa vidt.., pp. 47-56. Uffe 
Ellemann-Jensen, Da Danmark igen sagte ja  til det fcelles.., pp. 40-2. Margaret Thatcher, 
The Downing Street Years, Harper Collins Publishers, London, 1993, pp. 548-51. Europe, 
No. 4121, 30 June 1985 (special edition).
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Treaty changes, nor an IGC, as the European Council in Luxembourg could set itself up 
as an IGC and adopt any necessary measures. She called for progress with the internal 
market, political cooperation, the decision-making process referred to by the Howe Plan, 
and some changes to the role of the European Parliament. Prime Minister Schliiter 
expressed his support for the British position, stressing the need to strengthen cooperation 
in areas such as research and technology and the internal market, but that he saw no need 
for institutional changes to achieve this.
The debate the following day concentrated on the Franco-German text on 
institutional changes. When the discussion reached an impasse between the 'integration- 
friendly' member states and Denmark, Greece and the UK, Prime Minister Craxi decided 
to make a tour de table to establish who was in favour of calling an IGC on the basis of 
Article 236 of the Treaty of Rome (stipulating simple majority for convening an IGC). 
The manoeuvre singled out Denmark, Greece and the UK, whereby the Presidency 
concluded that there was a sufficient majority to call the IGC.
It was left to the incoming Luxembourg Presidency to formally convene the IGC. 
The reluctant member states had to decide whether to take part and influence the outcome 
or be placed before a fa it accompli with the risk of a two-speed Europe. The fact that an 
IGC follows a well-known formula where unanimity is the rule made it easier for the 
sceptic member states to take part. The Danish government's position was clear: Denmark 
should take part and try to reach an acceptable outcome with the help of an alliance with 
the UK and Greece. The key was the extent to which Margaret Thatcher would be willing 
to compromise in order to avoid marginalizing the UK. The problem was now whether 
the alternative majority in parliament would permit Denmark to take part in the IGC and 
under which conditions.
The Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister reported back on the outcome of the 
Milan European Council to the Market Committee on 5 July. They had a difficult task in 
evaluating the consequences of the 7:3 majority in favour of an IGC and how the situation 
would develop during the Luxembourg Presidency. The Social Democratic and Radical 
Liberal parties referred to Danish EC policy as defined by the parliamentary resolutions 
of May 1984 and 1985, emphasizing that Denmark could participate in the IGC if there 
were no prior conditions for accepting the outcome; while the Socialist People's Party and
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the Left Socialist Party were against Danish participation.159
IIL Denmark and the IGC 
1. Intergovernmental Negotiations
The call for an IGC not only put the minority government in a difficult position, but also 
the Social Democratic Party and the Radical Liberal Party, which would have to confront 
large Euro-sceptic groups within their parties which rejected any Treaty reforms and 
debates on EU.
1.1. The Dilemma o f the Moderate Opposition
The Social Democratic Party's internal problem in relation to the EC was highlighted by 
the two elections to the European Parliament in 1979 and 1984. In the 1979 election, the 
Social Democratic Party lost 67 per cent of the votes compared with the preceding general 
election (1977), and obtained three seats in the European Parliament. The same happened 
in the 1984 election when the party lost 64 per cent of the votes compared with the 
general election in the same year, and again obtained three seats in the European 
Parliament. It is noteworthy that the Radical Left Party experienced losses of 50 per cent 
of the votes in 1979 and 66 per cent in 1984 compared to the general elections, and did 
not obtain any seats in the European Parliament. The big right-wing pro-European parties, 
the Conservative and Liberal Parties, did not lose as large a share of their votes in the 
European Parliament elections compared with the general elections: 7 per cent and 32 per 
cent respectively in the 1979, election and 47 per cent and 39 per cent respectively in the 
1984 election. The most striking feature of the Danish elections to the European 
Parliament, however, was the fact that the People's Movement against the EC managed 
to win 4 of the 16 seats in both the 1979 and 1984 elections to the European Parliament. 
The rate of participation in the Euro-elections was much lower than in general elections: 
47.8 per cent in 1979 and 52.4 per cent in 1984, compared with 88.7 per cent in the 1977
,59Niels Jorgen Nehring, EF-pakken. Hvordan det kom sa vidt.., pp. 54-6. Uffe 
Ellemann-Jensen, Da Danmark igen sagte ja  til det fcelles.., pp. 44-6. Toger Seidenfaden, 
'Uafsluttet drama i Milano', Weekendavisen, 5 July 1985.
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and 88.4 per cent in the 1984 general elections.160
Ritt Bjerregaard's attempts to radicalize the Social Democratic Party in order to 
win over voters from the Socialist People's Party ruled out a pro-European line during the 
IGC and were influential in the debate. Ritt Bjerregaard had strong support for her non­
compromising line in the Social Democratic parliamentary group, while Anker Jorgensen, 
the party chairman, and Sven Auken,161 the political spokesman, favoured a more pro- 
European line. The traditional sceptic line was also represented by the EC spokesman, 
Ivar Norgaard. The internal split in the party leadership and the labour movement and a 
Euro-sceptic electorate turned the prospects of an IGC into a serious dilemma for the 
Social Democrats.162
Although the situation was somewhat similar for the Radical Liberal Party, it was 
different in respect of its position as a small party which often played the pivotal role in 
the middle ground of Danish party politics, but did not aspire to the leading position in 
a majority government. Since the general election in 1984, the Radical Liberal Party lent 
parliamentary support to the minority government in the economic area, but in respect of 
the EC the situation was different. While the Radical Liberal Party was not opposed to 
Danish membership of the EC, a large number of its voters were hostile to or hesitant of 
supranational integration and intergovernmental cooperation in the areas of security and 
defence. The Party Congress in September 1985 had taken a resolution against codifying 
the EPC in a treaty and extending its activities into the security policy field.163 The Party 
Chairman argued that EU should be rejected, since it was necessary for a small country 
like Denmark to maintain the 'veto-right' and not agree to more transfer of sovereignty to
160Carsten Lehman Sorensen, 'Danmarks EF-valg i 1979 og 1984', in Jorgen Elklit and 
Ole Tonsgaard (eds.), Valg og vcelgeradfcerd, Forlaget Politica, Arhus University, Arhus, 
1984, chapter 16, table p. 348.
161 Sven Auken, bom 1942, Lecturer at Arhus University 1973, MP for the Social 
Democratic Party since 1971, Political Spokesman 1977 and 1983-92, Minister for Labour 
Market Questions 1977-81, Vice-Chairman of the Social Democratic Party 1985-87 and 
Chairman 1987-92, Minister for the Environment since 1993.
162Erik Meier Carlsen, Plads fo r  dem alle?, pp. 48-52.
163Solveig Rodsgaard, 'Ole Vig Jensen om EPS: Stor betydning for dansk 
udenrigspolitik', Weekendavisen, 7 February 1986.
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supranational institutions.164
Prime Minister Schliiter and Foreign Minister Ellemann-Jensen, who had initiated 
informal contacts with the Social Democratic Party and the Radical Liberal Party during 
the work of the Dooge Committee, decided to intensify these contacts as prospects for an 
IGC now seemed real.165
1.2. Preparations fo r  the IGC
On 5 July the Luxembourg Presidency presented a proposal for reform of the Treaty of 
Rome to the General Affairs Council. The Foreign Ministers were to meet in Luxembourg 
on 22 July to convene the conference, set the agenda and agree on procedures. On 19 July 
the Danish Foreign Minister met with the Market Committee to decide on his mandate 
for this meeting. The government's line that Denmark should participate in the IGC was 
accepted, but the Social Democrats insisted on a number of conditions: the alliance 
between Denmark, Greece and the UK from Milan should be preserved; the European 
Parliament could only take part as an observer; and EPC-and EC-related matters should 
be kept separate.
The General Affairs Council agreed that EPC and EC affairs should be kept apart. 
The EPC was to be negotiated by the Political Affairs Directors of the Foreign Ministries 
who should complete their work by 15 October. Reforms to the Treaty of Rome were 
entrusted to an ad hoc group under the chairmanship of Jean Dondelinger from 
Luxembourg. The group agreed on a draft document on the reforms to the Treaty of 
Rome whose non-committing wording would help the Danish government to meet 
domestic criticism.166 The Danish Foreign Minister was satisfied with the results, although
164Niels Helveg Petersen, 'Unionsmodellen duer ikke', Weekendavisen, 5 July 1985.
165Erik Meier Carlsen confirmed in an interview that Sven Auken was convinced that 
a rejection of the SEA would have negative consequences for Denmark. The objective of 
the informal discussion between Anker Jorgensen, Sven Auken, the Prime Minister and 
the Foreign Minister was to find a way for the Social Democrats to be able to endorse the 
result of the IGC.
166The brief of the conference was worded 'a revision of the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community should be undertaken with a view to: improving Council 
decision-making procedures; strengthening the Commission's implementing power; 
increasing the European Parliament's powers; as well as extending Community policies
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opposed the Commission being present at the EPC deliberations.167
During the summer recess the Danish Foreign Ministry formulated Denmark's 
strategy for the IGC. It was agreed that the best way for Denmark to influence the 
outcome was to present a number of proposals for changes, drafted in the form of Treaty 
provisions.
In August the media debate intensified. In a series of newspaper articles, the 
Foreign Minister presented the reasons why Denmark was to take part in the IGC and 
what outcome could be expected. He tried to tone down the fears of EU by de- 
dramatizing the anti-EC groups' rhetoric. The anti-EC groups, represented by the People's 
Movement against the EC, the Left Socialist Party and the Socialist People's Party, 
warned against the IGC, EU and the soothing phrases of the Foreign Minister which they 
claimed were designed to hide the truth. They also attacked the Social Democrats for 
passively going along with the government's EC policy. On 5 September Ivar Norgaard 
hinted that the party was prepared to take a more positive attitude towards the IGC, 
including accepting a number of measures designed to strengthen some aspects of the 
Community. He warned, however, that the Social Democrats might provoke a general 
election if the government agreed to weaken the 'veto-right'.168
1.3. A Danish Initiative
On 5 September the Foreign Minister presented the proposal for Treaty changes to the
to new areas of activity. These amendments should be based on the proposals made by 
the Dooge Committee and Adonnino Committee and also on some aspects of the 
Commission proposal on the free movement of persons' (quoted in Europe, No. 4139, 25 
July 1985, p. 3, (unofficial translation).
167Niels Jorgen Nehring, EF-pakken: Hvordan det kom sa vidt.., pp. 56-65. Uffe 
Ellemann-Jensen, Da Danmark igen sagte ja  til det fcelles.., pp. 46-7. Europe, No. 4137, 
22-23 July 1985, p. 3.
168Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, 'En styrkelse af det europasiske samarbejde', Weekendavisen, 
26 July 1985. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, 'EF-Europaeisk Union', Information, 12 August 1985. 
Ib Christensen, 'Unionen toner frem', Weekendavisen, 19 July 1985. Keld Albrechtsen, 
'Kapitalens Vesteuropa-EF pa vej mod unionen', Weekendavisen, 2 August 1985. Gert 
Petersen, 'Danmark ma sige klart fra over for EF-unionen', Weekendavisen, 16 August
1985. Vibeke Sperling, 'Norgaard: Vi kan framprovokere et valg, hvis regeringen slaekker 
pa veto-retten', Information, 5 September 1985.
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Government's EC Committee. There was broad support for the initiative, especially as it 
had been designed to correspond to Social Democratic views, thus raising its chances of 
being accepted.169 The following day the Foreign Minister presented the initiative to the 
Market Committee, but support for the initiative was not whole-hearted: the Social 
Democrats wanted the proposal to reflect Denmark's fundamental EC principles, including 
a codifying of the EMS, an obligation to lead an expansive economic policy when 
unemployment reached a certain limit (4-5 per cent), and a reduction in the number of 
Commissioners. The Social Democrats were convinced that the British opposition to 
radical changes to the EEC Treaty would be maintained and that there would not be a 
result in time for the European Council in Luxembourg in December. The Radical 
Liberals referred to the parliamentary resolutions as the basis for Denmark's EC policy, 
and the far left-wing parties were opposed to any Danish initiative.170
During the General Affairs Council in Luxembourg the member states presented 
their positions: the Benelux countries, Italy and Germany wanted to see concrete and far- 
reaching results in the IGC, France adopted a wait-and-see policy, the UK and Greece 
were reticent. To the despair of the Danish Foreign Minister no member state, except 
Denmark, ruled out reform of the Treaties.171 After the Council meeting Uffe Ellemann- 
Jensen did not conceal his fear that Denmark was already isolated because of its dogmatic 
attitude. His remarks did not go down well with the Market Committee, where he was
169The initiative was composed of four main components: merging the EEC, ECSC 
and Euratom Treaties to one treaty; implementing a series of pragmatic institutional 
changes (introduce an ombudsman institution, reduce the number of Commissioners, 
codify the Council's Secretariat, automatically dismiss proposals from the Commission 
after a certain period, and establish an administrative court of justice); codifying a number 
of new policy areas, e.g. research and technology, internal and external environment, 
energy, right to participate in local elections, development assistance and third country 
participation in EC policies; and introducing intergovernmental agreements on culture, 
education, public health and judicial cooperation.
170Niels Jorgen Nehring: EF-pakken. Hvordan det kom sa vidt.., pp. 76-9. Uffe
Ellemann-Jensen, Da Danmark igen sagte ja  til det fcelles.., pp. 47-9.
]1]Europe, 11 September 1985, No. 4159, pp. 3-4.
141
accused of giving away Denmark's negotiating position.172 In particular the two radical 
left-wing parties sharply criticized the Foreign Minister for not respecting the 
parliamentary majority. The left-wing parties' attack on him was partly directed to the 
Social Democrats to remind them of the Euro-sceptics in their own party. Their strategy 
was to try to stir up as much ado as possible to prevent the party consolidating itself, as 
this, they feared, might lead to a realignment with the government. The People's 
Movement against the EC took part in this campaign, petitioning the MPs of the Market 
Committee.173
The Danish government saw the Dondelinger Group's deadline of 15 October 
approaching, but the Market Committee still had not agreed to submit proposals. The 
informal contacts with the Social Democratic leadership, and positive statements in the 
press by Ivar Norgaard, made the government opt for a resolute strategy: to present a 
revised Danish initiative in time for the Market Committee meeting on 11 October, to be 
finally decided at the meeting on 16 October.174 At the first meeting, the revised initiative 
was discussed. As no agreement was in sight, the Foreign Minister hinted at the 
possibility that the Market Committee did not formally agree about submitting the 
initiative, whereby the responsibility would rest with the government. This was an
172Claus Toksvig, 'Jagten pa ordene er gaet ind', Weekendavisen, 13 September 1985. 
Agner Ahm, 'Firklover-kamp om vaelgeme', Politiken, 20 September 1985. The author of 
the article refers to speculation about why the Foreign Minister exposed himself to the 
criticism caused by his statement. The possibility that he wanted to give himself a stronger 
profile in the government is mentioned as the most plausible, but no evidence has been 
found elsewhere to support that argument.
173Niels Jorgen Nehring, EF-pakken: Hvordan det kom sa vidt?, pp. 83-5. He 
confirmed the important influence the People's Movement against the EC has had on 
making MPs in all parties hesitate.
174The initiative had been revised after contacts between Social Democrats, in 
particular Sven Auken, the Radical Liberal Party Leader, Niels Helveg Petersen, and the 
Foreign Minister. The initiative was now in three stages: limited institutional changes 
according to previous proposals; specification of new policies pertaining to Article 235 
and codification of some principles (along the lines of the previous proposal); and 
intergovernmental agreements on some areas outside the scope of the Treaties, such as 
culture, education, public health and some judicial measures. The most significant change 
was the scrapping of the proposal to merge the Treaties, but otherwise the revised 
initiative was similar to the original. The initiative received some attention in the 
Dondelinger group and was quoted in Europe, No. 4186, 18 October 1985, pp. 3-4.
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opening to the Social Democrats not to force them to commit themselves before the 
outcome of the negotiations was known, but also not to distance themselves prematurely 
from elements they might agree to once their internal deliberations were concluded. At 
the extraordinary meeting of the Market Committee on 16 October, the Social Democrats 
agreed to the proposal as long as it was solely the government's responsibility. The party 
expressed reservations about the introduction of new areas of intergovernmental 
cooperation and some of the proposals on limited institutional changes, while supporting 
far-reaching measures in the environmental arena.175
1.4. The Work o f the IGC
Meanwhile, work in the two groups of the IGC continued in Brussels. The EPC group 
worked on the basis of the proposals tabled at the Milan European Council and the 
Dondelinger Group based its deliberations on proposals received from all EC member 
states, except the UK, and the Commission.176 The two groups reported to the Foreign 
Ministers who met six times before the Luxembourg European Council.
At the second ministerial meeting on 21 October, which dealt with the EEC 
negotiations, the Foreign Ministers had to take into account a substantial number of 
proposals. It became clear that the difficult points centred around the extension of the 
competences of the EC institutions (in particular the European Parliament), reform of the 
decision-making procedures and the introduction of new Community policies.
Inspired by French proposals stressing the need to find common ground between 
the member states, the Luxembourg Presidency took on the role of mediator by setting 
the agenda and proposing compromises. At the informal ministerial meeting of 26 
October, it was therefore decided that negotiations should concentrate on six areas: the 
internal market, research and technology, the powers of the European Parliament, the 
executive and management powers of the Commission, the decision-making procedure of 
the Council and monetary cooperation. The following ministerial discussion should be
175Niels Jorgen Nehring, EF-pakken: Hvordan det kom sa vidt.., pp. 90-6. Uffe 
Ellemann-Jensen, Da Danmark igen sagte ja  til det fcelles.., pp. 54-8.
176Richard Corbett, 'The 1985 Intergovernmental Conference and the Single European 
Act', in Price (ed.), The Dynamics o f European Union, p. 244. For the Commission 
proposal, see, for instance, Europe, No. 4174, 2 October 1985, p. 3.
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based on proposals drawn up by the Presidency.
As the principle was to find a solution to which all members could adhere, the 
negotiations became 'a process of limiting the scope and intensity of reform..'.177 The 
dynamics of the process were dependent on the extent to which the three big member 
states, France, Germany and the UK, could reach agreement on the outcome of the IGC. 
The Commission and the European Parliament, however, played significant roles by 
presenting proposals for reform, and pressurizing national politicians and parliaments to 
speak for their views. For Denmark, which was negotiating within a very limited margin 
of manoeuvre, the decisive factor was the outcome of the bilateral and trilateral talks 
during October and November with the political leaders of the UK, France and Germany. 
By the ministerial meeting of 11 November the Danish Foreign Minister, who sensed that 
an understanding was emerging between these three, urgently had to find out the exact 
position of the UK. To that effect, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen asked for a meeting with 
Geoffrey Howe on 18 November, before the EEC negotiations were resumed the 
following day. The Danish Foreign Minister left the meeting with the impression that the 
British had actively tried, together with France and Germany, to reach an agreement even 
if it meant that the British side would have to allow some concessions.178 After a 
conversation with President Mitterrand the Danish Prime Minister concluded that France 
also wanted concrete results from the IGC. The same message came from the Prime 
Minister's meeting with his Luxembourg colleague Santer.179
Because of the number of additional proposals180 which had reached the Presidency 
by mid-November, an extra ministerial meeting, a conclave, was convened for 30 
November. The main elements to be discussed were identified by a Presidency document 
of 27 November, and issues the foreign ministers were unable to conclude at this meeting
177Andrew Moravcsik, 'Negotiating the Single European Act', in Keohane and 
Hoffmann (eds.), The New European Community, p. 61.
178Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Da Danmark igen sagte ja  til det fcelles.., pp. 60-61.
179Niels Jorgen Nehring, EF-pakken: Hvordan det kom sa vidt.., pp. 110-13.
180For instance, on 20 November the Benelux countries adopted a communique in 
which they outlined their priorities. The French Foreign Minister Dumas presented an 'Act 
of European Union'. Both quoted in Europe, No. 4208, 21 November 1985, pp. 3 and 5.
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would be brought to the European Council on 2-3 December.181
The EPC negotiations started with a clearer framework for a solution than the 
Dondelinger Group. The basis for the negotiations was the Howe Plan, the Franco-German 
proposals (which had been tabled at the Milan European Council), and two other 
proposals, one Dutch and one Italian. The texts all proposed codifying the existing 
structure, but diverged on the principles and aims of political cooperation and on whether 
security matters should be dealt with within a European, NATO or WEU framework.182 
Documents prepared by the EPC group were discussed during the ministerial meetings of 
19 and 26 November, but the final texts were to be decided by the conclave and the 
European Council.
1.5. Government and Opposition 7183
As a successful outcome of the IGC seemed possible, it became increasingly urgent for 
the government to establish the position of the opposition, in particular the Social 
Democrats and the Radical Liberals. The Foreign Minister had three meetings with the 
Market Committee leading to the decisive meeting on 29 November before the European 
Council meeting.
On 9 November, the Foreign Minister reported to the Market Committee about the 
development of the IGC. He concluded that the general picture was still unclear, but that 
the ambitions of some member states should not be underestimated. The Social 
Democrats, whose overall position on the IGC was firmly anchored in the parliamentary 
resolutions of May 1984 and 1985, called upon the government to work for Danish 
interests in the environmental area, and asked that the government should actively give 
the other member states the impression that under no circumstances would Denmark
181Europe, No. 4212, 27 November 1985, p. 3.
182Richard Corbett, The 1985 Intergovernmental Conference and the Single European 
Act', in Pryce (ed.), Dynamics o f European Union, pp. 251-3.
183Niels Jorgen Nehring, EF-pakken: Hvordan det kom sa vidt?.. pp. 117-32. As the 
director of the Prime Minister's Office, Mr Nehring was always present at the meetings 
of the Market Committee. He also acted as the Prime Minister's stand-in during the 
Committee's meetings if necessary.
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accept a shift in the institutional balance.
At the next meeting on 15 November, the Foreign Minister reported that the 
emerging Franco-German understanding had increased the possibility for reform of the 
Treaty of Rome. He confirmed that Denmark would continue to press for EPC to be 
opened to third countries, that the proposal for a unified act under the heading 'European 
Union' would be rejected, and that Denmark would oppose any proposals to change the 
institutional balance. (Denmark was still arguing against any change in the decision­
making procedure pertaining to the internal market as it might endanger national 
environmental standards).
During the following meeting on 22 November, the Foreign Minister underlined 
the seriousness of the situation, as the possibility of an agreement among France, 
Germany and the UK was increasing. At the ministerial meeting of 19 November, their 
views had converged on some central points, such as the decision-making rules for the 
internal market combined with a mechanism for national environmental protection.
The Social Democrats were still not convinced that the IGC would succeed during 
the European Council meeting in Luxembourg. Referring to contacts with French and 
German politicians, they concluded that the chances of Denmark obtaining its most 
important interests were still good. The Radical Liberals criticized the EPC text, referring 
to the resolution adopted by the party conference which firmly rejected an EPC treaty.
Parallel to the Market Committee meetings, the Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister had informal meetings with the Social Democratic leadership. They underlined 
the possibility of a successful outcome for the IGC as the big three member states seemed 
to have come closer to an agreement on the most central areas, and they pointed out that 
because British reservations had to some extent been accommodated in the process, the 
outcome was also likely to be more acceptable for Denmark. The government still hoped 
that continued information to the Social Democrats could help the party to overcome its 
internal problems and thereby secure Denmark's ratification of a reform of the EC 
Treaties. The vague statements from the Social Democrats in the Market Committee, 
however, had made it impossible for the government to clarify Denmark's positions on a 
range of areas in the IGC. If the situation in the Market Committee was not unblocked 
before the European Council meeting on 2-3 December, the Prime Minister had decided 
not to seek a negotiation mandate, but to act within his constitutional prerogative without
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the support of a majority in the Market Committee.184 The Social Democratic leadership 
informally accepted the Prime Minister's decision as long as the government continued 
to negotiate within the parliamentary resolutions.
On 29 November, the Prime Minister held the crucial last meeting with the Market 
Committee before the Luxembourg European Council. Prime Minister Schliiter declared 
that since it was impossible to determine on which of the many proposals the negotiations 
would be based, he would not seek a mandate but would negotiate within the limits of 
the parliamentary resolutions. He listed Denmark's position in the areas where agreement 
was likely: the Single Act which was acceptable because it separated the EC from the 
EPC (although Denmark would insist on the right to translate the word 'union' into 'unity' 
(sammensJutning)); the internal market, where majority voting might be necessary on the 
condition that Denmark was granted a legal guarantee to keep its internal and external 
environmental standards; the proposals for a new decision-making procedure in matters 
related to the internal market, which were complicated, but deemed not amount to a 
transfer of competence to the European Parliament; and an outcome on the EPC, which 
was satisfactory as it would not endanger Nordic cooperation.
The Social Democrats expressed reservations on four points: the principle of 
majority voting in the internal market, fearing that a legal guarantee for the environment 
would be impossible to obtain; the transfer of competence to the European Parliament, 
which was incompatible with the parliamentary resolutions; the Single Act, which they 
believed would be withdrawn; and codifying the EPC, which would make third country 
involvement unlikely.
Of the other parties, the Radical Liberals opposed the Single Act and the proposals 
concerning the EPC while the radical left-wing parties reiterated their traditionally hostile 
arguments.
When the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister left for the final round of 
negotiations in Luxembourg, they had no support from the opposition, and could not be 
certain of obtaining a majority even for a limited result. The government had given itself
184It should be pointed out that according to the constitution's Article 19, foreign 
policy comes under the government's competence. The fact that the Prime Minister had 
agreed to discuss foreign policy (including the European Council meetings) in the Market 
Committee was a result of the parliamentary situation.
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free hands to negotiate, but the opposition had reserved the right to reject the result. The 
Social Democrats had failed to adopt a clear policy on the issues at stake in the IGC, and 
were seemingly tom between a moderate leadership and a predominately Euro-sceptic 
parliamentary group.185 During October and November the latter had become increasingly 
hostile to the IGC negotiations, as it was increasingly influenced by Ritt Bjerregaard who 
hoped that by adopting a negative position on the IGC and the Single Act she might be 
able to provoke a general election.186
2. The European Council in Luxembourg, December 1985187
Reforms to the Treaty of Rome became the main subject for negotiations between the 
Heads of State and Government in Luxembourg.
Denmark, which had relied on the British Prime Minister to oppose the most 
radical proposals, realized that the UK would agree to majority voting in the internal
185In an article from 1 December 1985, Ivar Norgaard recalled that the May 
parliamentary resolutions were the basis for Denmark's EC policy and had rejected the 
proposals in the Luxembourg Presidency document. At the same time, he underlined the 
importance of EC membership in political and economic terms for Denmark, but did not 
suggest that Prime Minister Schliiter should veto the negotiations. Ivar Norgaard, 'Meget 
star pa spil', Det Fri A ktuelt, 1 December 1985.
,86Ritt Bjerregaard's involvement in inducing a hostile attitude towards the IGC and 
the SEA in the Social Democratic parliamentary group, and the aim to force the 
government to call for a general election, was confirmed in all interviews in Copenhagen 
during October and November 1993, except by Mr Ivar Norgaard. He referred to the 
unsatisfactory legal guarantee for the Danish environmental standard and the transfer of 
competences to the European Parliament as the reasons for the Social Democratic Party's 
rejection of the Single Act. Four authors have indicated the same internal tactical reasons 
for the Social Democratic policy towards the Single Act: Niels Jorgen Nehring, Uffe 
Ellemann-Jensen, Erik Meier Carlsen and Lars Olsen in the publications referred to 
elsewhere in this thesis. On the other hand, it has been pointed out that many MPs were 
influenced during the Christmas holidays when they returned to their constituencies to 
meet the party faithful, who were to a large extent negative to Treaty reforms (Solveig 
Rodsgaard, 'Socialdemokratiets vej til nej', Weekendavisen, 28 February 1986).
1870n  the European Council in Luxembourg: Niels Jorgen Nehring, EF-pakken: 
Hvordan det kom sa vidt.., pp. 140-43. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Da Danmark igen sagte ja  
til det faelles.., pp. 67-70. Richard Corbett, 'The 1985 Intergovernmental Conference and 
the Single European Act', in Pryce (ed.), Dynamics o f European Union. Europe, No. 4213, 
28 November 1985, p. 4; No. 4216, 2-3 December 1985, pp. 3-6; No. 4217, 4 December 
1985, pp. 3-5, No. 4218, 5 December 1985, pp. 3-5.
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market on certain conditions. For Denmark's acceptance of majority voting, Poul Schliiter 
demanded a guarantee which would allow Denmark to keep its stricter environmental 
standards. The Danish demand was sharply criticized by some member states and, in 
particular, the Commission. After tough negotiations Chancellor Kohl came to Denmark's 
rescue suggesting a solution in the shape of Article 100A(4).
The European Council was unable to conclude the negotiations on the powers of 
the European Parliament as two reservations were pending: a Danish reservation because 
the measures went too far, and an Italian because they did not go far enough. The matter 
was left to the Foreign Ministers to settle at their meeting on 16-17 December.
The EPC chapter was concluded (to which two declarations were attached on 
Danish initiative188), as well as the dossiers on monetary cooperation, cohesion, research 
and development, environment, social policy, the Court of Justice and the Commission's 
executive and management powers. The framework of a 'European Union Act' was not 
brought up at Luxembourg, but was back on the table at the Foreign Ministers' meeting 
in December.189
Prime Minister Schliiter had to announce to the European Council that he could 
not accept the texts on behalf of Denmark, but had first to secure the support from a 
majority in the Folketing. The Danish Prime Minister was not alone in making 
reservations on the outcome, but Denmark's reservation was general and was to be 
subjected to parliamentary approval.
2.1. The Folketing's Reaction in December 1985
The reaction in the Market Committee on 6 December was more positive than before the 
European Council. The Social Democrats referred to issues where they were satisfied, 
such as the EPC texts and the environmental guarantee, but criticized strongly the texts
188The first declaration on behalf of all twelve member states reconfirms their open 
attitude to other European states which share their ideals and aims. In the second, the 
Danish government declares that the EPC section of the SEA does not affect its 
cooperation with other Nordic countries in the area of foreign policy. See SEA, final act.
189However, it led Prime Minister Schliiter to declare to the Danish press that 'the 
Union is dead', a statement which cost him dearly in terms of credibility when EU was 
back on the agenda at the Foreign Ministers' meeting later in December.
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on new powers to the European Parliament. Other opposition parties preferred to wait to 
give their reaction until the parliamentary debate on 10 December.
This debate took place on the initiative of the Socialist People's Party and the Left 
Socialist Party. On an agreement between the government and the Social Democratic 
Party the debate was held after the European Council so that any resolution passed could 
not have limited even further the government's margin of negotiation at the Council. The 
government knew from contacts with the Social Democratic leadership that they would 
not propose a resolution which would substantially change the basis of the present EC 
policy. The radical left parties, however, took the opportunity to pressurize Ivar Norgaard 
to disclose whether the Social Democrats considered accepting the proposal for change 
of Article 149 of the Treaty of Rome (thereby increasing the powers of the European 
Parliament). Ivar Norgaard tied the hands of the Social Democrats in future negotiations 
by declaring that, unless the proposal was changed, the immediate evaluation was that the 
Social Democrats would not accept it. The resolution proposed by the Social Democrats 
and the Radical Liberals, which recalled that the basis for Denmark's EC policy was the 
resolutions of May 1984 and May 1985, was adopted with a large majority.190
2.2. The Conclusion o f the IGC Negotiations
Before the Foreign Ministers' meeting, the European Parliament rejected the result of the 
European Council in Luxembourg with the aim of putting increased pressure on Italy. It 
had also voted to increase the resources of the structural funds above the budget ceiling, 
without prior agreement with the Council of Ministers, thus opening a conflict between 
the two institutions. In Denmark the actions of the European Parliament were used as 
proof of its irresponsibility, and made the debate on the Parliament's powers more 
contentious.
The Foreign Ministers met on 16-17 December to settle issues still outstanding 
after the Luxembourg European Council. In the period between the European Council in 
Luxembourg and this meeting, some member states, notably France, had been active in 
promoting the idea of a unitary framework and the powers of the European Parliament.
190Sten Gade and Ivar Norgaard, Folketingstidende, 10 December 1985, cols. 4165-
225.
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The Foreign Ministers agreed on a formula based on the French proposal for a 'European 
Union Act1 changing it into the 'Single European Act', and combining under the same 
framework changes to the ECSC, EEC and Euratom Treaties with the new EPC Treaty.191 
They also agreed to some small changes to the texts concerning the powers of the 
European Parliament on the basis of French and Italian amendments, but because more 
wide-ranging changes were not adopted, Italy did not withdraw its reservation. Foreign 
Minister Ellemann-Jensen also maintained Denmark's reservation to the totality of 
reforms.192 The Presidency declared that the IGC was concluded and that the SEA was to 
be signed at the beginning of the Dutch Presidency.
2.3. Government and Opposition II
When the Foreign Minister met with the Market Committee on 20 December he 
emphasized that other member states were ready to sign the SEA and that Italy would 
probably withdraw its reservation. Denmark was now in a situation where it had to make 
up its mind. If Denmark rejected the SEA, it would, in the long term, put its membership 
at stake, and in the medium term Denmark's political goodwill would have been consumed 
to the point where Danish agricultural and fishing interests were endangered. Ultimately, 
Ellemann-Jensen argued, it was a question of whether Denmark could remain a member 
of the EC.
At this stage, the government was careful not to express a formal opinion which
191Foreign Minister Ellemann-Jensen negotiated the right to translate the preamble's 
'..a European Union..' into Danish '..en europceisk sammenslutning..\ To change union 
(which exists in the Danish language) into sammenslutning (unity in English) was of 
major importance to the Foreign Minister in diverting the emotional debate about EU into 
more constructive discussions about the real content of the reform. He was quoted after 
the meeting saying that the decision concerning the 'heading' of the 'Single Act' made the 
Danish government's position, which was already quite complicated, even more delicate. 
(Europe, No. 4227, 18 December 1985, p. 5a) The Foreign Minister introduced another 
linguistic diversion by explaining that the Single Act was simply the wrapping 
(inpakningspapir) around the whole set of changes and measures adopted by the member 
states. The reforms were soon called the EC-package (EF-pakken), wrapped up as they 
were in the Single Act.
192Richard Corbett, 'The 1985 Intergovernmental Conference and the Single European 
Act1, in Pryce (ed.), Dynamics o f European Union, pp.255-8. Europe, No. 4227, 18 
December 1985, pp. 3-5a.
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might become a useful argument for the opposition to provoke a general election. The 
government and opposition agreed to hold a major parliamentary debate on the SEA on 
21 January 1986, in order to settle the issue in time for the formal signing expected for 
27-28 January 1986.
In the government's assessment, the Radical Liberal Party would not be able to 
support the ratification of the SEA because of its clear rejection of the EPC Treaty, and 
because of internal criticism of the party's role as parliamentary support party to the 
government on economic policy. As the radical left-wing parties had not changed their 
totally negative attitude, the Social Democrats remained the decisive party both for 
opponents and proponents.193 Through informal contacts the government tried to impress 
the moderate Social Democratic leadership with the seriousness of the situation, 
explaining that the IGC was concluded and that Denmark could not obtain further 
concessions.
On 9 January the Social Democratic parliamentary group held the first of two 
meetings to decide the SEA. Although the result was negative, Sven Auken, the Vice- 
Chairman of the party, published an article on 14 January in which he explained that his 
advice to the group had been to adopt a cautiously positive line, attaching conditions to 
the Social Democrats' acceptance of the SEA.194 On the same day (14 January), at the 
group's second and final meeting, it was decided to reject the SEA on the grounds of the 
transfer of new powers to the European Parliament and the environmental guarantee which 
was considered too weak. The decision was taken ahead of the big parliamentary debate 
and before the Trade Union Confederation had given its opinion at a meeting scheduled 
for 17 January. The Trade Union Confederation was not pleased, but refrained from
193The pressure on the Social Democratic Party was apparent both in parliament (see 
the debate of 10 December) and in the media. For instance, the People's Movement 
against the EC's MEPs, lb Christensen and Else Hammerich, announced that Denmark 
could safely reject the SEA, and they criticized the Social Democrats for wanting to forget 
their condition of 'zero change to the Treaty of Rome'. Ib Christensen, 'Vi kan trygt sige 
nej tak', Berlingske Tidende, 27 December 1985. Else Hammerich, 'Den danske hale kan 
ikke logre med EF-hunden', Information, 24 December 1985.
194Sven Auken, 'Vi giver ikke ved dorene nar det gaelder EF', Politiken, 14 January 
1986. Sven Auken had to leave the meeting early to take part in a debate with the Foreign 
Minister, and the group's deliberations later took on a more negative turn than he himself 
had been aware at this point.
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publicly criticizing the Social Democratic Party's decision.195
For the government, which was aiming to stay in power, the Social Democrats' 
rejection of the SEA was very serious. After consultation with the coalition parties and 
the Radical Liberals, Prime Minister Schliiter decided to hold a consultative referendum 
if two conditions were fulfilled: the rejection of the SEA by the Folketing, and that 
Denmark was isolated among the member states, i.e. that there were no possibilities of 
reopening the SEA to accommodate specific Danish demands. The Prime Minister 
announced his decision the evening of 14 January.196 The conditions were announced by 
the Foreign Minister on the same day, with the addition that if this situation was to 
materialize the referendum would be about Denmark's future participation in the EC.197 
Although a surprise to the Social Democrats, the party leader, Anker Jorgensen, 
immediately issued a statement that the party would respect the outcome of the 
referendum.198
195Erik Meier Carlsen, Plods fo r  dem alle?, pp. 51-2,72. Erik Meier Carlsen, 'Derfor 
matte Socialdemokratiet sige nej til pakken', Information, 27 February 1986. Henrik 
Kaufholz, Malin Lindgren, Henning Olsson, 'Socialdemokratiet et skib i havsnod', 
Politiken, 2 February 1986. In an interview, Hans Fliiger, Dansk M etals spokesman on 
EC affairs was of the opinion that internal politics had played too large a part in the 
decision around the SEA. Jens Holme, 'Socialdemokrater spiller dilettant med Danmarks 
EF-medlemskab', Information, 8-9 February 1986.
196Interview of 14 January 1986 quoted in Nikolaj Petersen and Christian Thune (eds.), 
Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Arbog 1986, Jurist og 0konomiforbundets Forlag, Copenhagen, 
1987, pp. 281-2. The Foreign Minister wrote that the idea of a referendum had originally 
come from the Foreign Ministry, which had, on the initiative of the Foreign Minister, 
produced a series of papers on possible scenarios for the ratification of the SEA. A 
referendum was mentioned as a possibility which the Foreign Minister claims to have 
discussed with the Prime Minister (Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Da Danmark igen sagte ja  til 
det fcelles.., pp. 86-7, 93-5). Niels Jorgen Nehring, who does not dispute that the 
discussion took place, stressed that the decision was the Prime Minister's own: 'Poul 
Schliiter is a man capable of taking tough decisions when necessary' (interview on 2 
November 1993).
197Quoted in Petersen and Thune (eds.), Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Arbog 1986, p. 282.
198Niels Jorgen Nehring: EF-pakken. Hvordan det kom sa vidt.., pp. 171-3. The 
People's Movement against the EC had for many years, particularly in the autumn of 
1985, demanded a second referendum on Denmark's EC membership. The government had 
rejected the idea because the SEA did not amount to additional transfer of sovereignty to
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3. The Referendum on the SEA
3.1. The Debates in the Folketing
The parliamentary debate on 21 January was designed to be the final act in the ratification 
of the SEA, but had changed character since the Social Democrat announcement to reject 
the SEA and the Prime Minister's decision to call a referendum. The Prime Minister and 
the Foreign Minister could now make the government's views openly known, as the 
government aimed to vote against the parliamentary resolution proposed by the Social 
Democratic Party.
Prime Minister Schliiter began his statement by recognizing the accordance 
between the SEA result and Denmark's initial negotiation position. He underlined that the 
importance which other member states attached to the SEA made Denmark's rejection of 
the SEA politically impossible although legally incontestable. The Prime Minister recalled 
that Denmark's economic structure was organized on the basis of Community membership 
and that politically Denmark was a part of the EC. The consequences of the Folketing's 
rejection were incalculable and in the government's view might force Denmark to leave 
the EC. Therefore the population would have to be given the right to pronounce itself, as 
it had in 1972.
The Foreign Minister endorsed the government line, stressing that the 
consequences for a rejection of the SEA would in the short term lead to loss of goodwill 
to the detriment of Danish interests, as other member states' perception that Denmark 
questioned its membership was damaging.
The Social Democratic spokesman on EC affairs, Ivar Norgaard, criticized the 
government for making a rejection of the SEA into a question of Denmark's EC 
membership. As Article 236 of the Treaty of Rome prescribed unanimity, the 
consequences that the government cited were exaggerated and Denmark could therefore 
reject the negotiated result. The Social Democrats regarded the referendum as concerning 
the SEA, not Denmark's EC membership, and rejected the proposal on the European 
Parliament's new powers and the environmental guarantee. They did, however, accept the
the Community, and therefore did not fall under the constitution's Article 20. The 
referendum on SEA was, therefore, to be consultative, but as the political parties 
announced their intention to respect the outcome, a rejection in parliament of the SEA 
could be overridden by a positive outcome.
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EPC Treaty, but as the government did not want to split the ratification into two votes, 
they would have to reject the entire SEA. The Liberal Radical Party leader, Niels Helveg 
Petersen, in his turn rejected the EPC Treaty, but accepted the reforms to the Community 
Treaties. As the vote was on the whole of the SEA, the Radical Liberals must vote 
against.
The parliamentary debate ended with a resolution adopted by the Social 
Democratic Party, the Radical Liberal Party, the Socialist People's Party and the Left 
Socialist Party, with only one MP defecting from each of the first two parties:
The Folketing confirms its support of European cooperation. The Folketing calls 
on the government to reject the negotiation result achieved, being as a whole 
unsatisfactory. The government is requested to conduct further negotiations in 
order to reach a result which is satisfactory to the Folketing. The outcome is to 
be presented to the Folketing.199
3.2. Fulfilling the Rem caning Conditions o f the Referendum
The first part of fulfilling the second condition for calling a referendum was attained as 
the European Parliament voted to accept the outcome of the IGC on 16 January 1986. As 
the MEPs endorsed the SEA, Italy let its reservation on the European Parliament's new 
powers fall and was ready to ratify the SEA.
The second part of the second condition was attained when Foreign Minister 
Ellemann-Jensen began his tour of EC capitals on 22 January, to enquire whether other 
members were ready to open the negotiations to accommodate Danish reservations. The 
answers all pointed in the same direction: the member states did not want to reopen the 
SEA, fearing that previous disagreements would find their way back on the agenda 
making a final settlement very difficult. The Foreign Minister managed to secure the 
member states' approval of a Danish declaration on the environmental guarantee in Article 
100A, as inserted at the Foreign Ministers' last formal meeting under the framework of
199Poul Schliiter, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Ivar Norgaard and Niels Helveg Petersen, 
Folketingstidende, 21 January 1986, cols. 5314-454.
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the IGC.200
On 27 January the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister reported the outcome 
of the consultation with the EC member states to the Folketing. Both ministers confirmed 
the synonymous results of their talks with other EC governments: there could be no 
renegotiation of the outcome of the IGC; Denmark would have to consider the whole 
SEA, not a part of it; and Denmark's interpretation of the environmental guarantee and 
the new powers to the European Parliament was valid.
The parliamentary debate ended in a resolution endorsed by the government 
parties, the Radical Liberal Party, the Progress Party and the Left Socialist Party calling 
for a referendum. The Social Democratic Party and the Socialist People's Party abstained, 
but confirmed their intention to vote for the referendum bill and respect its outcome.201
3.3. The Referendum Campaign
The campaign started as soon as the Prime Minister announced his decision to call a 
referendum on the SEA. The brief period from the formal vote on the referendum bill on 
4 February and the polling day on 27 February led to an intense campaign.
On 15 January the first opinion poll was published showing a 57 per cent majority 
in favour of the SEA with 47 per cent against. The tendency for a majority in favour grew 
stronger during January and the beginning of February, peaking at 75 per cent in favour, 
but fell back to the original level on the polling day. The final result was an endorsement 
of the SEA with 56.2 per cent in favour against 43.8 per cent, with a participation rate 
of 75.4 per cent.202
The proponents, represented by the governing parties and the Progress Party, were 
supported by Danish industry. A few trade unions, in particular those representing workers
200Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Da Danmark igen sagte ja  til det fcelles.., pp. 99-102. 
Europe, 22 January 1986, No. 4243, editorial. Europe, No. 4244, 23 January 1986, 
editorial. Europe, No. 4245, 24 January 1986, p. 3. Information, 'Bonn lover Danmark 
garantier i EF-striden', 24 January 1986.
201Poul Schliiter and Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Folketingstidende, 28 January 1986, cols. 
5860-954.
202Ole Tonsgaard, 'Folkeafstemningen om EF-pakken', in Petersen and Thune (eds.), 
Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Arbog 1986, pp. 113-39.
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in the food processing industry, openly advocated a vote in favour of the SEA. The 
proponents took advantage of the carefully positive initial statements on the SEA by the 
Social Democratic leadership and the open divisions in the Radical Liberal Party and 
among the trade unions.
The opponents were divided in two groups: the radical left parties - the Left 
Socialist Party and the Socialist People's Party - and the People's Movement against the 
EC, representing the fundamental and long-standing opposition against treaty reforms and 
European integration; and the Social Democratic Party and the Radical Liberal Party 
which were openly divided on the subject.
The Social Democratic Party felt the discontent of the Confederation of Trade 
Unions, which considered the labour movement had been disregarded by the party for not 
waiting for the unions' position on the SEA scheduled for 17 January and in time for the 
parliamentary debate on 21 January. As the party's rejection of the SEA was openly 
known, the Confederation of Trade Unions chose to support its position, but called on the 
government not to link the decision on the SEA with Denmark's EC membership. On 8 
February the Confederation decided that in view of the referendum on the SEA, it would 
not recommend any official position to its members, and left it to the individual trade 
unions to decide what to recommend to their members. The trade unions were split 
between those which openly supported the SEA (see above), those which did not adopt 
an official position but whose leadership was openly in favour, e.g. Danish Metal 
(formerly Danish Smiths' and Metal Workers' Union), and those which were openly 
against the SEA and supported the Social Democratic Party's campaign, in particular the 
Specialized Workers' Union (formerly General and Semi-skilled Workers' Union).203 
Although most of the trade unions did give their support to the opponents of the SEA, 
there was an apparent division between the trade unions representing the 'weak' workers, 
i.e. those on low pay with low skills often employed in the public sector and mostly 
women, and those representing the 'strong' workers, i.e. the highly skilled, well-paid 
workers often men employed in the export sectors. The latter group was upset over what 
it considered a radicalization of the Social Democratic Party away from the traditional
203Niels Jorgen Nehring, EF-pakken: Hvordan det kom sa vidt.., pp. 176-8.
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values of the labour movement towards unrealistic left-wing politics.204
The proponents emphasized the SEA's concrete content in terms of new policy areas, the 
internal market, the limited impact of the reforms of EC institutions and majority voting 
in areas covered only by the internal market. As the campaign started, the proponents 
stressed the risk that a rejection of the SEA might be the first step towards Denmark 
leaving the Community. Whether this was a tactic to break the opponents' lines or the 
government's true conviction (probably a combination of the two), the threat to Denmark's 
EC membership posed a dilemma for the opponents.
The Social Democrats and the Radical Liberals who favoured the Community, but 
were against the development towards EU, strongly criticized the government's threats that 
Denmark would have to leave the Community as exaggerated and irresponsible. The 
Social Democrats argued that Denmark could veto the SEA on the basis of Article 236 
of the Rome Treaty without any damaging consequences to the Community's activities. 
The reasons why they recommended the population to vote against the SEA were the 
transfer of competences to the European Parliament, lack of protection of Danish 
environmental standards, and, above all, to put a stop to the slide towards EU, including 
the loss of the 'veto-right'.205
The Socialist People's Party and the People's Movement against the EC, whose 
fundamental aim had been to end Denmark's EC membership, had been demanding a 
second referendum on the EC for many years. They now found themselves in an awkward 
situation as the initiative for this referendum had come from the government, which
204See the views expressed by Hans Fliiger, Danish Metal's EC Affairs spokesman. He 
writes that Danish Metal was not impressed by the way in which the Social Democratic 
Party had handled the political process around the SEA. The party's politics had been too 
much influenced by the radical left parties and the People's Movement against the EC, 
which put in danger the position of the Danish workers' movement in Europe, as well as 
Danish interests in general. Hans Fliiger, 'Politik og maskinstormeri', Weekendavisen, 28 
February 1986.
205Birte Weiss, 'Ikke et ondt ord...', Det Fri Aktuelt, 17 February 1986. Interview with 
Anton Johansen, President of the Food Processing Workers' Union, and Bjom Westh, MP 
for the Social Democratic Party, to illustrate the disagreement between the trade union and 
the party. Jorgen Placing, 'De er vildt uenige', Det Fri Aktuelt 20 February, 1986. Ivar 
Norgaard, 'Stem nej', Det Fri Aktuelt 23 February, 1986.
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presented it as an indirect vote on Denmark's future membership of the EC.206 Both parties 
chose to reject the government's view on the consequences of a negative outcome, by 
stressing that the vote concerned only the SEA. The Socialist People's Party advocated 
other models of cooperation in Europe, such as Eureka207 or Europe a la carte208 which 
did not threaten Danish sovereignty.209
Part of the opponents' criticism of the government was directed towards the 
disclosures of confidential reports drawn up by civil servants on the consequences of a 
rejection of the SEA, subsequently discarded as scaremongering.210 Political personalities 
from other EC member states were drawn into the Danish debate on the 'veto-right'. Both 
EC Commissioner Frans Andriessen, the Belgian Foreign Minister, Leo Tindemans, and 
the Dutch Foreign Minister, Hans van den Broek, were quoted explaining that the 'veto- 
right' did not exist. Their statements were used in the debate by the opponents as proof 
that the SEA would definitely put a stop to Denmark's 'right' to veto.211
While the campaign was heating up in Denmark, the Dutch Presidency invited the
206The Socialist People's Party Congress in 1985 had adopted a political platform 
which had a referendum on Denmark's EC membership as condition of forming a coalition 
government with the Social Democratic Party. The Social Democrats had officially 
rejected this condition. Interview with Steen Gade, spokesman for EC Affairs for the 
Socialist People' Party. Stig Albinus, Erik Meier Carlsen, 'Schliiter har vundet forste 
halvleg', Information, 6 February 1986. The People's Movement against the EC's aim was 
Denmark's withdrawal from the EC. This official objective was stated in a manifesto 
adopted on 24 March 1974. Quoted in Jens Maigard (ed.), Under bekvemlighedsflag: En 
kritisk analyse a f Folkbevceglesen mod EF og JuniBevcegelsen, Fiskers Forlag, 
Fredriksberg, 1993.
207Eureka: intergovernmental cooperation in research and development between the EC 
member states, open also to non-EC states.
208Europe a la carte: a concept based on the notion that EC member states may choose 
to participate in some or all core issues of the Community which are identified jointly and 
continuously under review. A core issue is defined as one which is better solved on the 
European level than on the national, regional or local levels.
209See interview with Sten Gade in Information, 6 February 1986. Interview with Jens 
Peter Bonde, MEP for the People's Movement against the EC, Torger Seidenfaden, 'Vil 
have et aerligt valg', Weekendavisen, 14 February 1986.
210'Regeringen offentliggor EF-'skraemmenotat', Information, 10 February 1986.
21’Niels Jorgen Nehring, EF-pakken: Hvordan det kom sa vidt.., pp. 208-10.
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EC member states to sign the SEA, against the wish of the Danish government and some 
other governments.212 Only nine states ultimately signed the SEA on 17 February, as Italy 
refused to sign before the Danish referendum and Greece wanted to show its solidarity 
with the Danish government.
3.4. The Result
The SEA was endorsed by the Danish population, but with a smaller margin than 
expected. Compared to the referendum in October 1972, the majority in favour had 
decreased from 63.3 per cent in 1972 to 56.2 per cent in 1986. Analyses show that the 
parties which had advocated a coherent line before and during the campaign enjoyed their 
voters' support, while the Social Democratic Party and the Radical Liberal Party's voters 
voted against the SEA with 75 per cent and 44 per cent respectively. On a national basis, 
74 per cent of those in favour of EC membership voted in favour of the SEA while 17 
per cent voted against, while only 4 per cent of those against EC membership voted in 
favour of the SEA.213
The Prime Minister called a meeting between the party chairmen on 28 February 
at which all parties, except the Socialist People's Party, announced their intention to vote 
in favour of the ratification act. However, the Social Democratic leadership demanded that 
the new cooperation procedure between the Council of Ministers and the European 
Parliament in areas covered by the internal market be the subject of a study on the 
efficiency of the Danish decision-making process and a guarantee of democratic control 
by the Market Committee and debates in the Folketing.214 To this effect, a report was 
adopted by the Market Committee on 14 November 1986, thus strengthening the 
parliamentary process in provisions pertaining to the internal market.215
212Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Da Danmark igen sagte ja  til det fcelles.., pp. 124-5. Europe, 
19 February 1986, No. 4263, editorial.
21301e Tonsgaard, 'Folkeafstemningen om EF-pakken', in Petersen and Thune (eds ), 
Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Arbog 1986, pp. 136-7.
214Niels Jorgen Nehring, EF-pakken: Hvordan det kom sa vidt.., pp. 216-7.
215Markedsutvalget, Beretning vedrorendeprocedure iforbindelse medgennenforelsen 
af Europceisk Fcelles A kt, 14 November 1986.
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The Foreign Minister signed the SEA, together with Italy and Greece, in The 
Hague on 28 February. On 20 May 1986, the Folketing adopted with a large majority 
(only the Socialist People's Party voted against) the law amending the accession act thus 
enabling Denmark's ratification of the SEA.
IV. Conclusion
In its capacity as a major reform of the EC Treaties and by the inclusion of the EPC in 
the Treaty framework, the SEA was the first step towards deeper integration, thus 
challenging the established Danish EC policy based on pledges made at the time of 
accession in 1972. Ivar Nergaard, who was one of the architects of the traditional Danish 
EC policy, wrote some days before the SEA referendum in 1986 that the proponents of 
the EC (at least the Social Democrats) agreed with the opponents of 1972 that Denmark 
should not be part of a political union; this was a promise to the population and the Social 
Democrats had therefore to reject the SEA.216 Although many other factors lay behind the 
Social Democratic rejection of the SEA, Ivar Norgaard pointed at the traditional Danish 
attitude to the EC which had not changed since 1972, but which had become increasingly 
out of step with the development of European integration.
The factors influencing Denmark's position in the period from the Solemn 
Declaration on European Union in Stuttgart to the signing of the SEA were both external 
in terms of other member states' objectives in relaunching the EC, and internal, in terms 
of the parliamentary situation, popular scepticism to European integration, and political 
parties' responses to these challenges.
216Ivar Norgaard, 'Stem nej', Det Fri Aktuelt, 23 February 1986. The same opinion was 
expressed by Ritt Bjerregaard: 'in 1972, in the referendum on yes or no to the EC, the 
Social Democrats stressed the economic and trade aspects of the cooperation. That's what 
it was all about. We said to the voters if there are later to be changes to the cooperation 
we now recommend, the Social Democratic Party will be against. We are a guarantee 
against future changes. This is why we are now against the EC-package. Although there 
are no big things happening [through the adoption of the SEA], it is a part of the process 
towards further integration, and we promised in 1972 that we would take no further steps'. 
Ritt Bjerregaard quoted in Solveig Rodsgaard, 'Ja-sigeme er uaerlige', Weekendavisen, 21 
February 1986.
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It has been argued that during the first half of the 1980s the British government gradually 
came to accept reforms of the Treaties, because concessions in the institutional area w ere, 
traded for the internal market which the UK wanted, and because the threat of exclusion 
from the hard core of member states became a real prospect for the UK policy-makers and 
diplomats.217 In the Danish case, the threat of exclusion was taken seriously by the 
government as well as by Danish industry and some trade unions. To long-standing 
opponents of Danish EC membership in general, and the SEA in particular, the debate on 
Europe a la carte, two-tier Europe and other forms of differentiated integration presented 
real prospects of realizing their goal of a Europe-wide free trade area with ad hoc patterns 
of cooperation wherever desired.
As far as the Social Democrats and the Radical Liberals were concerned, they 
disliked the thought of Denmark becoming a second-class EC member; EC membership 
on a status quo basis was their goal. The Social Democrats seemed not to take the 
government's fear of exclusion seriously, demanding the government to veto the SEA in 
the last weeks before the referendum. It might have been more a wish to renegotiate the 
terms of the SEA, especially in the case of a Social Democratic victory in a general 
election, than a fundamental rejection of reforms as such. The Social Democrats would 
have been able, together with the radical left-wing parties and maybe the Radical Liberals, 
to veto the IGC negotiations on a much earlier stage, but chose not to do so.
The government's insistence that a rejection of the SEA was the first step in 
Denmark's withdrawal from the Community was part of a strategy to win votes in the 
referendum and spilt the opponents' ranks. Equally, it was based on the recognition that 
a fundamental change in the Community regime was not acceptable to Denmark. 
Therefore, concerning the intergovernmental negotiations, the government decided that the 
only chance to reach an acceptable solution was to water down the scope of the Treaty 
reforms or even prevent Treaty-based reforms as such. This could only be achieved by 
taking part in the negotiations, making the Danish positions known, and hoping that the 
UK's opposition would make a distinct impact on the outcome. What made the process 
of negotiation different in the Dooge Committee was the new approach on behalf of the
217Paul Taylor, 'The New Dynamics of EC integration in the 1980s', in Juliet Lodge 
(ed.), The European Community and the Challenge o f the Future, Pinter, 1989, pp. 3-25.
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'reform-friendly' member states in that consensus was no longer the rule. The 'test of truth' 
had now arrived 'which singled out those who want to go towards a stronger political 
union and those who do not wish to do so'.218
The Social Democratic Party, in power from 1975 to 1982 experienced increasing 
difficulties, particularly in the area of economic policy, but relied on the support of right- 
wing parties in EC-related matters. When Poul Schliiter formed a four-party minority 
government in 1982, it implemented a successful economic policy with the support of the 
Radical Liberal Party. The battleground between opposition and government was first in 
the security area where the Social Democrats, with support from the radical left-wing 
parties and the neutralist Radical Liberal Party, pressed for a Nordic nuclear-free zone and 
other neutral policies, leading the USA to question Denmark's intentions in NATO. This 
seriously embarrassed the government, in which at least three parties (the Conservative, 
the Liberal and the Centre-Democratic Parties) were strongly in favour of Denmark's 
membership of NATO. As the attempts to relaunch the Community gained pace, 
parliamentary conflicts moved over to the EC arena. The same alternative majority, led 
by the Social Democrats, announced its intention to control the Foreign Minister's conduct 
in EC negotiations through the Market Committee.219 The Prime Minister also felt 
compelled to report to the Market Committee on the European Council meetings and to 
accept the Committee's view, which often amounted to a negotiating mandate. Early on 
in the reform debate the government decided that Danish acceptance of Treaty reforms 
was dependent on endorsement by the Social Democratic Party,220 based on an underlying 
understanding between the government and the Social Democratic leadership to aim for 
a negotiation result which the latter would be able to endorse. The reason why events in 
the end took another course is partly found in internal Social Democratic tactical 
considerations, and partly in the realization that the IGC had produced concrete results 
in terms of reforms to the Treaties which some Social Democratic politicians had
21 President Mitterrand at the press conference after the Milan European Council. 
Quoted in Europe, No. 412 (special edition), 30 June 1985, p. 8.
219Henning Olsson, 'Anker vil fore Ellemann i meget kort snor', Politiken, 9 September 
1985.
220Niels Jorgen Nehring, EF-pakken: Hvordan det kom sa vidt.., pp. 9-10.
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difficulty in accepting.
The government parties continued their long-standing positive policy towards the 
EC as they entered the referendum debate, although this attitude, however positive, was 
more pragmatic and functional than pro-integrationist. There were obvious differences in 
the European convictions held by the coalition parties. The Liberals and the Centre- 
Democrats were more positive towards integration than the Conservatives and the 
Christian People's Party.
The Social Democratic Party feared an internal division, in 1972, most of all. 
Pressure was strong from the radical left which did well in the 1981 and 1984 general 
elections much at the expense of the Social Democratic Party. The radical wing of the 
party, led by Ritt Bjerregaard, sought to strengthen the party's appeal to the voters on the 
left by focusing on the environment, security policy, Third World issues and adopting a 
more hostile attitude towards the EC. The radical left-wing parties took advantage of this 
division, as did the People's Movement against the EC which did not hesitate to challenge 
Social Democratic assurances to the population to limit European integration. The 
challenge from the radical left made the adoption of a conciliatory line towards the 
government increasingly dangerous. Information from the party faithful on Social 
Democratic voters' negative opinions towards the SEA influenced the Social Democratic 
MPs, and might have been decisive in making up their minds. There were, however, also 
tactical considerations at play, whether the Social Democrats should force the government 
to call a general election after the defeat in parliament over the SEA (see footnote 186). 
The conflict in the party has been partly explained by Anker Jorgensen's weak leadership 
(there was speculation about a leadership challenge had the defeat in the referendum been 
larger),221 but this does not explain the fundamental unease with which the Social 
Democrats approached European integration.
The Radical Liberal Party experienced a similar dilemma about the EC being 
divided on the SEA, to its dilemma on EC membership in 1972. The party leadership, 
criticized internally for giving parliamentary support to the government on economic 
issues, could not afford to be seen also lending support on EC reform, at least not until
221'Ja til pakken ikke stort nok til stormlob mot Anker Jorgensen', Information, 28 
February 1986.
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the Social Democrats had decided in favour of the SEA.
The opposing groups derived their strength and legitimacy from widespread 
scepticism in the population towards the EC, in particular supranational integration and 
EU. The scepticism was a dominant feature in opinion polls (see table 1) and during 
elections to the European Parliament in 1979 and 1984 where the People's Movement 
against the EC increasingly took over the role of mouthpiece for popular resentment 
against the Community.
The government's way of dealing with the internal and external pressures will be analyzed 
with the help of Petersen's modified typology of strategies.
The bastion strategy was most influential in the run-up to the IGC. The parliamentary 
resolution of May 1984 spelled clearly out the bastions establishing the conditions for 
Denmark's acceptance of EC developments (see section 3.2). The Market Committee's 
continuous references to the May 1984 resolution further underlined its role as a landmark 
for Denmark's EC policy. As a result the Danish negotiation positions, both in the Dooge 
Committee and the IGC, were defined in compliance with the resolution. The bastions 
were: the preservation of the 'veto-right'; the preservation of the division of competence 
between the Council of Ministers, the Commission and the European Parliament; and the 
rejection of Treaty reforms or new Treaties derived from the rejection of the European 
Parliament's draft Treaty on EU. The resolution listed a number of areas in which the 
Folketing would welcome action at the EC level. These areas were important when the 
government sought conditions to concede the bastions.
As the negotiations progressed, two factors forced Denmark to give up the 
bastions, either partially or totally: Danish politicians and the civil service's miscalculation 
of the dynamics in the reform process and the determination of the 'integration-friendly' 
member states; and the willingness of the UK to trade concessions on Treaty reforms for 
agreement in areas of British interest. Likewise, France's readiness to see through 
institutional reform was misjudged by Danish policy-makers who long believed that 
France, in the end, would fall back on traditional positions, fending off any attempts to 
reduce national sovereignty.
Denmark found itself in an integration dilemma, running the risk of being
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entrapped or abandoned. It chose entrapment with some qualifications (see also concession 
strategy): the Treaty-reform bastion had to be given up completely, but as it had only 
been indirectly mentioned in the parliamentary resolution of 1984 the government was 
able to argue that the steps were necessary and of minor importance; the Luxembourg 
compromise was not to be directly discussed by the IGC, which made it possible to argue 
that majority voting in the area of the internal market did not threaten the veto-right 
bastion; and the new cooperation procedure was too complicated to establish a priori if 
the European Parliament's competence had been increased. The European Parliament's 
disapproval of the SEA helped the Danish government to argue that the institutional 
balance remained intact.
Areas in which the Folketing had requested action were brought into the 
negotiations, as the government knew the list represented Social Democratic conditions 
and that Social Democratic acceptance of the outcome rested on the inclusion of at least 
some of these areas in the SEA. They became bargaining chips for Denmark's final 
acceptance.
The condition strategy. It is difficult to establish whether some of the conditions 
Denmark demanded be included in the SEA were promoted or initiated by other member 
states. Some of the areas, however, in which the Folketing specifically wanted to see 
action were included in the Danish negotiation initiative (see also bastion strategy). Other 
provisions where Danish fingerprints could be detected were: Article 100A(4) (the 
environmental guarantee), accompanied by the unilateral Danish declaration for added 
strength, which was important in accommodating Social Democratic fears of lowered 
Danish environmental standards, and a number of articles concerning workers' health and 
safety, research and development and the environment; and, on Danish insistence, the 
general declaration on the EPC, along with the unilateral Danish declaration on EPC 
which served to fulfil the Folketing's wish not to exclude the EFTA states in political 
matters, nor exclude Denmark from Nordic cooperation in the area of foreign policy.
The concession strategy. After a long period without major changes, pressures 
within the Community for reforms grew stronger towards the mid-1980s. In 1984 several 
factors necessary for a major reform project were present, prompting the 'integration- 
friendly' groups in the EC to press for action. Denmark twice faced the choice of 
participating in negotiations or remaining outside: when the Dooge committee was set up,
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and when the IGC was convened. On both occasions, Denmark could have chosen not to 
participate, but decided it better served Danish interests to take part and influence the 
negotiations from the inside. Once the IGC was under way Denmark *w*4tconcessions 
a number of strategic bastions. In the debate which followed, the Danish government was 
at pains to defend the bastions, explaining that no concessions of any real importance had 
been given.
To some extent the government was right that the reform of the SEA seemed at 
first less far-reaching than some had hoped, but time has shown that the SEA introduced 
some major changes to the Community regime. Examples of the government's efforts to 
sooth public scepticism were apparent in its linguistic agility: union became unity 
(sammenslutning), the Single Act became wrapping (inpakningspapir) , the cooperation 
procedure became an improved hearing of the European Parliament, while the significance 
of the EPC Treaty and majority voting in the Council were played down. These examples 
amount to concessions to the bastions of the parliamentary resolutions of 1984 and 1985. 
Most noteworthy are the acceptance of Treaty-based reforms, the changes in the 
institutional balance through the cooperation procedure,222 the new power of co-decision 
and the acceptance of majority voting in the Council in a limited number of areas.
Denmark experienced a dilemma of integration, perceiving a threat of isolation as the 
pressure for Treaty reforms grew stronger. The renewed European dynamism caused many 
political difficulties in Denmark. To what extent was Denmark's reluctance of Treaty 
reform acknowledged by other EC members? To what extent did other member states 
understand the tricky political balancing act taking place in the Folketing?
It is impossible to answer these questions in great detail or certitude, but it is 
possible to detect some reactions to Denmark by the Community and the member states. 
Although Danish resistance to Treaty reform and European integration was well known 
if not least from the footnotes of the Stuttgart Declaration or the Dooge Committee report, 
it was never considered with the same alarm as British resistance. Not until the SEA's 
ratification hung on a positive outcome in the referendum did the media's focus turn to
222The extent to which the cooperation procedure changed the institutional balance is 
a matter of interpretation, but it did certainly change the dynamics within the Council. The 
co-decision gave the parliament real powers in a few areas.
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Denmark.223 European commentators had problems in understanding what exactly caused 
problems for Denmark, how the internal political situation had emerged, and why the 
referendum had been called.224 According to one civil servant, what really made it difficult 
for Danish negotiators was Denmark's rigid EC policy, spelt out in detail in parliamentary 
debates and resolutions, which made Danish negotiation positions known and enabled EC 
partners to assess whether the Danish negotiator had any margin of manoeuvre. The rigid 
character of Danish EC policy had made Denmark an uninteresting negotiation partner, 
as it had little or nothing to offer during the negotiations. The fact of not being at the hea-vf 
of the negotiations increased Denmark's perception of isolation.225
The SEA was the first major attempt to succeed in strengthening the Community regime.
It did not amount to a change of the regime, but was an important change in the regime 
which with time modified the norm of behaviour of Council ministers. It reinforced the 
Community regime by strengthening the framework of cooperation through the Single Act 
and by introducing new policy areas, or strengthening existing ones, such as: the external 
and internal environment, research and technology, social policy, and social and economic 
cohesion. It gave the Community a clear sense of purpose with the internal market project 
and approved the legitimacy and effectiveness of the EC institutions.
Since accession to the Community, Denmark's traditional EC policy based on 
status quo had not been challenged. Now, with the relaunch of the Community the 
pressure for reform of the Treaties grew. The initial response was predictable, one 
Denmark had often used when Community reforms were on the agenda: there were to be 
no changes to the principles and norms of the acquis communautaire as there was enough
223For example see: Financial Times, 'Danish threat to EEC reforms', 15 January 1986. 
Le Monde, 'Le Danemark et la Communaute europeenne: Y etre ou ne pas y etre...', 29 
January 1986.
224See for example: Lasse Ellegaard, 'I Bruxelles forstar de ikke et kuk..', 
Weekendavisen, 7 February 1986. Financial Times, 'Why Community reform alarms the 
Danes', 16 January, 1986. Financial Times, 'Danish need for realism', 21 January 1986. 
Le Monde, 'Le Danemark bloque la reform de la CEE', 23 January 1986. Financial Times, 
'The ostriches have a point', 27 January 1986. Le Monde, 'Les choses iraient-elles trop 
bien au Danemark?', 26 February 1986.
225Niels Jorgen Nehring, EF-pakken: Hvordan det kom sa vidt.., p. 24.
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scope within the existing Treaties to render the EC institutions more effective. The 
approach was spelt out clearly in the general reservation of the Danish representative in 
the Dooge Committee, in which Treaty-based changes were not endorsed.
As the IGC was called with a mandate to negotiate reforms to the existing Treaties 
and a new Treaty concerning political cooperation, Denmark adopted a strategy of 
conditions to the conference, proposing functional reforms in terms of new Community 
policy and stronger intergovernmental cooperation, but only limited institutional changes.
The Danish position in 1985-86 was a continuation of the traditional EC policy 
on which DenmarksEC membership had been based since 1972. The policy, designed and 
supported by the Social Democratic Party, formed the basis for Denmark's participation 
in the IGC, was presented by ministers of the right-wing government, but safeguarded by 
the alternative majority in the Market Committee. The policy amounted to a clear break 
with the principle of European integration of the Treaty of Rome. In the debate of 1972, 
the 'veto-right' received much attention as a symbol of Denmark's capacity to resist the 
process of European integration leading towards EU. The right to veto European 
integration was interpreted as a safeguard of the last resort against the loss of sovereignty 
by a small state (Denmark) entrapped in the process of European integration.
Paradoxically, successive Social Democratic governments from 1971-73 and 1975- 
1982 had been more relaxed about European integration, signing for instance the 
declaration of the Paris Summit of 1972. With the right-wing parties coming to power, 
the Social Democrats wanted to secure the new government's compliance with its EC 
policy, a policy which the new government had to accept because of its fragile 
parliamentary situation.
It is questionable whether the Schliiter government would have taken a more 
'integration-friendly' line in the IGC had it relied on a majority in parliament, as only two 
parties in the coalition, the Liberals and the Centre-Democrats, were in favour of 
European integration per se. By a larger margin of manoeuvre, the government would 
probably have been able to avoid the referendum and the loss of goodwill in which 
Denmark's rigid stance in the IGC resulted. Although its approach might have been more 
flexible, it would not had been as pro-European as some core members of the EC.
The balancing act between external and internal pressures entailed some breaches 
of norms of behaviour by the government which probably resulted in the loss of goodwill
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and prestige. The first example is the Solemn Declaration on European Union, to which 
the Danish Prime Minister was forced to attach a number of reservations by the 
alternative majority. Normally, reservations are not attached to political declarations of 
the Community which are statements of intent and not programmes of action. The Danish 
footnotes gave rise to much irritation among the other member states, but were on the 
other hand overshadowed by the British position.
A second example is the rigid negotiation positions in the Dooge Committee and 
the IGC, which although met with some understanding by other member states, weakened 
Denmark's position in the Community negotiations (which are about give and take to 
balance the accounts of rights and obligations of membership).
A third example is the weak domestic parliamentary position of the government, 
which also weakened Denmark's negotiation position as the ministers had great difficulties 
in bargaining and delivering. The Foreign Minister's negotiation style was reported to 
have had a damaging effect on Denmark's prestige, in that he pointed out when his 
personal views were different than Denmark's negotiating positions. Commentators in 
Copenhagen suggested that other EC ministers would be willing to give concessions only 
to a minister who could argue convincingly. On the other hand, the Foreign Minister 
made the government's difficult position clear to other member states, which is reported 
to have earned the support of Chancellor Kohl for Prime Minister Schliiter's insistence on 
a guarantee for the environment at the Luxembourg European Council.
Denmark did not break the rules or decision-making procedures. On the contrary, 
it was part of Denmark's EC policy to follow the rules and decision-making procedures 
of the Treaties. This enabled Denmark to argue as it did in the Dooge Committee and the 
IGC, that Treaty-based reforms were unnecessary if there was sufficient political will in 
the Community to comply with the provisions of the Treaties.
The political debacle around the SEA did not change the basis for Denmark's EC 
membership and the fundamental aspects of its EC policy. Officially, in the eyes of the 
Danish public, the ratification of the SEA was not an acceptance of European integration. 
It was a limited step that made the EC institutions more effective, introduced new EC 
policies and codified existing practices of the EPC. Nevertheless, the SEA, and the 
psychological blockage against EC reforms which was overcome, had a fundamental
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impact on those parties which had campaigned against and lost, especially the Social 
Democratic and Radical Liberal Parties. The SEA proved that the Community had the 
capacity of reforming the acquis communautaire, showing that the Community regime 
could change and that the process of European integration had a dynamics of its own.
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Chapter 5
Denmark and European Union
1990-1993
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Part 1. Denmark and the Intergovernmental Negotiations
L Introduction: The Social Democratic Party
After the 1986 referendum on the SEA, Danish EC policy underwent a slow but steady, 
process of change. The change was most spectacular in the Social Democratic Party, 
whose shift from a cautious and sceptical position on EC integration to a positive attitude 
laid new foundations for Denmark's EC policy. The reasons enabling the Social 
Democratic leadership to adopt a new policy were triggered both by internal and external 
challenges. This gradual development, which had started in 1985, paved the way for close 
cooperation between the government and the Social Democrats in setting Denmark's 
position for the IGCs of 1991.
1.1. Internal Challenges
In 1987, the Social Democratic party leader, Anker Jorgensen, resigned and Sven Auken 
was chosen to replace him. Sven Auken, together with Ritt Bjerregaard as chairwoman 
of the parliamentary group and foreign policy spokeswoman, undertook the formulation 
of a more positive Social Democratic EC policy.
With this change of leadership in 1987, the older generation of cautious European 
pragmatists was replaced by a younger generation of Social Democrats (the 1971 
generation, i.e. the Social Democrats elected to parliament in 1971) who had previously 
been sceptical about European integration. During the mid-1980s, they began to redefine 
their attitude towards European integration and ponder the possible benefits of an active 
Danish policy within the Community. The work of uniting the party around a pro- 
European political platform started with a committee set up in 1985 under the 
chairmanship of Birte Weiss.226 Its task was to find a formula acceptable to the party as 
a whole, that at the same time would enable the adoption of a more positive EC policy. 
The report produced by the committee was endorsed as the basis for further debate on the 
EC at the Social Democratic Party's annual congress in September 1986. Although
226Birte Weiss, bom 1941, MP for the Social Democratic Party 1971-73 and since 
1975, Vice-Chairman of the Social Democratic Party since 1984, Minister for Home 
Affairs since 1993.
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successful in stimulating debate within the Social Democratic Party, the report did not 
represent a radical shift away from the party's sceptical attitude towards European 
integration, as it advocated the retention of the existing institutional framework, rejected 
plans for EU, and welcomed the accession of European countries with a view to creating 
a more open Europe.227 The report was, nevertheless, a break with the negative position 
adopted by the 1971 generation in previous EC debates. The popular endorsement of the 
SEA in February 1986 also impressed the Social Democrats, the positive result standing 
out as proof of the population's final acceptance of Denmark's membership of the 
Community.228
The last time that the alternative majority on foreign and security policy in the 
Folketing had triggered a political crisis was in 1988, when the Social Democrats 
proposed a bill forcing the government to undertake an obligation of informing visiting 
naval ships of Denmark's policy not to accept nuclear arms on its territory. The right-wing 
government under Poul Schliiter did not accept defeat on this matter, which was deemed 
to undermine Denmark's membership in NATO, the cornerstone of the Conservative 
Party's security policy. Instead the government decided to call for a general election. The 
1988 general election produced yet another minority government composed of the 
Conservatives, the Liberals and the Radical Liberals. The result meant that the left-wing 
opposition no longer commanded the alternative majority in the Folketing, where it had 
been so influential on matters pertaining to the EC and the security and defence policy.229
1.2. External Challenges
The relaunch of the EC, with the signing of the SEA and the internal market project, had 
a profound impact on the whole political establishment in Denmark. The tendency towards 
increased coordination of economic policies at the European level activated political
227Birte Weiss and Ralf Pittelkow (eds.), Et abent Europa, AOF's Forlag, Copenhagen, 
October, 1986. The resolution from the Social Democratic Party's annual congress, 6-7 
September 1986, attached to the report, pp. 113-8.
228Lars Olsen, 'Den stenede vej til Europa: Ivar Norgaard, Ritt Bjerregaard og 
Socialdemokratiets EF-politik 1986-93', Vandkunsten, No. 10, 1993.
229Steen Sauerberg, 'The General Election in Denmark 1988', Scandinavian Political 
Studies, Vol. 11, No. 4, 1988, pp. 361-71. Erik Meier Carlsen, Plads fordem  alle?, p. 88.
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parties and social partners.
The legislative programme of the internal market provided for the adoption of a 
series of measures which touched the foundations of the traditional Social Democratic 
political platform: full employment and social equality through redistribution of income. 
The consequences of the internal market for Danish welfare society were debated: 
increased economic interdependence of the internal market economies would reduce the 
possibility for national intervention to protect ailing industries or boost economic activity; 
free movement of capital would direct investment to where the return was highest, and 
with the price of labour a crucial factor, the prospects for well-paid Danish workers 
seemed bleak; and harmonization of indirect taxes, which was perceived as a threat to 
Denmark's social security system, financed to a great extent by value-added and special 
taxes.230
As the process towards the internal market gained momentum towards the end of 
1987, the Social Democrats realized that to be able to continue an effective pursuit of 
their policies, the party would have to become more active in the European policy-making 
process. The party leader, Sven Auken, intensified his contacts with European colleagues 
within the framework of the European Confederation of Social Democratic and Socialist 
Parties in the EC - a forum of which the Danish Social Democrats had long since been 
a member, without actively supporting its policies. On the domestic level, the party argued 
for strengthened political involvement by introducing general debates in the Folketing on 
the principles of the Community's development, improved parliamentary control through 
the Market Committee, and closer contacts between the Folketing and the European 
Parliament.231
An important factor in lifting Social Democratic politics on to the European arena 
was the Commission's 1988 proposal for a social dimension to counterbalance the effect 
of free market forces within the internal market. The social dimension was welcomed by 
the Social Democratic Party and the labour movement as a means of guaranteeing the
230Jens Henrik Haahr, 'Socialdemokratiets nye EF-politik i integrationsteoretisk 
belysning', in Petersen and Thune (eds.), Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Arbog 1990, Jurist og 
0konomiforbundets Forlag, 1991, pp. 69-84.
231 Sven Auken, 'Det politiske system og gennemforelsen af den indre marked', Politica, 
No. 4, 1989, pp. 424-30.
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fundamental rights of workers and preventing social dumping from the southern member 
states. Their disappointment was great when eleven Heads of State and Government at the 
European Council in Strasbourg in December 1989 adopted the Social Charter, not as a 
binding agreement but as a statement of intent to work towards an improvement of 
workers' rights in the Community. The social dimension and strengthened consultation 
between social partners at the European level induced the labour movement to become 
actively involved in EC policy-making.
The British government's reluctance to adopt measures related to the social 
dimension, the environment and research and development frustrated the Social Democrats 
and convinced them to relax one of the fundamental conditions of Denmark's EC 
membership, the 'veto-right'. The party began advocating that measures in these areas be 
adopted by qualified majority in order to prevent legislation falling hostage to one or two 
member states.
Finally, the peaceful revolution in central and eastern Europe, the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union, and above all the reunification of Germany fundamentally changed 
the Social Democrats' opinion, together with other parties in parliament, on the 
Community's role in Europe as a stabilizer and guarantor of economic prosperity and 
democracy.
n. Negotiating for a New European Structure 
1. The IGCs and Denmark
External and internal developments thus paved the way for the formation of a political 
consensus in Denmark on the future shape of the EC. The willingness to adopt an active 
Danish EC policy was shared by all parties to the left and right of the centre.
1.1. The Background to EMU
The implementation of the internal market, and the accession of Spain and Portugal to the 
EC necessitated the adoption of a stable budgetary framework for the Community. With 
this aim, in 1988 the Commission put forward a proposal for reform of the budget, the 
Delors package. The European Council's agreement on the Commission budget proposal 
at an extraordinary session in Brussels from 11-13 February 1988 was accompanied by
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the Inter-institutional Agreement concluded between the Council of Ministers, the 
Commission and the European Parliament in June 1988.232
As the Community's future developments were set on a firm course, the debate on 
the establishment of EMU re-emerged. EMU was seen by many as the logical step to 
follow the freeing of capital movements and integration of financial services. For others, 
the motivation was to capitalize on the cooperation developed in the European Monetary 
System (EMS) by strengthening the institutional framework and political accountability.
The idea of EMU was not new to the Community. After the Werner Report (the 
first report on EMU presented to the EC Heads of State and Government in 1970) and 
the creation of the EMS in December 1978, monetary cooperation functioned satisfactorily 
during the 1980s for those member states which had committed themselves to the 
discipline of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). The exchange rate parities within the 
ERM remained stab le from 1987 onwards and an alignment in the economic development 
of the member states took place towards the end of the 1980s. In parallel, economic 
interdependence steadily increased between the member states.233
The European Council meeting in Hanover in June 1988 responded to the renewed 
debate on EMU by setting up a committee under the chairmanship of Jacques Delors to 
investigate and propose concrete stages towards EMU.234 Behind the decision to convene 
the Delors Committee lay, apart from the economic and financial logic, a series of 
political considerations: the member states which had achieved the goal of monetary 
stability were increasingly reluctant to let the Bundesbank dominate decision-making; 
responsibility for monetary policy, it was argued, should be shared in a system built up
232John Pinder, European Community: The Building o f a Union, Oxford University 
Press, 1991, pp. 158-64. Commission des Communautes europeennes, X X lIe Rapport 
general sur Tactivite des Communautes europeennes 1988, Office des publications 
officielles, Luxembourg, 1989, pp. 60-61.
233Niels Thygesen, 'Okonomisk og monetasr union', in Petersen and Thune, (eds.) 
Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Arbog 1991, p. 64. Poul Skytte Christoffersen, Konferencen 
vedrorende traktaten om den europceiske union, Jurist og Okonomiforbundets Forlag, 1992, 
p. 17.
234Jens Thomsen, 'Denmark og okonomisk monetaer union', in Thune and Petersen 
(eds.), Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Arbog 1989, Jurist og Okonomiforbundets Forlag, 1990, 
pp. 84-93.
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around the member states' monetary authorities; while at the same time, Germany's 
economic strength and assertiveness worried some member states, especially France, and 
this fear of German dominance increased in parallel with the process of German 
reunification.235
The Delors Committee's report was presented to the European Council in Madrid 
in June 1989.236 The Heads of State and Government endorsed the report and decided to 
enforce the first phase of EMU by 1 July 1990. They also discussed the implementation 
of the second and third phase of EMU, but on British insistence no concrete steps were 
taken towards calling an IGC.
France, taking over the Presidency in July 1989, was determined to make some 
progress. The Minister for European Affairs, Elisabeth Guigou, headed a committee of 
personal representatives of the Finance and Foreign Ministers whose task was to complete 
a catalogue of issues to be resolved by intergovernmental negotiations.237 At the European 
Council in Strasbourg in December 1989, eleven Heads of State and Government voted 
in favour of convening an IGC at the end of 1990 on EMU,238 only Prime Minister 
Thatcher voted against.239 It was at this European Council Chancellor Kohl voiced his 
concern about increasing the political legitimacy of the Community, and suggested that 
EMU be created in parallel with a political union. At the time the initiative was received 
negatively, in particular by the French Presidency, and was seen as an attempt to slow 
down progress towards EMU.240 Under the Italian Presidency in the second half of 1990
235John Pinder, European Community: The Building o f a Union, p. 134-5.
236European Communities, 'Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the European 
Community', Europe Documents, No. 1550/1551, 20 April 1989.
237European Communities, 'Report on the Principal Questions Raised by the 
Implementation of Economic and Monetary Union (Guigou Report)', Europe Documents, 
No. 1580, 9 November 1989.
238Europe, No. 5149, 9 December 1989, p .3.
239Poul Skytte Christoffersen, Konferencen vedrorende traktaten om den europceiske 
union, p. 20.
240Poul Skytte Christoffersen, Konferencen vedrorende traktaten om den europceiske 
union, pp. 20-21.
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preparations for the IGC continued.241 The member states tried to agree on an agenda for 
the negotiations and a time table, but the British Prime Minister was still opposed to the 
planned IGC. Critical voices against EMU were also raised in Germany, in particular from 
the Bundesbank President, Karl Otto Pohl.242
1.2. The Folketing and the Prospects o f EMU
In Denmark the prospect of an IGC was discussed on 23 May 1989 in the Folketing. At 
the time Prime Minister Schliiter adopted a cautious position by underlining the beneficial 
effects of the ERM on the rate of inflation and interest rate, which in turn had helped 
Danish industry. The government endorsed the provisions of the first phase of EMU as 
proposed by the Delors Report, but rejected the automatic transition to the second and 
third phase.
The Social Democratic spokesman on EC Affairs, Ivar Norgaard, stressed his 
party's conditions for supporting the first phase of EMU while agreeing with the Prime 
Minister in rejecting the automatic transition and urging him to resist any calls for an IGC 
at the European Council in Madrid. The Social Democrats presented a motion for 
resolution which read:
The Folketing reconfirms the goals of full employment, better internal and external 
environment and a more equitable social division of wealth, which should be 
secure central positions in relation to the development of the internal market and 
economic and monetary cooperation. Furthermore, the Folketing reconfirms the 
possible implementation of the first phase as proposed by the Delors Report, 
which does not automatically oblige the implementation of the second and third
241European Communities, 'Guidelines for the EC-EPC Italian Presidency', Europe 
Documents, No. 1611, 10 April 1990. 'Italian Presidency of Community Council (second 
half of 1990): Objectives', Europe Documents, No .1629, 26 June 1990.
242See for instance, 'Deutsche Bundesbank's Statement on Creating Economic and 
Monetary Union in Europe', Europe Documents, No. 1655, 5 October 1990. 'Address by 
Karl Otto Pohl on the Outlook for Monetary Cooperation in Europe', Europe Documents, 
No. 1578, 4 November 1989.
179
phases...243
This resolution was adopted by the Social Democrats, the Conservatives, the Liberals, the 
Radical Liberals and the Christian People's Party, while the Socialist People's Party, the 
Progress Party and the Centre Democratic Party voted against.
On 30 November 1989, the Prime Minister was asked about the government's 
position for the IGC on EMU which was expected to be convened at the Strasbourg 
European Council in December. His statement was a cautious endorsement of the goal of 
EMU, and listed a number of positive economic effects, while trying to play down fears 
about losing sovereignty over economic and monetary policy. Prime Minister Schliiter was 
pleased that the EFTA countries, the central and eastern European countries and the 
Soviet Union were forging closer relations with the EC. Denmark should therefore work 
to provide the EC with the financial means and the political and economic strength 
necessary to meet this challenge. The Social Democrats agreed with the government that 
it was in Denmark's interest to participate in the IGC on EMU, even though the IGC was 
deemed unnecessary. Their spokesman also agreed that restraining the dominant position 
of the Bundesbank would be a positive thing, although unlikely to happen. He insisted 
that the Social Democratic Party was categorically against depriving the Folketing and 
other national parliaments of their right to decide over the scope and content of the 
budgetary bills and exchange rate adjustments. The Social Democratic Party proposed a 
motion of resolution which was accepted by all parties, except the Socialist People's Party 
which abstained. It read:
The Folketing reconfirms the resolution of 23 May 1989 and calls upon the 
government to ensure that a future IGC is endowed with a broad mandate, 
including (1) stronger economic and monetary cooperation to secure economic 
growth and high employment; (2) new forms of decision-making and patterns of 
cooperation which are open for close cooperation with the EFTA countries and the 
central and eastern European countries which undertake democratic reforms; and
243Poul Schliiter and Ivar Norgaard, Folketingstidenden, 23 May 1989, col. 10575 
onwards.
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(3) the possibility to introduce minimum requirements in the environmental and 
labour market areas when decisions are taken with qualified majority.244
1.3. The Background to PU
In as much as EMU was prompted by internal developments, PU was influenced by 
external events and challenges.
On 9 November 1989 the Berlin Wall fell. The process of reuniting Germany 
gained its own momentum, and recognizing the will of the German people, all parties 
involved accepted and welcomed a sovereign Germany, albeit with some initial hesitation 
from some member states (especially France and the UK). The EC political leaders and 
institutions decided that the accession of the five East German Lander should be parallel 
to the all-German reunification process and that no changes to the EC Treaties would be 
necessary. At the same time the reform process in central and eastern Europe gained 
considerable momentum. The democratically elected governments turned to the 
Community to seek economic and political support for securing stable democracies based 
on a market economic system.
In the Community, several member states were concerned about the considerable 
economic and political strength of reunified Germany, whose geographical position and 
traditional ties with central Europe might imply a redirection of German priorities towards 
promoting the economic and political stability of its eastern neighbours. France strove to 
find ways to bind Germany tighter to the process of European integration, an idea 
received with sympathy by other member states, including Denmark.
Chancellor Kohl, concerned about satisfying domestic demands for greater 
democracy within the EC, raised the idea of PU in parallel with the IGC on EMU at the 
European Council meeting in Strasbourg of 1989. While the initiative was not accepted 
at this stage, the process was, however, initiated and the Commission245 and the European
244Poul Schliiter and Ivar Norgaard, Folketingstidenden, 30 November 1989, col.2567 
onwards.
245Jacques Delors's speech to the European Parliament on 17 January 1990, Europe, 
18 January 1990.
Parliament presented their views on a strengthened political framework.246
On 18 April 1990, President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl sent a letter to the 
Irish Prime Minister, Charles Haughey, urging him to consider extending the agenda of 
the extraordinary European Council to be held on 28 April to include a discussion on 
EU.247 The French and German leaders hoped that the European Council would speed up 
the preparation on EMU and initiate preparations for an IGC on PU.
Because of resistance from some member states (the UK in particular, but also 
Denmark and Portugal), the extraordinary European Council in Dublin did not convene 
an IGC on PU, but asked the Foreign Ministers to examine and prepare proposals on PU 
to be discussed at the next European Council in June.248
At the European Council in Dublin on 25-26 June the Foreign Ministers presented 
the report on PU, listing a number of themes to be negotiated by the IGC: the overall 
objective of PU; its democratic legitimacy; the efficiency of the Community and its 
institutions; unity and cohesion in the Community's international action; and decision­
making and implementation. The European Council endorsed the Foreign Ministers' report 
and decided to convene the IGC on PU to start on 14 December 1990.249
1.4. The Folketing and the Prospects o f PU
In the Folketing's debate on EC policy on 18 April 1990, a consensus between most of 
the political parties took form on Denmark's position and interests in the 
intergovernmental negotiations. Prime Minister Schliiter listed five factors which 
necessitated the establishment of a structure for political and economic stability, economic
246European Parliament, 'Conference of European Community Parliaments: Final 
Declaration', Europe Documents, No. 1668, 8 December 1990. Europe, No. 5238, 20 April 
1990, p. 4. See also the Martin and Colombo Reports, footnotes 271 and 272.
247Letter from Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand to Prime Minister Haughey, 
quoted in Europe, No. 5238, 20 April 1990, p. 3.
248Presidency Conclusions issued at the special meeting of the European Council in 
Dublin, 28 April 1990, Europe, No. 5245, 30 April 1990.
249'Conclusions of the European Council, Dublin, 25-26 June 1990', Europe 
Documents, No. 1632/1633, 29 June 1990. Foreign Ministers' report in annexe 1 of the 
conclusions on 'Political Union', Europe Documents, No. 1628, 23 June 1990.
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growth and high employment: the end of the division of Europe in two blocks dominated 
by the superpowers; the central and eastern European countries' attempts to establish 
political pluralism and market economic systems; the dynamics of the Community's 
integration process; the German reunification; and technological and industrial 
development. The Prime Minister, reconfirming that the Community system was in need 
of modernization beyond the SEA, reiterated the demands of the Social Democratic Party 
that labour, social and environmental policies should be included in the forthcoming 
negotiations and that there should be increased decision-making by qualified majority. The 
government's position was now so close to the Social Democrats' that their chairman, 
Sven Auken, expressed his satisfaction with the agreement on a number of central points. 
The Social Democratic Party welcomed the enlarged agenda for the IGC, but warned 
against substantive changes in the division of competence between the EC institutions.
Following the pattern from the EC policy debates of 1989, the debate ended in 
agreement, on the adoption of a resolution, which was supported by all parties except the 
Socialist People's Party and by the Progress Party which abstained. It read:
The Folketing calls on the government to pursue an active policy on Europe on 
the basis of: (1) support to and cooperation with the new, democratically elected 
governments in the former communist countries in central and eastern Europe; (2) 
support to the use of all possibilities for progress within the framework of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; (3) support of speedy 
agreements on substantive and balanced reductions of nuclear arms and troops in 
Europe as a first step towards a common European security structure; (4) support 
to the German people's right of self-determination, an assurance that German unity 
is created within a broad European context, an extended cooperation within the EC 
and a continued North American engagement in European security; (5) support to 
a speedy and extensive agreement between the EC and EFTA; and (6) support of 
a strengthening of Community cooperation, (the Folketing's resolution of 30 
November 1989), making majority decisions possible in view of securing 
minimum guarantees for environmental protection and workers' rights, greater 
democratic control and openness in a strengthened economic and monetary 
cooperation, to secure economic growth and employment while continuing to
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respect the member states' independent policy of division of income.250
1.5. The Danish Memorandum, October 1990
The close positions of the government and the Social Democratic Party, and the prospects 
of two IGCs during 1991, prompted the latter to insist on drafting a memorandum on 
Denmark's position in view of the negotiations. The Foreign Minister was at first reluctant 
to the Memorandum, as it would de facto restrain the government's margin of 
manoeuvre,251 but the government's minority position in parliament in reality left it with 
little choice other than to seek to establish an EC policy which was supported by a 
majority in the Folketing. The Memorandum became a trade-off between securing active 
Danish participation in the IGCs and tying Danish negotiators to rigid positions.252 It did, 
however, give Danish negotiators a strong hand in the IGCs, which, combined with 
intensive and constructive cooperation with the Market Committee, helped Denmark to 
secure a number of its objectives.253 During the summer and autumn of 1990 the 
government parties - the Conservatives, Liberals and the Radical Liberals - and the Social 
Democratic Party negotiated the Memorandum which was subsequently endorsed by the 
Christian People's Party and the Centre-Democratic Party. The Socialist People's Party and 
the Progress Party, however, rejected it, thereby confirming their positions furthest on the 
left and right in Danish politics.
The Danish Memorandum was the first successful attempt to establish a positive 
Danish EC policy based on a parliamentary majority. Its objectives were a combination 
of far-reaching reforms in areas of functional cooperation, largely reflecting Social 
Democratic policies, and modest statements concerning political integration. Although the
250Poul Schliiter and Sven Auken, Folketingstidenden, 18 April 1990, col. 8455 
onwards.
25'interview in Copenhagen, 22 October 1993.
252Interview in Copenhagen, 2 November 1993. The Memorandum is reproduced in 
English in Finn Laursen and Sophie Vanhoonacker, The Intergovernmental Conference on 
Political Union: Institutional Reforms, New Policies and International Identity o f the 
European Community, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, 1992. •
253A point shared by several Danish diplomats and politicians. Information gathered 
during interviews in Copenhagen in October-November 1993.
184
Danish integration strategy had changed considerably, it was still based on the rejection 
of a federal development of the Community.254
In the parliamentary debate following the presentation of the Memorandum, the 
Foreign Minister expressed his satisfaction that Denmark was now able to play an active 
role in the IGCs, and was convinced that other EC member states had already noted the 
new and different attitude which could no longer leave them in doubts about Denmark's 
commitment to European cooperation.255
With the Memorandum firmly endorsed by a large majority in parliament, the 
government translated its text into treaty articles which were presented to the IGCs in 
March 1991.256
1.6. The Intergovernmental Negotiations on EMU257
The two IGCs, designed to run in parallel and be concluded during 1991, were at the end 
of 1990 at different stages of preparation. The EMU negotiations, thoroughly prepared 
during the previous two years, had several treaty texts to consider, while the PU 
negotiators had five pages of conclusions from the European Council of Rome.258
At the extraordinary European Council meeting at Rome on 27-28 October 1990, 
the Presidency succeeded in reaching a fairly concise mandate for EMU which set the
254Nikolaj Petersen, EF, den politiske union og Danmark: Analyse og dokumentation, 
Det Sikkerheds- og Nedrustningspolitiske Udvalg (SNU), Copenhagen, 1991, p. 39.
255Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Folketingstidende, 11 October 1990, col. 980 onwards.
256The EC policy was in itself not affected by the result of the general election in 
December 1990, after which the Social Democrats, despite a good result, were not able 
to form a government. The Conservative Party and the Liberal Party remained in power, 
forming a government based on a minority of 60 seats, eleven less than the Social 
Democratic Party.
257The sections of the negotiations on EMU and PU are partly based on Poul Skytte 
Christoffersen's detailed account of the events published in Konferencen vedrorende 
traktaten om den europceiske union. Mr Christoffersen was at the time chef de cabinet of 
Niels Ersboll, Secretary General of the General Secretariat of the Council.
258Joseph Weyland, 'Strategies and Perspectives of the Luxembourg Presidency', in 
Emil J. Kirchner and Anastassia Tsagkari (eds.), The EC Council Presidency: The Dutch 
and Luxembourg Presidencies, UACES Proceedings 9, UACES, London, 1993, p. 17.
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date of 1 January 1994 for the second stage, a final decision on the transition to the third 
stage to be taken before 1 January 1997, and a series of concrete propositions on the 
content of the treaty texts.259
As the IGC was to meet for the first time on 14 December 1990, it was decided 
that the work was to be carried out partly by a group of Finance Ministers' personal 
representatives, and partly by the Foreign Ministers' personal representatives (the same 
people who were representatives at the IGC on PU). In reality the first group came to play 
the decisive role in the negotiations on EMU and the conferences proceeded 
independently. Denmark was represented by Jens Thomsen, Head of the Ministry of 
Economics (okonomiministeriet).
The EMU committee received treaty texts from the Commission, France and 
Germany, the British proposal for a 'hard ECU',260 and proposals on specific points from 
other member states. The Delors Report, the report of the Monetary Committee (on 
budgetary coordination and the European central bank system), the Carli Report (on the 
discussion between the Ministers of Finance during the Italian Presidency), the report of 
the Committee of Central Bank Governors (on a European System of Central Banks) and 
the Guigou questionnaire (identifying fundamental technical, institutional and political 
questions) were also included. The Luxembourg Presidency chose to take the 
Commission's draft treaty as basis for the negotiations.
The IGC on EMU became linked to the IGC on PU on the political level as 
difficulties in the latter held up progress in the former. At the beginning of 1991, 
Germany insisted it would not commit itself (and the D-Mark) to EMU unless there was
259European Communities, 'European Council Conclusions of the Presidency (Rome, 
27 and 28 October 1990)', Europe Documents, No. 1658, 30 October 1990.
260Commission of the European Communities, 'Draft EEC Treaty on Economic and 
Monetary Union', Europe Documents, No. 1675/76, 20 December 1990. France, 'Draft 
Treaty on Economic and Monetary Union', Europe Documents, No. 1686, 31 January 
1991. Germany, 'EMU: An overall proposal by the Federal Republic of Germany for the 
intergovernmental conference'", Europe Documents, No. 1700, 20 March 1991. HM 
Treasury, 'Economic and Monetary Union - Beyond Stage I: Possible Treaty Provisions 
and Statute for a European Monetary Fund', Europe Documents, No. 1682, 10 January 
1991.
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general commitment to a political dimension.261 At one stage, Franco-German relations 
cooled as France, urging speedy progress in the EMU negotiations, was disappointed by
German reluctance to conclude the IGC before negotiations on PU had made substantial
262progress.
In time for the Luxembourg European Council of 28-29 June 1991, the Presidency 
presented a consolidated text on the progress of the work of the IGCs.263 Despite this, the 
European Council was not able to take substantive decisions regarding the IGCs.264
The Dutch Presidency took an orthodox stance in the IGC on EMU, basing the 
negotiations on the principles of the Luxembourg draft treaty while striving to spell out 
the provisions of the text in greater detail.
1.6.1. Danish Positions on EMU
The Danish Memorandum was explicit in demanding that sustainable economic growth 
and full employment be part of the general objectives of EMU. The IGC had no problems 
in settling the treaty text in this regard (Maastricht Treaty, Article 2).
On free movement of capital the Memorandum suggested action against violations 
of national taxation law, and decision-making by unanimity in the taxation area to 
safeguard national independence. Denmark's insistence on safeguards for infringement of 
national law was met (Article 73d) and decisions on turnover taxes, excise duties and 
other indirect taxation were still to be taken by unanimity (Article 99). With regard to free 
movement of capital, Denmark had a particular problem which had been regulated in 
national law shortly before the accession in 1973: the ban on the acquisition by foreigners 
of second homes. Since Denmark's accession, there had periodically been doubts about 
the compatibility of this law with the Treaty of Rome. The case had not yet been raised 
before the ECJ, but was expected before too long. The Danish government was anxious
261David Buchan, 'Emu train stopped in its tracks', Financial Times, 8 April 1991.
262Financial Times, 'Pact to slow European Union', 10 June 1991.
263European Communities, 'Draft Treaty on the Union', Europe Documents, No. 1722- 
23, 5 July 1991.
264European Council meeting in Luxembourg 28-29 June 1991 and the Conclusions 
of the Presidency, Europe, Special Edition, No. 5524, 30 June 1991.
187
to settle the matter with a confirmation of the right to uphold national law, and had 
succeeded in obtaining a protocol, despite little sympathy from other member states, 
because it had acquired a reputation as a constructive negotiation partner.265
On monetary policy, the negotiations did not produce any special difficulties for 
Denmark. Being a de facto participant of the D-Mark zone for several years, the Danish 
political establishment recognized the necessity for creating an independent European 
central bank, while the Memorandum's claim for democratic control of the monetary 
institutions was satisfied in the treaty text. The rule of 'one country one vote' in the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) Governing Council which was demanded by 
the small member states, Denmark included, was accepted (the protocol on the statute of 
the ESCB and the European Central Bank (ECB)).
The Memorandum explicitly stressed the principle of subsidiarity as regards 
economic policy. The outcome of the argument as to whether EMU should be based on 
a centralized (Community-based) economic policy or not was settled in a compromise 
which closely followed German wishes, as a series of rules for good economic 
management was spelt out in the treaty, while a Community system of macroeconomic 
management was avoided.266 The macroeconomic reference values to check excessive 
government deficits were accepted by Denmark, although the government was not 
prepared to give the Council of Ministers the competence to pass binding legislation 
regarding national budgets.
The transition between the phases and policies of the second phase of EMU were 
among the most contentious subjects of the IGC. On constitutional grounds Denmark 
rejected an automatic transition. Since some member states, in particular Germany, refused 
a general opt-out clause, Danish and British negotiators had to be satisfied with individual 
protocols excluding their countries from the automatic transition to the third stage (Danish 
and British protocols on EMU).
Negotiations on the protocols were conducted towards the end of the Dutch 
Presidency and were agreed during the European Council in Maastricht. While the Danish
265Poul Skytte Christoffersen, Konferencen vedrorende traktaten om den europceiske 
union, p. 70.
266Poul Skytte Christoffersen, Konferencen vedrorende traktaten om den europceiske 
union, pp. 80-81.
negotiators strove to explain that the automatic transfer was unacceptable to Denmark for 
constitutional reasons, other member states failed to grasp in full the grounds for their 
demands. However, Denmark was granted the necessary protocol without much ado.267
Although belonging to the Community pillar, EMU departed from its institutional 
structure by creating a new institution, the ESCB, directly responsible to the European 
Council, and by reducing the influence of the Commission, the European Parliament and 
the ECJ. In the negotiations, Denmark argued that the Commission and the European 
Parliament should not play too influential a role in economic policy, which should remain 
a prerogative of each member state. The member states agreed on a formula by which the 
Commission kept the right of initiative while the European Parliament was deprived of 
any real influence in the decision-making process.
1.6.2. The Folketing's Reactions to the Progress on EMU
On 5 December 1991 during the parliamentary debate on the progress in the 
intergovernmental negotiations before the European Council in Maastricht, the Economics 
Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, confirmed the government's view that the draft treaty 
was positive for Denmark, underlining the twin objectives of linking economic growth to 
the protection of the environment, as well as giving equal importance to the goals of full 
employment and low inflation. He stressed the importance for Denmark of being part of 
the monetary decision-making in EMU's third phase to avoid merely adjusting to 
dominant countries' decisions. Finally, he argued, the rejection of the automatic transition 
in Denmark's case was not based on the rejection of the principles of EMU, but on 
constitutional requirements.
The Social Democratic Party and the Radical Liberal Party endorsed the 
government's negotiation position, but stressed that by ratifying the new Treaty Denmark 
could not be bound to participating in the third phase without a referendum. The 
resolution (see section 2.6) adopted by the Folketing called upon the government to secure 
that Denmark would not be bound to the single currency. The Social People's Party and
267Poul Skytte Christoffersen, Konferencen vedrorende traktaten om den europceiske 
union, p. 94.
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the Progress Party rejected, on different grounds, EMU and the single currency.268
1.7. The Intergovernmental Negotiations on PU
In the centre of the drive towards PU lay a recognition that the Community should 
prepare itself for the future, both in terms of implementing EMU, the internal market, 
enlargement and fulfilling its external role as an anchor of stability in Europe.
As the decision to convene an IGC on PU had only been taken in June 1990, the 
Luxembourg Presidency had been prompted to give priority to PU so that it could catch 
up with EMU and the IGCs could be concluded simultaneously (see section 2.4). One of 
the fundamental problems for the IGC was that although PU and EU were often used in 
Community terminology, they had never been precisely defined and therefore no one was 
certain about their shape or content. As each actor had its own idea on EU, it was soon 
agreed that the objective of the IGC was not to produce a treaty representing the final 
stage of European integration.269
When the IGC on PU met for the first time on 14 December 1990 in conjunction 
with the European Council in Rome, it had a handful of texts to consider on the subject, 
including the conclusions of the European Council in Rome in October and December, 
the report from the Foreign Ministers' personal representatives of 30 November 1990270 
and the European Parliament's Martin Reports (on institutional reform),271 the Colombo 
Reports (on the constitutional basis of EU)272 and the Commission's opinion273 (later an
268Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Sven Auken and Niels Helveg Petersen, Folketingstidende, 
5 December 1991, col. 3315 onwards.
269Poul Skytte Christoffersen, Konferencen vedrorende traktaten om den europceiske 
union, p. 41.
270European Communities, 'Preparation of the Intergovernmental Conference on 
Political Union: The Presidency's Assessment', Europe Documents, No. 1666, 6 December
1990.
271European Parliament, 'Resolution on the Intergovernmental Conference in the 
Context of the Parliament's Strategy for European Union', Official Journal, No. C 96, 17 
April 1990 and No. C 231, 17 September 1990.
272European Parliament, 'Resolution on the Constitutional Basis of European Union', 
A3-0165/90, 11 July 1990 and A3-0301/90, 12 December 1990.
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additional number of proposals and initiatives were forwarded by the member states and 
the Commission). In view of the amount of work in turning the proposed texts (of which 
most were in the form of catalogues of issues) into treaty articles, the IGC, composed of 
the Foreign Ministers' personal representatives and the Commission, agreed to meet on 
a weekly basis. Denmark was represented by Gunnar Riberholdt, formerly permanent 
representative to the EC, but at the time Danish Ambassador to France.
The role of the Presidency, and the strategy it chose to embark on the negotiations, 
had a significant impact on the result. Luxembourg chose to rely on the Council's General 
Secretariat to assist in drafting treaty texts and to strike compromises between the member 
states' delegations.
The Presidency strategy of 'zeroing' down the differences between the member 
states by searching for acceptable solutions quickly produced substantial results in the 
form of a first draft treaty on 17 April, which already represented 80 per cent of the treaty 
agreed on in Maastricht.274 The draft treaty on the Union was presented to the European 
Council in Luxembourg on 28-29 June, but no agreement was reached.
Since the Luxembourg draft treaty had been criticized by some member states as 
too modest, in particular with regard to the structure of the treaty and the competences 
of the European Parliament, the Dutch Presidency set itself the task of producing a unitary 
treaty framework.275 The Dutch Presidency, without proper consultation with the Council's
273Commission of the European Communities, 'Commission Opinion of 21 October on 
the proposals for amendment of the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community with a View to Political Union', Bulletin o f the European Communities, 
Supplement 2/91, 1991.
274Joseph Weyland, 'Strategies and Perspectives of the Luxembourg Presidency', in 
Kirchner and Tsagkari, The EC Council Presidency, p. 17. See also, Europe, No. 5473, 
17 April 1991, pp. 3-4.
275Charles R. van Beuge, 'Strategies and Perspectives of the Dutch Presidency', in 
Kirchner and Tsagkari (eds.), The EC Presidency, pp. 27-28. Mr van Beuge stressed that 
'there was...a perception that quite a number of capitals shared the idea [of a unitary 
treaty: own remark]...It was evidenced in the meeting of early June where it was found 
that about eight delegations were extremely unhappy with the Luxembourg draft. A new 
approach was needed...We came back with the clear impression that it [the draft treaty] 
would find support with four countries; four states being neutral and four being 
against....On Monday 13 September we learned that the only state supporting the draft was 
the Dutch.'
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General Secretariat or the member states, except Belgium, presented a new draft treaty 
in September.276 The Dutch draft treaty was rejected by the member states at a ministerial 
meeting on 30 September and was subsequently withdrawn. The Foreign Ministers agreed 
to put the Luxembourg draft treaty back on the negotiation table as the basis for 
negotiations that were scheduled for conclusion at the European Council in Maastricht.
Although the Dutch initiative had delayed the negotiations, it did help to make 
clear to the most pro-integrationist groups the solutions that were politically possible, and 
to commit the most reluctant to the Luxembourg draft treaty, as they had had to insist it 
be brought back to the negotiations.277
1.8. Danish Positions on PU
The concepts of EU and the federal perspective were fundamentally sensitive to the 
Danish government, which, like previous governments, had troubles with the translation 
of the word 'union' (which had until now been translated into 'unity', sammenslutning, (see 
chapter 3 and 4)). Prime Minister Schliiter, who had at least twice in 1986 declared 
publicly that 'the union is dead', saw its revival with the debate on EMU and PU. This 
was not a substantial problem for those politicians who favoured the EC, but was 
nevertheless a source of embarrassment in regard to the Danish population. The Danish 
Memorandum suggested the IGCs be held under the title 'The Role of the Community in 
a Future European Construction', neatly avoiding any reference to union (although EMU 
appears in the text). During the negotiations, however, the Danish government had to 
accept the term 'European Union', which was inserted at the Maastricht European Council 
as compensation to the pro-integrationist member states which insisted on an explicit 
commitment to the federal objective, but which had been withdrawn since it was 
completely unacceptable to Denmark and some other member states.278
276European Communities, 'Draft Treaty Towards European Union', Europe 
Documents, No. 1733/1734, 3 October, 1991.
277David Buchan, 'EC sails towards safe harbour', Financial Times, 2 October 1991. 
Mr Buchan writes that 'in the revolt against the Dutch plan, many of the 12 have sung the 
merits of the Luxembourg plan louder than they intended'.
21%Financial Times, 'Dutch warn other UK moves on EC treaty', 15 November 1991. 
International Herald Tribune, 'Drop 'Federal' From EC Treaty, Portugal Urges', 27
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The Memorandum suggested that subsidiarity should be stated as a fundamental 
principle in the preamble. The IGC agreed on this, but disagreed when it came to its 
application and legal value. Danish politicians saw the principle as a rule of 'nearness', 
meaning that decisions should be taken as close to the citizens as possible, but did not 
necessarily consider it as a means to divide competence between the local, regional, 
national and European levels according to federal thinking. Denmark favoured the temple 
construction of the Luxembourg draft treaty and opposed the tree construction of the 
Dutch draft treaty.
Danish EC policy was consistent in insisting on intergovernmental cooperation in 
foreign and security policy, home affairs and judicial cooperation. There was no support 
for a 'Communitization' of these areas in Denmark, which subsequently took a restrictive 
position with regard to the role of EC institutions and voting procedures.
Endowing the Union with a citizenship was originally a Spanish proposal. 
Although the Danish Memorandum did not mention this possibility, the concrete content 
of the final provisions did not pose any problems for Danish politicians as long as the 
treaty provisions upheld the 1990 directives concerning citizens who might lay a financial 
burden on the host country.
Denmark adopted its most progressive negotiation position regarding the extension 
of Community competence in both existing and new policy areas, and suggested that 
decisions be taken by qualified majority, with some exceptions. The Danish Memorandum 
proposed Community action in: consumer protection, development policy, public health 
policy, education policy, energy policy, telecommunications and cultural policy. The IGC 
was able to agree on treaty provisions in most of these areas except energy policy. There 
was also agreement on extending telecommunications to the trans-European networks and 
introducing industrial policy as a Community policy.
Danish EC policy was based on demands from the Social Democrats for substantive 
improvements in social and environmental policies, and their support of the final resulting 
treaty depended on real progress in these areas. The social and environmental policies 
were linked to the fundamental policies of EMU, but also to an upgrading of the
November 1991.
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provisions in place since the SEA and the Social Charter. The Memorandum stressed that 
environmental policy should be granted a central role in the Community, and that 
decisions should be adopted by qualified majority while based on a guarantee for member 
states which wanted to apply more stringent rules. The provisions of the social dimension 
should be included in the treaty and adopted by qualified majority, based on minimum 
requirements. The Danish government also emphasized the importance of introducing 
majority voting for the adoption of framework decisions within the research and 
development policy.
Some member states opposed decision-making by qualified majority in the 
environmental area, but a compromise solution was found at the Maastricht European 
Council, where the principle of majority decision was confirmed but with a series of 
exemptions. The Social Charter created more problems and became the subject of an 
unorthodox arrangement at the Maastricht European Council.
On the question of increasing the democratic legitimacy of the Community, Denmark, 
although not denying the necessity of granting the European Parliament greater influence 
in decision-making procedures, preferred to emphasize the importance of national 
parliaments and their participation in the Community law-making process. The Danish 
Memorandum proposed extending the cooperation procedure to all Community policy 
areas where decisions were to be adopted by qualified majority, and to give the European 
Parliament greater powers of control over the Commission and the right to initiate 
Community legislation in some areas. The Memorandum proposed the creation of an 
Ombudsman institution to represent the interests of individual citizens and placed 
considerable importance on introducing a policy of openness.
After strongly opposing the original proposal for the co-decision procedure, 
Denmark accepted the revised and extended procedure,279 but opposed the dual vote of 
investiture of the Commission President and the 'college'. There was considerable 
satisfaction in Denmark that the proposal for an Ombudsman institution was accepted by 
other member states, but disappointment that there had been no agreement on the policy
279Richard Corbett, 'The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union', Journal o f 
Common Market Studies, Vol. XXX, No. 3, September 1992, pp. 271-98.
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of openness.280 Denmark, together with France and the UK, brought the role of national 
parliaments into the IGC where the discussion focused on the principle of subsidiarity, 
a ban on harmonizing national law in the areas of culture, education, vocational training 
and public health, and upholding national parliaments' right to ratify certain treaties. On 
British insistence a declaration on the role of national parliaments in EU was attached to 
the treaty.
Strengthened cooperation within the sphere of foreign and security policy was advocated 
in the Danish Memorandum, while the prospect of substantially deeper integration in this 
area was the subject of much debate in Denmark (see below). The proposals were based 
on building and extending the existing framework of intergovernmental consultation 
within EPC, where agreements should be reached through consensus and coordinated 
through the Council's General Secretariat, not the Commission or a new institution. The 
Memorandum did not mention a future defence policy, but as the government presented 
draft treaty articles on foreign and security policy, the Danish position became clearer: 
this policy could apply to all areas where there was unity between the member states, but 
strictly military collaboration should remain compatible to the structures of the alliances 
to which some member states already belonged, and their responsibilities and duties 
within these alliances should be respected.281
Denmark, together with the UK and Ireland, opposed majority voting in certain 
matters of foreign policy and security, and it joined forces with the UK, the Netherlands 
and Portugal on insisting that no moves should be taken which could endanger American 
participation in NATO or its military presence in Europe.
On the question of the WEU as a bridge between EU and NATO, Denmark's 
position was precarious. As a member of NATO, it could not base its refusal to become 
a member of the WEU on neutrality, as Ireland did.
In October, two proposals on security and defence policy were presented to the 
IGC: the Anglo-Italian declaration on European security and defence; and the Franco-
2i0Politiken, 'Danske fmgeraftryk paEF-union', 20 April 1991 .Politiken, 'Positiv dansk 
reaktion', 12 December 1991.
281Quoted in Europe, No. 5456, 21 March 1991, pp. 5-6.
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German initiative on foreign, security and defence policy.282 For Denmark, it was 
important that in the Anglo-Italian declaration two member states which traditionally held 
opposing views on European integration had been able to agree on a common statement. 
Another significant development was the softened American position on a future European 
defence dimension, expressed by President Bush at the NATO Summit in Rome on 7-8 
November 1991. The new initiatives, inserted as revised articles in the Dutch draft treaty, 
were discussed at the Foreign Ministers' conclave in Noordwijk but as a final settlement 
could not be agreed, they were left to the European Council in Maastricht.
Although not mentioned in the Danish Memorandum, the final result adopted at 
Maastricht on home affairs and judicial cooperation was acceptable to Denmark, mainly 
because the cooperation remained intergovernmental and outside the scope of the EC 
institutions. Denmark fought hard against putting the third pillar under Community 
competence and rejected membership of the Schengen cooperation (an intergovernmental 
agreement between some EU member states which abolishes checks on persons at 
common borders of the signatories).
1.9. The Danish Debate during the Intergovernmental Negotiations 
The debate in Denmark during 1991 focused on the aspects of political integration where 
there was no prior political consensus, in particular the federal objective of the Union, the 
role of EC institutions in the intergovernmental pillars, and the strengthening of the 
foreign and security policy, in particular with regard to majority voting and the possibility 
of a future European defence policy and European defence. On these issues the Danish 
EC policy had not changed, and positions adopted during negotiations reflected the 
traditional rejection of European integration, a federal development of the Community and 
the strengthening of the EC institutions.
Central actors before and during the IGC were the Conservative Party and the 
Liberal Party (which formed a coalition government after the general election in
282European Communities, Europe Documents, No. 1735, 5 October 1991; and Europe 
Documents, No. 1738, 18 October 1991.
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December 1990) and the Social Democratic Party.283 Relations between the government 
and the Social Democratic Party took the shape of a triangular cooperation, where 
particular interests paved the way for changing alliances between the parties. On defence, 
the Conservatives and the Social Democrats agreed on rejecting the WEU against the pro- 
European defence policy advocated by the Foreign Minister. The same alliance was 
formed on other issues regarding European integration, e.g. a single currency, the structure 
of the Treaty and the Union's federal goal. On the social dimension the alliance changed, 
as the Social Democratic insistence on turning the Social Charter into a treaty-based 
Community policy was supported by the Liberal Party, while the Danish Employers' 
Association and some groups within the Conservative Party opposed the proposal.284 The 
Social Democratic party was divided on defence, as some MPs of the 1971 generation, 
led by Ritt Bjerregaard, favoured strengthening the European defence dimension and the 
WEU,285 while another group of traditional Social Democratic MPs led by Ivar Norgaard 
rejected any plans towards a European defence. The party chairman, Sven Auken, for 
reasons of personal conviction and respect to the integration-sceptic hinterland, decided 
that the WEU should not become the European defence organization, a position 
subsequently endorsed as the official Social Democratic policy.286
Before the decisive meeting of the European Council in Maastricht on 9-10
283Lars Olsen has written that the coordination between the government and the Social 
Democratic Party on the Danish positions during the IGC took place through several 
channels: between the Social Democratic leadership and the government, in particular 
through Ritt Bjerregaard and Uffe Ellemann-Jensen; between the civil servants in the 
Foreign Ministry and the centrally placed policy-makers in the Social Democratic Party 
machinery; between the Danish Social Democratic Party and other parties in Europe which 
received information from the Commission President and Social Democratic Foreign 
Ministers in other member states; and a special link between the British government and 
the Social Democratic Party's leadership to coordinate opposition to federal tendencies 
(Lars Olsen, 'Den stenede vej til Europa', Vandkunsteri).
284See Lars Olsen, 'Det stenede vej til Europa', Vandkunsten. Lars Olsen, interview 
with Ivar Norgaard, 'Danmark skal ikke bare fore tilpsningspolitik', Information, 29 June
1991.
285Hans Drachman, interview with Ritt Bjerregaard, 'S har noglen til en ny dansk 
forsvarspolitik', Politiken, 1 April 1991.
286Lars Olsen, 'Den stenede vej til Europa', Vandkunsten.
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December 1991, the political debate in Denmark concentrated on the outstanding issues. 
While the Foreign Minister gave increasingly vocal support to Denmark becoming a 
member of the WEU, which in his view was the centrepiece of a future European defence 
policy, the Social Democrats and the Conservatives opposed reducing the role of NATO 
in Europe.287 The Social Democrats changed their position slightly after the presentation 
of the Anglo-Italian proposal on security and defence and the NATO Summit in Rome 
(see above), but it was the prospect of deferring the decision until some neutral EFTA 
countries had become members of EU that convinced reluctant members of the party to 
accept the compromise solution at Maastricht. Ivar Norgaard expressed his party's position 
in the Folketing in October by suggesting that this decision should be deferred until 
Sweden's and Austria's positions were clearer and the central and eastern European 
countries had joined (NATO, EU or WEU, or all of them, he did not specify: own 
remark). Meanwhile, he continued, Denmark should remain a member of NATO, but he 
did not explicitly rule out the possibility of considering the issue again when the situation 
had become clearer. On the subject of the Union's 'federal character', Ivar Norgaard 
insisted that any such reference must be removed. On these two points, the Radical 
Liberals supported the Social Democratic line.288
On 5 December, in the Folketing's last debate on EC policy before the European Council 
in Maastricht, Prime Minister Schliiter expressed his satisfaction that the Treaty remained 
a three pillar construction delineating clearly which policies belonged to the Community 
and which were intergovernmental. He disapproved of majority voting in certain decisions 
pertaining to the CFSP, but thought that in practice majority voting in this area would be 
limited, as larger member states would guarantee that the intergovernmental aspect of the 
CFSP was upheld. On defence policy, the Prime Minister recorded a consensus in the 
Folketing on Denmark's wish to maintain defence cooperation within NATO, and, as with 
the third stage of EMU, Denmark demanded the possibility of deciding at a later stage 
whether or not to participate in a future European defence alliance. Finally, he praised the
287Hans Drachmann, interview with Sven Auken and Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, 'Pa vej 
mod Europa men i hver sin takt', Politiken, 8 December 1991.
288Ivar Norgaard and Niels Helveg Petersen, Folketingstidende, 29 October 1991, col. 
1081 onwards.
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impact of the Danish Memorandum in guiding the IGC negotiations towards a result 
acceptable to Denmark. The Prime Minister underlined Denmark's positive attitude 
towards the applications for membership presented by a series of European countries and 
wanted the European Council to adopt a positive statement to that effect.
The Social Democratic chairman, Sven Auken, considered the draft treaty tabled 
for the European Council satisfactory because it ruled out the creation of a European 
super state, social depreciation and secured a say for the Danish population on the future 
decisions on a single currency and defence. He criticized the government, however, for 
not having reached agreement on three areas where the Social Democrats wanted action: 
the principle of an active economic policy to combat unemployment, too loosely 
formulated in the EMU text; Danish proposals for greater openness of Community 
activities which were not matched with concrete provisions; and the texts on social policy 
which ran the risk of being watered down to secure the acceptance of the British 
government. In view of the negotiations at the European Council meeting, Sven Auken 
proposed a motion of resolution on behalf of the Social Democratic Party, the 
Conservative Party, the Liberal Party, the Centre-Democrats, the Radical Liberal Party and 
the Christian People's Party:
The Folketing calls on the government at the final negotiations on reform of the 
EC, to work for: (1) strengthening of the Community's economic and political 
cooperation without accepting a federal perspective; (2) openness in regard to the 
accession of new member states to the EC and strengthened cooperation with non­
member states; (3) strengthening the environment policy with the possibility of 
adopting minimum requirements by majority decisions; (4) the introduction of a 
social dimension; (5) no obligation for Denmark to participate in military 
cooperation; (6) no obligation for Denmark to participate in a single currency; and 
(7) openness in the Community's decision-making process.
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1.10. The European Council in Maastricht in December 1991289
After tough and protracted negotiations, the European Council succeeded in agreeing on 
the Maastricht Treaty. In regard to the parliamentary resolution of 5 December 1991 (see 
above), the Danish political leaders had succeeded in obtaining most of its objectives: the 
defence dimension had been resolved by a provision stating that the CFSP included the 
eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common 
defence (Article J.4.1). The WEU was mentioned in the Treaty as an integrated part of 
the development of the Union, but stressed CFSP's compatibility with the obligations 
stemming from some member states' membership of NATO (Article J.4.4). The member 
states of the WEU attached a declaration to the Treaty in which the members of the 
Union, but not members of WEU, were invited to accede. There was, therefore, no 
obligation for Denmark to become a member of WEU, and no certainty that EU would 
include a common defence.
Denmark was granted a protocol recognizing that its constitution contained 
provisions which might necessitate a referendum prior to Denmark's entry into the third 
stage of EMU, and the protocol on second homes that had previously been agreed was 
confirmed.
The provisions introduced by the SEA on the environment were amended to allow 
for decision-making by majority voting, except for a limited number of areas. The 
negotiations on the social dimension became very difficult as the British Prime Minister, 
John Major, refused to accept the compromise suggested to him by the Presidency. The 
other eleven member states, led by France, Germany and Denmark, refused in their turn 
to give in to British insistence on maintaining the non-binding status of the Social Charter. 
A solution was found in the form of an opt-out clause for eleven member states, which 
set up between them a social policy based on the acquis communautaire with a view to 
implementing the Social Charter.
289See, for instance, Europe, Nos. 5622, 5623, 5626, 5627 and 5628, 4, 5, 9-10, 11 and
12 December 1991. Financial Times, 'Single currency to start by 1999', 10 December 
1991; 'A Heath Robinson design for Europe', 12 December 1991. International Herald 
Tribune, 'Accord on WEU Is Designated to Bolster European Security and Reassure 
NATO', 11 December 1991. Le Monde, 'Le fait qu'un pays sur douze n'ait pas enraye la 
marche en avant de la Communaute est un point considerable a declare M. F rancis 
Mitterrand', 12 December 1991.
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The 'federal objective' was removed, to be replaced by a phrase confirming that 
the Treaty 'marked a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe' (Article A). The principle of subsidiarity was introduced by the Treaty 
in the shape of a political statement of intent (Article B) and was specified in the 
provisions pertaining to the European Community (Article 2) or in provision on individual 
policy areas, such as education, culture and health.
As regards openness to new member states, the European Council gave a positive 
statement in the Maastricht Presidency conclusions to that effect.290
On the whole the Danish government obtained its negotiation objectives. Foreign 
Minister Ellemann-Jensen was satisfied with the result, claiming that the government had 
literally fulfilled all the requirements of the parliamentary resolution.291 There were, 
however, two points on which the government was subsequently criticized by the Social 
Democrats for not having reached a satisfactory result: the principle of an active economic 
policy to combat unemployment, which although mentioned as an objective of EMU, had 
on German insistence not been placed on an equal footing as the goal of price stability;292 
and the policy of openness in Community activities on which the political leaders had not 
been able to agree.293
Reactions from other political parties in Denmark were mainly positive. Only the 
Socialist People's Party and the Progress Party, which opposed the IGC negotiations, 
expressed their discontent by urging the population to vote against the new Treaty in the 
referendum planned to take place during the coming six months.294
290'Presidency Conclusions', European Council in Maastricht, 9-10 December 1991, 
Europe, No. 5628. 12 December 1991.
29]Politiken, 'Unionen taet pa danske krav', 12 December 1991.
292Lars Olsen, 'Den stenede vej til Europa', Vandkunsten.
293Politiken, 'Positiv dansk reaktion', 12 December 1991.
294Information, 'Roser til regeringen for resultatet i Maastricht', 12 December 1991. 
Politiken, 'Kun to partier imod', 12 December 1991.
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2. The Referendum on the Maastricht Treaty on 2 June 1991
2.1. The Constitutional Requirement
On 10 March 1992 the Danish government presented a bill amending the EC accession 
act for ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. In 1972, the accession act had been passed 
on the basis of the constitution's Article 20 (see chapter 3) which prescribes that a five- 
sixths' majority of Folketing members pronounce themselves in favour of transfer of 
national sovereignty to intergovernmental authorities (but which had been overridden by 
the Folketing's decision to call a binding referendum on the basis of Article 42). If  the 
five-sixths' majority cannot be reached, the government, in upholding the act, can call a 
referendum to settle the matter. The question in regard to the Maastricht Treaty was 
whether the new and amended provisions pertaining to the Community pillar required 
transfer of sovereignty on the basis of Article 20. Experts from the Department of Justice 
submitted a report on 3 March 1992 which stated that taking into account the provisions 
on EMU, the Union citizenship and the new policy areas conferred to the Community, it 
was 'not quite unlikely' (ikke ganske utvivlsomt) that the Maastricht Treaty involved 
transfer of sovereignty in some areas, and it should therefore be ratified on the basis of 
Article 20 of the constitution.295
However, before the Maastricht European Council in December 1991, Danish 
politicians had already promised the public the opportunity to vote in a referendum on the 
Treaty.296 In January 1992, after consultation with the Social Democratic Party, Prime 
Minister Schluter announced that the referendum be held on 2 June 1992, according to 
Article 20 of the constitution, and that the referendum would, contrary to the referendum 
on SEA, be binding for the Folketing. When asked in what areas Denmark would be 
forsaking sovereignty when ratifying the Maastricht Treaty, the Prime Minister did not 
wish to take a position as to whether the Treaty implied transfer of sovereignty from a 
constitutional point of view, but the government had chosen to be on the safe side 
concerning the population's right to pronounce itself in case there were any doubts the
295For an account of the constitutional requirements regarding the Maastricht Treaty 
see, Udenrigsministeriet, Hvidbog om Danmark og Maastricht-Traktaten, Copenhagen, 
October 1992, pp. 43-52.
296See, for instance, an interview with Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and Sven Auken in 
Politiken, 'Pa vej mod Europa men i hver sin takt', 8 December 1991.
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ratification necessitated transfer of sovereignty.297
The Folketing passed the bill of ratification after the third reading on 12 May 1992 
with 130 votes to 25. This was just below the five-sixths' prescribed by the constitution, 
but if the Folketing had been able to acquire the sufficient number of votes, there would, 
in Nikolaj Petersen's words, 'almost certainly have been a referendum anyway, because 
since 1972 a political convention has been established that the people should be asked in 
connection with major changes in Denmark's relationship with the European Community. 
The referendum of 1992 only reinforced this convention..'.298
2.2. The Social Democratic Party's Leadership Contest
A political event which attracted great interest during the first few months of 1992 was 
the leadership contest in the Social Democratic Party between Sven Auken and Poul 
Nyrup Rasmussen.299 The leadership challenge was not directly caused by differences over 
the party's EC policy, but had a direct impact on the party's ability to mobilize for the 
Maastricht campaign, delaying its start as other parties chose to wait until the Social 
Democrats' internal problems were settled.300 The challenge was prompted by the doubts 
of leading personalities in the party and the Confederation of Trade Unions over Sven
cc
Auken's personal ability to form^govemment. Disappointment had been great after the 
1990 election when the party had been unable to form government despite the best 
election result since 1971. Sven Auken's personal integrity was questioned by the Radical 
Liberal leader, Niels Helveg Petersen, to the point where the latter refrained from forming 
a coalition government with the Social Democrats.301 Another factor undermining Sven
291 Information, 'Schliiter-Auken aftale gav hurtig EF-dato', 24 January 1992.
298Nikolaj Petersen, "Game, Set and Match": Denmark and the European Union from  
Maastricht to Edinburgh, Institute of Political Science, Arhus University, Arhus, January 
1993, p. 2.
299Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, bom 1942, Economist at the Confederation of Danish Trade 
Unions 1971-79 and Chief Economist 1980-86, MP for the Social Democratic Party since 
1988, Vice-Chairman for the Social Democratic Party in 1988 and Chairman since 1992, 
Prime Minister since 1993.
300Information, 'Frygten for et nej er stigende', 19 March 1992.
301See Erik Meier Carlsen, Plads fo r  dem alle?, pp. 84-91.
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Auken's position as party leader was a political row involving Ritt Bjerregaard, 
Chairwoman of the Social Democratic parliamentary group and Shadow Foreign Minister. 
Ritt Bjerregaard, who during 1991 had hinted at the possibility that the Social Democrats 
might have to reconsider their opposition to the WEU, reiterated this argument with force 
after having been deprived of her place at the top of the party.302 The debate over defence 
aggravated an already unstable situation in the party, setting traditionally Euro-sceptic 
Social Democrats against the pro-European generation, and Sven Auken's inability to 
contain the disagreements was seen as yet more proof of his weakness as party leader.
At the extraordinary party congress on 11 April 1992 Poul Nyrup Rasmussen was 
elected chairman of the Social Democratic Party.303 Immediately after his appointment, 
the new party Chairman started to rally his forces for the referendum on 2 June.
2.3. The Referendum Campaign
In some respects the referendum campaign on the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 was different 
from previous campaigns in 1972 and 1986, as there was almost consensus between the 
established parties. First, the political parties advocating a yes in the referendum, with the 
support of both employers' and workers' organizations, together represented almost the 
whole political and administrative elite. Second, in 1992 the proponents had to convince 
the electorate about the virtues of closer economic and political integration within EU, 
while the opponents claimed to have told the truth in the past about the sliding slope 
towards the United States of Europe. The character of the 1992 campaign prompted the 
emergence of a number of new elements.
2.4. The Political Parties
The Conservative Party was traditionally pro-European, although in a pragmatic and 
minimalistic way. It believed in the nation-state as the main actor in international politics 
and rejected any federal tendencies in the EC. The Maastricht Treaty was endorsed by the
302Ritt Bjerregaard, 'Sadan omtrent ligger landet', Politiken, 26 January 1992.
303 Poul Albret, 'Auken er fasrdig', Information, 17 March 1992. Poul Albret, 'Auken 
og Nyrup: Intet kup', Information, 18 March 1992. Lasse Ellegaard, 'Karaktermord pa 
Slotsholmen', Information, 21-22 March 1992. Henning Olsson, 'Nyrup k ro n e tPolitiken, 
12 April 1992. Poul Albret, 'Vi vil se tarer', Information, 14 April 1992.
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party, not because it was another step towards an ever closer union, but because of the 
external necessity prompted by the peaceful revolution in central and eastern Europe and 
the breakup of the Soviet Union. The strengthening of the intergovernmental aspect of the 
Treaty in terms of more power to the European Council and the Council of Ministers, and 
the introduction of subsidiarity were deemed positive.304 In 1992 Poul Schliiter expressed 
the view that the prospects of a United States of Europe, which he opposed, had gone 
away in the mid-1980s, and that the Maastricht Treaty was a strengthening of Charles de 
Gaulle's vision of VEurope des patries305 His views reflected a tendency in the 
Conservative Party, which had emerged in parallel with attempts to regulate social policy 
and workers' rights on a European level and to introduce matters of political integration 
such as defence, immigration policy and monetary and economic policy. The party was 
in favour of safeguarding national sovereignty and values against the interference of 
Brussels and over-rigid regulation. A number of Conservative MPs, including the Finance 
Minister, Henning Dyremose, criticized the single currency and plans for a European 
defence. The criticism of European integration increasingly took the shape of a traditional 
right-wing ideology stressing the need to safeguard national sovereignty and the symbols 
attached to it.306
Paradoxically, the Conservative Party was increasingly at odds with the 'pro- 
integrationist' Liberal Party over Danish EC policy, while sharing many arguments with 
Euro-sceptic Social Democrats, in particular over the rejection of WEU membership, 
participation in the third stage of EMU, and interference in Danish society by an over- 
zealous Brussels administration. The Conservative Party's campaign advocated a yes to 
the Maastricht Treaty, but with much less zeal than its coalition partner.307
With its outspoken leader, Foreign Minister Ellemann-Jensen, the Liberal Party had firmly
304Poul Schliiter, 'Skal vi sige farvel til EF efter tyve fremgangsrige ar?', in Jens 
Stubjasr (ed.), Meninger om Danmark og EF-unionen, Forlaget Aktuelle Boger, 
Copenhagen, 1992, pp. 20-30.
305Poul Schliiter, 'Schliiter: Unionen er stadigt stendod', Politiken, 30 May 1992.
306Hans Drachman, 'EF-motstanden skifter side, Politiken, 23 June 1992.
307Michael Kristiansen. 'Det matte blive et nej', Weekendavisen, 4 June 1992.
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placed itself as one of the most pro-European political parties and one of the few to 
endorse a federal development of the Community. The party's consistent support of EC 
integration attracted pro-European voters with the result that the Liberal Party enjoyed 
their support for an active pro-European policy. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen stressed in strong 
words the necessity for a small country like Denmark to ratify the Maastricht Treaty, 
because of the dramatic developments in central and eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
and threats of social and political unrest, the necessity to maintain Denmark's influence 
in the process of building a future European structure, and because of accession of the 
Nordic applicants. The Foreign Minister took the lead in the debate on WEU, arguing that 
it was both Denmark's duty and in its interest to become a member, and fulfil, as he saw 
it, the obligations of Union membership.308 The personal style of the Foreign Minister, and 
his forthrightness on issues such as defence, attracted a great deal of criticism from some 
Social Democrats and members of the Socialist People's Party, as it was seen as breaking 
with the convention of advocating a minimalistic and status quo position with regard to 
European integration.309
The Radical Liberal Party left the government coalition in December 1990 after losing 
three seats in the election. The party's views on the EC were traditionally close to the 
Social Democratic Party, and this pattern was repeated with the Maastricht Treaty where 
the two parties shared similar views on some key issues. The Radical Liberals' strongest 
opposition followed its traditional neutralist leaning and was directed against a European 
defence policy and the WEU, but it accepted the provisions on the eventual framing of 
a common defence policy and the declaration of the WEU. Niels Helveg Petersen was
308Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, 'Denmark og det nye sikkerhedspolitiske landskab', 
Information, 12 February 1992. The Foreign Minister took the unusual step for a Danish 
minister of advocating a new and stronger political architecture in Europe in the 
international press. See, for example, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, 'La proposition du Denmark', 
Le Monde, 18 April 1991; Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, 'New World Order requires wider and 
deeper EC', Financial Times, 25 April 1991; and interview in International Herald Tribune, 
'European View: 'Better lives for AH', 9 December 1991.
309View expressed in an interview in Copenhagen, 21 October 1993.
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also vocal in his rejection of a federal vision for the Community.310 The Radical Liberals 
supported the Maastricht Treaty because it represented a step in the right direction with 
regard to the environmental policy and the policy of openness with the introduction of the 
Ombudsman institution. The party was generally positive towards EMU. Most important 
for the party, however, was the importance for a small country like Denmark of being part 
of the shaping of European politics and the prospect of Union enlargement to the Nordic 
countries.311
The small right-wing parties, the Centre-Democrats and the Christian People's Party, voted 
in favour of ratification together with the government parties, the Radical Liberals and the 
Social Democrats. On specific aspects of the Maastricht Treaty, however, the parties' 
opinions differed: while the Christian People's Party welcomed the retention of the 
intergovernmental cooperation in the second and third pillars, emphasizing the importance 
of the nation-state, and rejected the introduction of a European defence dimension, it was 
satisfied with strengthened integration with regard to social, environmental and 
development policies; meanwhile the Centre-Democrats, who together with the Liberals 
were the only party supporting European integration per se, had wanted the Danish 
Memorandum to go further, advocating Danish participation in the third stage of EMU 
and closer political integration, and adopting an open attitude to a European defence 
policy.312
During the period from the SEA to the Danish Memorandum, the Social Democratic Party 
had undergone a significant shift in relation to the EC (see earlier discussion). The 
change, however, was not homogeneous.
310Niels Helveg Petersen, Folketingstidende, 5 December 1991, cols. 3367-3371. Niels 
Helveg Petersen, 'Europa e ikke USA', Politiken, 24 July 1991.
31'Niels Helveg Petersen, Folketingstidenden, first reading of the ratification act, 17 
March 1992, cols. 7783 onwards. Niels Helveg Petersen, 'Hvordan vi kan bruge vor 
indflydelse pa Europa-samarbejdet', in Stubkjaer (ed.), Meninger om Danmark og EF- 
Unionen, pp. 79-84.
312Peter Duetoft, Folketingstidende, 25 October 1990, cols. 1042-1049. Erhard 
Jakobsen, Folketingstidende, 5 December 1991, cols. 3356 onwards.
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First, it was primarily the 1971 generation which opposed membership in 1972 and 
the SEA in 1986, that had become more pro-European. The older generation, which 
negotiated the accession in 1972 and had been ready to accept the SEA in the autumn of 
1985, maintained its pragmatic and minimalistic EC policy. The Maastricht Treaty, 
however, with the introduction of EMU and PU, went against its traditional positions. Ivar 
Norgaard, the leading spokesman of Danish EC policy until the referendum in 1986, did 
not support the Maastricht Treaty's political dimension, nor the third stage of EMU. He 
felt bound to the Social Democrats' 1972 promise to the Danish people that the party 
should veto any development towards EU.313 The Euro-sceptic Social Democratic MPs 
were brought in line with the party by a compromise in regard to the Danish 
Memorandum, with the result that the party's positions on a future defence dimension 
gradually hardened (although the party accepted the formulations in the Maastricht Treaty 
because of the prospect of accession by some neutral EFTA states) and feelings towards 
the third stage of EMU which had originally had been quite positive (in the 
Memorandum) became negative.
Second, the distance between the primarily Euro-positive top level and the still 
Euro-sceptic party faithful remained considerable which made the party elite's 
understanding of the feelings towards EU at the grassroot level all the more difficult.
The Progress Party traditionally supported Denmark's EC membership and favoured the 
SEA and the internal market. The reason the party decided to oppose the Maastricht 
Treaty was founded in its ideology, which rejected political intervention and 
administrative regulation, while advocating a free market economy and the individual's 
freedom of choice. In its view the Community was wrong to introduce European-wide 
regulation in the environmental and social areas, to strengthen economic and political 
integration, and to insert a reference to a future European defence. The Community, it 
argued, should remain an internal market without detailed regulation and political 
integration.314 The Progress Party adopted an increasingly nationalist rhetoric as threats
313Lars Olsen, interview with Ivar Norgaard, 'Denmark skal ikke bare fore 
tilpasningspolitik, Information, 29 June 1991.
314Annette Just, Folketingstidenden, 5 December 1991, cols. 3357-3361.
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to Danish values, identity, independence and sovereignty were used as arguments against 
EU and interference from Brussels.315
The Socialist People's Party, which had opposed Denmark's EC membership since the 
1960s, warned against the integrationist logic which would, it believed, in time lead to 
the United States of Europe. After the SEA referendum, the Socialist People's Party had 
come to accept Denmark's membership of the Community, but it was still strongly 
opposed to further European integration. In the autumn of 1991, the Socialist People's 
Party had officially deleted the demand for Denmark's withdrawal from the EC in the 
political programme. In the same year Holger K. Nielsen316 was elected new Party 
Chairman in close competition with Sten Gade, spokesman on EC Affairs, who had 
started a reform of the party's EC policy.317
The party advocated a new European structure, which included the EFTA countries 
and the central and eastern European countries, built on a high degree of integration in 
areas such as culture, environment, social policy, commercial interaction and foreign 
policy. The main reason why the party rejected the Maastricht Treaty was because it 
excluded other European countries by introducing an integrated framework of economic 
and political integration in the form of EMU, CFSP and the defence dimension, and 
because it did notdo enough in areas such as social and environment policies, openness 
of the Community decision-making process and in assisting developing countries.318
315B o Andersen (ed.), Fri som fugeln - i et bur, Forlaget Liberty, Copenhagen, 1993.
316Holger K. Nielsen, bom 1950, Official at the European Parliament 1979-81, MP for 
the Socialist People's Party 1981-84 and since 1987, Member of the Socialist People's 
Party's Executive Committee 1976-79 and since 1984, Chairman of the party since 1991.
3,7Poul Albert, interview with Sten Gade, 'SF: Anden fra 1972 er ikke dod', 
Information, 19 May 1992. In this article Sten Gade states that his party wants to reform 
the EC and its integration process to be open to all European countries and to go much 
further in some areas.
318Sten Gade, 'Abent Europa nu!', Information, 27 June 1991. Sten Gade, 
Folketingstidende, 5 December 1991,cols. 3350-55.
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2.5. The Social Partners
Danish industry favoured the Maastricht Treaty and took part in the campaign advocating 
a yes in the referendum of 2 June. It had presented its views in 1990, advocating strongly 
in favour of EMU, deeper political integration and more effective decision-making and 
implementation of Community legislation. It warned against too much bureaucracy, an 
unnecessarily cumbersome legislative process and wanted a more open attitude towards 
other European countries.319 Although some voices in the business community were raised 
against the social dimension, over-regulation and Brussels bureaucracy, the business 
organizations invested both money and effort into the campaign. The joint campaign of 
the Federation of Danish Industries, Danish Metal and the European Movement attracted 
much public attention. It was the first time that two organizations representing opposing 
sides in the labour market had decided to cooperate on an issue of this magnitude. The 
result was not altogether positive: when analysing the outcome of the referendum, the 
organizations realized that their unusual cooperation had been interpreted by some Danes 
as a plot by the organizational elite to promote their own interests.320
The labour movement had become increasingly active in EC policy-making both on 
European and Danish levels since the introduction of the internal market programme. As 
an increasing number of decisions related to the labour market were being taken within 
the EC framework, the labour movement gradually realized it had to be part of the 
decision-making process to safeguard the interests of its members. It also strove to 
counterbalance the influence of southern member states' trade unions, which were striving 
towards labour market policies regulated by law, while the Danish trade unions favoured 
their traditional self-regulating system where the social partners agreed on workers' 
conditions through negotiation.
On the question of deeper economic and political integration as in 1972 the trade 
unions were split, although to a lesser degree. The Confederation of Danish Trade Unions 
which had close consultations with the Social Democratic Party before and during the
3]9The EC Way after 1992: Danish Industry's Wishes fo r  the Future EC, Federation 
of Danish Industries, Copenhagen, September 1990.
320Interview with representatives of Danish Metal, 24 February 1993, and of 
Federation of Danish Industries, 21 October 1993.
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IGCs, endorsed the Maastricht Treaty and recommended a positive vote in the 
referendum.321 Danish Metal (see above) campaigned vigorously for a positive outcome. 
Two other big trade unions, representing office and shop workers and specialized workers, 
had problems in adopting a position on the Maastricht Treaty. In both cases the 
leaderships were in favour and the executive councils advocated a positive vote in the 
referendum, but because of opposition from a substantial number of branch organizations 
neither of the two trade unions could adopt an official policy in favour of the Maastricht 
Treaty.322
2.6. Other Actors
The People's Movement against the EC had been dominating the popular movement since 
the 1960s, holding four seats in the European Parliament and influencing both the voters 
and political parties. After the referendum in 1986, the People's Movement against the EC 
gradually lost influence over the debate as the Danish population's endorsement of EC 
membership had undermined its raison d ’etre. At the end of the 1980s and the beginning 
of the 1990s, a new phenomenon emerged with the appearance of a number of popular 
movements, pleading opposition against political integration, mostly in the shape of EU, 
but not against membership of the EC as such. The new movements ranged over the 
whole political spectrum, contrary to the previous concentration to the left.
Denmark'92 was founded in December 1991 by EC opponents, some from the 
People's Movement against the EC, on the grounds that the latter alone could not secure 
a rejection of EU. Denmark'92 rejected EU and thereby the Maastricht Treaty claiming 
it was the wrong framework for the new Europe, and that it excluded the EFTA states and 
the newly democratized countries in central and eastern Europe. EU, they argued, with 
EMU, a European defence and an ever increasing centralization was designed one day to 
become a superpower in which Denmark would lose national independence and 
sovereignty. In their opinion, it was impossible to create a democratic system among the
32]Fagbevcegelsen og arbejdsmarkedet i EF: Den sociale dimension efter topmodet i 
Maastricht 1991, Landsorganisationen, March 1992. Interview at the Confederation of 
Danish Trade Unions, 29 October 1993.
322Erik Meier Carlsen, Plads fo r  dem alle?, pp. 127-8. Interview at the Specialized 
Workers' Union ( SiD), 26 October 1993.
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340 million people, and, therefore, in the name of democracy Denmark should reject the 
Maastricht Treaty. Denmark'92 appealed to those who feared that EU would wipe out 
Danish democratic and societal values, and to the popular discontent with the 
effectiveness and justness of the existing Community.323
The Trade Union Movement against the Union (Fagbevcegelsen mod Unionen) was 
founded in July 1991, composed of trade unions, workers at large industries and 
individual branches. Its influence was strongest among workers employed in the public 
sector.
Popular discontent with European integration to the centre and right of the political 
spectrum was seized on by two movements against EU, Charter 92 (Frihedsbrev 92), and 
Necessary Forum (Nodvendigt Forum). The former was composed of a number of right- 
wing intellectuals who pledged to safeguard the Danish nation-state and its symbols 
against further integration. The latter was founded in December 1989 with the objective 
of informing the Danish people about the economic and political union and safeguarding 
Danish democracy.324
In view of the referendum campaign the People's Movement against the EC, 
Denmark'92 and Necessary Forum formed No to the Union (Nej til Unionen) to better 
influence the population.325
In the 1992 campaign there were some incidents of external commentators whose remarks 
were widely reported in the press and influenced the debate: for example Danes working 
in the EC institutions, in particular, Niels Ersboll, Secretary General of the Council's 
Secretariat, and Commissioner Henning Christophersen whose warnings of mass 
unemployment if Denmark rejected the Maastricht Treaty were dismissed as scare-
323Drude Dahlerup, 'Min vision for Europa er anderledes end den, Unionen laegger op 
til', in Stubkjaer (ed.), Meninger om Danmark og EF-Unionen, pp. 100-112.
324 Arne Hardis, 'Nej'ets mange ansigter', in Jens Maigard (ed.), Under 
Bekvemmelighedsflag: En kritisk analyse a f Folkebevcegelsen m odEFog JuniBevcegelsen, 
Fiskers Forlag, Fredriksberg, 1993, pp. 13-9.
325Lene Torp Carlsen, 'Nu kommer Unions-kampagnen', Information, 19 May 1992.
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mongering.326 The Commission President Jacques Delors's remarks on the institutional 
structure of an enlarged EU also had a considerable negative effect on the opinion polls 
in Denmark.327 Although Danish newspapers afterwards admitted that Jacques Delors had 
been wrongly quoted, his remarks gave rise to a suspicion about the true objectives of EU 
and were readily exploited by the opponents of the Maastricht Treaty.328
2.7. The Outcome o f the Referendum on 2 June 1992
Contrary to the political and administrative elite's expectations of a positive outcome, the 
Danish population rejected the Maastricht Treaty by a narrow margin (49.3 per cent in 
favour and 50.7 per cent against, with a participation rate of 83.1 per cent).329 The 
outcome was at first interpreted as a vote of no confidence by the population in the 
parliamentary majority and was accepted as such by the politicians themselves.330 Most 
influenced by the popular rejection was Foreign Minister Ellemann-Jensen, who had 
invested much personal prestige in the campaign, and the Social Democratic Party with 
its new leader as only 34 per cent of its voters had endorsed the party's 
recommendation.331 The Liberal Party's voters, however, had supported the leadership's 
recommendation (85 per cent voted in favour) as did the Conservative Party's (82 per cent 
voted in favour), the Centre-Democrats' (75 per cent voted in favour), as well as the 
Socialist People's Party's supporters (94 per cent voted against) and the Progress Party's
326Per Knudsen, 'Vor mand i Bruxelles', Information, 30-31 May 1992.
327See Torp Carlsen, 'Nu kommer Unions-kampagnen', Information.
328Lars Olsen, 'Bag om Delors' "chock"-planer', Weekendavisen, 14 May 1992.
329Extract from the announcement of the Home Office concerning the result of the 
referendum on 2 June 1992, quoted in Petersen and Thune (eds.), Dansk Udenrigspolitisk 
Arbog 1992, Jurist og Okonomiforbundets Forlag, 1993, p. 351.
330Solveig Rodsgaard, 'Vaslgemes mistillidsvotum', Weekendavisen, 4 June 1992. 
Views also expressed during interviews on 23 February and 3 November 1993.
331Jens Henrik Haahr, Folkeafstemningen 2. juni 1992 om dansk ratifikation a f 
Maastricht-traktaten: En analyse a f udfaldet og dets baggrund, Institute of Political 
Science, University of Arhus, Arhus, 1992, table 3. Similar results are shown in Hans 
Jorgen Nielsen, 'The Danish Voters and the Referendum in June 1992 on the Maastricht 
Agreement', in Kelstrup (ed.), European Integration and Denmark's Participation, pp. 365- 
80, table 1.
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(82 per cent voted against). Apart from the Social Democratic voters, only the Christian 
People's Party voters disagreed with the party' recommendation rejecting the Maastricht 
Treaty (69 per cent voted against). Regarding the Radical Liberal Party the studies showed 
different results, but on average about 50 per cent endorsed the party's recommendation.
The authors of an analysis of the referendum assumed that the reason why the 
population voted against the EC was determined by their perception of the Community 
as either a political or an economic phenomenon. Their analysis showed that in 1992, for 
the first time, a political definition (not economic) of the EC dominated the public debate. 
At the same time, the voters felt they had no grasp on the consequences of EU. As 
politicians and other commentators argued that the Maastricht Treaty was primarily of a 
political nature, not economic, the population's fundamental opposition (see table 1) 
towards deeper European integration became decisive for the outcome of the 
referendum.332 The study established that of those who voted in favour of the Maastricht 
Treaty the reasons were that Denmark would not manage without the EC (44 per cent), 
for general economic advantages (19 per cent), or they did not know why (26 per cent). 
Those who voted against stated factors such as loss of sovereignty (43 per cent), 
opposition to the vision of EU (14 per cent), a European defence policy (13 per cent) or 
EC interference in Danish law-making (11 per cent).333 On the basis of this study, Nikolaj 
Petersen concluded that it was difficult to substantiate convincingly the theory of a 
democratic revolt against the political establishment. He argued that it was more plausible 
that the voters rejected the Maastricht Treaty because they were opposed to important 
aspects of it. To clarify this, he referred back to one finding of the previous study, 
showing that out of ten aspects of the Treaty only four were accepted by a majority or 
a plurality: the breakdown of trade barriers (61 per cent); the internal market (59 per 
cent); EMU (45 per cent); and economic and social cohesion (42 per cent). Other, mostly 
political aspects of the Treaty were rejected by a majority or a plurality: common foreign 
policy (36 per cent in favour); a European defence policy (37 per cent in favour); a single 
currency (35 per cent in favour); the social dimension (33 per cent in favour), the vision
332Karen Siune, Palle Svensson and Ole Tonsgaard, Det blev et nej, Forlaget Politica, 
Arhus, 1992, see, in particular, chapter 3, quotes from pp. 78 and 86-7.
333Siune, Svenson and Tonsgaard, Det blev et nej, table 7.10, p. 93.
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of a United States of Europe (23 per cent in favour); and a Union citizenship (15 per cent 
in favour).334
A Danish MP expressed similar views stressing that the population had been very 
consistent in its position towards European integration: in the referendum of 1986, the 
population had endorsed the SEA because it was in favour of economic integration; while 
in 1992, the population rejected the Maastricht Treaty because it was perceived to be 
about political integration. The mistake of the political and administrative elite was that, 
while becoming pro-European itself, it had failed to recognize that popular opinion had 
not developed in parallel.335
Part 2. The Route Towards the Edinburgh Agreement 
in. Finding a Solution to the Danish Problem'
1. After 2 June 1992...
Many commentators in Denmark have described how the result of the referendum on 2 
June came as a complete surprise to the political and administrative establishment, 
plunging Denmark into its deepest political crises for more than 40 years. What softened 
the blow was the show of sympathy from most EC member states which, to the surprise 
of some groups in Denmark, quite quickly seemed to accept the necessity for a pragmatic 
solution to the problem: Denmark was not going to be thrown out of the EC as some pro- 
European politicians had warned during the campaign.336
334Nikolaj Petersen, "Game, Set and Match": Denmark and the European Union from 
Maastricht to Edinburgh, Institute of Political Studies, University of Arhus, Arhus, January 
1993, pp. 7-8. See also Siune, Svensson and Tonsgaard, Det blev et nej, table 6.3, p. 74.
335Interview in Copenhagen, 3 November 1993.
336View expressed during interviews with policy-makers in Copenhagen in February, 
October and November 1993. See also Lars Olsen, Den stenede vej til Europa', 
Vandkunsten, and Nikolaj Petersen, "Den rette forhandlingsstrategi fo r  Danmark": 
Danmark og den Europceiske Union efter 2. juni, Institute of Political Science, Arhus 
University, Arhus, August 1992. Initial reactions in some member states, however, were 
much less understanding, as some political leaders took a tough stance on pressing ahead 
with ratification. Denmark, whose predicament had a direct influence in the British debate 
over Maastricht, found an ally in the British Prime Minister and Foreign Minister who
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At the EC Foreign Ministers' meeting in Oslo on 4 June, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen 
supported a declaration which called the other member states to continue their ratification 
according to the timetable, excluded any renegotiation of the Treaty, but left the door 
open for Denmark.
The Foreign Ministers' position on the Danish rejection was endorsed by the 
European Council in Lisbon on 26-27 June 1992, which confirmed that the timetable for 
ratification should continue as planned and linked the official opening of accession 
negotiations to the adoption of the Treaty. The incoming British Presidency adopted a 
wait-and-see policy to let Denmark decide how to handle the crisis.337
The EC Foreign Ministers' decision not to speculate on a second Danish 
referendum, or allow a renegotiation of the Treaty, was in accordance with the wishes of 
the Danish Foreign Minister and the Foreign Ministry. Their initial strategy was to adopt 
a low profile, hoping that public discontent in other EC member states would lead to the 
adoption of policies of nearness and openness, and on this basis ask the Danish population 
again to accept the Treaty with the knowledge of other countries' determination to press 
ahead without Denmark. The Foreign Minister did not want Denmark to acquire a special 
status within EU which would resurrect its position from the 1970s and early 1980s as 
a 'footnote' country.338 The Foreign Minister's support of the joint declaration of the Oslo 
meeting and his refusal to demand a renegotiation for Denmark upset the anti-EC groups, 
in particular the Socialist People's Party which had specifically called for the government 
not to renounce this option.339 The Foreign Minister's position, however, had no support 
in the Conservative Party, nor in the Social Democratic or Radical Liberal Parties. He was 
forced to give up the hard line during the summer, when it became clear that the Social 
Democrats would not give their support to a second referendum unless there was an
urged the EC member states to take a softer stance. See Financial Times, 'EC vows to 
ratify Maastricht', 4 June 1992; and The Guardian, 'EC puts brave face on snub', 4 June
1992.
™Europe, Special Edition, No. 5760. 28 June 1992, pp. 1-4.
338Lars Olsen, 'Den stenede vej til Europa', Vandkunsten.
339John Iversen, Det Nationale Kompromis. Danmark og det nye Europa, SP-forlag,
1993, p. 20.
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agreement between Denmark and its EC partners on a special status for Denmark, 
including defence and the single currency. As the Conservative Party shared this view, 
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen was forced to adopt a more accommodating position.340
After 2 June, the groups opposing the Maastricht Treaty faced a difficult situation. 
For the first time they had 'won' a referendum on the EC, but with the victory came also 
the responsibility of finding a solution to Denmark's future relations with EU, especially 
as no group any longer directly advocated Denmark's withdrawal from the EC. The 
People's Movement against the EC, together with other popular movements against the 
EC/Union, called on the government to include them in a round table discussion on the 
basis of their declaration of May 1992 on the conditions for negotiating with the EC in 
the event of a rejection.341
The Socialist People's Party, which had published its conditions for a renegotiation 
on 11 May, presented them to the Prime Minister's EC-crisis committee.342 The conditions 
were based on Denmark's exclusion from some provisions which, as the party saw it, were 
directly part of the development towards EU: the realization of EMU; the provisions on 
a common defence policy, including the link between the Union and WEU, and decision­
making by majority voting in the CFSP; the provisions on the Union citizenship; a 
supranational judicial cooperation; and the common provisions for EU (the transept).343
For the Social Democrats, especially the new party leader, the consequences of the 
negative outcome of the referendum were problematic. They agreed that a solution must 
contain substantial changes to Denmark's relation to the EC to respect the popular 
rejection of the Maastricht Treaty, but that it must maintain Denmark's participation in 
areas important to the party, such as economic cooperation, foreign policy, environmental 
policy and the social dimension.344 The dividing lines within the party were between Ritt
340Lars Olsen, 'Den stenede vej til Europa', Vandkunsten.
341Niels Rohleder, 'Motstandere vil mode Schliiter', Information, 4 June 1992.
342Lars Olsen, 'SFs svaere EF-plan', Weekendavisen, 1 May 1992. Lars Olsen, 'Hvis 
Danmark stemmer nej...', Weekendavisen, 22 May 1992.
343John Iversen, Den Nationale Kompromis, p. 17 and 20.
344Lars Olsen, 'Den stenede vej til Europa', Vandkunsten.
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Bjerregaard, as newly appointed President of the European Movement, and the pro- 
European part of the labour movement on one side, and the Euro-sceptic MPs, represented 
by Sven Auken and Ivar Norgaard on the other.345 The party leadership, closer to the pro- 
European wing of the party than the Euro-sceptic, was aware of the danger of showing 
a divided front at the party congress in September which aimed at adopting an official 
Social Democratic position. In consultation with the government, especially the Prime 
Minister and the Foreign Ministry, the Social Democratic executive committee was able 
to unite around a compromise which satisfied all sides, but which was still quite close to 
the party leader's more pro-European opinion.346
The Social Democratic congress of 9-13 September 1992 adopted a resolution 
which on several points was similar to the Socialist People's Party's conditions for 
negotiation. The resolution stressed that Danish EC policy in the future should be 
consistent in its respect for the referendum result and distanced from a Union leading to 
the United States of Europe. The resolution spelled out the conditions for a special status 
for Denmark in EU:
Denmark rejects membership of WEU, Denmark shall remain outside any common 
defence (policy) within the framework of the EC; Denmark remains outside the 
single currency and the attached conditions regulating economic policy (the third 
phase of EMU); Denmark shall not be bound to the Union citizenship, while 
maintaining the provisions on the right for EC citizens to stand and vote in local 
elections and introduce the same right in elections to the European Parliament; and 
it should be established that Denmark will not transfer asylum and police 
cooperation to the EC. In these areas, only intergovernmental cooperation will 
prevail in which Denmark wishes to participate.347
345Jens J. Krogh, 'Ritt vil have et ja', Det Fri Aktuelt, 22 June 1992. Annegrethe 
Rasmussen, 'Syv bud pa Danmarks fremtid i EF', Information, 20 August 1992. Ole 
Lorenzen, 'Unionstanken helt dod', Det Fri Aktuelt, 9 September 1992. Solveig Rodsgaard, 
'Regeringen fredet', Weekendavisen, 12 June 1992.
346Interview in Copenhagen, 22 October 1992
347Quoted in John Iversen, Den Nationale Kompromis, pp. 23-4.
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The Socialist People's Party was satisfied that the Social Democrats had chosen to adopt 
a position so close to their own, although the content and wording in their statement 
dispelled a much tougher stance. On 26 September, the Socialist People's Party leader, 
Holger K. Nielsen, invited all parties willing to form a national compromise respecting 
the popular rejection of the Maastricht Treaty to find a solution to Denmark's future 
relations with the EC on the basis of Denmark remaining a member.348
1.1. The National Compromise
The Social Democratic Party, which had doubts whether the Socialist People's Party 
would maintain its position as a responsible negotiating partner, also knew that the latter 
had to be part of any official negotiations with the EC member states for negotiations to 
be seen as representing a majority view in the population. For the Socialist People's Party, 
to be part of an agreement constituted both a challenge to its deeply rooted traditionally 
hostile position towards European integration and a unique possibility to prove itself a 
reliable coalition partner to the Social Democratic Party. The party leader wanted to show 
that with his rise to power, the Socialist People's Party had become a fully-fledged 
coalition partner, and hoped that by convincing the Social Democrats, the two parties 
could ultimately form government.349
At the beginning of October 1992, the Socialist People's Party and the Social 
Democratic Party embarked on a series of confidential consultations. On Social 
Democratic insistence they were soon joined by the Radical Liberal Party, which on 20 
September had adopted a resolution on similar lines. Together these parties constituted 
a majority in the Folketing.
Despite similarities in the declarations, there were important differences between 
the Socialist People's Party and the Social Democratic Party with regard to the 
formulation of the conditions guiding an agreement with the EC. The Socialist People's 
Party called for a new IGC to consider the conditions necessary for a solution and 
rejected the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. They proposed that amendments to the
348Poul Albert, interview with Holger K. Nielsen, 'Den mest ombejlede mand',
Information, 26 September 1992.
349Interview in Copenhagen, 2 November 1993.
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Treaty should be laid down in legally binding texts, not restricted in duration, and that 
Denmark's special status should be open to future member states which might wish 
another form of association to EU. New areas, such as openness and democracy in the 
decision-making system, nearness, improved actions for the environment and the 
maintenance of the Danish collective bargaining system should be stipulated in binding 
provisions.350 The Social Democrats, meanwhile, supported by the Radical Liberals, 
wished to leave open the question of signing the Maastricht Treaty, the legal value, 
duration and form of an agreement with the other EC member states and did not demand 
a renegotiation of the Treaty. The Social Democrats managed to convince the Socialist 
People's Party to accept a formula which could constitute an acceptable negotiation basis 
for all parties involved.351
During the early autumn of 1992, the Foreign Ministry had elaborated a white 
paper on Denmark and the Maastricht Treaty on the Foreign Minister's initiative.352 The 
white paper, published on 9 October, provided the basis for an internal debate on 
Denmark's future relation to EU. Although presenting a number of possible solutions to 
the 'Danish problem', it did not preclude any internal political negotiations by stating the 
government's preferred option.
1.2. The Birmingham European Council
Danish politicians had the possibility of sounding out the positions of the other member 
states at the extraordinary European Council meeting in Birmingham on 16 October 1992, 
which aimed to address the problems of the ratification process, give new impetus to the 
Maastricht ratification process and sooth widespread opposition among EC citizens. The 
meeting was preceded by intense diplomatic activity between the Danish government and 
political parties, in particular the Social Democratic Party, and the UK, Germany and to
350Quoted in John Iversen, Det Nationale Kompromis, pp. 22-3.
351Poul Albert, 'Pa vej mot nationalt kompromis', Information, 22 October 1992. The 
Socialist People's Party negotiating team, party leader Holger K. Nielsen, EC Affairs 
Spokesman Sten Gade, and MEP John Iversen took judicial advice from professor Hjalte 
Rasmussen (interview 25 October 1993).
352Hvidbog om Danmark og Maastricht-traktaten, Udenrigsministeriet, Copenhagen, 
October 1992.
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some extent France.
Before the European Council the three parties negotiating the National 
Compromise, during a meeting in the Market Committee, obliged the Danish Prime 
Minister to present an initial negotiating platform to the European Council. The platform 
was composed of the headings of the congress resolutions from the Social Democratic and 
Radical Liberal Parties, and option 5.7 of the government's white paper which stipulated 
a special status for Denmark on the basis of a ratification of the Maastricht Treaty whose 
content and form should be negotiated between Denmark and its EC partners.353
At the Birmingham European Council, the unaccommodating attitude towards 
Denmark from the Lisbon European Council had softened considerably, as European 
political leaders had to admit that events since June had shown that Danish popular 
discontent towards the Maastricht Treaty was not an isolated phenomenon. The Heads of 
State and Government adopted a declaration in which they pledged to make the 
Community more open and accountable to its citizens, respect the culture, history and 
traditions of individual nations, clarify and respect the principle of subsidiarity and 
strengthen its democratic dimension.354 In the Presidency conclusions, the European 
Council 'noted the Danish white paper and welcomed the Danish government's intention 
to present within the next few weeks ideas on the way forward'.355
On 22 October, the Social Democratic Party, the Radical Liberal Party and the 
Socialist People's Party presented the National Compromise. Although informed about the 
negotiations, the government parties had not been included and were given no real 
possibility to influence. As it would have been politically unthinkable to reject the 
National Compromise as Denmark's official negotiation position, the government decided
353Hilary Barnes, 'Danes seek opt-outs from Maastricht', Financial Times, 16 October 
1992. Jens Maigard, 'EF og S, RV og SF', Information, 15 October 1992. Hvidbog om 
Danmark og Maastricht-Traktaten, p. 195.
354Quoted in Financial Times, 'Declaration seeks 'a community close to its citizens", 
17-18 October 1992.
355Reproduced in Petersen and Thune (eds.), Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Arbog 1992, pp. 
358-9.
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to accept the texts after some small amendments.356 The National Compromise was unique 
in that the government was de facto excluded from shaping Denmark's position in regard 
to such a politically important issue as the negotiation position on Denmark's future in the 
Community. Uffe Ell emann-Jensen did not conceal his displeasure with the text, but 
decided together with the Prime Minister, who was less opposed, to give it their 
support.357 On 27 October 1992 all parties in the Folketing, except the Progress Party, 
agreed to adopt a document, on the basis of the National Compromise, with the title 
'Denmark in Europe' to serve as a negotiating basis in the deliberations in view of the 
European Council meeting in Edinburgh, from 11-12 December 1992.
The document 'Denmark in Europe' set out a series of general statements on future 
objectives of the EU, followed by specific statements about Denmark's wishes as a 
member, such as strengthening the role of national parliaments and controlling functions 
of the European Parliament, that future EC legislation as far as possible be based on 
framework directives and that the social dimension be adopted with provisions for 
minimum standards, that the principle of nearness be strengthened and endowed with 
concrete content, and, finally, that the internal market be maintained and strengthened, as 
well as the fight against unemployment being the cornerstone in economic cooperation. 
The document spelt out Denmark's conditions to ratify the Maastricht Treaty, the basic 
principle being that Denmark was bound to the result in the referendum, and therefore any 
agreement should be qualitatively different from the Treaty. In relation to the vision of 
EU, Denmark stressed that European cooperation was composed of nations which had 
decided by free will to conduct jointly some of their competences. In this context, 
Denmark's participation in EU necessitated that the following principles be agreed:
(1) Denmark refrains from participating in the defence dimension, including
membership of WEU and a common defence policy or a common defence; (2)
Denmark refrains from participating in the single currency and the conditions
356Nikolaj Petersen, 'Denmark og Den Europaeiske Union: Fra regeringsmemorandum 
til Edinburgh-afgorelse', in Petersen and Thune (eds.), Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Arbog 
1992, pp. 80-99. Lars Olsen, 'Den stenede vej til Europa', Vandkunsten. Solveig 
Rodsgaard, 'Holger og konen siger nja til unionen', Weekendavisen, 23 October 1992.
357Rodsgaard, 'Holger og konen siger nja til unionen, Weekendavisen.
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relating to a common economic policy of the third phase of EMU. Denmark, 
however, remains a member of the EMS and participates in the second stage of 
EMU; (3) Denmark will not be committed to the Union citizenship, although it 
will respect its practical implications; (4) Denmark does not accept the transfer of 
sovereignty in judicial and police cooperation, but wants to participate on the 
present intergovernmental basis. Denmark therefore cannot support the transfer of 
some parts of the third pillar to the supranational first pillar; (5) as a consequence 
of these conditions, the vision of EU, as defined by the common provisions of the 
Maastricht Treaty, will not be applicable to Denmark in the areas mentioned.
The document finally specified that an agreement must be legally binding for all twelve 
EC member states and without a time limit. In exchange, Denmark pledged not to oppose 
other member states in progressing in any of the areas in which Denmark wanted 
exemptions. The final shape of the agreement should be decided by negotiation between 
Denmark and the EC member states. A last chapter stated Denmark's wish that accession 
negotiations with the applicant EFTA states, in particular the Nordic, be opened as soon 
as possible.358
1.3. Negotiations with the Other Eleven Member States
After the document 'Denmark in Europe' had been presented, the Prime Minister and the 
Foreign Minister engaged themselves in a diplomatic offensive to explain and convince 
other EC member states to accept Denmark's conditions.
When negotiating with the EC, Denmark had a strong card, not only concerning 
the ratification of the Treaty, but also due to the British statement that it did not wish to 
ratify before the 'Danish problem' was solved.359 It was therefore directly in the British 
interest to try to find a solution which was acceptable to all member states, using its 
position in the Presidency.
Danish politicians and the Foreign Ministry were aware that although support from
358The most important points of 'Denmark in Europe' are reproduced in Petersen and 
Thune (eds.), Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Arbog 1992, pp. 362-5.
359The Guardian, 'Major resists calls for fresh approach', 4 June 1992. David Marsh, 
'Danes rule out short cuts to treaty accord1, Financial Times, 1 September 1992.
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the British Presidency was helpful, too close cooperation might be detrimental for 
Denmark. Efforts were made from the Danish side to secure German support for a special 
status, both because it was clear that without Germany's support no reticent member state 
would be won over, and to signal a deeper shift in Danish EC policy away from the 
traditional identification with an Atlantic orientation, as represented by the UK, towards 
a continental orientation represented by Germany. In the late 1980s Denmark had decided 
its political-strategic interest lay in good relations with Germany, and the two countries 
often shared policy interests within the EC framework, particularity in the social and 
environment areas.360
During the weeks before the decisive European Council meeting in Edinburgh on 
11-12 December 1992, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and Poul Schliiter conducted a tour around 
the EC capitals to win support for a solution to the 'Danish problem'. In parallel the Social 
Democratic party leader, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, undertook a similar diplomatic offensive 
trying to explain Denmark's position, both to other Social Democratic and Socialist parties 
and to leaders from opposing political parties, for instance the British Prime Minister.361
Many commentators in Denmark underlined the important role played by Niels 
Ersboll, Secretary General in the Council's Secretariat and his chef de cabinet, Poul Skytte 
Christoffersen, in finding a text which satisfied both Danish and European negotiation 
partners.362 One commentator in the Foreign Ministry pointed out that Niels Ersboll's 
position was delicate as he could not be seen to help Danish politicians too much because 
of his position as a high European civil servant. On the other hand, he and his staff had 
the advantage of having an extensive knowledge of the Maastricht texts, from running the 
secretarial functions of the IGCs, and the internal political situation in Denmark. During 
the Edinburgh European Council, the efforts of the Council Secretariat were decisive in 
finding an acceptable solution.363
360Lars Olsen, 'Dans mellem venner', Weekendavisen, 2 October 1992.
361Michael Seidelin, 'Den rode rose skyder knop', Det Fri Aktuelt, 7 November 1992.
362Interviews in Copenhagen, 21 October and 4 November 1993, and in Brussels, 23 
February 1994. See also Erik Meier Carlsen, 'Den danske losning', Det Fri Aktuelt, 2 
December 1992.
363Interview in Brussels, 23 February 1994.
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At the beginning of December a solution was presented by the British Presidency 
which satisfied Denmark's conditions in those areas which had been most specifically 
pointed out. The most difficult problem, however, remained: to craft a solution which was 
legally binding without necessitating a renegotiation of the Maastricht Treaty. The Social 
Democrats were reportedly more open on this point than the Socialist People's Party, 
whose acceptance relied on the legal character of the agreement reached. Its leader, 
Holger K. Nielsen, was pressurized by Euro-sceptic groups in his own party, and the 
popular movements against the Union which hoped for a new Treaty, or a Treaty-based 
special status for Denmark.364 By agreeing on the National Compromise, the Socialist 
People's Party had already given up three conditions, renegotiation of the Maastricht 
Treaty, the exemption from the common provisions, and Denmark's special status being 
available for applicant European states. If the party was seen to be giving up further 
conditions an internal revolt was possible.365
On 10 December 1992 the Market Committee decided to give Prime Minister 
Schliiter and Foreign Minister Ellemann-Jensen a broad negotiation mandate in view of 
the European Council in Edinburgh. The mandate stipulated that any agreement should 
respect the conditions of the National Compromise and be conducted on the basis of the 
British Presidency proposal.366
2. Hie European Council in Edinburgh, December 1992
2.1. The Negotiat ed Solution
The European Council in Edinburgh, chaired by a very beleaguered British Presidency, 
had a number of serious problems to consider: the collapse of the ERM in September, the 
war in Bosnia, the worsening recession in Europe, and prospects of political instability 
and economic and social hardship in central and eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union. It had first to settle the issues left on the Maastricht agenda, the negotiations over
364Erik Meier Carlsen, 'Den danske losning', Det Fri A ktuelt, 2 December 1992. Hans 
Drachmann, 'Listige ord i EF-kompromis', Politiken, 4 December 1992. Erik Meier 
Carlsen, 'Holgers svaereste beslutning', Det Fri A ktuelt, 11 December 1992.
365Erik Meier Carlsen, 'Holgers valg', Det Fri A ktuelt, 11 December 1992.
36601e Lorenzen 'Fire krav til Edinburgh', Det Fri A ktuelt, 11 December 1992. Michael 
Seidelin and Jens Langergaard, 'Nogeln er dansk', Det Fri A ktuelt, 11 December 1992.
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the Community's next five-year budget and the 'Danish problem'. A successful European 
Council was deemed essential to break the Community's deadlock over its future 
development and was therefore preceded by intense diplomatic consultation.367 British 
diplomats were reported to have linked all issues on the agenda into making the European 
Council 'an all or nothing summit'.368
Denmark's accession to the Maastricht Treaty was solved by a complicated structure 
where statements on openness and transparency, subsidiarity (nearness), enlargement and 
an initiative for economic recovery were stipulated in Part A of the Presidency conclusion 
and elaborated in annexes attached to them, while Denmark's special status was laid down 
in Part B, with a decision between the Heads of State and Government and four 
declarations (one by the European Council and three unilateral declarations by Denmark) 
attached to them in annexes.
In Part A, the European Council confirmed its commitment to a more open and 
transparent Community on the basis of the Birmingham Declaration and proposed means 
of implementing it. It adopted a general approach to the application of the principle of 
subsidiarity and noted the report on this subject from the Commission. It agreed to open 
accession negotiations with the applicant EFTA states immediately after the Maastricht 
Treaty was ratified and the five-year budget agreed.
In Part B the European Council recalled that the Maastricht Treaty required 
ratification by all member states and the importance of concluding the process without 
reopening the present text. On the basis of 'Denmark in Europe', it agreed on 
arrangements which should be applicable solely to Denmark. The text made clear that the 
Heads of State and Government representing independent and sovereign states which had 
freely decided to exercise some of their competences in common, agreed on the following 
decision:
A. The Union citizenship gives 'nationals of the member states additional rights
367See, for instance, Financial Times, 'Major urges Edinburgh deal to end EC 
paralysis', 11 December 1992.
368Lionel Barber, 'The Maastricht journey resumes', Financial Times, 14 December 
1992.
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and protection'..it does not 'in any way take the place of national citizenship'...; B. 
On the basis of the protocol on the third stage on EMU, 'Denmark has given 
notification that it will not participate in the third stage', thereby not being bound 
by the rules concerning economic policy, but still participating in the EMS; C. In 
relation to defence policy, 'Denmark has become an observer' to the WEU; D. 
Denmark will participate in cooperation on justice and home affairs on an 
intergovernmental basis; E. Denmark may 'inform other member states it no longer 
wishes to avail itself of all or part of the decision', and will apply in full all 
relevant measures in force.369
Annexe 2 was composed of two declarations: first, on social, consumer and environment 
policy and the distribution of income where the European Council made clear that more 
stringent protection in these areas were compatible with the Treaty; second, Denmark 
renounced exercising its Presidency in each case involving the elaboration or 
implementation of decisions having defence implications.
Annexe 3 was made up of unilateral declarations in which Denmark: (1) stressed 
the difference between the Danish and Union citizenship since nothing in the Treaty 
'implies or foresees an undertaking to create a citizenship of the Union in the sense of a 
citizenship of a nation-state'. Specified rights and privileges of the Danish citizenship were 
only applicable to Danish citizens, but that Denmark would fully respect 'all specific 
rights expressly provided for in the Treaty..'; (2) specified that if the development in 
justice and home affairs required transfer of sovereignty, it would be decided according 
to the requirement of the Danish constitution; and (3) stressed that the decision and the 
declarations were the response to the result of the Danish referendum on 2 June 1992.
2.2. Danish Reactions to the Edinburgh Agreement
Danish reactions to the Edinburgh agreement were favourable. The Foreign Minister stated 
that his country had received all it asked for and expected a 60 per cent vote in favour
369Europe, Special edition No. 5878, 13 December 1992. Europe, Special edition, No. 
5878bis, 13-14 December 1992.
227
in the second referendum.370 The Social Democratic leader, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, and 
the Socialist People's Party leader, Holger K. Nielsen, were also satisfied with the Prime 
Minister's efforts at the European Council. Other opposition parties reacted positively to 
the agreement, except for the Progress Party which claimed that the Danish population 
had rejected the entire EU, not specific parts of it. The popular movements against the 
EC/Union criticized the parties behind the National Compromise and the Edinburgh 
Agreement, calling on the Socialist People's Party to reject it.371
The three parties behind the National Compromise were eager to stress that by 
accepting the Edinburgh Agreement they did not bend to EC pressure, but that their 
cooperation heralded a new Danish EC policy: its cornerstone was the clarification that 
EU was composed of independent and sovereign states having freely decided to exercise 
in common some of their competences, a formulation which put an effective stop to the 
'sliding slope' towards a federal Europe; EU was to enlarge first towards the applicant 
EFTA states, then to central and eastern European countries; more European-wide action 
to promote economic growth and fight against employment; and finally, subsidiarity 
(nearness), transparency and openness, and democracy in line with the philosophy of the 
National Compromise, with the difference that the latter concentrated on promoting the 
place of national parliaments in the EC legislative system. The three parties hoped that 
the Edinburgh Agreement might be a first step towards a radically different EU, and that 
European integration would take a different course including the whole of Europe, not 
only privileged parts of western Europe.372
370Europe, Special Edition No. 5878, 13 December 1992, p. 2.
371 Ole Lorenzen and Jens Ringberg, 'Roser til Schliiter og Holger' and 'Job, miljo of
verlfaerd bag ny dansk politik', Det Fri A ktuelt, 14 December 1992.
372Erik Meier Carlsen, 'Holgers K.'s vej til ansvaret', Det Fri Aktuelt, 14 December
1992. Erik Meier Carlsen, 'En ny Europa-politik', Det Fri Aktuelt, 16 December 1992.
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IV. The Basis for a New Danish EC Policy
1. The Referendum of 18 May 1993
1.1. Change in the Political Landscape
On 15 January 1993, Poul Schliiter resigned from his post as Prime Minister, primarily 
because of the Tamil scandal regarding Justice Minister Ninn-Hansen's management of 
boat refugees from Sri Lanka and the granting of visas to Denmark for their families.373 
The Tamil scandal, which had been in the sidelines for many months waiting for the 
result of an official investigation, was only one of several scandals (the ambi affairs, the 
'gebyr' affair and the Fogh Rasmussen affair) haunting the Conservative-Liberal minority 
government.374 The terrain was now open for the biggest party, the Social Democratic 
Party, whose party leader enjoyed the confidence of other parties to form government. On 
25 January, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen announced his new four-party coalition government 
composed of the Social Democrats, the Radical Liberals, the Centre Party and the 
Christian People's Party. For the first time since 1971, Denmark was ruled by a 
government commanding a majority in the Folketing with Poul Nyrup Rasmussen as 
Prime Minister and Niels Helveg Petersen of the Radical Liberal Party as Foreign 
Minister. Poul Nyrup Rasmusserfschoice not to include the Socialist People's party, despite 
its efforts during the negotiations on the National Compromise to show itself as a reliable 
coalition partner, outraged the Socialist People's Party leadership and made it more 
difficult for it to convince the party's political hinterland to vote in favour in the May 
referendum.375
Besides preparing for the second referendum on 18 May 1993, the new 
government had also the management of the EC Presidency to grapple with. The Prime 
Minister saw this as an opportunity to make real progress in those areas Denmark had 
announced as its priorities; enlargement, openness and transparency, subsidiarity and
313Europe, No. 5899, 16 January 1993.
374Michael Kristiansen and Arne Notkin, 'Nej, Hr. Minister', Weekendavisen, 22
January 1993.
375Interview in Copenhagen, 2 November 1993.
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actions to reduce unemployment in Europe.376
1.2. The Basis fo r  a Second Referendum
In the centre of the debate leading up to the second referendum was the question whether 
the Edinburgh Agreement had changed Denmark's basis for participating in EU, and 
whether the government was respecting the rejection of the treaty of 2 June when calling 
for a new referendum.
The parties behind 'Denmark in Europe' supported the Edinburgh Agreement and 
argued that Denmark obtained a qualitatively different basis for Union membership which 
was legally binding and could not be challenged in the ECJ. The Progress Party, some 
dissidents in the Socialist People's Party and the popular movements against the Union 
argued that the Maastricht Treaty had not changed with the Edinburgh Agreement and that 
Denmark would be part of EU if the population voted in favour. The Edinburgh 
Agreement's legal value was doubtful, they argued, and a second rejection of the 
Maastricht Treaty would once and for all stop plans towards EU.377
The government took account of popular fears that the Maastricht Treaty was 
being introduced through the back door when proposing a legislative package enabling 
Denmark to ratify the Treaty, including the Edinburgh Agreement. The first bill was the 
original amendment to the act of accession from 1972 enabling Denmark to ratify the 
Maastricht Treaty. The second bill approved the Edinburgh Agreement which in turn 
enabled Denmark to ratify the Maastricht Treaty. This bill specifically noted that the 
Maastricht Treaty was only applicable to Denmark in the extent to which the Edinburgh 
Agreement prescribed. A third bill was included in the package enabling the Folketing to 
call for a referendum on the basis of the ratification passed by parliament. The bill noted 
that the ratification bill and the bill amending the Danish act of accession would be 
passed according to the constitution Article 19 which stipulates that ratification can be
376Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, 'Den europaeiske udfordring', Det Fri A ktuelt, 29 December
1992.
377Jens-Peter Bonde, 'Junibevaegelsens AND', Information, 22 December 1992. Oluf 
Jorgensen, 'Samme grundlag som 2. juni', Information, 23 December 1992. Jens-Peter 
Bonde, 'Edinburgh-aftalen lukker for et abent Europa, Information, 24 December 1992. 
Christian Baunsgaard, 'SF sikrede kattelemmen', Information, 29 December 1992.
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secured by a binding referendum if so decided by the Folketing in a special law. The 
parties in parliament had previously agreed not to pass these bills according to Article 20 
of the constitution, since a five-sixths' majority (likely to be obtained) would 
automatically have made a referendum impossible.378
On 30 March 1993, the Folketing endorsed the three bills with a majority of 154 
votes to 16, as the Progress Party, three MPs from the Socialist People's Party and one 
MP of the Radical Liberal Party voted against. The debate during the three readings of 
the proposed bills was characterized by the Progress Party's attacks on the seven parties 
in favour of ratification, arguing that the adoption of the bills implied that Denmark would 
be part of PU, which involved transfer of sovereignty and threatened Denmark's 
independence. The MPs of the Socialist People's Party opposing the bills argued that the 
Edinburgh Agreement had not separated Denmark from EU, implying that in the future 
Denmark would have to take part in its defence dimension and other areas which the 
population opposed. They criticized the legal value of the Edinburgh Agreement which 
might prove too weak in the future. This criticism was met by the Socialist People's 
Party's leadership and the government, in particular the Foreign Minister. They underlined 
the importance of the Edinburgh Agreement which did not only constitute a new basis for 
Denmark's participation in EU, but, together with the National Compromise, was the 
beginning of a new Danish EC policy.379
1.3. The Campaign
The campaign leading to the referendum on 18 May 1993 was in some important respects 
different than the one in connection to the referendum of 2 June 1992. First, seven 
political parties, including the Socialist People's Party, were advocating a popular
378Presented on 9 February 1993 by the Foreign Minister, Niels Helveg Petersen: 
Lovforslag nr. L 176, Forslag til Lov om cendring a f lov om Danmarks tiltrcedelse a f De 
Europceiske Fcelleskaber.; Lovforslag nr. L 177, Forslag til Lov om Danmarks tiltrcedelse 
a f Edinburgh-Afgorelsen og Maastricht-Trataten; Lovforslag nr. L 178, Forslag til 
qfholdelse a f folkeafstemning om forslag til lov om Danmarks tiltrcedelse a f Edinburg- 
Afgorelsen og Maastricht-Traktaten.
379Folketingstidende, first, second and third reading of the bills concerning Denmark's 
accession to the Maastricht Treaty and the Edinburgh Agreement, 11 February, 23 March 
and 30 March 1993.
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endorsement. The Social Democratic Party, this time in power, was not distracted by 
internal problems as had been the case in the run-up to 2 June. Second, the groups 
advocating a rejection were represented by the Progress Party, which lacked political 
credibility, and the popular movements against the EC/Union which underwent 
fundamental changes before and during the campaign. Third, the Edinburgh Agreement 
removed the issues the electorate had found most difficult to accept. The other eleven 
member states' willingness to grant a special status to Denmark had been noted and it was 
generally felt that if the special status was rejected, Denmark could not continue as a 
member of the EC (although some opposing groups argued it could).
The Edinburgh Agreement helped to unify the Social Democratic Party leadership and the 
party faithful, who felt that the Agreement was a substantial compromise on which 
Denmark's future relation to EU could be based. Its position in the government mobilized 
the party to show unity and the Socialist People's Party's support helped to convince left- 
wing Social Democrats to endorse the party's position. The party's campaign was much 
more effective than in 1992, focusing on economic growth and higher employment and 
warning against the unpleasant consequences for the Danish economy in the case of 
another rejection, which, it argued, would probably lead to Denmark's withdrawal from 
the EC. Those MPs who had been sceptical in 1992, in particular Ivar Norgaard, were 
strongly in favour of ratification in 1993, believing that the Edinburgh Agreement was a 
better basis for Denmark's participation in EU, distancing Denmark from the 'sliding slope' 
towards the federal objectives in form of a common defence, a single currency and a 
European Central Bank. Ritt Bjerregaard, representing the most pro-European wing of the 
party, launched herself in the debate as an outspoken advocator of EU.380
The Socialist People's Party's endorsement of the Edinburgh Agreement aroused a storm 
of protest from some of its MPs and many of the party faithful. The party leadership, 
which had negotiated the National Compromise without prior consultation, tried in early 
1993 to convince its political hinterland that an acceptance of the Edinburgh Agreement
380Annegrethe Rasmussen, 'Europabevaegelsen-et politisk fsenomen', Information, 8 
May 1993.
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was necessary and in line with the party's vision of a different European cooperation 
framework.381 The opposition within the party was not satisfied by the leadership's 
explanation which, in an effort to disarm the dissenting groups, decided to call an 
extraordinary party congress on 13-14 March 1993. The congress was a victory for the 
party leadership's EC policy which was endorsed by over 70 per cent of the delegates, 
thus giving the go-ahead for convincing the party's electorate to vote in favour in the 
referendum. To prevent a possible split, the congress decided, contrary to party rules, that 
opponents were free to campaign against EU.382
The government parties adopted a common platform for the referendum campaign, which, 
although conducted individually, was composed of eleven arguments in favour of a 
ratification. The campaign argued that the Edinburgh Agreement was legally binding and 
impossible to change without another referendum and constituted the basis for a new 
Danish EC policy. Because it was vitally important for a small country like Denmark to 
be part of EC cooperation, Denmark should remain part of the EU decision-making 
process working for its policies, including the promotion of economic growth and 
employment, enlargement towards the EFTA applicants, strengthening of environmental 
policy and the social dimension, subsidiarity and openness towards the central and eastern 
European countries.383
The Conservative Party and the Liberal Party, in opposition after over ten years in power, 
continued loyally to support the National Compromise and the Edinburgh Agreement. The 
Liberal Party, and its leader Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, considered the special status an
381 See, for instance, Holger K. Nielsen, 'Den 18. maj skal vi stemme om noget nyt', 
Arhus stiftstidende, 22 February 1993. Steen Gade, 'Det bizarre EF-synpunk', Information, 
13 March 1993. Steen Gade, 'Blodt og abent EF', Politiken, 12 March 1993. John Iversen, 
'Nye lande kan fa EF "a la carte'", Berlingske Tidende, 20 February 1993.
382Borsen, 'Stor landsode-sejr til Holger K. Nielsens EF-politik', 15 March 1993. 
Berlingske Tidende, 'Nej-sigere er frit stillet', 15 March 1993. Marianne Krogh Andersen 
and Olav Christensen, 'Stort bifald til SF-formandends EF-ja', Jyllands-Posten, 14 March 
1993.
383Thomas Larsen, 'Regeringen klar med 11 argumenter for ja', Jyllands-Posten, 18 
March 1993.
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unsatisfactory basis for Denmark's membership of EU, but recognized the necessity for 
obtaining a positive result in the referendum while preparing to lead a pro-European 
policy in opposition after 18 May.384 The Conservative Party mounted a cautious 
campaign based on the necessity for Denmark to endorse the new solution, both for the 
country itself and for Europe as a whole.385 Within the party, however, some voices were 
again raised against the vision of the United States of Europe and the single currency. On 
the question of membership of the WEU, the Conservatives and the Liberals shared the 
view that full membership was preferable to the observer status stipulated in the 
Edinburgh Agreement.386
Danish industry was also active in the campaign, stressing the necessity for the Danish 
economy of a positive outcome in the referendum.387 After the rejection in the referendum 
the previous year, Danish companies had refrained from investing until the uncertainty 
about Denmark's position within the EC was solved. Central organizations and individual 
branches advocated a vote in favour on 18 May, arguing that another rejection would cost 
dearly in terms of high unemployment.388 Their campaign echoed the results in the 
Finance Ministry's consequence report commissioned by the government and published 
in early March. The report predicted that if there was a negative outcome in the 
referendum and Denmark would have to give up its EC membership for an EEA status,
384Interview with Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Annegrethe Rasmussen, 'SF's holdningsskift 
er regeringens storste sejr'. Information, 28 December 1992. Morten Sabroe, 'Uffes nye 
klae'r', Politiken, 12 May 1993. Henning Olsson, 'Politik krig i dag', Politiken, 19 May 
1993. Inverview in Copenhagen, 2 November 1993.
385Kent Kirk, 'Europa venter pa Danmark', Jyllands-Posten, 13 April 1993.
386Solveig Rodsgaard, interview with Henning Dyremose, 'De konservatives 
suveraenitet', Weekendavisen, 16 April 1993. Lene Froslev, 'Ja-partier er uenige om EF- 
forsvar', Berlingske Tidende, 3 May 1993.
387Carsten Bessing, 'Industrin starter offensiv ja-kampagne', Information, 14 April 
1993.
388Leif Beck Fallesen, 'Beskeden okonomisk ketch up-effekt efter ja', Heinz Andresen, 
'EF-ja kan vende industri-nedtur', Heinz Andresen, 'Brancher klynger sig til habet om 
dansk ja' and Heinz Andresen, 'Europa venter pa et dansk ja', Borsen, 13 April 1993. Ame 
Panduro, 'EF-nej koster arbejdspladser', Jyllands-Posten, 13 April 1993.
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the economic consequences would be severe. Although this report was criticized by the 
Union opponents as scaremongering, this time they had more difficulties in arguing that 
everything would go on as before after a second rejection.389 The Director of Denmark's 
Central Bank, Erik Hoffmeyer, who before the referendum in 1992 had predicted that a 
negative result would have no direct impact on the Danish economy, warned against the 
consequences of another rejection as it would probably lead to either Denmark's 
withdrawal from the EC or other member states forming another basis for cooperation 
excluding Denmark.390
The emphasis on the economic consequences of a second rejection was also adopted in 
the campaign of the Social Democratic Party (see above) and the labour movement. 
Although sharing the same objective, Danish industry and Danish Metal refrained from 
cooperation in order to prevent repeating tactical mistakes from the referendum of 2 
June.391 The labour movement was again deeply split over the Edinburgh Agreement and 
the Maastricht Treaty. The Confederation of Trade Unions advocated its members to vote 
yes on 18 May and campaigned actively in the run-up to the referendum. The Specialized 
Workers' Union's (SiD) executive committee decided to advise its members to vote in 
favour, but had problems in implementing this policy as many local branches directly 
opposed the leadership. A similar situation arose in the trade union representing workers 
in the office and retail sector, (HK), where the executive committee advocated a vote in 
favour while the municipal branch rejected the solution from Edinburgh. In other large 
trade unions representing those employed in the public sector (Forbundet fo r  Offentligt 
Ansatte) the leadership was equally divided between proponents and opponents.392
389Frede Verstergaard, 'Regeringens nej-perspektiv', Weekendavisen, 5 March 1993. 
Frank Daahlgaard (Necessary Forum), 'Et net union-nej ingen katastrofe', Berlingske 
Tidende, 5 March 1993. Kim Behnke (MP for the Progress Party), 'Fejlagtig EF-rapport', 
Jyllands-Posten, 5 March 1993.
390Erik Hoffmeyer, 'Realiteteme i EF-debatten, Politiken, 17 April 1993.
391Interview in Copenhagen, 21 October 1993.
392Karen Margrethe Schelin, 'Hvem vil ha' en bla ballon', Berlingske Tidende, 26 April 
1993. Ingelise Larsen, 'Fagenes syn pa union flimere i EF-tagen', Politiken, 11 May 1993.
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Strongest opposition against the Edinburgh Agreement and EU came from the popular 
movements, joined by discontented MPs from the Social People's Party. The groups 
opposing EU were largely the same as in 1992, but with one important difference. The 
People's Movement against the EC, which for many years had staged the most effective 
opposition against Denmark's EC membership and received both legitimacy and financing 
on the basis of its four seats in the European Parliament, had gradually lost its credibility 
as the Danish population's opposition had switched from the EC to EU. To this effect, 
three of its leaders and MEPs, Jens Peter Bonde, Birgit Bjomvig and Ulla Sandbaek broke 
away from the movement to form, together with the founders of Denmark'92, a new 
popular movement against EU, the June Movement. The remaining MEP, lb Christensen, 
criticized the breakaway group and alluded that the underlying reason was the three 
MEPs' reluctance to cover the debts incurred by the People's Movement against the EC 
during the 1992 campaign with their parliamentary revenues.393
The June Movement, founded on 28-29 November 1992, suffered a credibility 
problem in opposing Denmark's special status on the basis of the Edinburgh Agreement, 
which in most Danish commentators' opinion respected the National Compromise 
(previously endorsed by the June Movement). Suspicion grew among the participants in 
the debate that many members of the June Movement, in particular those originally from 
the People's Movement against the EC, were in fact opposing Danish membership of EU 
and EC membership. If this was true, the June Movement did not respect the views of the 
voters, on which its whole raison d'etre was founded.394 The June Movement, therefore, 
had to convince the population that the Edinburgh Agreement had not changed the basis 
for Denmark's participation in EU. It also argued that it was safe for the Danish 
population to vote against, contrary to the general warning that Denmark might have to 
leave the EC in the event of a second popular rejection. To this end the June Movement
393Ib Christensen, 'Om os selv', Notat, 19 February 1993.
394Niels I. Meyer, 'Denmark skal blive i EF', Politiken, 1 April 1993. Lars Olsen, 'Den 
skjulte dagsorden', Politiken, 5 May 1993. Bjom Wirlander, 'Nej-folkene far hvad de har 
bedt om', Det Fri Aktuelt, 7 April 1993. Thorsten Theilgaard, 'Bondes trovaerdighed', 
Information, 26 Febrary 1993.
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tried not only to present its views in the media,395 but invited British Euro-sceptic lawyers 
to explain the true legal character of the agreement and other prominent British Euro- 
sceptics to take part in the debate.396
The right-wing groups against EU, the Progress Party, Necessary Forum and 
Charter 92, continued their opposition against the Maastricht Treaty which, according to 
them, had not been changed by the Edinburgh Agreement.397
2. The Outcome of the Referendum on 18 May, 1993
The Danish politicians advocating in favour of Denmark's ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty on the basis of the Edinburgh Agreement were relieved when the Danish 
population endorsed their recommendation with 57 per cent in favour and 43 per cent 
against.398 Most notable, however, was the share of the population previously claiming to 
be in favour, which had fallen sharply since the campaign started in early April.399 Despite 
the vigorous campaign of the Prime Minister and his Social Democratic Party, many of 
its traditional voters (40 per cent) still voted against the recommended policy. For the 
Socialist People's Party, more than 80 per cent of its voters chose not to respect the party 
line, without, however, penalizing the party in the opinion polls where it scored 8 per cent 
higher than compared to the general election of 1990.400
395See, for example, Jens Peter Bonde, 'Altemativet er reform', Information, 30 April 
1993. Drude Dahlerup, 'Kvindeme og Unionen', Det Fri Aktuelt 1 April, 1993.
396Dagbladet 18 maj, 'Udantagelser er irrelevante', 4 May 1993. Lene Froslev and Ole 
Bang Nielsen, 'Ny jura-strid om Unions-aftale', Berlingske Tidende, 3 May 1993. Niels 
I. Meyer, 'Danmark skal blive i EF', Politiken, 1 April 1993.
397Poul Albert, 'Z: Et ja  vil ramme folkepensionen', Information, 30 March 1993. Ole 
Lorenzen, 'FRP: Maastricht hiver EF i socialisk retning', Det Fri Aktuelt, 30 March 1993. 
Frank Dahlgaard (member of Charter 92 and the Conservative Party), 'Altemativet til 
Unionen', Dagbladet 18. maj, 13 April 1993. Lars Bogeskov, 'Borgerlig trussel mod EF- 
unionen', Information, 30 March 1993.
39SThe Economist, 'Maastricht: Europe celebrates', 22 May 1993, pp. 37-41.
399Berlingske Tidende, 'Gallups stemmebarometer', 11 April 1993.
400Lars-Bo Larsen, 'I strid med vaelgeme', and Lars Kaaaber, 'S: Gode venner igen', 
Politiken, 19 May 1993. Berlingske Tidende, 'EF-valg splittede SF abenlyst', 20 May
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The Prime Minister, who was eager to fulfil his campaign promises of brighter 
economic prospects if the referendum ended in a positive result, launched economic 
measures to fight against unemployment.401 The move was synchronized by the Danish 
Central Bank's decision to lower the base rate from 9.25 per cent to 8.25 per cent.402
The consensus created by necessity among the seven parties supporting the 
National Compromise came abruptly to an end after the 18 May referendum, as the 
Liberal Party and the Centre-Democrats announced they would now concentrate their 
efforts on removing all opt-outs introduced by the Edinburgh Agreement in time for the 
next IGC in 1996. The Foreign Minister, Niels Helveg Petersen, retorted that the National 
Compromise reflected the government's EC policy which it intended to maintain, and the 
Edinburgh Agreement was the basis for Denmark's membership of EU enshrined in the 
bills passed in parliament.403 On 18 May, the Foreign Minister promised in a statement 
that this referendum was the last of the decade, despite some EC member states which 
already wanted institutional reform in 1996.404
V. Conclusion
The period surrounding the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty was characterized by the 
emergence of a more positive Danish EC policy. The pro-European attitude, however, was 
not shared by a majority of the population, a fact which came abruptly to the fore with 
the rejection of the Treaty on 2 June 1992. In the following few months, the Danish 
political parties sought a basis for negotiations with the EC, which would respect the 
outcome of the referendum while not necessitating a renegotiation of the Maastricht 
Treaty. The outcome of the deliberations between Denmark and the other eleven member
1993.
401Hugh Camegy and Hilary Barnes, 'Rasmussen is quick to reward voters', Financial 
Times, 20 May 1993.
A02Berlingske Tidende, 'Udlandet tror igen pa kronen', 20 May 1993.
403Bo Jepsen, 'Uenighed om dansk EF-politik', Berlingske Tidende, 20 May 1993.
404Lars-Bo Larsen, 'Helveg: Sidste traktat-aendring', Politiken, 18 May 1993.
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states, in the form of the Edinburgh Agreement, fulfilled Denmark's conditions both in 
content and in form by opting out from four core areas of the Treaty in a legally binding 
agreement without any limit of duration. Denmark's special position regulates its 
participation in EU, thus setting the terms for its adherence to the acquis communautaire 
and politique of the Union.
The period between the referendum on the SEA and the start of the IGCs in late 1990 
saw the reformulation of Denmark's EC policy. The condition for this fundamental change 
lay primarily in the shift in the Social Democratic Party from a status quo-oriented EC 
policy into a positive EC policy. The shift was paralleled in the Radical Liberal Party, 
which because of the end of the cold war and the manifest ambitions of the central and 
eastern European countries on forging close links to the EC, adopted a progressive 
position on foreign and security cooperation within the EC. The Socialist People's Party, 
which had abandoned its request for Denmark's withdrawal from the EC, advocated 
European cooperation, although on a different basis than the Maastricht Treaty. Common 
to all three parties, however, was the phenomenon that the leaderships' pro-European 
attitudes were not matched by the party faithful, nor a majority of their traditional voters.
The EC-positive parliamentary majority paved the way for the adoption of a 
negotiation position, the Danish Memorandum, which was presented to the IGCs in the 
form of treaty texts. While the Memorandum made explicit proposals in existing and new 
policy areas and economic and monetary cooperation, it was less specific on foreign and 
security policy and did not mention defence policy. During the IGCs in 1991 the Market 
Committee safeguarded the Danish Memorandum, transforming it into mandates for 
Danish negotiators, but showed a high degree of flexibility in updating or proposing 
positions on new proposals as the negotiations developed. By proving a constructive 
negotiation partner, Denmark obtained its objectives, even when the other member states 
had not quite understood the reasons for Denmark's inability to adopt certain measures. 
The outcome of the Maastricht European Council was recognized as being favourable to 
Denmark and very close to its original objectives.
The outcome of the referendum on 2 June 1992 came as a shock to all parties, 
including those who had advocated against EU, and threw the political and administrative 
elites into a difficult situation. When it soon became clear that Denmark would not be
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forced to leave the EC, but that other member states were willing to find a solution on 
two conditions (no renegotiation and the continuation of the ratification process), the 
political parties set about finding a formula which would enable Denmark to ratify the 
Treaty while respecting the population's rejection. The extraordinary situation whereby the 
negotiation basis was agreed by three opposition parties, excluding the government, is due 
to Denmark's system of minority coalition governments, the government also previously 
having been marginalized in the process of adopting policies on the EC (see the SEA and 
the alternative parliamentary majority).
The Maastricht Treaty, which in itself constitutes a major development in the 
process of European integration, amounted probably to a strengthening of the Community 
regime as it took a major step in changing the acquis communautaire and politique. The 
steps were substantial, both in terms of changes to the existing treaties by the introduction 
of new policy areas, in introducing intergovernmental cooperation within a common 
framework, sometimes applying intergovernmental cooperation with Community 
cooperation, and in adopting a highly symbolic framework of terminology - EU, a 
citizenship, and possibly a future single currency and European defence. All those in the 
Danish public who had long feared the 'sliding slope' to the United States of Europe were 
alarmed by the prospects of the Maastricht Treaty and its proposals for major reforms for 
political integration.
Denmark experienced less internal pressure during the IGCs of 1991 than during the SEA, 
because the Danish Memorandum united a majority of the political parties. More in line 
with the policy of the core member states, Denmark experienced less pressure from other 
EC states and was rewarded for its position as a constructive negotiation partner.
By adopting the National Compromise, Denmark moved away from its mainstream 
EC policy, advocating a solution much more in line with the traditional sceptical status 
quo-oriented EC policy. Denmark experienced an integration dilemma par excellence, as 
it was perceived that if the Edinburgh Agreement was rejected by the population Denmark 
would probably be abandoned, while in the situation right after the first referendum it was 
entrapped between the urge to forge ahead in the EC and being held back by a sceptical 
population. The internal and external pressures in each period, the government and the 
pro-European parties' way of dealing with them will be analysed with the help of Nikolaj
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Petersen's modified typology of strategies.
The bastion strategy was influential to some degree in the process of adopting the Danish 
Memorandum, but became crucial in deciding the elements of the National Compromise 
and thus the conditions of the Edinburgh Agreement.
The bastions of the Danish Memorandum closely reflect some of the fundamental 
views of the Social Democrats, such as the insistence on efficient environmental and 
social policies by a general rule of majority voting, the strengthening of the position of 
national parliaments, the retention of political control over monetary policy, national 
budgets remaining a prerogative of the individual states, and the rejection of a defence 
dimension and majority voting in the area of foreign and security policy. Later an 
important federal bastion was formulated rejecting the federal objective of EU. Another 
set of bastions was the adoption of new policy areas or the extension of existing areas. 
However important, they were not pursued with the same vigour as the former.
As the negotiations progressed, Denmark withstood the bastion on environmental 
and social dimension together in particular with France and Germany against British 
opposition. The unorthodox solution to the social dimension is evidence that neither side 
of this argument was prepared to give in. The bastion on national parliaments was never 
discussed during the IGCs, although a protocol was adopted to that effect, proposed by 
the UK. Concerning the EMU bastion, the Danish position hardened during the course of 
the negotiations, mostly due to internal opposition in the Social Democratic Party where 
the loss of national sovereignty in economic policy was strongly criticized. Denmark 
secured an opt-out clause in the form of a protocol on EMU, giving Denmark the right 
to decide at a later stage whether to join the third stage of EMU. On the question of a 
future defence dimension and membership of WEU, Social Democratic opposition 
hardened at first, but was later moderated because of American statements on the future 
role of NATO, the formulation of a bridge between the CFSP and WEU, and prospects 
of enlargement towards neutral and non-aligned applicant states. Denmark accepted the 
formulations in the treaty text on the future defence dimension and the objectives of the 
CFSP, because it was compatible with its membership of NATO, and because the WEU's 
member states' declaration only 'invites' members of the Union to become member of 
WEU. Denmark managed to retain its bastions on EMU and the defence dimension and
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WEU, not by preventing their inclusion in the text, but by opting out of their obligations. 
The federal objective of EU was removed from the treaty text due to British, Portuguese 
and Danish opposition. Denmark had to accept the formulation of an 'ever closer union', 
but this again was mollified with 'in which decision are taken as closely as possible to the 
citizens'. Another important issue for Denmark was the 'second home' bastion which it 
succeeded in upholding by a special protocol.
Many of the policy areas suggested by Denmark were accepted by other member 
states, such as consumer protection, development policy, public health, education, 
telecommunications, culture and the Ombudsman institution. Only energy policy was not 
accepted.
The condition strategy. In Denmark's case the 'second home' bastion was accepted 
by the other member states, although some of them doubted its compliance with the 
Treaty of Rome. With the protocol on the third stage on EMU, Denmark's constitutional 
requirements were respected, without other member states fully understanding their 
application, especially as Denmark fulfilled the convergence criteria and had been 
shadowing the German D-Mark for some time. Denmark was active in rejecting the 
federal objective, but could rely on the UK to fight this matter. Denmark had more 
problems in explaining its rejection of membership of WEU than, for instance, neutral 
Ireland. As with the third stage of EMU, it was assumed that those countries demanding 
an opt-out in the defense area did so for domestic reasons. With the developments in 
Europe, a future European defence might be acceptable also for these member states 
currently opting out. Therefore, it was more important, argued other member states, to 
concede to the protocols if it meant that the outcome of the referenda could be ensured.405
The concession strategy related in Denmark's case to the areas where national 
sovereignty or symbols of European integration were dominating. The federal bastion was 
upheld, but a concession in terms of 'ever closer union' and the title 'Treaty on European 
Union' was necessary. Danish politicians could no longer translate Union into unity 
(sammenslutning) and had to argue that EU, which had always before been avoided,
405Interview in Brussels, 23 February 1994
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represented good prospects for Denmark and the Danish economy.406 Foreign and security 
policy was an area where Denmark had to give some important concessions: the majority 
voting in CFSP for some decisions had originally been rejected; and the mention of a 
future common defence and the bridge to WEU, designated as the future military arm of 
the Union, was in sharp contrast to the Danish Memorandum. On the powers of the 
European Parliament, Denmark originally opposed the new co-decision procedure, but 
finally gave in to this demand. On the economic policy of EMU, Denmark had to accept 
the compromise solution of tight economic policy, while a Community system of 
macroeconomic management was avoided. The Social Democrats had originally asked for 
the goal of full employment to be stated as a central objective of EU. The outcome was 
a formulation where the goals of 'harmonious and balanced development of economic 
activities, sustainable non-inflationary growth..' were placed above 'a high level of 
employment and of social protection' (Article 2). This might not be a concession to the 
right-wing parties of the Folketing, but the left-wing parties criticized the whole chapter 
of EMU for promoting stringent monetary policy before high employment and not 
providing for the possibility of adopting measures to stimulate an economy in recession.
These three strategies were employed before and during the IGCs, when the pressures on 
Danish policy-makers mainly came from political parties and other organized interests, 
which on the whole agreed on a fundamentally positive position towards reforms of the 
Community system. Of the bastions erected, some expressed fundamental opposition 
towards a Community economic policy and the automatic transfer to the third stage of 
EMU, a future European defence dimension or the explicit statement of a federal vocation 
of the EU, some expressed a strategic interest such as majority voting and minimum 
guarantees in the environmental and social areas, some were prompted by an interest to 
expand functional integration in new or existing policy areas, and some small and well- 
defined areas corresponded to particular Danish concerns such as the 'second home' issue. 
The EC member states succeeded in squaring the circle between the particular demands 
of Denmark, the UK and other countries, and keeping all members on board (although this
406In Denmark, EU was more often called the EC-Union (EF-unionen), constituting 
something of a contradiction.
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is questionable as far as the arrangement on the Social Chapter and the third stage of 
EMU are concerned).
After 2 June the situation changed radically. As the possibility of a renegotiation 
of the Maastricht Treaty was excluded, Danish politicians, in particular the three parties 
on the left and centre (not part of the government) whose supporters to a great extent had 
voted against the Treaty, felt compelled to agree on a basis for negotiation which 
respected the population's fears and reluctance to European integration. The National 
Compromise ('Denmark in Europe') was presented as Denmark's conditions for calling a 
second referendum which, the politicians hoped, would result in an endorsement of the 
Treaty.
The National Compromise is a series of bastions which specifies the aspects of 
European integration Denmark cannot accept. In some ways this is a renegotiation of the 
terms of Denmark's accession to the EC from 1972, but which were at the time not part 
of the concrete negotiations due to the stage of the Community's development. The 
Maastricht Treaty introduced some of those aspects which the Social Democratic 
government of 1971-73 and 1975-82 had promised to veto to prevent the 'sliding slope' 
towards the United States of Europe. The government and a large majority of the Danish 
political parties, did not evoke the veto during the IGCs, but negotiated terms they 
thought were acceptable to the population. The veto was, in effect, placed instead by the 
Danish population. Therefore, the terms of the National Compromise are in many respects 
equivalent to the aspects of European integration which were rejected in the accession 
debate of 1972. In erecting these bastions, which had to be legally binding and without 
time limit, Denmark hoped to be exempted from the aspects of European integration a 
majority in the country did not accept, thus creating a new basis for its membership of 
EU where it can participate in the Community regime in functional areas of the EC and 
intergovernmental cooperation, but be excluded from political integration and its symbols. 
Denmark also obtained an assurance that the Community regime was based on an 
intergovernmental framework in which independent states by their free will can decide 
to exercise some competences together. The inclusion of the Edinburgh Agreement in the 
Danish ratification act strengthened its legal value (which between the EC member states 
was binding according to international law, not Community law, and could therefore not 
be challenged in the ECJ) and gave the population an assurance of the politicians'
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willingness to tie themselves down for the basis of Denmark's participation, which they 
cannot abandon without an endorsement by a popular vote.
With the Edinburgh Agreement, Denmark has changed the basis on which it 
participates in EU and therefore its adherence to the acquis communautaire and politique. 
It is argued here that with the Edinburgh Agreement, Denmark has renegotiated, or 
negotiated for the first time (taking into account that the specific terms of political and 
economic and monetary union were not known in 1971-72), the terms of its membership 
of EU. Denmark stands outside the acquis communautaire and politique in some areas 
(see section 4.5), but the Edinburgh Agreement (according to the Agreement itself) does 
not change the acquis communautaire and politique, nor is it part of it. This is certainly 
true from a judicial point of view, but it is also true that the norm of the Community 
regime has been changed, as a sort of differentiated membership has been granted.
Denmark, in accepting the Edinburgh Agreement and making it the cornerstone 
for a new EC policy, has broken with the principle of the Community regime in that it 
has renounced the political acquis and the principal objective of European integration. 
Many commentators have stressed that the full effect of the Edinburgh Agreement on 
Denmark's participation in EU cannot yet be fully assessed.407 Much depends on the 
development of EU in terms of fulfilling the objective of EMU and the defence 
dimension. Denmark's differentiated membership is likely to emerge gradually if the EU 
implements the objectives of the Maastricht Treaty, but if the process of European 
integration stalls, the effects are likely to be much less serious than feared.
Denmark's prestige as a member state, determined by the compliance of the 
Community norms of behaviour, was damaged by the events in 1992 and 1993. However, 
during the IGC, Denmark was rewarded for complying with the norms of negotiation 
behaviour, but was forced by its population's rejection to break the principles of European 
integration. The reason why Denmark lost prestige was that despite negotiating 
constructively, with a majority of parliament endorsing the outcome, it was still not able 
to deliver the population's vote in favour. This was a serious set-back caused by the 
Danish political system and culture, by which other member states are bound to question
407Interviews in Copenhagen 19 October, 2 and 4 November 1993, and in Brussels 23 
February 1994.
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Denmark's reliability as a member and its capacity to comply with the norms of 
behaviour.
Denmark, as before, did not break with rules or decision-making procedures. 
Before the IGCs, it had even given up one of its principal bastions, 'the veto-right'- 
bastion, which was now in an indirect manner confined to the intergovernmental areas 
(where Denmark insists it should remain). The fact that since its accession to the EC, 
Denmark has complied to the rules and the decision-making procedures, but been in 
almost constant breach of the principle of the Community regime, and in 
intergovernmental negotiations has often broken the norms of behaviour because of the 
special feature of the Danish political system, underlines its fundamental uneasiness with 
European integration, which although in recent years has receded in the political and 
administrative elites is still a fundamental aspect of Danish society.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion: Assessment and Analysis
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I. Introduction
The overall aim of this thesis is to establish the factors that condition Denmark's pattern 
of involvement in the EC and its reluctance about European integration.
The thesis embarks on this task by elaborating a framework built on a twofold 
approach, with a theoretical and an empirical dimension for assessing the rights and 
obligations of EC membership, investigating Denmark's position in the integration process, 
the integration dilemma encountered when facing the challenge of external and internal 
pressures and its implications for successive governments and the Danish political 
environment. The thesis aims to link the intergovernmental dimension and the dynamic 
process of integration by analysing the implications of deeper integration on the domestic 
political level. It attempts to fill the gap between the European and the domestic levels 
in the study of integration by focusing upon their inter-relationship.
The theoretical dimension of the thesis is built around a structure which aims to 
investigate the rights and obligations of EC/EU membership, thereby shedding light on 
the conditions of participation in the European integration process for an individual 
member state. To fulfil this aim the thesis analyses the role of the acquis communauiaire 
in the integration process and links it to the four basic elements of the theory of 
International Regimes - principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. This 
approach makes the analysis of the 'regime contract' operational and enables identification 
of the decisive factors of the 'Community regime'. Another aim is to link the integration 
process with the development of the 'Community regime'. This is realized by introducing 
a dynamic concept into the analysis of the terms of the 'Community contract', and by 
evaluating the process of deeper integration in terms of the changes of or within 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures.
The empirical dimension of the thesis is based on three episodes in Denmark's 
membership of EC/EU. Their aim is to analyse Denmark's position in the 'Community 
regime' and its reluctance to share the objective of European integration. A second aim 
is to shed light on the integration dilemma in which a small EC member state finds itself 
when it does not share the principles and norms of integration, but at the same time 
perceives a withdrawal from the 'Community regime' as detrimental to its own interests 
and does not think itself powerful enough to halt or change the course of integration. The
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integration dilemma is shown to have an impact on domestic politics, as it dramatizes the 
conflict between external and internal pressures for and against deeper integration, and 
highlights successive governments' efforts to balance the situation to avoid political and 
economic marginalization.
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part discusses the usefulness of the 
theoretical framework, the difficulties encountered when putting the theoretical framework 
into operation and the strengths and weaknesses of the approach of analysing the rights 
and obligations of EC/EU membership and the conditions of participation in the European 
integration process. The second part analyses the questions relating to the episodes in 
Denmark's EC/EU membership and the implications of Denmark's reluctance to embrace 
the principles and norms of the 'regime contract' and the 'Community regime'. Finally, the 
third part discusses the implications of the empirical findings and possible future research 
that is highlighted by the thesis's theoretical approach and empirical findings.
OL Discussion and Assessment
In studying Denmark's participation in the European integration process, there are a 
number of aspects which have to be taken into account and handled with great care. 
Although I have tried to cover as many as possible in the following discussion the 
complexity of the subject in question makes it virtually impossible to present an 
exhaustive picture. The objective of this discussion is to draw the reader's attention to the 
usefulness of the theoretical framework, the difficulties encountered during the research 
and the strengths and weaknesses of the thesis.
1. The General Framework
Many scholars have tried to put in writing the complexity of the study of European 
integration and the frustration which might be encountered by anyone who attempts 
research into this phenomenon. One fundamental difficulty is the fact that there is no 
generally accepted definition of European integration. Donald Puchala's description of 
blind men and an elephant is a telling allegory of the difficulties in studying European
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integration.408 Each researcher, as a blind person, analyses the part of the elephant he is 
closest to, without knowledge of the composition of the whole animal, nor the capacity 
to relate accurately the findings of the different parts into a correct whole. The result is 
inevitably a confused image of what an elephant is, how it looks and what it does.
This thesis constitutes no exception to the difficulty inherent in the study of 
European integration. In concentrating on Denmark and Denmark's difficulties in 
accepting the principle of the political integration of the EC, other important aspects of 
the EC/EU are not covered. Nevertheless, the thesis enhances knowledge about Denmark's 
involvement in the EC, which in its turn will enhance the general knowledge of the 
complex process of European integration.
European integration has incited the emergence of several theories attempting to 
identify the laws governing the process and explaining its direction. Despite dealing with 
European integration, this thesis's analysis is not explicitly based on the most established 
integration theories, be they federalism, functionalism or neo-functionalism.
2. The Theoretical Approach
The thesis constructs a theoretical framework which combines the four elements of the 
theory of International Regimes with the acquis communautaire of the Community. The 
aim is to identify the concept of acquis communautaire which is central to the 
development of the Community and to the process of European integration. It is assumed 
that by identifying the acquis communautaire with the development of the Community, 
knowledge is gained about the rights and obligations of the European integration process. 
To put this concept in operation in the shape of an analytical tool, the four basic elements 
of the theory of International Regimes are identified with aspects of the acquis 
communautaire. In identifying principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures 
with the development of the acquis communautaire, it is possible to analyse which 
particular aspects of European integration caused problems in the Danish political process.
This approach should be assessed according to its theoretical and analytical 
usefulness. In theoretical terms, it is possible to criticize the use of elements belonging
408Donald Puchala, 'Of Blind Men, Elephants and International Integration', Journal o f  
Common Market Studies, Vol. 10, 1972, pp. 267-84.
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to a theory which is normally not connected to the specific case of European integration. 
It is my view that this does not constitute a substantial problem, as the elements are 
combined with a distinct feature of the Community (acquis communautaire) in a particular 
process (European integration). The elements prove useful in defining different aspects 
of the acquis communautaire and filling the rights and obligations of Community 
membership with concrete substance. The terms 'Community regime' and 'regime contract' 
are useful in giving meaning to the complex body of mutual obligations inherent in 
participation in the European integration process.
With regard to the thesis's definition of a judicial and political dimension of the 
acquis communautaire, such an approach is necessary in order to distinguish between, on 
the one hand the tangible and concrete rights and obligations of Community membership 
laid down in the provision of the treaties and the secondary legislation, and, on the other 
hand, the intangible and less concrete form of rights and obligations arising from the 
process of close cooperation and gradual integration between the member states. Only by 
identifying the latter, is it possible to find out the causes for the fundamental reluctance 
Denmark has displayed towards European integration.
In practical terms, the identification of the principles, norms, rules and decision­
making procedures with the acquis communautaire is necessary, but inevitably subject to 
my perception of the individual parts of the acquis communautaire. The definition of 
norms of behaviour in the Community is an interesting, but difficult, concept which 
deserves more extensive investigation (see below). The identification of principles is a 
little less problematic, although it should be kept in mind that the interpretation of the 
implication of Community principles is subject to each member state's perception of the 
obligations of European integration. Rules and decision-making procedures are in this 
thesis approached in a straightforward manner, although attention is drawn to the 
difficulty in assessing whether the violation of a decision-making procedure amounts to 
a violation with wider implications.
A special difficulty relates to assessing whether a development of the acquis 
communautaire amounts to a change of or within the Community regime and whether the 
change has brought with it a weakening or a strengthening of the regime. In the first case 
the problem lies in establishing whether the change has affected the principles and/or the 
norms, or whether it was confined to a change in the rules and/or decision-making
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procedures. In the latter case the difficulty lies in assessing the impact of the change on 
European integration. The effect of the change may not be apparent before a certain time 
period has elapsed and the new provisions have come into operation, or the change may 
be a prescription of future objectives rather than the introduction of new provisions for 
cooperation. The Maastricht Treaty is an example of the latter case, as it not only contains 
prescriptions of future objectives, but in addition, some aspects, such as institutional and 
defence implications, are deferred to the IGC scheduled for 1996. The SEA is an example 
of the first, in that the dynamics of the cooperation procedure were not foreseen to their 
full extent when the Treaty reforms were first passed, but in practice they injected new 
dynamics into the functioning of the Council of Ministers and cooperation between the 
Council and the European Parliament.
3. The Perspective
The thesis focuses on Denmark's participation in, and reaction to, European integration 
in order to explain its pattern of involvement in the EC. This perspective raises a number 
of problems which are inherent in focusing on the relationship between an individual 
member state and a complex phenomenon, such as the EC.
First, by focusing on Denmark's reluctance to accept the political dimension of 
European integration, the acceptance of other actors, institutions, member states and others 
are not questioned and are implicitly taken for granted. This is obviously not the case, as 
many views and interpretations exist of the meaning of 'an ever closer union between the 
peoples of Europe' as there are actors involved in the process. The conclusion that 
Denmark had problems in accepting the political dimension of integration is here taken 
to signify its reluctance to make European integration a part of its democratic process, as 
an issue of legitimate political debate where political parties, social partners and other 
groups discuss its strengths and weaknesses and desirable direction, without refuting the 
desirability of integration itself. Denmark is not alone in finding it difficult to introduce 
European integration as a part of its democratic process; other member states experience 
similar dilemmas, but others again have accepted integration as an economic and political 
necessity.
Second, it is not my intention to pass a moral judgement on Denmark's behaviour 
in the EC. Showing that a member state has not, or did not, accept the implications of
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political integration is a way of explaining why it took a reticent attitude to plans for 
deeper integration and why such plans caused so much domestic political strife. It is not 
to pass a judgement on whether its non-acceptance was a good or a bad thing, which is 
entirely a matter of personal conviction. Neither is it intended to prove that Denmark's 
non-acceptance was in some way more serious than that of other member states. The 
existence of a number of characteristics in Danish political life, however, forced the non- 
acceptance out into the open, and had serious implications for Danish governments which, 
regardless of their political creed, worked for Denmark's acceding to or remaining a 
member of the EC. The characteristics pointed out here include the fragmented 
parliamentary composition, the long succession of weak minority governments, the battle 
over EC policy between government and opposition in the Market Committee with its 
considerable political influence, the existence of strong popular anti-EC movements and, 
above all, the strong dislike of political integration among the general public.
4. Hie lin k  Between Theoiy and Empirical Research
To render the theoretical framework operational, a link had to be found between theory 
and the empirical findings of the study of Denmark's EC membership. The link was 
constructed by introducing the notion of an integration dilemma facing Denmark in the 
European integration process, to illustrate the Danish perception of being placed before 
two extremes: being abandoned by other EC member states, a course detrimental to 
Denmark's long term economic and political interests; or being entrapped in the process 
of ever deeper integration, a course which was seen as detrimental to Danish societal 
values and resisted by a majority of the political and administrative elites as well as the 
population. In this concept, which refers to the position of small states in the integration 
process, lies the notion that the member state in question deems itself unable to halt or 
change the direction of the integration process. There is also an underlying assumption 
that the state has problems in accepting the terms of the 'regime contract' and the 
objective of the 'Community regime'.
The concept of an integration dilemma has proved to fit with the position of 
Denmark in the European integration process, and has shown to be useful in establishing 
Danish reactions to the 'Community regime' when negotiating for EC membership and 
when steps were taken to deepen the level of integration. On each occasion, Denmark
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experienced an integration dilemma, in that Danish governments perceived the costs of 
remaining outside or having to withdraw from the 'Community regime' as higher than 
joining or remaining a part of it, while at the same time strong forces inside Denmark 
opposed joining or sanctioning deeper integration of the EC.
To analyse the nature of the integration dilemma and the successive Danish 
governments' attempts to find a way between the two extremes of being abandoned or 
entrapped, a typology of strategies has been introduced. The strategies serve both to 
analyse the nature of the conditions set up by Denmark to join the dynamic process within 
the 'Community regime1, in terms of aspects it could not accept at present or in the future 
(bastions), aspects for which it convinced other EC member states to grant Denmark a 
special solution (conditions), and aspects that Denmark had to accept to remain part of 
the process, but which often were presented as less significant in the domestic debate than 
their true impact probably was (concessions). The strategies prove to be useful in 
analysing the pressures on Danish governments and the balance they aimed at restoring 
between external and internal pressures. They also make it possible to identify those 
aspects of the 'Community regime' that Denmark resisted, often erected as bastions to 
signal to the EC and its member states, as well as to the domestic audience, the areas 
where Denmark would resist deeper integration.
HI. Analysis
The analysis aims at tying together the findings in the accounts of the three periods of 
study on Denmark, and its pattern of involvement in the Community, with the theoretical 
framework. The emphasis of the analysis is on the thesis's key proposition that during 
twenty years of EC membership Denmark has been a reluctant partner in the European 
integration process (p. 13), and the questions asked in the introductory chapter about 
Denmark on the one hand and the Community regime and the European integration 
process on the other.
1. Is the Danish Case Different?
When studying Denmark and its relation to the EC a number of striking and sometimes 
contradictory phenomena emerge. They seem to hold part of the explanation as to why
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Denmark has sometimes been regarded as a reluctant partner by other EC member states. 
Some of the most important are: Why has Denmark taken such a different attitude to 
European integration from Belgium and the Netherlands? Why has Denmark been 
regarded as a foot-dragging country with regard to deeper integration when it has always 
belonged to the best concerning the implementation of EC legislation? Why have 
federalist ideas found so little support in Denmark? And why is European integration 
perceived with a great amount of unease in Denmark?
These questions highlight the different attitude Denmark has taken towards 
European integration and its position in the European integration process. The accounts 
have focused on the empirical implications of these aspects which have influenced 
Denmark's involvement in the EC and on which some observations can be made.
1.1. A Different Attitude to European Integration
The case of Denmark and its EC membership is often compared to those of Belgium and 
the Netherlands. All three countries are small and dependent, from an economic and 
security point of view, on their big neighbours, especially Germany. All three experienced 
the effects of big-power politics in the nineteenth century and were affected by German 
aggression during the world wars. After the Second World War, however, they took a 
different view on the attempts to integrate western Europe in order to reduce the risk of 
future wars and to contain their large German neighbour. Belgium and the Netherlands 
became proponents of supranational integration in the shape of the ECSC and later the 
EEC and Euratom, while Denmark preferred a large European-wide free trade area with 
an intergovernmental character. Although Denmark was not hostile to the early attempts 
to set up sector-specific cooperation,409 it remained cool towards federalist inspired 
initiatives in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Denmark took a fundamentally different 
attitude to Belgium and the Netherlands concerning Germany, as its containment in a 
supranational framework was considered necessary by the latter two. To Denmark, 
participation in such a framework entailed the risk of being absorbed by its powerful 
neighbour. This, together with British opposition, tilted the decision against joining the
409Hans Branner, 'Danish European Policy since 1945: The Question of Sovereignty' 
in Kelstrup, (ed.), European Integration and Denmark's Participation, pp. 297-327.
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ECSC in 1952.410 An important point in this context is the fundamentally different attitude 
of the Belgian and Dutch resistance movement on the one hand and the Danish on the 
other. The Danish resistance movement was one of the founding forces behind the popular 
movements against the EC warning strongly against the effects of European integration 
on Danish society and adopting a strong nationalistic rhetoric in its defence of Denmark's 
independence. Meanwhile, the resistance movement on the continent took a totally 
opposite view, regarding deep integration as essential for peace and stability in Europe.
Basically different views of supranational cooperation and the effects of European 
integration on a small state have influenced Belgian, Dutch and Danish perceptions of the 
integration process.
1.2. Implementation o f Legislation versus Acceptance o f Integration 
Being willing to implement EC legislation, while at the same time showing reluctance 
towards accepting steps towards deeper integration, may at first seem contradictory. In the 
Danish case, however, it is not. There are three important reasons why Denmark is one 
of the member states which scores highest in implementing EC legislation into Danish 
law. First, for a small country, the reliance on a legal framework respected by all member 
states is of vital importance. In the accession debate in the early 1970s this aspect of the 
Community was deemed positive and beneficial to Denmark, especially as experiences 
in EFTA from 1965 (p. 66) underlined the power of a large country, the UK in this case, 
in intergovernmental cooperation. Second, there is a strong sense of following rules and 
implementing decisions in Danish civil service tradition. Danish society is characterized 
by the citizens' accepting and respecting the laws adopted by the authorities. The problem, 
however, for Danes has been accepting detailed EC regulations which are to them outside 
the perception of what is reasonable, but being law it is felt to be necessary to implement 
them as such. Some member states' tradition of regulating through law, but taking the 
implementation of legislation less seriously, is in contradiction with the Danish state 
culture of 'fair' laws which are implemented and complied with.411 Third, Danish
410Hans Branner, 'Pa vagt eller spring? Danmark og den Europaeisk integration 1948- 
53', in Niichel Thomsen, The Odd Man Out?, pp. 29-64.
411Tim Knudsen, 'Det gar nok - et essay om dansk statskultur og eurokratiet', Politica, 
Arhus, Vol. 25, No. 3. 1993, pp. 260-87.
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reluctance in the 1970s and 1980s towards reform of the EC Treaties was accompanied 
by statements that only if all member states followed the Treaties was there scope to 
implement a series of functional improvements to existing policies and cooperation.412 The 
insistence on maintaining the existing legal framework was both fundamental, in the sense 
that Denmark believed that the Treaties offered the possibility of extending and improving 
the functioning of the Community, and tactical in the sense that it was used as an 
argument against reforms of the existing Treaties or the drafting of new.
1.3. Federalism and Denmark
Early attempts to formulate a federal strategy to unite Europe passed nearly unnoticed in 
Denmark. Some Danish parliamentarians took part in the conference in The Hague in 
1948, but could not muster any significant interest for these plans in Denmark. Many of 
them later opposed economic integration in the form of the EC. For instance, Frode 
Jacobsen, who was one of the Danish delegates at The Hague conference, voted against 
Denmark's ratification of the act of accession in 1972. In Denmark, in contrast to several 
continental EC states, the resistance movement did not embrace federal ideals, but on the 
contrary was a founding member of the People's Movement against the EC in the early 
1960s. Likewise, in contrast to, for instance, Italy, the Danish radical left was totally 
opposed to political integration in western Europe.
Danish political scientists have, however, pointed out that Denmark, traditionally 
placed in the integration-sceptical group of states, together with the UK and other Nordic 
countries, was in the late 1950s and early 1960s ready to embrace some forms of sector- 
specific integration, but concerns about sovereignty and the influence of British criticism 
of supranational cooperation put a stop to any concrete steps towards joining the ECSC.413 
British reluctance to further steps towards European integration, however, continued to 
play an important role in Denmark, both at the elite level, where British opposition to 
institutional reforms was shared by Danish Euro-sceptics, and at the popular level, where
412See, for instance, Otto Moller's general reservation to the approach of the Dooge 
Committee.
413See, for instance, Hans Branner, 'Danish European policy since 1945: The Question 
of Sovereignty', in Kelstrup (ed ), European Integration and Denmark's Participation, pp. 
297-327.
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problems arising in the British debate over Europe were often referred to in the Danish 
media and used by the popular movements against the EC to underline their arguments. 
The reform of the Danish constitution in 1954, when Article 20 was inserted to pave the 
way for future transfer of sovereignty to international authorities, has been interpreted as 
a sign that Danish politicians at the time foresaw Denmark joining some form of binding
414cooperation.
Opposition to European integration was articulated at the time of the first 
membership application to the EC in 1961, and then increased during the accession 
negotiations to peak before the referendum in 1972. Some commentators have underlined 
the impact of the nature of the referendum campaign on the perception of European 
integration in Denmark.415 Because of internal division in some political parties, in 
particular the Social Democratic and Radical Liberal Parties, it was decided to hold a 
binding referendum. The campaign preceding the referendum allowed a polarization of 
arguments for and against membership of the EC, and the lines drawn between the 
opponents and proponents remained largely intact until the Danish Memorandum of 1990. 
The significance of the campaign was the proponents' insistence on the economic aspects 
of the EC, while playing down the significance of the political aspects and avoiding 
mention of the dynamic dimension of European integration. The opponents, however, 
accepted the validity of both federalist ideals and the dynamics of functional integration, 
not as positive elements, but as threats to national sovereignty and Danish society as a 
whole. The view of federalism as a concept without firm links to reality was underpinned 
by Danish EC policy as formulated after accession. The Social Democratic EC 
spokesman, Ivar Norgaard, often referred to airy-fairy federalists on the continent who 
drew up plans for a European Union that nobody wanted.
414Hans Branner, 'Danish European Policy since 1945: The Question of Sovereignty', 
in Kelstrup (ed ), European Integration and Denmark's Participation, p. 308.
415See, for instance, Mogens Rudiger, Danmark og EF 1967-1985, paper presented at 
the conference Dansk Udenrigspolitik i perioden 1967-1992, Copenhagen, 7-8 October
1993.
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2. Danish Society and the Community Regime
Denmark has often been classified as a pragmatic functionalist closely in line with British 
attitudes to the EC. It is questionable if this classification is appropriate, but both 
Denmark's population and its elite have undoubtedly, with few exceptions, not supported 
political integration or the objective of EU. The clearest signs of Danish reluctance 
towards European integration were the insistence on the 'veto right' and the refusal to 
reform the Treaties to transfer more power to the EC institutions, to codify the foreign 
political cooperation or to include security and military matters into the EC framework. 
The Folketing has been reluctant to enhance the position of the European Parliament and 
forge established links between the two. The objective of EU was avoided by most 
proponents of EC membership until the run-up to the IGCs in 1991 when political parties 
had to embrace this highly charged concept. Other symbols of an emerging state-like 
entity in Europe are still refuted in Denmark, such as Union citizenship, a common 
European defence, a common currency, a federal institutional structure and the 
'Communitization' of a number of primarily intergovernmental policies, such as foreign 
and security policy and justice and home affairs.
Although the economic benefits of EC membership have never been denied in 
Denmark, the impact of political integration on Danish society, its values and traditions 
has been resisted. A number of fundamental elements have contributed to this resistance 
towards European integration.
The relationship between the Community and Danish society has been described as 
problematic (Tim Knudsen, 1992, pp. 291-3)416 and a number of specific factors have been 
mentioned: (1) a fear that European integration will lead to the dissolution of the Danish 
welfare state; (2) a belief in the high ethical standards of the Danish civil service 
combined with a perception that other member states are less rigorous in complying with 
EC legislation; (3) an identity problem for Danish politicians and high civil servants who 
have to adapt their folklighed to the norms of behaviour of their European counterparts,
416The following account is based on Tim Knudsen, 'Det gar nok - et essay om dansk 
statskultur og eurokratiet', Politica, Arhus, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 269-87. Tim Knudsen, 'A 
Portrait of Danish State-culture: Why Denmark needs two National Anthems', in Kelstrup 
(ed.), European Integration and Denmark's Participation, pp. 262-96.
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while once back in Denmark they have to resume the Danish code of behaviour; (4) the 
folklige element which is linked to people's nearness to the centre of decision-making - 
a fundamental attitude based on the intellectual thinking of the Danish philosopher, N.F.S. 
Grundtvig, who praised the virtues of self-reliance, equality, consensus-based decision­
making and folklighed; (5) small-state thinking and a neutralist tendency which prevent 
Danes from trying to influence what is perceived as big-power politics; and (6) the long 
historical experience of one political centre and one culture, language and religion which 
makes a pluri-centred democracy more difficult to accept.
These factors made the opposition to EC membership advocate closer Nordic 
cooperation, as it was felt that the Nordic countries have similar social, cultural and 
political traditions. They have also prompted Danish politicians, in their efforts to make 
the 'Community regime' appear more acceptable to the Danish population, to stress the 
need for more transparency, openness and nearness (subsidiarity) to the Community's 
decision-making process. The Danish interpretation of subsidiarity is different from many 
other EC members' definition. The term 'nearness' better illustrates Danish thinking, as the 
Danes prefer that decisions are taken as close to the citizens as possible. This 
interpretation is close to the Danish understanding of local democracy, which is a distinct 
feature of Danish governance. All these factors have had an impact on Danish politicians 
trying to adapt Community symbols, including the language, to a low-key level more 
suitable to Danish thinking and traditions, which has been noticed little in Brussels 
probably due to the limited number of Danish-speaking foreigners.
As European integration and the emergence of EU have been regarded as a threat 
to traditional political and societal values, the Community regime has been perceived as 
incompatible with Danish society and the political system. As membership of the EC has 
been seen by the political and administrative elite as necessary for the Danish economy 
and hence the survival of the welfare state, European integration with the risk of being 
entrapped or abandoned has become a dilemma. Small-state thinking is linked to this 
concept, because if a state feels a threat to its established societal system by another 
system, it must be founded in the belief that the small state is not capable of changing the 
external regime, but only either adapting to it or withdrawing.
Signs that the Community regime was perceived as incompatible with Danish 
society first emerged on the centre and left of the political spectrum. The Social
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Democratic Party and the trade union movement were divided on the question of the 
necessity of Denmark being a member of the EC and held a deep reluctance towards 
European integration, mostly because of the perceived threat to the welfare state. The 
Radical Liberal Party was also divided on EC membership, mainly because of the strong 
tradition of neutrality and Nordic cooperation. The leadership of both these parties, 
however, advocated Danish membership of the EC in the referendum campaign of 1972.
The radical left and the People's Movement against the EC opposed EC 
membership because of the adverse effect on national sovereignty, Danish identity and 
society. The rhetoric among the opponents on the political left had strong national 
overtones, which emphasized directly or indirectly the superiority of the Danish regime 
as opposed to the one prevailing in the EC and its member states. To underline this point, 
these groups often pointed at Nordic cooperation as an alternative, because the Nordic 
countries were perceived as sharing many of Denmark's democratic, societal and cultural 
values.
Only two parties on the right of the Danish political spectrum have openly 
supported European integration: the Liberal Party and the Centre-Democratic Party. The 
Conservative Party, together with the Christian People's Party, has supported Danish 
membership of the EC, but not European integration per se. Notably, Poul Schliiter has 
declared at least twice that EU was dead. During the IGCs of 1991, some MPs of the 
Conservative Party showed increased uneasiness with the concept of EU and its effect on 
Danish sovereignty. Right-wing groups adopted arguments regarding national sovereignty 
and the safeguard of Danish interests, which had previously been more common to 
Conservative groups in, for instance, the UK or France.
Throughout Denmark's membership of the EC and before, the Danish population 
has shown little support for European integration. In fact, Denmark's membership of the 
EC from shortly after the referendum in 1972 until the mid-1980s (before the referendum 
on the SEA) was not supported by a majority of the population. European Parliament 
elections have been an occasion where the Danish population has shown its discontent 
with Denmark's EC membership by voting for the People's Movement against the EC, 
which has held as many seats in the European Parliament as the group obtaining a better 
result than the political parties. The political parties divided on this issue, the Social 
Democratic and Radical Liberal Parties, have suffered heavy losses compared to national
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elections, while the right-wing parties have largely held on to their positions. One effect 
of the People's Movement against the EC's strong position in the public debate has been 
to keep alive the question of whether Denmark should remain a member of the 
Community.
The perceived incompatibility between the Community regime and traditional values of 
Danish society has had an impact on Denmark's behaviour as a Community member and 
its adaptation to EC membership. The fact that Denmark has not felt a shared ownership 
of the principles and norms of the Community has meant that the 'Community regime' has 
been seen as a threat to the Danish regime. The following analysis of the three episodes 
in Denmark's EC membership will take account of Denmark's position and behaviour as 
an EC member and its efforts to reconcile developments of the European integration 
process with the perceived incompatibility of the Community regime and Danish society. 
The analysis will make it possible to establish Denmark's pattern of involvement in the 
EC.
3. European Integration - A Source of Conflict in Denmark
The episodes in Denmark's EC membership have shown that Denmark, despite adjusting 
without great problems to functional integration and benefiting from economic cooperation 
through its EC membership, did not accept the principles of political integration. It is of 
course possible to argue that the meaning of the goal of 'an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe' was unknown to all member states, but here Denmark's non-acceptance 
is understood as its initial refusal to support reform of the EC Treaties, either to 
strengthen and extend the competences of the EC institutions, the inclusion of policy-areas 
where loss of sovereignty was particularly feared or the adoption of state-like symbols, 
be they linguistic ('European Union'), of substance (e.g. a single currency), or symbolic 
(Union citizenship). Linked to this was the nature of the debate in Denmark concerning 
elements of federal or neo-functional integration, which were both used as arguments by 
the opponents, while the proponents, with few exceptions, avoided, played down or 
refuted their significance. It is possible to conclude that for a long time European 
integration was not an accepted element in the democratic process in Denmark, but an 
area of conflict which emerged in the case of external pressure for deeper integration, or
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which was avoided in the absence of external pressure.
The latent conflict over European integration which re-emerged when the 
Community prepared to take additional steps in this direction during the first half of the 
1980s, is directly linked to what was perceived in Denmark as an integration dilemma. 
The integration dilemma arose because of at least three factors: (1) there was not 
sufficient support in Denmark for European integration; (2) Danish governments (along 
with some other groups) perceived membership of the EC as a necessity to uphold the 
welfare state; and (3) the belief that Denmark as a small member state could not stop the 
process of deeper integration, because other states would forge ahead without it were 
Denmark to cast its veto. Although a big member state may perceive an integration 
dilemma, its position is different from a small state's, because the political significance 
of its veto, as well as the withdrawal of a big member state, is more likely to weaken the 
Community regime. It also has more to offer when seeking an acceptable compromise.
To succeed in balancing internal and external pressures successive Danish 
governments adopted a series of strategies whenever Denmark's position as an EC 
member (future or present) was at stake. Bastions were erected against different elements 
of European integration, whether they were actually part of the negotiations or not. 
Conditions were imposed on other member states to accept specific Danish objections or 
modify proposals to be acceptable at the Danish level. Finally, Denmark had to give 
concessions during the intergovernmental negotiations, whose significance was often 
played down on the domestic scene. The implementation of the strategies was made all 
the more difficult as EC policy increasingly became an area of intra-party conflict and the 
population increasingly expected to be given the right of final assent. The instability in 
the Danish political system with a long series of weak minority governments contributed 
to this. In this context, it is possible to interpret the Edinburgh Agreement as a large 
bastion erected by the whole Danish political establishment against further integration at 
the request of the Danish population.
3.1. The Terms o f the 'Community Contract'
The account of the three episodes in Denmark's EC membership shows that Denmark was 
repeatedly reluctant to adopt the political dimension of the acquis communautaire, and 
although some groups and politicians who were favourable towards a political European
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construction, the majority of the political elite, together with popular movements and the 
population as a whole, did not embrace this objective.
3.1.1. Principles
It was the principles of the Community regime which in particular caused problems for 
Denmark. Many of the bastions erected during the three episodes covered by this study 
were directed against perceived threats to Danish society, or were designed to put a stop 
to the integration process if needed. Behind the feeling that the Community regime 
presented a threat to Denmark lay a suspicion about the consequences of 'an ever closer 
union among the peoples of Europe1, a vision perceived as different or foreign to Danish 
society and its democratic, social and cultural values. Denmark had no problems in 
accepting a degree of functional integration in areas where the gains were concrete and 
easily detectible, but when integration deepened in functional economic areas, or moved 
into the political dimension, Denmark's reluctance became apparent. In fact, Denmark 
signalled early on that deepened political integration would not be supported and that it 
did not share the purpose of the Community regime nor the means of obtaining deeper 
political integration. The reluctance towards political integration was initially felt within 
parties and groups to the centre and left in the political spectrum, but later changed 
slightly in its nature. As the Community regime developed, so did the nature of 
Denmark's reluctance. Over time, however, many features of the nature of Danish 
reluctance remained, which implies that there are several similarities in the opposition 
against the Community regime from the early accession period to the Edinburgh 
Agreement. With the help of the findings in this study of Denmark's EC membership, it 
is possible to establish the nature and development of Danish opposition to the 
Community principles.
Denmark's reluctance to political integration first appeared in the shape of its 
initial market-political objective, a broad free trade area for all western European 
countries. After some contacts with the High Authority of the ECSC, Denmark decided 
to opt for the formation of cooperation within an intergovernmental framework in EFTA 
together with the UK, the Nordic countries and Austria. EFTA was clearly not an ideal 
trading framework for Denmark, but was preferred to the tighter cooperation for which 
the EC Six were aiming.
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Denmark's reluctance towards political integration was overcome when the UK 
decided to apply for EC membership in 1961. Denmark followed the UK in 1961, again 
in 1967 when both countries applied for the second time, and in 1970 when accession 
negotiations were opened. The motivation to become a member was clearly economic, 
partly because Denmark's main trading partners, the UK and Germany, were to belong to 
the same framework, partly because Danish farmers wanted to benefit from the 
preferential conditions under the CAP, while Denmark's industry grew more competitive 
during the 1960s and was increasingly able to sustain the competition within the EC. The 
means by which Denmark succeeded in balancing the economic advantages of belonging 
to the Community with the disadvantages perceived in political integration, was a set of 
conditions and a declared perception of future integration in the Community. The 
conditions were: accession together with the UK, the possibility of maintaining the 
provisions of the Nordic cooperation, and that other Nordic countries would forge free 
trade agreements with the EC. The perception of the prospects of future integration was 
built up around the notion that the enlarged EC would be different, as the new member 
states would contribute to a more open, socially more developed, and internationally more 
far-sighted Community. This image of the enlarged Community was tied to the 
proponents' insistence during the referendum campaign that EC membership was 
necessary economically and that its political consequences were insignificant.
The debate on creating a Nordic customs union, Nordek, in the end of the 1960s, 
is in some ways a mirror image of the debate on EC membership. Closer ties with the 
Nordic countries were not seen as threatening or detrimental to Danish political and social 
values and Nordic integration was generally supported by the Danish public. There was 
an underlying awareness among the civil servants in the Foreign Ministry that the 
differing economic interests of the Nordic countries might be an obstacle to concluding 
a customs treaty. The Nordic appeal was so strong among the Danish public, however, 
that the political and administrative elites found it necessary to attempt to negotiate with 
the other Nordic countries, if only to show the opponents to the EC and those who were 
hesitant, that a Nordic customs union was not a realistic alternative to EC membership.
The fact that the political dimension of the acquis communautaire did not pose any 
problems in the accession negotiations for the simple reason that it was not negotiated, 
did not refrain Danish politicians from 'warning' the EC of areas where further integration
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was unacceptable thus calming public fears by rejecting some aspects of future 
development of the Community principles. Most conspicuous were the Danish Social 
Democratic Market Minister's declaration on EMU, in which he insisted on Denmark's 
sovereignty over economic policy, and a Market Committee report417 which set further 
limits to future European integration, by insisting on the preservation of the existing 
institutional structure and, by insisting that common policies and foreign policy should 
remain an area of intergovernmental cooperation. The means to ensure a status quo-based 
development was the 'veto-right', a concept on whose importance all Danish politicians 
agreed. Domestically, the political and administrative adaptation was aimed at securing 
the Folketing's positions in the democratic process, and on separating EC matters from 
the political dimension of foreign policy-making by setting up a Department of Foreign 
Economic Affairs within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
The notion of a status quo-based EC policy was especially strong in the Social 
Democratic Party whose leading Spokesman on EC Affairs, Ivar Norgaard, felt bound by 
the 1972 pledge to the population to veto future attempts to deepen integration. The status 
quo-based EC policy was a clear sign that Denmark did not share the principle of a 
process of integration towards EU. The Social Democratic Party's position, as the largest 
and most influential party, was crucial from the accession until the first reform of the EC 
Treaties with the SEA. Being in power from 1971-73 and 1975-1982, the party introduced 
its policy on the EC which it was able to maintain as Denmark's official EC policy even 
after the right-wing government under Poul Schliiter came to power in 1982.
Denmark's reaction to the reform process, starting with the Solemn Declaration on 
EU in 1983 and the Dooge Committee in 1984-85, was therefore largely in line with the 
previous cautiously sceptical EC policy. The conditions erected by Denmark as regards 
participation in the intergovernmental negotiations were similar to the bastions erected 
against political integration at the time of accession: no substantial reform of the Treaties, 
no extension of the competences of the EC institutions and the preservation of the 'veto- 
right'. Denmark's categorical rejection of Treaty reform led to a political isolation in 
relation to the discussions taking place between other EC member states. The
A]1Markedsutvalget, 'Betaenkning', 25 August 1972, supplement to bill Nos. 157 and 
206, Folketingstidenden.
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government's negotiation position was made even more difficult by the integration-sceptic 
alternative majority which restrained the ministers' margin of manoeuvre by a hostile 
attitude in the Market Committee to the reform proposals emanating from Brussels. When 
the population was asked to pronounce itself on Denmark's position in the EC in 1986, 
it was again presented as economically necessary to endorse the SEA while its political 
significance was played down.
A gradual development in the attitude towards the Community principles occurred 
after the referendum on the SEA, resulting in the Danish Memorandum of 1990 which 
represented a new and positive negotiation platform for the IGCs agreed between the 
right-wing government and the moderate opposition. Despite the positive EC policy 
expressed in the Memorandum, many of the old reservations about European integration 
were still present and influenced the Danish negotiation objectives. The means of securing 
Danish interest in the EC, however, had changed, as it was recognized for the first time 
by a parliamentary majority that negotiating on a positive basis was the best way to meet 
Danish objectives. There was also a new recognition that some policy objectives, for 
instance in the social or environmental areas, could best be reached at a European level. 
The old status quo-based policy opposing any changes in the Community regime had 
given way to a more positive position based on the notion that deeper integration in some 
areas could benefit Danish interests. But there was still no overall endorsement of political 
integration. For instance, Prime Minister Schliiter insisted on the primacy of the 
intergovernmental aspects of the Maastricht Treaty which in his view had removed the 
drive towards a federal Europe and ensured the development of VEurope des patries. The 
popular rejection of the Maastricht Treaty, and the subsequent negotiation with the EC 
member states leading to the Edinburgh Agreement, forced Danish politicians to 
reconsider the basis for Denmark's participation in EU and single out areas where 
integration was not acceptable for a majority of the population. The Edinburgh Agreement 
opened a new chapter in Denmark's EC policy and Danish attitudes to Community 
principles. It was an attempt to make the EC/EU regime correspond better to Danish 
political and social values by interpreting some aspects of the Maastricht Treaty 'in a 
Danish way', for instance the concept subsidiarity versus nearness. The Agreement also 
advocated the introduction of values close to the Danish regime, such as more openness 
and transparency in the EU decision-making process.
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From this discussion it is possible to deduce that the nature of Denmark's 
reluctance towards EC principles was founded in the perception of a threat to Danish 
social, cultural and democratic values by the process of integration. The process towards 
'an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe' was perceived as a vision of a state­
like entity, where Danish society ran the risk of losing what was perceived as specific to 
it, and what was cherished by a majority of the population and the political and 
administrative elites. Denmark's reluctance to the EC principles went through a gradual 
development from a sceptical policy aimed at preserving the EC status quo to a 
recognition that some of Denmark's interests could best be achieved at the Community 
level and therefore a limited deepening of the integration process in certain areas was 
necessary to achieve these aims. The reluctance towards political integration, however, 
had not lost its intensity despite changing its character in this regard. The staunchest 
opposition came, as before, from political parties on the radical left, the traditional Social 
Democratic wing and trade unions mainly representing public sector workers, but also 
from the radical right and popular movements with both left and right political leanings.
Denmark's reluctance to share the Community principles has formed its 
participation in the European integration process and influenced the Danish political 
process. But has the Community regime been influenced by Denmark's reluctance to share 
the over-arching principles?
The theory of International Regimes tells us that if the principles are shared by all 
member states the regime functions coherently, but if they are not, the Community regime 
may weaken or divert from its original direction. It is difficult to prove that the Danish 
reluctance has had a significant impact on the coherence of the Community regime over 
the long term, although, depending on its development, the Edinburgh Agreement may 
well prove to have influenced the coherence of the Community regime. It is clear, 
however, that Danish reluctance towards deeper political integration has twice threatened 
to stop the integration process. The first was the parliamentary rejection of the SEA in 
1986 which, although it had at the time already been overridden by a pledge to respect 
the outcome of a referendum, showed a discord between the Danish political elite and the 
Community regime. The second was the Danish population's rejection of the Maastricht 
Treaty, which had a profound impact on the ratification process in other member states 
by focusing public discontent on the way in which the process of deeper integration had
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been negotiated.
On the other hand, it is also true that the size and influence of a member state is 
important if its reluctance about deeper integration is to have a profound impact on the 
integration process. Denmark has never felt able to use its much cherished 'veto-right' 
during the intergovernmental negotiations covered by this thesis as Danish politicians have 
assessed that the risk of being abandoned by other member states is greater than the 
chances that Denmark would be able to halt the integration process or significantly change 
its course.
Denmark's reluctance has introduced some changes to the acquis communautaire; 
be they of less significance, such as the ban on foreign ownership of secondary homes; 
important, such as the guarantee to uphold national standards in the area of health and 
safety of workers; of major importance, such as the Danish opt-outs in the Maastricht 
Treaty; or of fundamental importance, like the Edinburgh Agreement which has changed 
the political dimension of the acquis communautaire.
3.1.2. Norms
As discussed earlier (section 3), there is an inherent difficulty in identifying the norms and 
distinguishing them from the principles of the Community regime. It is possible, however, 
to deduce from the definitions of norms (chapter 2, section 4.2) that they concern the 
behaviour of member states in the Community regime and are closely connected to the 
principles as they are defined in terms of rights and obligations. Denmark's adherence to 
the norms of the Community regime will therefore be seen in the light of its reluctance 
to share the Community principles.
In refuting the principles, Denmark found itself breaking the norms of the 
Community regime: in refusing to support any move to further European integration, it 
did not assume the obligations of EC membership enshrined in the principles. This was 
the case with Ivar Norgaard's speech during the accession negotiations, at the Stuttgart 
European Council and in the Dooge Committee, where Danish ministers and officials 
declared it did not support the approach to improve the cooperation by reforming the EC 
Treaties, but wanted a pragmatic adjustment of the efficiency of the institutions and 
usefulness of the common policies within the existing Treaties. Denmark's reluctant 
participation in intergovernmental negotiations from 1984-85 was apparent from the
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internal political dispute played out in the Market Committee. The right-wing 
government's inability to take the lead in EC policy, and the discord between the views 
of the Foreign Minister and the alternative majority in parliament, was noticed by 
Denmark's EC partners. Although the reasons behind the moderate opposition's reluctance 
to support EC reforms were not fully understood by other EC member states, Denmark's 
prestige was probably weakened by the open denunciation of European integration by 
some Danish actors, and the government's inability to negotiate positively and later to 
deliver parliament's ratification.
In the IGCs of 1991, a parliamentary majority enabled Denmark to negotiate on 
a positive platform, which changed the character of the cooperation between the 
government and the Market Committee, which no longer represented opposition to EC 
reforms, but which had become a reliable negotiation partner and support to the Danish 
government. By having earned the reputation of negotiating positively, i.e. accepting the 
principle of European integration to obtain national interests and thereby no longer 
breaking the norms, Denmark obtained several concessions from its EC partners on vital 
issues. The concessions were deemed so important in Denmark that the political elite was 
convinced the population would accept the new Treaty although it contained measures to 
deepen political integration which were accompanied by some important political symbols.
The popular rejection of the Maastricht Treaty cannot be interpreted as the breach 
of a norm, but in the subsequent negotiations with the EC member states, Denmark had 
to clarify which parts of the Community were unacceptable to a majority of the 
population. The Edinburgh Agreement, which identifies the areas of EU where Denmark 
does not participate, is an agreement on Denmark's partial membership of EU. In this 
context, Denmark's prestige as a Union member has been weakened, as it no longer 
assumes in full the rights and obligations of EU membership.
3.1.3. Rules and Decision-Making Procedures
In regard to the functional cooperation within common policy areas or other areas of 
cooperation within the existing Treaties, Denmark in general kept to the rules and 
decision-making procedures regulating them. This is partly a result of Danish political and 
administrative culture where rules are followed and decisions implemented, partly part of 
a strategy to show other more 'reform-willing' member states what could be achieved
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within the existing treaty framework if only all parties complied. In this context the 
change in the political support for EC development which emerged in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, heralded a important shift in the political elite's acceptance of the EC as a 
dynamic community. It is clear that important parts of the political elite did not support 
the aspect of a federal or state-like development of the EC, but a majority did accept the 
EC as the framework within which many of Europe's economic and political problems 
could be solved. As a majority had accepted the necessity to deal with common problems 
within a strong and coherent common framework, it became easier to identify Denmark's 
positions in view of a major overhaul of the Community and to take a positive and 
progressive attitude to these changes. As a result, Denmark demanded changes to the 
decision-making procedures to obtain EC legislation in a whole range of areas, in 
particular in social and environmental policy. Denmark also demanded the inclusion of 
new areas of cooperation in which the EC institutions should have exclusive competence 
or in which competence should be shared between the member states and EC institutions. 
As a consequence, Denmark let go of its insistence of the 'veto-right' in areas covered by 
common policies, and advocated that decisions should be adopted by qualified majority 
voting.
At the time of the negotiation of the SEA, Denmark had obtained a concession 
from established EC rules in the area of health and safety of workers, as it was recognized 
that more stringent national standards could be applied as long as they did not constitute 
a barrier to trade. The right to uphold national deviances in the internal market was 
further developed by the introduction of subsidiarity as a guiding principle for the level 
of competence for issuing Community-wide rules, a development which Denmark 
supported.
3.2. Denmark's Partial Membership o f EU
When seeking a solution to the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty, the difficulty for 
Danish politicians lay in identifying a formula which at the same time respected the 
population's verdict, did not necessitate a renegotiation of the Treaty (which other member 
states did not accept) and would not lead to Denmark's withdrawal from the EC. The 
option of holding on to its veto over the ratification process and let other member states 
find a way forward was not considered by the pro-European parties in parliament, as it
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was believed that this would lead to complete Danish isolation and in the end force 
Denmark to withdraw from the EC.
The initiative to negotiate a platform for Denmark was taken by the Socialist 
People's Party which, because of its opposition to the Maastricht Treaty and European 
integration in general, had gained credibility in public opinion. It invited two other parties, 
the Social Democrats and the Radical Liberals whose voters to a great extent had voted 
against the leaderships' recommendation to endorse the Treaty, to take part in the 
negotiation, while the government parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals whose 
voters had largely followed the parties' recommendations, were excluded. The outcome 
of the negotiations, the National Compromise, was presented to the government, which, 
after minor changes, presented it to the EC member states as Denmark's negotiation 
platform, 'Denmark in Europe'. The document was based on the notion that Denmark 
would ratify the Maastricht Treaty and become member of EU, but on certain conditions 
which respected the result of the referendum. An agreement should be without time limit 
and endowed with legal validity.
After negotiations and consultations with the EC member states with the assistance 
of the British Presidency and the Council's Secretariat, the European Council in Edinburgh 
reached the Edinburgh Agreement on terms which were very close to the conditions as 
stated in 'Denmark in Europe'.
The Edinburgh Agreement is not only an agreement on a differentiated 
membership of EU granted to Denmark, it is also a negotiation, for the first time, of the 
political dimension of acquis communautaire, which Denmark subscribed to without fully 
accepting at the time of accession to the EC. The terms of the Edinburgh Agreement both 
stipulate the parts of the acquis communautaire in which Denmark does not participate, 
and regulate Denmark's perception of its position in the Community regime by setting out 
some propositions about the nature of EU in which Denmark is ready to take part.
The Edinburgh Agreement is a complex legal instrument which under international 
law, in agreement of all twelve EC member states, allows a differentiated Danish 
membership of EU. Although the agreement was explicitly to be applicable exclusively 
to Denmark, it is part of the political dimension of the acquis communautaire and has 
introduced a new element in the Community regime. In exchange for the differentiated 
membership, Denmark has pledged not to stop other member states developing closer
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cooperation or action, and has declared that the decision and declarations of the Edinburgh 
Agreement were compatible with the Maastricht Treaty and did not call its objectives into 
question.
The four areas - Union citizenship, EMU, defence policy and justice and home 
affairs - in which Denmark does not participate or participates under certain conditions, 
were regulated through the twelve EC member states' decision and the explanatory 
unilateral declarations of Denmark. As a result, Denmark has adopted all the provisions 
relating to Union citizenship, while noting that this citizenship is fundamentally different 
from Danish citizenship and that Denmark will not participate in Union citizenship on the 
same basis as citizenship of a nation-state. Denmark will not participate in Union 
decisions which have defence obligations, or which are related to the third stage of EMU, 
but will participate in justice and home affairs, but only on an intergovernmental basis.
The symbolic value of regulating its participation in EU may have been great for 
Denmark, but it is in the light of the domestic reluctance towards European integration 
that the differentiated membership has to be seen, as Denmark pledged to respect the 
practical provisions of Union citizenship and the area of justice and home affairs as long 
as it remains intergovernmental. Regarding non-participation in the third stage of EMU, 
which safeguards the formal sovereignty of Danish economic policy-making, the effect 
on Denmark's real sovereignty must be seen in the light of its long-standing participation 
in the D-Mark zone. A similar consideration may be raised regarding the common defence 
policy and membership of the WEU, which Denmark has renounced although remaining 
a member of NATO.
The Edinburgh Agreement is accompanied by a series of clarifications of 
provisions which have a bearing on the Danish perception (and other member states' 
perceptions) of EU. The first is a declaration which serves to reassure two traditional 
Danish fears often present in the debate on the EC: that the Maastricht Treaty does not 
prevent any member state from maintaining or introducing more stringent protection 
measures in labour policy, social policy, consumer protection or protection of the 
environment; and that each member state is permitted to pursue its own policy regarding 
the distribution of income and to maintain or improve social welfare benefits.
The second is a series of declarations and reports added to the Presidency 
conclusions of the Lisbon, Birmingham and Edinburgh European Councils clarifying the
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principle of sovereignty, pledging greater transparency and nearness to the citizens, 
combatting unemployment through an economic growth initiative and opening accession 
negotiations with the applicant EFTA states.
Finally, the act of ratification, which includes the Edinburgh Agreement in the act 
of accession, clarifies (in the comments to the bill) that if Denmark were to accede any 
part of the four exempted areas and commitments flowing from them (e.g. membership 
of WEU), such an action would have to be endorsed by a five-sixths' majority in the 
Folketing or a referendum.
On Danish insistence (in 'Denmark in Europe'), an agreement between the twelve EC 
member states should specify that the basis for cooperation is that the member states, in 
their capacity as independent states, have freely decided to exercise some competences 
together. The phrase was reiterated almost literally in the Edinburgh Agreement, while the 
member states also recognized the special problems relating to Denmark raised in the 
document 'Denmark in Europe'. The ratification act repeated the importance of the 
intergovernmental character of EU and stressed that 'Denmark in Europe' constituted the 
basis for a new long-term Danish EC policy. Denmark had thereby specified the basis for 
its participation in the Community regime, which was subsequently accepted by other 
member states through the Edinburgh Agreement. It is possible that Denmark's reluctance 
about European integration has come full circle with the Edinburgh Agreement, but 
Denmark might also feel the disadvantages of its partial membership to be greater than 
the advantages. Danish pro-European politicians have noted with regret the adoption of 
the Edinburgh Agreement, and hope that the accession of other Nordic countries to EU 
might reduce the popular scepticism towards European integration, thereby enabling 
Denmark to renounce the Edinburgh Agreement and assume in full the rights and 
obligations of EU membership.
IV. Final Assessment
1. Findings, Implications and Possible Further Research
As stated earlier, the conclusion that Denmark's integration dilemma is founded in its deep 
reluctance towards European integration is not a judgement of whether Danish difficulties
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in accepting the principle of political integration is a good or a bad thing, but assists in 
explaining its behaviour as a member of the EC. The findings should be assessed as to 
their usefulness in understanding the underlying conditions for an individual member state 
in the integration process. From such an understanding, knowledge about the process itself 
can be gained. The findings are intended to cover the middle ground between domestic 
and external politics, which is crucial to the understanding of challenges facing member 
states in EU taking part in the process of integration. The case of Denmark, not widely 
known outside its borders, can bring new understanding of the difficulties facing a 
member state when bringing integration into its domestic political process without a priori 
strong public support for this aim.
This research into Denmark and its pattern of involvement in the EC shows that:
• A country negotiating for EC membership which accepts in theory the whole 
acquis communautaire and its future implication may not have fully accepted the 
principles of European integration.
Membership of the EC and participation in the European integration process are 
subject to the acceptance of principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures which spell out the terms of the Community regime.
• European integration may be difficult to integrate in the domestic democratic 
system of an individual member state.
• The non-acceptance, or difficulties in accepting the implication of European
integration by an individual member state, ultimately marks the limits of extending
integration as it has an impact on the coherence between principles, norms, rules
and decision-making procedures.
The implications of these findings are that:
• European integration is conditioned by the acceptance of the principle of
integration by the member states with the principle of integration being linked to 
the acceptance of norms, rules and decision-making procedures.
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• The total acceptance of the acquis communautaire demanded from the applicant 
countries is possible to obtain in areas of the Community regime which are 
tangible and concrete and which are often explicitly laid down in the EC Treaties 
and secondary legislation, but difficult to obtain with regard to the principles and 
norms of participation in the integration process.
• An individual member state may experience an integration dilemma which 
influences its behaviour in the integration process. The perception of an integration 
dilemma is related to the member state's political and economic influence, popular 
support for EC membership and the domestic political environment.
• The non-acceptance of the principle of integration is bound to surface when the 
Community heads towards deeper integration. The deeper the integration, the more 
demanding the obligations that face the individual member state, but also the more 
the Community regime is dependent on acceptance from its members. When the 
acceptance is domestically impossible, as in the case of Denmark in 1992, the 
Community regime is under threat. The political and economic influence of an 
individual member is probably important in deciding the response from other 
member states, whether they forge ahead or halt the process, or if they grant the 
faulting member state a special status. In the first case, a big member state's non- 
acceptance to further integration would probably be more likely to halt the 
process, while in the latter event, a small member state would probably be more 
likely to be granted a special status, as the partial membership of such a member 
would be considered less threatening to the Community regime.
The approach of this thesis has opened areas of research which could be more fully
explored. There are a number of questions, theoretical and empirical, which deserve
further research. Some suggestions are:
• The importance of the acquis communautaire in the European integration process 
should be more fully investigated. The notion of a 'Community regime' and a 
'regime contract' may be useful in researching the rights and obligations of EC/EU 
membership.
• The notion of violation or non-acceptance of principles and norms of European
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integration could be deepened as well as extended to other cases.
• The notion of an integration dilemma is a useful concept when investigating the 
position of an individual member state in the integration process. Further research 
could aim at establishing the factors which condition the introduction of European 
integration as a principle of the domestic democratic process.
More empirical research could be carried out to investigate how other member 
states have, or have not, accepted the principle of integration, and the effect on 
both their behaviour as EC members and domestic policy-making. The relative 
position of member states and the factors influencing their prestige and importance 
in the Community could be profitably explored and would probably lead to deeper 
knowledge about the 'Community regime'. In the case of applicant or aspiring 
countries to EU membership, analyses on whether they would be willing or able 
to assume the full extent of rights and obligations of EU membership would be 
necessary, both with regard to the increasing intensity of integration and these 
countries' influence on the development of the 'Community regime'. The notion of 
an integration dilemma could be applied to would-be members to EU, as almost 
all of them are small or medium-sized countries, some with strong democratic 
traditions, others with weak, but which are all likely to encounter some difficulties 
in assuming or accepting the rights and obligations of EU membership, which after 
all, represent a much higher degree of integration than at the time of the first 
enlargement.
2. Main Conclusions
This thesis's contribution to the study of European integration is to highlight the rights and 
obligations of the 'Community regime' and the conditions under which an individual 
member state participates in the process of integration. To conclude, we will again look 
at Denmark's pattern of involvement in the EC.
It is possible to answer affirmatively to the questions asked in the introductory 
chapter (p. 13) by concluding that Denmark has been a reluctant partner in the European 
integration process mainly because of its difficulties in embracing the principles of the 
Community regime. The reluctance towards the Community principles have conditioned 
Denmark's pattern of involvement in the EC, in particular during intergovernmental
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negotiations to deepen the level of integration. However, Denmark has been a diligent 
member concerning the implementation of Community rules and in accepting the 
Community's decision-making procedures.
The reluctance towards political integration has been an area of conflict in Danish 
politics, as for a long time it was not accepted as part of the democratic process. 
Throughout Denmark's EC membership and before, however, Danish governments have 
striven to obtain or maintain the country's participation in the integration process, and 
have never hesitated to underline the economic costs involved in withdrawal from the 
Community. In view of the internal political dispute over political integration, consecutive 
governments have tried to balance internal pressures for a status quo-based EC policy, 
while the external pressure for deeper integration has increased. Towards the end of the 
1980s and during the early 1990s, the internal dispute changed character, as it was 
possible to obtain a parliamentary majority in favour of a positive Danish EC policy.
Finally, it is possible to argue that Danish reluctance towards European integration 
changed the nature of Denmark's participation in the integration process, as the agreement 
negotiated between the EC member states and Denmark in Edinburgh in December 1992, 
regulates the areas of EU in which Denmark does not participate and constitutes de facto 
a partial Danish membership of the process of European integration.
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Eigure 1
Denmark's EC Decision Making Structure
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Product Group Composition of Danish Export
1950 to 1970
% of total exports
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Source (Fig 2 and 3 ): Peter Hansen, The Formulation of Danish European Policy', 
Institute of Political ,Science, Aarhus University, Aarhus, 1973, p.23bis
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Source (Fig 4 ): Peter Hansen, T he Formulation of Danish European Policy’, 
Institute of Political Science, Aarhus University, Aarhus, 1973, p.23ter
Opinion Polls (I)
1961 to 1972
Are you for or against that Denmark joins 
share of responses ( %  ) the European Common Market in the case
that the UK does ?
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Source (Fig. 5 ): Peter Hansen, The Formulation of Danish European Policy’, 
Institute of Political Science, Aarhus University, Aarhus, 1973, p.24bis
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Figure 6
Opinion Poll (II)
If you were to vote today whether Denmark should join the European Common 
share of responses (% )  Market, would you vote for or against Danish accession ?
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Source (Fig 6 ): The Gallup Instituet and Berlingske Tidende, 13 January 1986
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Opinion Poll (III)
To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following five statements 
about the Common market ? (Answers in per cent)
agree disagree either or do not know
1972
The EC should gradually develop into the United
States of Europe. 199Q
1991
26 40 16 18 
22 56 7 15
19 57 11 13 
22 53 13 12
20 59 14 7
1972
The EC should become one nation with a coordinated
foreign policy. 199Q
1991
15 51 16 18
16 63 7 14 
13 64 10 13 
27 46 16 11 
31 49 14 6
1972
The EC should become a great power with a decisive j9gg 
influence over world politics
1991
15 50 14 21 
17 59 9 15 
22 51 14 13
24 49 17 10
25 52 17 6
1972
1976
The EC should have a common currency 1988
1990
1991
36 29 14 21 
36 43 7 14 
25 52 10 13 
34 46 14 6 
32 53 11 4
1972
1976
The EC should only be a free trade cooperation 1988
1990
1991
62 15 9 14 
66 19 5 10 
65 18 7 10 
62 20 11 7 
61 23 12 4
Source (Tab.l): Data from 1972 to 1988 from Observa and Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten, 8 January 1989. 
Data from 1990 and 1991 from SONAR and Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten, 26 May 1991
Other
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Danish Governments from 1960 to 1993
1. The general election of 15 November 1960. Viggo Kampmann (SD) forms government 
with the Social Democrats and the Radical Liberals.
Distribution of seats in the Folketing
SD 77
L 39
Cons 32
RL 11
SPP 11
Independence Party 6
Slesvig Party 1
Greenland418 2
179
2. Prime Minister Kampmann retires because of ill health and is succeeded by Jens Otto 
Krag (SD). The government (Krag I) comes to power on 3 November 1962 (SD+RL).
3. The general election of 22 November 1964. The Social Democrats form government 
alone (Krag II). J.O. Krag stays as Prime Minister.
Distribution of seats in the Folketing
SD 77
L 36
Cons 36
RL 10
SPP 10
Independence Party 5
Liberal Centre Party 2
Greenland 2
Faeroe Islands 1
179
418Greenland and the Faeroe Islands elect each two representatives to the Folketing. 
From time to time these representatives have chosen to join the parliamentary group of 
a political party (most often the Social Democratic Party). In that case they are not listed 
as representing their island communities.
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4. The general election of 22 November 1966. After negotiations between SD and other 
parties, the Krag II government continues. SPP supports the government on some issues, 
but is not accepted as coalition partner. Krag dismisses some ministers, for instance Per 
Haekkerup, and is appointed Foreign Minister as well as Prime Minister.
Distribution of seats in the Folketing
SD 70
L 35
Cons 34
SPP 20
RL 13
Liberal Centre Party 4
Greenland 2
Faeroe Islands 1
179
5. The general election of 23 January 1968. Hilmar Baunsgaard (RL) forms government 
with the Radical Liberals, Liberals and the Conservatives.
Distribution of seats in the Folketing
SD 63
Cons 37
L 34
RL 27
SPP 11
Left Socialist Party 4
Greenland 2
Faeroe Islands 1
179
6. The general of 21 September 1971. The Social Democrats turns down a proposal from 
the right-wing parties to form an 'EC-govemment' (to obtain a parliamentary majority for 
accession to the EC). The Social Democrats form a minority government under J.O. Krag 
(Krag III).
288
Distribution o f seats in the Folketing
SD 71
Cons 31
L 30
RL 27
SPP 17
Greenland 2
Faeroe Islands 1
179
7. On 3 October 1972, the day after the referendum on Denmark's accession the EC, J.O. 
Krag announces his decision to resign as Prime Minister. Anker Jorgensen is chosen to 
become Prime Minister in his place.
8. The general election of 4 December 1973 (the earth quake election). Poul Hartling is 
designated to form a minority Liberal government.
Distribution of seats in the Folketing
SD 47
Progress Party 27
L 22
RL 20
Cons 16
Centre Democratic Party 14
SPP 11
Christian People's Party 7
Communist Party 6
Justice League 5
Independence Party 1
Greenland 2
Faeroe Islands 1
179
9. The general election of 9 January 1975. The right-wing parties fail to form government 
after refusing the Progress Party's conditions for its support. Anker Jorgensen (SD) forms 
a minority government (Jorgensen II) after other parties have promised not to table a 
motion of no confidence against him.
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Distribution o f seats in the Folketing
SD 54
L 42
Progress Party 24
RL 12
Cons 10
SPP 10
Christian PP 9
Communist Party 7
Centre Democratic Party 4
Left Socialists 4
Greenland 2
Faeroe Islands 1
179
10. The general election of 15 February 1977. The election is triggered by a the 
government's defeat over the budget bill. Anker Jorgensen calls a general election whose 
result enables him to continue with the same cabinet.
Distribution of seats in the Folketing
SD 66
Progress Party 26
L 22
Cons 15
Centre Democratic Party 11
SPP 8
Communist Party 7
RL 6
Christian PP 6
Justice League 6
Left Socialists 5
Greenland 1
179
11. Change of government on 30 August 1978 without general election. Anker Jorgensen 
forms a minority government with the Liberal Party (Jorgensen III).
290
12. The general election of 23 October 1979 is triggered by the two government parties' 
disagreement over economic policy. Anker Jorgensen forms a minority government 
(Jorgensen IV)
Distribution of seats in the Folketing
SD 69
L 23
Cons 22
Progress Party 19
RL 10
SPP 11
Centre Democratic Party 6
Left Socialists 6
Christian PP 5
Justice League 5
Greenland 2
Other 1
179
13. The general election of 8 December 1981 is triggered by the government's defeat in 
parliament by a resolution proposed by the Radical Liberals. Anker Jorgensen forms a 
minority government (Jorgensen V).
Distribution of seats in the Folketing
SD 60
Cons 26
L 21
SPP 21
Progress Party 15
Centre Democratic Party 15
RL 9
Left Socialists 5
Christian PP 4
Greenland 2
Other 1
179
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14. The government Jorgensen V resigns. Poul Schluter (Cons) forms on 10 September 
1982 a four-party (Cons+L+CD+Christian PP) minority government (Schluter I) without 
a general election.
15. The general election of 10 January 1984 is triggered by the government's defeat in 
parliament over the budget bill. The right-wing four-party minority government continues 
unchanged after the election.
Distribution of seats in the Folketing
SD 57
Cons 42
L 23
SPP 21
RL 10
Centre Democratic Party 8
Progress Party 5
Christian PP 5
Left Socialists 5
Free Democrats 1
Greenland 1
Faeroe Islands 1
179
16. The general election of 8 September 1987. Poul Schluter forms government (Schluter 
II) with the same four parties.
Distribution of seats in the Folketing
SD 56
Cons 38
SPP 27
L 19
RL 11
Progress Party 9
Centre Democratic Party 9
Christian PP 4
Faelles Kurs 4
Greenland 1
Faeroe Islands 1
179
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17. The general election of 10 May 1988 is called after that the government refuses to 
accept a resolution regarding NATO battle ships. Poul Schluter (Schluter III) forms a 
minority government with the Cons+L+RL.
Distribution of seats in the Folketing
SD 56
Cons 35
SPP 24
L 23
Progress Party 16
RL 10
Centre Democratic party 9
Christian PP 4
Greenland 1
Faeroe Islands 1
179
18. The general election of 12 December 1990. Poul Schluter (Schluter IV) forms a 
minority government with the Liberals and Conservatives.
Distribution of seats in the Folketing
SD 71
L 30
Cons 30
SPP 15
Progress Party 12
Centre Democratic Party 9
RL 7
Christian PP 4
Faeroe Islands 1
179
19. On 15 January 1993, Poul Schluter resigns over the Tamil scandal. On 25 January 
1993, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen (SD) forms a majority government with the 
SD+RL+CD+Christian PP.
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